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Transhumanism is concerned with developing human life beyond its current 
form and limitations using biomedical technologies. The purpose of this project 
is to make a theological and ethical assessment of proposed transhumanist 
enhancement technologies, in the light of developments in chemical 
therapeutics that have already taken place, during the so-called “therapeutic 
revolution” years of the twentieth century (1950-1990). The key research 
question that will be addressed is: what can be learned from theological and 
ethical engagement with past therapeutic developments, and how does this 
learning inform an evaluation of proposed future transhumanist biomedical 
technologies within Christian theological ethics? 
In this project, a case study methodology is used to examine two areas of past 
therapeutic development, the contraceptive pill and selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants. The historical context and theological 
implications of these therapeutic developments are explored, and they are 
assessed against standard criteria for transhumanist developments. The 
findings from the case studies are then applied to proposed future 
transhumanist technologies, to determine how past experiences of therapeutic 
developments might inform ethical evaluation of future proposals in 
transhumanist technologies, and how issues with previous therapeutic 
developments might be reconsidered in the light of this evaluation. 
The thesis will be structured as follows: a) introduction and development of the 
research question, discussion of the methodology used and the assumptions 
made, b) description of transhumanist objectives and technologies and a 
theological and ethical critique of these, in order to develop theologically-
informed criteria of what constitutes a transhumanist technology, c) presentation 
of two case studies of previous therapeutic developments (the contraceptive pill 
and SSRI anti-depressants) and evaluation of these cases against the criteria 
for transhumanist technologies, d) discussion of these findings, and their 
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Chapter 1 - Biomedical Science – Past & Future 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The practice of medicine has always been of fundamental importance in the 
relief of human suffering, the promotion of wellbeing for all people and the 
provision of humanitarian aid in areas of endemic illness and natural disaster. 
Modern science and technology has led to the development of increasingly 
specific and sophisticated interventions and techniques in medicine, with the 
potential to have a profound impact on human health outcomes. This has been 
seen clearly in the field of pharmacology and chemical therapeutics where, 
since the mid-twentieth century, there has been a so-called “therapeutic 
revolution”, an exponential increase in the number of drug molecules available 
to health services for the treatment of diseases.1 The availability of a wider 
range of drugs, with increasingly specific modes of action has, in turn, enabled 
more sophisticated medical treatment in different clinical specialties.  
In recent years, the concept of transhumanism has developed. In brief, 
transhumanism may be described as the use of biomedical technologies not 
just to heal disease, but to enhance human life and experience beyond current 
expected human function. Forms of enhancement are already available, and 
have been for some time – for example, the use of caffeinated drinks to improve 
mental alertness. However, the radical nature of proposed future transhumanist 
biomedical technologies means they have the potential to provide significant 
enhancements to human function, longevity and cognitive abilities that were not 
previously available, and these may have profound effects on the shape of 
human life. I shall explore definitions of transhumanism in more detail in the 
next chapter, but note for now that Nicholas Bostrom, a prominent 
transhumanist, has defined transhumanism as “an interdisciplinary approach to 
understanding and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human 
condition that are emerging through advancing technology.”2 Many of the 
 
1 Richard Weinshilboum, “The Therapeutic Revolution”, Clinical Pharmacology 
and Therapeutics, 42 (1987), pp. 481-484. 
2 Nicholas Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values”, Journal of Philosophical 
Research, 30 (2005), p. 3.  
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technologies proposed by transhumanists are either not yet scientifically 
feasible, or not scalable for widespread routine use, but would have a significant 
impact on human life if they were.  
The purpose of this thesis is to assess proposed transhumanist enhancement 
technologies from the standpoint of Christian theological ethics, taking into 
account the developments in chemical therapeutics that have already taken 
place, during the so-called “therapeutic revolution” years of the twentieth  
century, which I shall define as 1950-1990. The objective of the thesis is to 
determine what can be learned from theological ethical engagement with past 
therapeutic developments, and how this learning informs an ethical evaluation 
of proposed future transhumanist biomedical technologies.  
The specific research questions that will be addressed in this thesis are: 
1) What are the various issues of theological ethics presented by 
transhumanist developments? 
2) To what extent were past therapeutic developments transhumanist 
technologies in their time, in the same way as proposed future 
technologies? 
3) What were the ethical concerns with past therapeutic developments? 
Have these ethical concerns been warranted in the light of subsequent 
experience? 
4) How do issues identified with previous therapeutic developments inform 
the evaluation of future biomedical technologies? On the one hand, there 
may be some new and unexpected issues with transhumanist biomedical 
developments; on the other, ethical concerns identified in relation to past 
therapeutic developments may have proved unfounded or be less 
relevant when considering future biomedical technologies. 
The thesis will address these questions by reviewing the transhumanism 
movement (accounting for its diversity and variation) and the theological and 
ethical criticisms of transhumanism. The thesis will then propose detailed 
criteria with which to evaluate biomedical technologies – both general criteria for 
what constitutes a transhumanist technology, and theological ethical criteria for 
evaluating these technologies from a Christian ethical standpoint. The criteria 
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will be then applied to two cases of past pharmaceutical development – the oral 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants – to determine whether these past 
developments could be regarded as having been transhumanist in their time, 
what ethical issues were debated at the time of their introduction, and how 
consideration of those issues has shifted during their use. The ethical issues 
associated with transhumanist technologies will then be reassessed in the light 
of the findings from the case studies, which will in turn be used to further refine 
the criteria for a transhumanist technology. The implications for medical ethics 
and Christian pastoral care will then be discussed. The detailed structure of the 
thesis is described in the next section.  
1.2. Thesis Outline & Structure 
The thesis is structured in six chapters, which will describe the scientific and 
historical background to both transhumanism and the twentieth century 
“therapeutic revolution”, discuss the transhumanism movement and theological 
issues arising from it, present two case studies from  twentieth century chemical 
therapeutics, and then apply the ethical findings from these case studies to the 
consideration of proposed future transhumanist technologies.  
This chapter, Chapter 1, will introduce the background of the project, and will 
describe the development of modern pharmacology, during the years of the so-
called “therapeutic revolution”. It will discuss the impact of the therapeutic 
revolution on human life and society, in terms of medical and healthcare 
benefits. The chapter will also describe the historical context of the ethical 
questions being discussed, by reviewing the history of medical ethics. In the 
latter part of the chapter, the scope, assumptions and limitations of the study 
will be described, and the methodology will be discussed in detail – including 
the use of case studies, the rationale for the cases chosen, and the use and 
importance of criteria. The wider implications of the research for medical ethics 
and pastoral care will be briefly discussed. 
Chapter 2 will explore in detail the objectives, history and claims of the 
transhumanist movement. It will examine and critique the various philosophical 
influences on transhumanism and the approaches taken by different 
protagonists of transhumanism. This will enable a taxonomy of the 
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transhumanist movement to be developed, so that its diversity can be 
understood, and common features explored. The chapter will describe three 
basic classifications of transhumanist scholarship: a) philosophical 
transhumanists, such as Max More and Nick Bostrom, who see transhumanism 
as a life philosophy; b) technological transhumanists, such as Ray Kurzweil and 
Hans Moravec, who see transhumanism from the perspective of the effects of 
technology (computing, artificial intelligence or cybernetics) on human life, and 
the benefits that it can bring; and c) ideological transhumanists, such as 
Katherine Hayles and Donna Haraway, who explore the effects of biomedical 
technology on human society, but in a way that is neutral to technology per se, 
and which primarily sees these technologies as tools for exploring cultural and 
ideological issues. The chapter will then describe briefly the main transhumanist 
technologies that have been proposed and describe major theological and 
ethical critiques of these technologies. 
The chapter will then specify two sets of criteria – a) general criteria by which a 
biomedical technology might be classified as a transhumanist technology, 
derived from the transhumanism literature, and b) specific criteria by which 
Christian ethicists might evaluate a transhumanist technology as permissible or 
desirable. These specific criteria are derived from the work of Neil Messer and 
Elaine Graham.3 There will then be a preliminary discussion about how 
proposed technologies which can be classified as transhumanist should be 
evaluated against the general and specific criteria. These two sets of criteria will 
then be used to assess the two case studies of previous therapeutic 
developments which took place during the “therapeutic revolution” years (1950-
1990) - the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants.  
Chapter 3 will present the first of these two case studies of previous therapeutic 
developments, the development of the oral contraceptive pill, which was 
 
3 Neil Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics: Theological and Ethical 
Reflections on Evolutionary Biology (London: SCM, 2007), pp. 229-235; Elaine 
Graham, “In Whose Image? Representations of Technology and the Ends of 
Humanity” in Future Perfect? God, Medicine and Human Identity, edited by 
Celia Deane-Drummond and Peter Manley Scott (London: T and T Clark 
International, 2006), pp. 56-69. 
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introduced in 1960. The first section of the chapter will describe the history of 
the oral contraceptive pill, discussing the events that led to its introduction, and 
the actions of the protagonists involved. The second section will discuss the 
effects of the pill on the lives of women and men, on marriage, and on society 
and will discuss the Roman Catholic Church’s theological and ethical concerns 
with the pill. Finally, the contraceptive pill will be evaluated against the three 
sets of criteria for transhumanist technologies developed in Chapter 2, to 
determine the extent to which, in its time, the pill could have been regarded as a 
transhumanist development, and to evaluate it from the perspective of 
theological concerns about transhumanist technologies. This will be compared 
with ethical responses to the pill (or the prospect of a contraceptive pill) at the 
time, and with contemporary ethical responses to the pill. 
Chapter 4 will present the second of these two case studies – the development 
of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants (for example, 
Prozac), which took place in the late 1980s. As with the previous chapter, the 
first section will describe the history of SSRI development. It will describe how 
SSRIs arose from previous developments in rational psychopharmacology, 
discussing the events that led to their introduction, and the actions of the 
protagonists involved. The second section will describe and evaluate the effects 
of SSRIs on society – their therapeutic effect on patients with clinical depression 
and their use as mood-altering drugs in individuals who are not depressed (the 
so-called “Prozac phenomenon”) – and discuss theological and ethical 
responses to SSRIs, examining in detail the work of Roman Catholic scholar, 
John-Mark Miravalle.4 Miravalle’s work, the most significant in this area, is a 
discussion of how depression fits into an understanding of human attributes 
based on the psychology of Thomas Aquinas and of the ethical goods of 
treating depression, and a natural law-based ethical critique of excessive use 
and over-reliance on antidepressant drugs. In the same way as the previous 
chapter, the third section of the chapter will then assess SSRI antidepressants 
against the three sets of criteria for transhumanist technologies developed in 
 
4 John-Mark Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God: A Catholic Moral 
Perspective on Antidepressants (Chicago: University of Scranton Press, 2010). 
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Chapter 2, to determine the extent to which, in their time, they could have been 
regarded as a transhumanist development, and to evaluate them from the 
perspective of theological concerns about transhumanist technologies. This will 
be compared with ethical responses to SSRIs of the time, and with 
contemporary ethical responses to SSRIs.  
Chapter 5 will reconsider some current transhumanist proposals and 
technologies, in the light of previous experience with chemical therapeutics, as 
outlined in the two case studies presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The chapter will 
begin by summarising the findings of the case studies according to the criteria 
and determining the issues in theological ethics that have arisen through the 
development and clinical use of these medicines, which are relevant to a 
Christian response to transhumanist technologies. The chapter will then begin 
to answer the research questions of this thesis. In terms of the first question, the 
various issues of theological ethics presented by transhumanist technologies, 
the discussion will focus on four specific domains – autonomy, nature/natural 
law, embodiment and the imago Dei – which I will show are points of contact 
between past biomedical technologies and potential future transhumanist 
technologies. The extent to which the contraceptive pill and SSRI 
antidepressants were, in their time, transhumanist technologies and their ethical 
implications will be evaluated, according to the criteria in Chapter 2. There will 
be a discussion about the ethical issues of these past therapeutic technologies, 
and whether the ethical concerns identified when they were introduced have 
proved to be of concern with long term experience. A response from Christian 
theological ethics to future transhumanist biomedical technologies will then be 
assessed, in the light of the ethical findings with previous medical technologies, 
and this reassessment will be used to further refine the criteria for 
transhumanist technologies used in this thesis.  
Chapter 6 will then draw general conclusions. Transhumanist technologies are 
often seen either optimistically, as a panacea for all human suffering, or 
pessimistically, as the gateway to a dystopian future. Based on theological and 
ethical reflection on past therapeutic developments, using objective criteria, this 
project will demonstrate that the reality is somewhere in between. With both 
modern medicine to date and proposed future transhumanist technologies, 
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scientists and practitioners are motivated by the alleviation of suffering, the 
improvement of human experience and the promotion of human flourishing, and 
these motivations are consistent with Christian ethics. However, the 
development of biomedical enhancement technologies, like all science, takes 
place within a social and cultural context and this affects how the technologies 
are evaluated by Christians, from a theological and ethical perspective. This 
project will show that the church should neither accept new biomedical 
enhancement technologies uncritically, nor respond with a knee-jerk rejection of 
such technologies. Instead, a nuanced Christian ethical critique of such 
technologies is required, based on the areas identified in this thesis, namely 
autonomy, nature, embodiment and the imago Dei. In the light of experience 
with the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants, an ethical evaluation of 
biomedical technology based largely on natural law, as has happened 
previously, will no longer be sufficient to ensure an accurate assessment of 
future, radical biomedical technologies. The concluding chapter will highlight 
possible further areas for research in the theological ethical evaluation of 
transhumanism and will end with a discussion of the practical implications of the 
research for medical ethics and for Christian pastoral care. 
The next section of this first chapter provides the context for the project, by 
describing the development of modern pharmacology, and its impact on human 
life and flourishing. 
1.3. Development & Impact of Modern Pharmacology 
This section discusses the development of the modern science-based 
pharmaceutical industry, describes some of its major therapeutic achievements, 
and analyses their impact on human mortality and quality of life in the twentieth 
century. Also, in this section, a definition of the so-called “therapeutic revolution” 
is given, in terms of the period of history that it describes.  
Modern pharmacological medicine has developed during the twentieth century, 
because of three main factors. First, during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, the understanding of, and technological capability in, the 
molecular sciences increased considerably. Second, since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the pharmaceutical industry has become increasingly socially 
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and academically respectable in both the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States (US) and this has led to its development as a commercial enterprise. 
Third, pharmacological medicine has developed to address unmet medical 
needs, particularly during and after the two world wars in the twentieth century. 
The history of the expansion of the manufacturing pharmaceutical industry in 
Britain during the twentieth century is described in detail by Judy Slinn.5 In the 
Victorian era, in both the US and UK, most medicines were manufactured by 
individual pharmacists (dispensing chemists) in their pharmacies, who primarily 
sold their medicines directly to the public. Furthermore, many of the medicines 
available were made of crude plant or animal extracts, and were of limited 
efficacy and often dubious quality. Many were produced according to a 
proprietary formula (“secret recipe”) of the pharmacist’s choice. Consequently, 
during the nineteenth century, many of the medicines available were of variable 
formulation and there was little information available on these medicines, other 
than that compiled for advertising purposes. 
However, various scientific and socio-political factors converged to stimulate the 
development of pharmaceutical manufacturing as an industry, in the early part 
of the twentieth century. 
These included: 
 The development of important new therapies in the early twentieth 
century from German medicinal chemistry research, which was dominant 
at the time. These new medicines included the local anaesthetic, 
procaine, the barbiturate sedatives and the arsenic compound for 
syphilis, Salvarsan.6 Moreover, the First World War cut off the supply of 
German pharmaceuticals to the Allied countries, and this stimulated 
pharmaceutical research in Britain and the United States.7 
 
5 Judy Slinn, “The Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry” in Making 
Medicines: A Brief History of Pharmacy and Pharmaceuticals edited by Stuart 
Anderson (London: Pharmaceutical Press, 2005), pp. 155-174. 
6 Slinn, “The Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry”, p. 162. 
7 Slinn, “The Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry”, pp. 165-166. 
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 The gradual acceptance of commercial pharmaceutical manufacturing as 
a respectable area of activity for the scientific academy in the early 
twentieth century. Tansey maintains that a key factor in this was the 
expansion of animal experimentation into commercial organisations.8  In 
the nineteenth century, only academic research laboratories - hospital, 
university and medical college laboratories - were licensed for animal 
experimentation. However, in 1901, after a lengthy political and 
professional campaign, the Wellcome Physiological Research 
Laboratories were granted formal registration for animal experimentation 
under the 1871 Cruelty to Animals legislation.9 This was a watershed for 
the research-based commercial pharmaceutical industry in Britain, and 
led the way for other pharmaceutical companies to apply for licenses to 
conduct animal experiments in their own laboratories. This in turn 
enabled them to attract highly-qualified research staff from academia and 
ensured further investment in pharmaceutical research.10 Acceptability of 
drug research to the academic community and indeed to wider society is 
an important factor in drug development, as will be seen in the first case 
study in this thesis, on oral contraception, in Chapter 3.  
 The professionalism in pharmaceutical manufacturing and sales that was 
advocated – and demonstrated - by Henry Wellcome, of Burroughs 
Wellcome, and others during the early years of the twentieth century.11 
The Burroughs Wellcome pharmaceutical company coined the term 
“ethical” in their advertising and promotional material, to describe their 
medicines that they promoted to the medical professional, as distinct 
from “patent” medicines, sold directly to the public.12 Burroughs 
Wellcome sought to manufacture high quality products, and promote 
 
8 Tilli Tansey, "Pills, profits and propriety: the early pharmaceutical industry in 
Britain", Pharmaceutical History (London), 25 (1995), p. 6. 
9 Tansey, "Pills, profits and propriety", p. 6. 
10 Tansey, “Pills, profits and propriety”, p. 6 
11 Tansey, “Pills, profits and propriety”, p. 3. 
12 Tilli Tansey, “Medicines and men: Burroughs Wellcome and Co and the 
British Drug Industry before the Second World War”, Journal of the Royal 
Society of Medicine, 95 (2002), p. 411. 
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them to the medical profession in an “ethical” manner. They therefore 
employed trained pharmacists as company representatives, produced 
regular mailings to the medical profession, and received copies of major 
medical journals such as the British Medical Journal and the Lancet in 
order to keep up to date with the latest medical developments.13 
In the early years of the twentieth century, chemical synthesis and chemical 
extraction techniques were limited, and many of the early pharmaceutical 
therapies were of biological origin. Experiments conducted in the nineteenth 
century had demonstrated that particular organs, such as the ovaries and 
testes, could exert an effect on the whole body, and this could only be explained 
as a result of chemicals secreted by those organs into the bloodstream. In 
1905, Baylis and Starling coined the term “hormone” for these chemical 
secretions (from the Greek hormaõ, meaning “I excite”).14 Medical scientists 
began to see the wider potential of hormonal therapy - for example, to manage 
menopausal symptoms and improve quality of life, not just to treat disease. In 
1910, Arnold Lorand published a book entitled “Old Age Deferred”, proposing 
the use of ovarian extracts to treat menopausal symptoms.15 Another important 
development in this area was the isolation of insulin from animal pancreatic 
secretions by Banting and Best at the University of Toronto in 1921-1922.16 This 
enabled the treatment of diabetes mellitus, a disease for which there had 
previously been no effective treatment.  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, there was increasing mass 
production of vaccines. In Germany in 1890, Behring and colleagues had 
discovered that animals immunised against diphtheria and tetanus produced 
antitoxins, which could be extracted and used as a component of a vaccine.17 
 
13 Tansey, “Pills, profits and propriety”, p. 3. 
14 Davis S.R., Dinatale I, Rivera Wall L and Davison S, “Postmenopausal 
Hormone Therapy: From Monkey Glands to Transdermal Patches”, Journal of 
Endocrinology, 185 (2005), pp. 207-222. 
15 Robert Jutte, Contraception: A History, translated by V. Russell (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2008), p. 288. 
16 Robert Simoni, Robert Hill and Martha Vaughan, "The discovery of insulin: 
the work of Frederick Banting and Charles Best", Journal of Biological 
Chemistry, 277 (2002), pp. 31-33.  
17 Tansey, “Medicines and men”, p. 412. 
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Consequently, by the early twentieth century, Burroughs Wellcome were 
producing diphtheria vaccine using horse serum, at their laboratories in south 
London.18 
Occasionally, natural products research yielded unlooked-for benefits. In 1904, 
Burroughs Wellcome recruited Henry Dale, an academic pharmacologist, to 
conduct a research project on ergot of rye, a fungal overgrowth on grain, which 
had marked effects on the human body when ingested.19 As the research 
progressed, Dale and his team found that ergot of rye was what has been 
described as "a treasure house of drugs", and contained not just one but 
several therapeutically significant substances, including acetylcholine, histamine 
and tyramine. This opened research avenues to discover a range of modern 
therapeutic substances - for example, the antihistamines, ergotamine, for 
migraines, and ergometrine, an obstetric vasoconstrictor.  
After the Second World War, however, there was a considerable expansion of 
pharmaceutical research, during which many new drugs were developed, an 
era known as the "therapeutic revolution". The term “therapeutic revolution”, to 
describe the period of post-war pharmaceutical industry expansion, was coined 
in retrospect in 1987 by an American clinical pharmacologist, Richard 
Weinshilboum, in a review of the various drug discovery advances by the 
pharmaceutical industry during the previous half-century.20 It should be noted, 
however, that the term was used by Rosenberg in 1977 to describe the 
development of medicine as a whole from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, 21 and by Reekie and Weber in 1979 to describe the development of 
the pharmaceutical industry since 1935.22 However, Weinshilboum’s definition is 
 
18 The production of vaccines from animal sera in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century represented a major shift in methodology in pharmaceutical 
manufacturing. A similar shift may take place in the twenty-first century in 
response to the COVID-19 crisis.  
19 Tansey, “Pills, profits and propriety”, p. 7. 
20 Weinshilboum, “The Therapeutic Revolution”, pp. 481-484. 
21 Charles Rosenberg, “The Therapeutic Revolution: Medicine, Meaning and 
Social Change in Nineteenth Century America”, Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine 20 (1977), pp. 485-506. 
22 W. Duncan Reekie and Michael Weber, Profit, Politics and Drugs (London: 
McMillan, 1979), p. 5. 
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contextually specific to pharmaceutical medicine, and is linked clearly with the 
post-war economic boom, and for these reasons has been incorporated in the 
recent work of historians of the pharmaceutical industry, for example, Viviane 
Quirke 23 and Judy Slinn.24 I will therefore define the “therapeutic revolution” as 
the period between 1950 and 1990, for the purposes of this study.  
Various reasons – both scientific and societal - have been cited for this post-war 
pharmaceutical expansion.25 First, during the twentieth century, new laboratory 
technology and techniques developed, which enabled more effective discovery 
of drug substances. This was partly due to the availability of new materials, and 
more sophisticated chemical analysis, extraction and purification techniques. In 
addition, the development of computers and information technology from the 
1960s onwards enabled the development of systems that would perform 
Quantitative Structure Activity Relationship (QSAR) analysis – that is, determine 
how the shape of the molecule affects its biological activity. This process 
facilitated mass production and screening of large numbers of drug candidate 
molecules by pharmaceutical researchers.26  
Second, the development of drug molecules with specific modes of action was, 
in part, due to an increased understanding of the “receptor” theory of drug 
action. According to receptor theory, many biological or biochemical processes 
are mediated by the action of biochemicals and hormones at specific 
biochemical receptor sites on the cells in different body tissues.27 A simple 
example of this is: when a person is frightened, adrenaline in the bloodstream 
stimulates beta receptors in the heart, which leads to an increase in heart rate. 
 
23 Viviane Quirke, “From Alkaloids to Gene Therapy: A Brief History of Drug 
Discovery in the 20th Century”, in Making Medicines: A Brief History of 
Pharmacy and Pharmaceuticals, edited by Stuart Anderson (London: 
Pharmaceutical Press, 2005), pp. 177-201. 
24 Slinn, “The Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry”, pp. 155-174.  
25 Slinn, “The Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry”, pp. 168-169. 
26 Jurgen Drews, “Drug Discovery: A Historical Perspective”, Science, 287 
(2000), pp. 1960-1964. 
27 For a history of receptor theory, see John Parascandola and Ronald 
Jasensky, “Origins of the Receptor Theory of Drug Action”, Bulletin of Medical 
History, 48 (1974), pp. 199-220. 
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Consequently, the actions - and side-effects – of many drugs are due to their 
effects at different receptors in different parts of the body.  
The idea of receptors arose from the work of the German clinician and 
medicinal chemist, Paul Ehrlich, on early antibacterial agents.28 Ehrlich noted 
that these antibacterial agents – which were termed “chemotherapeutic agents” 
– had a selective affinity for certain biological tissues, and he proposed the idea 
that there were “chemo-receptors” on the tissues, to which the drug bound. The 
theory of receptors took a while to be widely accepted in pharmacology, mainly 
due to a debate about what a receptor was, and how it acted.29 It was through 
the work of A.J. Clark in the 1920s and 1930s that the concept of receptors 
became widely understood and accepted. Clark demonstrated the principle of 
quantitative receptor responses – i.e. different amounts of a drug produced a 
different response at its receptor.30 This paved the way for considerable 
research on synthetic drug molecules that might exert therapeutic effects by 
either acting as a stimulant (agonist) or a blocker (antagonist) at that receptor. 
Medicinal chemists would develop molecules that resembled a natural 
substance in chemical structure, but which would have additional stimulation or 
blocking effects at the receptor, and therefore have a therapeutic action. This 
enabled a wide range of specific drugs to be developed.  
A third factor in the post-war therapeutic revolution was the effort of wartime 
therapeutic research during World War Two bearing fruit. The classic example 
of this was the development of penicillin in Britain from 1940 to 1944 by Howard 
Florey and colleagues at Oxford, following the discovery of the Penicillium 
mould by Sir Alexander Fleming in 1926.31 The work was driven by the need for 
a specific antibiotic which could be used to treat battle-field infections, and 
therefore aid the war effort. Florey and his team developed a cottage industry 
 
28 Drews, “Drug Discovery”, pp. 1960-1964. 
29 Viviane Quirke, “Putting Theory into Practice: James Black, Receptor Theory 
and the Development of Beta Blockers at ICI, 1958-1976”, Medical History, 50 
(2006), pp. 73-75. 
30 Quirke, “Putting Theory into Practice”, pp. 73-75. 
31 Jonathan Liebenau, “The Rise of the British Pharmaceutical Industry”, British 
Medical Journal, 301 (1990), pp. 724-728, p. 733. 
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for isolating and purifying the active penicillin from the mould. However, they 
could do so only in moderate quantities, because of the restrictions of life in 
wartime Britain. Once America entered the war, though, Florey took penicillin to 
the US, where companies such as Pfizer used their expertise in deep 
fermentation techniques to produce penicillin in much larger quantities. This 
paved the way for the development of different antibiotic molecules, and mass 
production of a range of antibiotics which could treat hitherto untreatable, and 
often life-threatening, bacterial infections.  
Fourth, the pharmaceutical industry, like other industries, benefited 
economically from the post-war economic boom. There was significant 
investment in the biological and scientific industries at this time, and the 
formation of the NHS in Britain in 1948 created a mass market for new drugs, 
which was a factor in stimulating pharmaceutical development.32 
The so-called “therapeutic revolution” era gave rise to rapid developments in 
various therapeutic areas, including antibiotics, cardiovascular medicine, 
respiratory medicine, psychopharmacology, hormonal therapies and various 
others. The societal impact and ethical implications of two pharmaceutical 
developments of this era – the oral contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants 
- will be explored in detail in two subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
However, several other therapeutic developments are worthy of comment in this 
outline section. Work by James Black and colleagues at ICI Pharmaceuticals 
from 1958 onwards drew on increasingly sophisticated knowledge of beta-
adrenoreceptors in the heart and blood vessels to develop the first beta 
receptor blocking drugs (“beta blockers”), which became the cornerstone of 
therapy for hypertension, angina and other cardiac conditions.33 The potent 
beta-blocker, propranolol, was launched in 1965, and this was followed by 
atenolol in 1976, which is active only at beta receptors in the heart, and 
therefore has a more favourable side-effect profile than propranolol. Both these 
 
32 Quirke, “From Alkaloids to Gene Therapy”, pp. 177-201. 
33 Quirke, “Putting Theory into Practice”, pp. 69-90. 
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drugs have had a significant effect on patient mortality and morbidity in various 
forms of cardiovascular disease. 
Increasing knowledge of beta receptor pharmacology also led to the 
development of beta 2 receptor stimulants for the treatment of asthma, by David 
Jack and colleagues at Glaxo (now GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)).34 These drugs act 
on the beta 2 receptors in the lungs to dilate the bronchial tubes, and are given 
by inhalation to relieve the symptoms of asthma and chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD). The first of these was salbutamol, launched in 
1969 as Ventolin, which revolutionized the treatment of asthma. This was 
followed by the longer acting beta 2 agonist, salmeterol, launched in 1990. 
In 1964, James Black left ICI Pharmaceuticals and went to work for American 
pharmaceutical firm, Smith, Kline and French (again now part of GSK) on their 
“histamine project”. In 1966, two subtypes of histamine receptor were identified, 
one of which (the histamine-2 (H2) receptor) specifically mediated stomach acid 
production. SK and F scientists therefore looked for a H2 blocking drug that 
would reduce gastric acid secretion, and therefore promote healing of gastric 
ulcers. After several unsuccessful compounds, and political tensions within the 
company concerning the progress of the project, the ground-breaking anti-ulcer 
drug, Tagamet (cimetidine), was launched in 1976.35 The launch of Tagamet 
was a turning-point in the treatment of gastrointestinal diseases which before 
then had been a cause of considerable morbidity and chronic pain and 
discomfort for sufferers. 
What is the legacy of the age of expansion of drug discovery known as the 
“therapeutic revolution”? It certainly led to the growth of the pharmaceutical 
industry, both commercially and in terms of its marketing activities. There was 
an exponential increase in pharmaceutical industry business value worldwide, 
from $600million before the Second World War, to $4000million in the mid-
 
34 Jenny Bryan, “Ventolin remains a breath of fresh air”, Pharmaceutical 
Journal, 279 (2007), pp. 404-405. 
35 Herdis Molinder, “The Development of Cimetidine: 1964 – 1976 – A Human 
Story”, Journal of Clinical Gastroenterology, 19 (1994), pp. 248-254. 
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1950s.36 Liebenau notes that the world pharmaceutical market continued to 
expand through the 1960s and 1970s; he states that the worldwide market was 
worth $10billion in the mid-60s, but increased to $36billion in the mid-70s and 
$90billion by the early 1980s.37 This market activity has been dominated by the 
economies of the developed countries – principally the United States, Britain, 
Germany, Switzerland and Japan. Prentis and Walker note that, from 1964 to 
1980, the number of new drugs produced by British pharmaceutical companies 
increased year on year, due to development of high throughput screening, as 
previously described.38 However, the number of new drugs rejected increased 
as well, due to more sophisticated safety testing and regulatory requirements. 
Furthermore, from the 1950s, many native British pharmaceutical companies 
expanded into other markets, for example the US and Europe, and 
correspondingly many American pharmaceutical companies (for example, 
Pfizer, Merck and Co, and Smith, Kline and French) began trading in the UK. 
The pharmaceutical industry has certainly been successful commercially 
because of the “therapeutic revolution”, but has this revolution had a significant 
effect on human life, health and flourishing? The next section of this chapter will 
evaluate the impact of developments of chemical therapeutics on human life 
and health from a demographic and epidemiological perspective during the 
twentieth century. 
1.4. Human Life & Flourishing in the Twentieth Century 
During the twentieth century, there has been the most rapid decline in mortality 
in human history. United Nations data show that world average life expectancy 
(at birth) has increased from 48 years in 1950-1955 to 68 years in 2005-2010.39 
These averages includes data from the developing world; the life expectancies 
for developed countries alone are higher. For example, life expectancy from 
 
36 Slinn, “The Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry”, p. 162. 
37 Liebenau, “The Rise of the British Pharmaceutical Industry”, p. 724. 
38 R.A. Prentis and S.R. Walker, “Trends in the Development of New Medicines 
by UK-owned Pharmaceutical Companies (1966-1980)”, British Journal of 
Clinical Pharmacology, 21 (1986), pp. 437-443. 
39 United Nations. "Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2011). World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision”, 2011, 
http://esa.un.org/wpp/ (accessed May 2015).  
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birth in the UK in 2012 was reported as 83.3 years for women, and 79.2 years 
for men.40 
As the figures suggest, there is considerable worldwide variation in life 
expectancy. The United Nations (UN) Population Report indicates that there 
has been little improvement of life expectancy in Africa, due 
“in large part to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, other factors have also played a 
role, including armed conflict, economic stagnation, and resurgent 
infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria.”41 
UN data on mortality trends show that the major determinant of global life 
expectancy now is the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the African countries.42 It is 
recognised that improvements in HIV therapy, and wider access to such 
therapy, are likely to have a major impact on population and life expectancy in 
Africa over the next 100 years.43 
As evidenced by the changes in life expectancy reported, mortality rates have 
been falling during the past century. In the UK, there was a sharp decline in 
mortality between the late nineteenth century and approximately 1930, and then 
a more gradual decline throughout the remainder of the twentieth century.44 In 
particular, there have been substantial reductions of infant mortality (death in 
the first year of life, recorded as deaths per 1000 live births) during the twentieth 
century. UK government figures for the twentieth century indicate that the rate of 
 
40 Joe Hicks and Grahame Allen, “A Century of Change: Trends in UK Statistics 
since 1900”, House of Commons Research Paper 99/111 (1999), p. 8. 
41 United Nations. “Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2011). World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision”, 2011 
http://esa.un.org/wpp/ (accessed May 2015).  . 
42 United Nations. “Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2013). World Mortality Report 2013”,2013,  
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/mortality/world
-mortality-report-2013.asp (accessed May 2015) 
43 United Nations. “Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2011). World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision”, 2011 
http://esa.un.org/wpp/ (accessed May 2015). 
44 Neil Tranter, British Population in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: 
MacMillan, 1996), p. 64. 
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infant mortality decreased from 140 deaths per 1000 live births in 1900 to 5.8 
per 1000 live births in 1997.45 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
attributes this worldwide improvement of life expectancy to better standards of 
living, better education, better nutrition, sanitation and housing and improved 
health services - and access to those services.46 The population demographer, 
Neil Tranter, has discussed the factors contributing to the general reduction of 
mortality and increased life expectancy during the twentieth century.47 He states 
that the marked improvements in life expectancy in the late nineteenth century 
and the first half of the twentieth century have been largely due to a reduction in 
communicable diseases, such as influenza, smallpox, measles, cholera, 
dysentery and others. He claims that there may be some biological factors in 
this – for example, reduction of disease virulence or increase in human genetic 
resistance – although, given the timescale involved, this seems doubtful. 
However, he claims that this reduction in mortality has been mainly due to 
human factors, such as improved nutrition, better housing, cleaner water, 
improved hygiene and effective quarantine/isolation procedures to prevent the 
spread of communicable diseases. Furthermore, Tranter rightly argues that 
these public health measures, implemented in populous urban areas, have had 
the greatest impact on mortality statistics.48 This reduction in mortality in the 
early twentieth century is also due to the development and commercial 
distribution of vaccines, as described previously.  
 
45 Hicks and Allen, “A Century of Change”, p. 8. 
46 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2013), 
“OECD Factbook 2013: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics,” 2013,  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/factbook-2013-95-en (accessed May 2015).  
47 Tranter, British Population in the Twentieth Century, pp. 71-82. 
48 The factors underlying mortality reduction in the twentieth century have been 
hotly debated (Tranter, British Population in the Twentieth Century, p64ff). 
Public health measures (improved sanitation etc) may not have been sufficient 
to contribute to the sharp decrease in mortality in the early years of the 
twentieth century, and this decrease may have been due to improved nutrition 
and living conditions alone. Furthermore, while it has been often suggested that 
the sharp reduction of infant mortality in the early twentieth  century was due in 
part to improved obstetric techniques, these techniques did not become 
commonplace until the 1930s, so this could not have been a factor. 
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However, Tranter argues, other factors have come into play to account for the 
ongoing gradual reduction of mortality during the latter half of the twentieth 
century.49 First, there is the development of modern therapeutics; for example, 
antibacterial agents such as Prontosil and penicillin have had a significant 
impact on sepsis, and sulphapyridine, chloramphenicol and streptomycin a 
major effect on mortality from respiratory diseases. With cardiovascular 
disease, a third of the decline in cardiovascular mortality has been attributed to 
drugs such as beta blockers (for example, propranolol and atenolol, as 
mentioned previously) and anticoagulants, used for treatment of hypertension 
and for secondary prevention following a heart attack (i.e. to prevent a further 
heart attack, which might prove fatal). Second, reduced mortality in the second 
half of the twentieth century has also been influenced by increased access to 
life-saving treatments facilitated by the National Health Service, which was 
formed in 1948. 
Not only have mortality rates fallen over the last century, but the causes of 
mortality have changed. UK population research indicates that, in 1880, 
infections and parasitic diseases were the largest cause of death, accounting 
for 33% of all deaths.50 Furthermore, at that time, around 58% of deaths were 
classed as “other”, and this category included deaths with no symptoms, deaths 
of “old age” and deaths where the cause was poorly understood. However, by 
1997, the leading causes of death were cancer (43%) and cardiovascular 
disease (26%), and only 17% of people died of infections. These changes in 
cause of mortality probably reflect the following factors:  
 The impact of modern sanitation and antimicrobial therapy on the 
management of infectious diseases. 
 Improved pathological understanding and diagnostic techniques to 
enable identification and classification of diseases previously classed as 
“other” (especially non-solid tumour cancers).  
 
49 Tranter, British Population in the Twentieth Century, pp. 66-70. 
50 Hicks and Allen, “A Century of Change”, p. 9. 
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 Replacement of communicable, infectious diseases by “diseases of 
affluence”, such as heart disease and certain types of cancer, as the 
leading causes of mortality during the twentieth century.51. 
As stated earlier, most of the reduction in mortality in developed countries over 
the last century has been due to factors such as better standards of living, 
better nutrition, sanitation and housing and improved health services. 
Nevertheless, modern pharmacology has had a significant impact on mortality 
and life expectancy in the last fifty years or so. This has been largely due to 
progress in two areas: a) the use of antibiotics and vaccines against infectious 
diseases, and b) the availability of specific cardiovascular drugs to prevent heart 
attacks and stroke. 
As well as its impact on health outcomes and the quality of human life, modern 
pharmacology has also contributed to the development of modern evidence-
based medicine and has affected the ways in which medicine is practiced. 
Evidence-based medicine, and its ethical issues, has been discussed in detail 
by Woolf.52 While medicine has always been evidence-based, in the sense that 
it is empirical (i.e. it responds to observations about the patient), Wolfe argues 
that modern evidence-based medicine seeks to make an explicit link between 
scientific findings about medicines, and public health policy concerning their 
use.53  
Woolf asserts that this rational approach has become necessary because of 
“stirring advances” in pharmacology, which in turn have enabled increased 
capacity for treatment of a widening range of medical conditions, and which has 
meant that health budgets have been unable to keep up with technological 
advancement. Woolf argues that evidence-based medicine has clarified that 
some medicines have been under-used, others have been over-used and still 
 
51 Tranter, “British Population in the Twentieth Century”, pp. 75-76. 
52 Steven Woolf, “Evidence-Based Medicine: A Historical and International 
Overview”, Proceedings of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, 31 
(2001), pp. 39-41. 
53 A similar evidence-based approach, linked with public policy, will be needed 
to enable fair and equitable distribution of future biomedical enhancement 
technologies, as I will argue in Chapter 5. 
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others have been misused. An evidence-based approach to medicine therefore, 
in my view, contributes to ethical decision-making about medical treatments, 
and so I would argue that, as a general principle, future biomedical technologies 
– which would include technologies that could be classified as transhumanist – 
should be also be considered in an evidence-based way, in the same way as 
past and present medical technologies. I will explore this issue in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
Woolf highlights two ethical issues with evidence-based medicine. First, there is 
the problem that scientific criticisms of a treatment may lead policy makers (who 
may not appreciate the scientific nature of the criticisms) to limit funding and 
services to provide the treatment in an inappropriate way. This may encourage 
either a lack of transparency on the part of the pharmaceutical industry about 
the publication of clinical trial data, or a lack of candour on the part of some 
sections of the scientific and medical community about making comment to the 
media concerning new drugs. Second, there is the risk of what Woolf calls 
“cookbook” medicine, where clinicians might only treat a patient if clinical trials 
indicate that a treatment is beneficial, and may not treat a patient empirically, 
even when it is appropriate to do so.54  
Following the “stirring advances” in pharmacology in the twentieth century, the 
scene is set for ever more sophisticated biomedical interventions in the twenty-
first century. The use of recombinant DNA technology from the 1980s onwards 
led to the production of larger biological therapeutic molecules, as opposed to 
the small molecule medicines of the “therapeutic revolution” years.55 These 
“biological” therapies affect disease processes at specific points in biochemical 
and cellular mechanisms. They therefore provide more treatment options, 
especially for endocrine and autoimmune diseases, and may provide benefits 
for increasingly specific patient subgroups. Consequently, these biological 
treatments introduce the possibility of truly personalised medicine – instead of 
 
54 Steven Woolf, “Evidence-Based Medicine”, pp. 39-41. 
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Press International, 2001), pp. 14-34. 
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the same medicine being given to everyone with the same illness, medical 
treatment is customised for the individual patient, according to their specific 
disease type and personal characteristics – for example, age, sex, weight, and 
metabolic capacity. The next step is “genomic” medicine – the use of agents 
that have therapeutic effects by specifically increasing or decreasing the 
expression of different genes. Other high-tech future possibilities include 
medical nanotechnology, cryogenics, cybernetics, neural threads,56 and various 
other technologies that are still only at the experimental stage, if that. These are 
the technologies that are often envisaged by the transhumanist movement. 
Because of their specific and potentially far-reaching effects, these new 
technologies have the potential to radically alter human life and experience in a 
way that previous forms of medicine have not. 
Consequently, future biomedical technologies have been subject to scrutiny by 
theologians and ethicists, to an extent that has not been the case with many 
previous medical technologies. In some cases, these new biomedical 
technologies may give rise to hitherto unexpected consequences and new 
ethical issues; in other cases, these technologies may be treated with suspicion 
just because they are an unknown quantity culturally, even though they do not 
clearly raise any new ethical issues. Again, I will explore these issues in more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
I have shown above that the “stirring advances” of modern pharmacology from 
the “therapeutic revolution” years have led to a reduction in human mortality, 
albeit a modest reduction compared to other human welfare factors, such as 
improved sanitation, housing, nutrition and standards of living. Yet, apart from 
occasional side effect “scares” and some trenchant media critics of the 
pharmaceutical industry as a whole, there have been no serious concerns about 
the overall ethical value of modern pharmacology, despite the relatively modest 
overall mortality benefits, and given the risks involved. Partly this is because 
medicines do more than reduce mortality – for example, they reduce morbidity 
 
56 A device that would be implanted into the brain to convert thoughts (brain 
electrical activity) to digital information.  
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(suffering) and they improve quality of life. However, these benefits, especially 
improvement in quality of life, are harder to demonstrate in controlled studies 
and at a population level. 
Therefore, it is possible that, because future transhumanist biomedical 
technologies are potentially more radical in their effects and their scope than 
past medical therapies, these technologies have the potential to provide 
proportionally far greater benefits for humanity than past medical treatments. 
Therefore, there might be a positive ethical argument for the appropriate use of 
transhumanist technologies in future, based on their radical therapeutic 
potential. Yet this positive ethical argument for transhumanist technologies as 
medical treatments is seldom articulated even by transhumanist scholars, and 
certainly not by Christian theologians. Consequently, it is all the more important 
that the ethical issues with transhumanism are fully examined, and then re-
evaluated in the light of previous medical therapies, to gain an insight into the 
true ethical status of future transhumanist technologies. The potentially far-
reaching therapeutic benefits of future transhumanist biomedical technologies 
on human health and flourishing, compared with the relatively modest impact of 
past therapeutic developments, will be taken into account in the ethical 
evaluation of medical technologies in Chapter 5. 
Biomedical technologies – both the previous pharmacological advances of the 
modern era, and the proposed transhumanist biomedical enhancements of the 
future – give rise to medical ethical issues. A brief review of the history of 
medical ethics will be helpful to understand the issues discussed later in this 
thesis in their historical context. The next section of this introductory chapter 
provides this review. 
1.5. Approaches to Medical Ethics: Ancient, Modern and Post Modern 
Medical ethics as a discipline has its roots in ancient times. Ancient traditions of 
medical ethics can be determined from the oaths of initiation taken by 
physicians and healers of that era. Two distinct traditions can be traced – an 
eastern tradition, based on ancient Indian medicine, and a western tradition, 
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based on the medical practice of ancient Greece.57 This section will focus on 
the western tradition as this is most relevant to modern western medical 
practice, and to the ethical principles relating to the modern, and potential 
postmodern, therapeutics that are discussed in this thesis.  
Hippocrates (c460-371 BC) is regarded as “the father of medicine”;58 the 
Hippocratic Oath, an oath of initiation taken by new medical practitioners is one 
of the oldest sources of medical ethics, and the oath still forms part of physician 
induction in many countries in the modern age. The central ethical tenets of the 
Hippocratic Oath – which may be summarised as: a) do no harm, b) maintain 
confidentiality, and c) do not exploit patients – have not changed since ancient 
times.59 Nutton notes that an important aspect of the Hippocratic Oath is its 
emphasis that there is no stigma in doing nothing, if doing nothing is the correct 
response in that case, and that the primary purpose of the oath is to 
differentiate good and bad practitioners.60 Nevertheless, despite the fact that it 
is well-established, and is a primary source of medical ethics, the Hippocratic 
Oath has its problems. First, Nutton points out that the oath seems to regard 
medical ethics solely in terms of the obligations of belonging to a group – i.e. of 
medical practitioners.61 This is at odds with the multidisciplinary and holistic 
ethos of healthcare in the modern context. Moreover, Nutton claims that the 
religious (albeit pagan) language of the oath suggests that it was written for a 
specific group of physicians and was not used as universally in the ancient 
world as is popularly thought. Second, Nutton contends that, rather than simply 
providing ethical guidance to resolve ethical dilemmas, the Oath actually 
introduced ethical dilemmas. An example of this might be the Oath’s prohibition 
of surgery at all costs.62 However, I would suggest that this might be a twentieth  
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century perspective and may not take into account the fact that any surgery was 
highly dangerous prior to the development of modern anaesthesia and 
disinfection. 
Longrigg, though, asserts that the Hippocratic Oath is concerned with ethics as 
a whole, not just the ethics of the practice of medicine, and regards the Oath as 
deontological in nature; that is to say it is primarily about the absolute duties of 
the practitioner.63 Longrigg also suggests, correctly in my view, that the 
adoption of the Hippocratic Oath by Galen, a Roman physician of the second 
century, has contributed to its centrality in the Western medical tradition. 
Nevertheless, despite a clear ethical and cultural tradition of medicine in the 
ancient world, the operation of the human body at that time was understood 
solely in pre-modern terms, with the theory of the “humours” – that supposedly 
chemical substances called “humours” regulated the body, and that illness was 
caused by an imbalance of humours.64 
Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle note that the practice and ethics of medicine 
in the ancient world was developed in the context of the development of moral 
reasoning and philosophical attitudes to life as a whole, and they describe the 
development of ethics in its socio-cultural context in the ancient world.65 In his 
epic poems, Homer provided a narrative account of virtues such as love, 
courage, justice, piety and others, which served as a basis for developing moral 
reasoning. Socrates, however, questioned Homer’s account of virtues in a 
negative manner, and asked the question: what was the good of life? He coined 
the dictum, “It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong.” His pessimism led to 
his condemnation by Athenian society, which in due course led to his suicide by 
self-poisoning.  
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Plato was a student of Socrates and developed his mentor’s thinking. Plato 
argued that the virtues of this world – for example, the triad of truth, goodness 
and beauty – could not be fully experienced in this world – and were, in fact, 
only expressions of perfect “forms” of these virtues in another heavenly world. 
This led to dualistic thinking, in which the body and materiality were a separate 
realm from spirit. This posed one of the greatest challenges to the Christian 
message of the early church; because of the incarnation of Christ and the 
coming of the Holy Spirit, there was no body-spirit divide inherent in Christian 
anthropology, and this supported a monistic, and holistic, view of the human 
person.66  
Aristotle was, in turn, a student of Plato, but he moved away from Plato’s theory 
of forms and, instead, asked the question: what are the goods of human life? In 
other words, what are the things of life that have moral currency and value, and 
lead to fulfilment, happiness and flourishing? Aristotle equated “happiness” with 
function. He argued that, by the application of reason, functions could be 
achieved, and the goods of life could be realised. Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics was an example of how his theory worked out in practice. The work of 
Aristotle is particularly significant in medical ethics because his thinking was 
highly influential for Thomas Aquinas, and the medieval development of natural 
law theory.67  
Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle then outline the principles of Judaeo-
Christian ethics.68 They state that ethics based on the Judaeo Christian tradition 
are based on the revelation of God, and obedience to God’s revealed 
commands and covenant, obedience which brings with it moral tenets. God had 
spoken through the patriarchs and prophets - and moral codes had been given 
by God in the Decalogue and other legal material in the Old Testament. The 
 
66 This is foundational for the importance of embodiment in Christian theological 
anthropology, which I will introduce in Chapter 2 and return to with reference to 
the case studies in Chapter 5. 
67 For an overview of natural law see Stephen Pope, “Natural Law and Christian 
Ethics”, in Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics, edited by Robin Gill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 67-86. 
68 Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle, Introduction to Bioethics, pp. 20-21. 
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New Testament built onto this, and the early church developed an 
understanding of how to live ethically in a Christian way, in contrast to the 
prevailing Greek thought forms, and the culture of the Roman Empire at the 
time. The tension between Christian beliefs about the resurrection of the body 
and Plato-influenced dualisms is an example of this. After the conversion of the 
Emperor Constantine, the Christian ethical understanding of the world became 
embedded in the political structures of Western society in the Christendom era. 
This made the Christian ethical world view the received public ethical world 
view. 
The particular contribution of Christianity to medical ethics has included the 
notion of a healing and reconciling God (for example, Exodus 15v26), the 
concept of shalom, which is often translated “peace”, and is concerned with 
human wholeness and flourishing, in its broadest sense. The idea of shalom, 
with connotations of health, is seen in Old Testament passages such as Psalm 
32, Jeremiah 8v15 and Isaiah 53v5.69 O’Brien and Harris quote Cornelius 
Plantinga’s helpful definition of shalom as, 
 “universal flourishing, wholeness, and delight—a rich state of affairs in 
which natural needs are satisfied and natural gifts fruitfully employed, all 
under the arch of God’s love” 70 
Moreover, passages from the New Testament portray Jesus – the Messiah and 
the Prince of Peace – as the bringer of shalom and healing (Luke 10v5-9; 
Hebrews 12v13-14). Jesus performed healing miracles (Mark 2v1-12; John 5v1-
15) and by his death on the cross, Jesus provided the ultimate healing, by 
forgiving sins and reconciling the world to God. Thus, a message of healing 
appears to be central and integral to a Christian understanding of salvation. 
 
69 This holistic approach is seen in modern approaches to health, such as that 
of the World Health Organisation (WHO) which defines health as “a state of 
complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, and not merely the absence of 
any disease or infirmity.” See WHO Constitution, 
https://www.who.int/about/who-we-are/constitution, (accessed March 2020).  
70 Graham O’Brien and Timothy Harris, “What on Earth Is God Doing? Relating 
Theology and Science through Biblical Theology”, Perspectives on Science and 
Christian Faith, 64 (2012), pp. 147-156. 
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The development of natural law is especially important for the development of 
medical ethics, as the natural law approach to ethics has underpinned Roman 
Catholic moral responses to modern medical developments – including both the 
cases described in this thesis – and will be discussed and critiqued in greater 
detail later in the thesis. Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle give an account of 
natural law, as it relates to medical ethics.71 Natural law, they state, originates 
as far back as the Stoics in the fifth century BC. The central principle of natural 
law is, to quote Bryant, that “a good life is a life based in accordance with 
nature.” This was combined with the principle, derived from Aristotle, that 
nothing in nature is produced without a purpose, and that if a creature is able to 
fulfil its nature, then it is directed to morally good ends. Drawing on Aristotle and 
the Stoics, the medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) developed 
natural law theory most fully. He developed Aristotle’s idea of the functions of 
life into a classification of general and specific human functions. According to 
Aquinas, reflection on human nature shows the ends or purposes to which 
human beings are naturally inclined, and this indicates moral imperatives in 
human life. Much Roman Catholic thinking on medicine is still based on natural 
law – so, for example, because procreation is the natural end of sex, the Roman 
Catholic Church has objected to contraception on theological grounds. This will 
be explored in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
The Renaissance was a significant time for the development of medicine, as a 
discipline. The establishment of the “new” universities, and their medical 
curricula, meant that the dissection of human bodies became commonplace 
and, because of this, there was increasing knowledge of anatomy and 
physiology.72 Jackson argues, reasonably, that the expansion of experimental 
knowledge of medicine at that time led to a gradual rejection of the humouralism 
of the Hippocratic and Galenic medical traditions, in favour of physiological 
mechanisms, based on the new empirical, experimental, observations.  
Consequently, during the seventeenth century, a new type of medical 
practitioner emerged – one who used material treatments, for example herbal or 
 
71 Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle, Introduction to Bioethics, pp. 21-22. 
72 Jackson, The History of Medicine, p. 61. 
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natural products, instead of relying on humoural theory. Wear terms such 
practitioners “iatrochemists” (iatros = doctor 73) and these were the forerunners 
of both apothecaries (specialists in pharmaceutical medicine) and chemists.74 
Wear has described the development of iatrochemical medicine, which has 
traditionally been based on the principles of Paracelsus, the sixteenth century 
scientist and mystical writer, who strongly opposed traditional ideas of medicine 
from the ancient world.75 Unsurprisingly, the iatrochemical practitioners faced 
intense opposition from the “establishment” – physicians of the Hippocratic and 
Galenic traditions - who regarded the newcomers as unprofessional charlatans. 
Nevertheless, the new paradigm of medicine found royal patronage in various 
countries, and gradually gained social and intellectual respectability, largely due 
to its links with modernity. Wear asserts that, in England and France, the new 
medicine held the moral high ground, because of its associations with Christian 
charity, as opposed to the avaricious and protectionist tendencies of the 
Hippocratic establishment.76 In the seventeenth century, Puritans empathised 
with iatrochemical medicine because a search for personal knowledge in the 
natural world aligned well with the Reformed ideal of a personal relationship 
with God. Furthermore, the Puritans found iatrochemical medicine attractive 
because it did not have the “pagan” foundations of the Hippocratic tradition.77 
The earliest British guide to medical ethics of the modern era was John 
Gregory’s text “Observations of Duties and Offices of a Physician”, published in 
1770.78 Another well-known publication of the era was Thomas Percival’s 
“Medical Ethics”, published in 1803.79 Porter contends that these medical ethics 
books were by no means theoretical texts, but were written with the intention of 
encouraging patients to go to “established” physicians because of their codes of 
 
73 A drug-induced disease is called an iatrogenic disease. 
74 Andrew Wear, “Medicine in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700”, in The 
Western Medical Tradition 800BC – 1800AD, edited by Lawrence Conrad, 
Michael Neve, Vivian Nutton, Roy Porter and Andrew Wear (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 320-325. 
75 Wear, “Medicine in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700”, pp. 310-312. 
76 Wear, “Medicine in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700”, p. 322. 
77 Wear, “Medicine in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700”, p. 323. 
78 Jackson, The History of Medicine, p. 108. 
79 Jackson, The History of Medicine, p. 451. 
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conduct; in other words, that there was an implicit medical protectionist agenda 
to these publications.80 In my view, however, this is debatable. The 
Enlightenment was a time of rational enquiry in many fields of human interest, 
and also a time of progressive humanism. Furthermore, medicine was in the 
process of developing its identity as a modern profession, at that time. It is quite 
possible that these publications were simply the fruits of the new era for the 
medical profession and were not necessarily written entirely to support a 
particular political agenda.  
Nevertheless, the era from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment was a time of 
seismic change in medical ethical thinking. Bryant, Baggot la Velle and Searle 
argue that the Copernican revolution undermined religious understandings of 
the universe, which in turn, undermined traditional Christian moral thinking, 
based on religious revelation and an immutable natural law.81 The general 
approach to ethics therefore shifted from God revealing ethical principles to 
humanity, to humanity determining ethical responses with the power of reason. 
With his “categorical imperative” or supreme principle of duty, Immanuel Kant 
developed a deontological – an absolute, duty-based – ethical system, which 
was independent of any notion of religious revelation. 
However, a key ethical development for medicine in the modern era was 
consequentialism, which came to prominence in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. The best-known form of consequentialism was utilitarianism, which 
was developed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.82 The consequentialist 
approach is that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the 
consequences of the action, not by the duty or the motivation of the actor. 
Therefore, in principle, an act is good if it produces the greatest good for the 
greatest number of people. Consequentialism, in its various forms, is potentially 
problematic from a Christian perspective for various reasons. First, because of 
 
80 Roy Porter, “The Eighteenth Century”, in The Western Medical Tradition 
800BC – 1800AD, edited by Lawrence Conrad, Michael Neve, Vivian Nutton, 
Roy Porter and Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
p. 446. 
81 Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Seale, Introduction to Bioethics, p. 22. 
82 Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Seale, Introduction to Bioethics, p. 23. 
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revelation, the Christian ethical tradition has a clear deontological basis, and 
also stresses the importance of virtue, so is by no means a solely consequence-
based ethical system. Second, consequentialism seems to have a limited 
perception of the scope of human good. Third, there is the problem of whether 
consequences can be anticipated. The fourth and possibly greatest difficulty is 
that a consequentialist approach could, for example, justify the murder of one 
person (prohibited in Christian terms), for a greater good.83 
Nevertheless, consequentialism plays a major part in modern bioethics, since 
many medical economic arguments about cost-utility of medical treatments and 
distribution of healthcare resources are, in practice, made on consequentialist 
grounds. However, a purely consequentialist approach to ethics of biomedical 
technology is problematic, because of the issue of “unintended consequences” 
that may be observed with newly introduced treatments, for which there is 
limited experience. The issue of unintended consequences is an important one 
in the ethical evaluation of newly developed medical technologies and therefore 
highly relevant to proposed transhumanist technologies and will be discussed in 
more depth later in the thesis.  
Another key influence on modern bioethics has been the Second World War, 
and its aftermath.84 After the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, there was a 
subsequent international awareness and condemnation of the Holocaust and 
Nazi atrocities during the war, and this marked the beginning of the modern 
human rights movement. Under the Nazi regime, non-consensual medical 
experiments had been conducted on prisoners – Jews, but also children and 
other vulnerable groups, and prisoners of war. At an ideological level, this 
experimentation was justified by the Nazis using a racial purity ideology, and the 
fact that these groups were regarded as sub-human (Untermenschen), so “did 
not count” as human beings. As a consequence of the subsequent international 
outcry, ethical standards for scientific experimentation and international human 
rights agreements were developed, such as the Nuremberg Code (1947), the 
World Medical Association’s Declaration of Geneva (1948), and the Helsinki 
 
83 Neil Messer, SCM Study Guide: Christian Ethics (London: SCM, 2006), p. 80. 
84 Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Seale, Introduction to Bioethics, pp. 23-24. 
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Declaration (1964).85 Duffin contends that the Nuremberg Code had little impact 
on the development of US life sciences research after the war; 86 nevertheless, 
as well as providing a framework for human rights, these standards did also 
provided the foundations for modern, ethical clinical trial methodology,87 which 
is important in assessing the efficacy and safety of new drugs.88 
Other stimuli for the development of modern bioethics as a discipline were: a) 
the perceived inadequacies of traditional forms of ethical thought; b) the rapid 
advance of biomedical technology (as evidenced by the post-war development 
of the pharmaceutical industry in the “therapeutic revolution” era); c) decreasing 
paternalism in medicine, and decreasing deference to the authority of the 
medical profession, and d) an increasing concern for the environment and the 
sustainability of the earth’s resources.89 
Modern bioethics is therefore concerned not just with the practice of medicine 
and the behaviours of medical practitioners, but with the appropriate distribution 
of healthcare services in society, and the political and financial implications of 
this distribution. New medical technologies (for example, transplantation, 
genetic and reproductive technologies) have introduced new ethical issues, 
such as, 1) how much intervention is ethically justified, when radical forms of 
medical intervention are technologically possible? 2) at what point does death 
occur? and 3) how can scarce resources be distributed equitably? 90 The first 
and third of these issues are especially important in any ethical evaluation of 
future transhumanism and enhancement technologies. Indeed, I will show in 
Chapter 5 that, similarly, the ethics of transhumanist medical technologies are 
far broader than the ethics of individual medical intervention and in addition 
 
85 Jackson, The History of Medicine, p. 171. At present, the Declaration of 
Geneva is being proposed as an alternative to the Hippocratic Oath for various 
healthcare professions, not just medicine.  
86 Jacalyn Duffin, History of Medicine: A Scandalously Short Introduction 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 323. 
87 Duffin, History of Medicine, p. 105. 
88 Clinical trial methodological issues were of particular importance in the 
development of SSRI antidepressants, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
89 Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle, Introduction to Bioethics, p. 24. 
90 Jackson, The History of Medicine, p. 193. 
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relate to the equitable distribution of medical technologies in society and the 
extent to which human life and community as a whole is affected by their use.  
To conclude this section, I would argue that, in its long and illustrious history, 
medical ethics has developed through three phases, a Hippocratic phase, a 
Renaissance/Enlightenment phase and a Late Modern phase. Initially, with the 
Hippocratic tradition of ancient Greece, medical ethics focused in the duties and 
behaviours of the medical practitioner. As the scientific knowledge and methods 
of medicine were undeveloped at that time, the conduct of the practitioner was 
the key determinant in the moral good and reputation of the practice of 
medicine. Then, following the Renaissance and Enlightenment, when greater 
experimental knowledge of the human body gradually brought more 
sophisticated methods of medical treatment, ethical questions in medicine 
began to focus on the techniques of medicine and the consequences of these 
techniques for the patient. Finally, in the late modern and post-modern era, with 
the developments of modern bioethics, the ethical questions of healthcare and 
medicine are no longer solely restricted to ethical questions about the practice 
of medicine. They now encompass questions about distribution of healthcare 
resources in society – budget, staffing, medicines and equipment - the 
relationship between healthcare and human rights in society and the extent to 
which medical intervention is appropriate in an age where radical and far-
reaching medical technologies are available. 
It is within this ethical context that the ethical implications of proposed future 
transhumanist biomedical technologies must be evaluated. I will evaluate 
transhumanist technologies in Chapter 2, but the final section of this opening 
chapter will examine the assumptions, scope and limitations of this project, and 
a brief discussion of the ethical and pastoral implications of this work.  
1.6. Assumptions, Scope & Limitations of the Project 
This project makes some important assumptions: 
a) that past and future medical technologies can be compared in a like-for-
like way using the chosen, published criteria. Given that previous 
therapeutic developments and future transhumanist technologies are 
40 
 
both forms of technology (i.e. material ways of effecting a task or 
process) used medically, this is a reasonable assumption. However, it 
must be acknowledged that the perception of technology is affected by 
prevailing sociocultural views of what a technology is. So, for example, a 
popular understanding of technology might be that it consists of 
computers and electronics; however, a wheel is a form of technology 
(albeit a well-established one). 
b) that ethical issues identified with previous medical technologies will be 
applicable to the discussion of future technologies. Given that medical 
ethics, at any time in history, is about the features or effects of a medical 
technology, and its impact on individual human beings, and on human 
society as a whole, it is reasonable to assume that the ethical issues 
arising from previous medical technologies would be applicable in some 
way to future biomedical technologies.  
c) that it is possible to determine permissible and desirable features of 
future medical technologies specifically from the standpoint of Christian 
ethics. Given that there has already been a Christian response to, and 
critique of, proposed transhumanism technologies (which will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2), and that there have often been 
Christian ethical issues with past medical treatments (including both the 
pharmaceutical case studies presented in this thesis), again it is 
reasonable to assume that a Christian ethical evaluation of biomedical 
technologies is equally possible for both past and future technologies. 
The scope of this project is the evaluation of medical technologies from a 
perspective of Christian theological ethics, and how ethical findings from case 
studies of previous developments in chemical therapeutics might influence an 
ethical evaluation of future transhumanist biomedical developments. Some 
scientific history will be presented in this thesis (and indeed, has already been 
presented), but only as much as to provide the background and context for a 
study in theological ethics of medical science. Similarly, this work will explore 
and explicate areas of theology – for example, the imago Dei, theological 
anthropology and eschatology – but only as far as they are relevant to my 
ethical evaluation of biomedical technologies. 
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The main limitations of the project are therefore as follows: 
a) the project is a project of theological ethics and will focus on Christian 
ethical responses to medical technologies and the theological issues that 
underpin them. 
b) the project will concern itself with Christian views of medical ethics, 
although it is acknowledged that the other Abrahamic faiths (Judaism 
and Islam) may have similar ethical stances on use of medical 
technologies, arising from their doctrines of creation, humanity and 
eschatology. 
c) although the project surveys a range of proposed transhumanist 
technologies, it chooses just two case studies of past therapeutics from 
the “therapeutic revolution” era of twentieth century pharmaceutical 
development. This is to allow enough space to critically evaluate the 
theological ethical issues in detail. The two case studies – the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants - have therefore been 
chosen carefully, and the rationale for this choice is presented later in 
this chapter.  
d) the implications of the findings of this project will be limited to medical 
ethics and pastoral care. While the project touches on broader 
theological issues – for example, social justice, gender theology, 
theology of ecology and the environment and human distinctiveness, 
among others - it will not explore these in any detail. 
The next sections will examine in detail the methodology for the project, 
describing the literature review technique of the project, and the rationale for 
case studies and use of objective criteria.  
1.7. Literature Review 
In a PhD project, it is common to undertake a discrete literature review, in order 
to critically evaluate the research that has already taken place in the field, to 
determine where gaps in knowledge lie, and how the proposed research relates 
to the body of knowledge already available, and to define the scope and 
objectives of the proposed research project. This project is multidisciplinary in 
scope and engages with literature in different areas – clinical medicine, the 
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history of medicine, transhumanism, theology of technology and theological 
ethics – in order to create an ethical dialogue between past therapeutic 
developments and proposed future transhumanist biomedical technologies. It is 
therefore more appropriate to survey and critically evaluate relevant literature 
relating to each chapter as an ongoing process, and for this reason there is no 
discrete literature review for the project.  
1.8. Use of Case Studies 
This study uses a case study methodology to examine two cases of 
pharmaceutical technology, looking specifically at the history of the 
development and use of the technology, its impact on society and Christian 
ethical responses to the technology. This section describes the benefits and 
drawbacks of case study methodology and explains why case studies have 
been used in this project. 
Case studies were first adopted in the nineteenth century in the teaching of 
medicine and the law, because teachers found that students learnt general, 
abstract principles better from the review of specific, actual examples.91 Case 
study methodology for teaching and research is now widespread in the social 
sciences, although it has been described - perhaps unfairly - as the “weak 
sibling” of social science methods, compared to surveys, ethnographic studies 
or analysis of archival information.92 In addition, case studies have become the 
most widely-used method in practical theology for evaluating formation, faith 
experience or church or ministerial practice.93 The case study has been 
particularly beneficial in the clinical pastoral education tradition,94 and so it is a 
natural development for a case study methodology to be used here to evaluate 
Christian ethical responses to biomedical technologies. 
 
91 Daniel Schipani, “Case Study Method”, in The Wiley Blackwell Companion to 
Practical Theology, edited by Bonnie Miller-McLemore (Chichester: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2011), pp. 91-101. 
92 Schipani, “Case Study Method”, p. 92; Robert Yin, Case Study Research: 
Design and Methods, 3rd Edition (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2013), pp. 1-18. 
93 Schipani, “Case Study Method”, p. 91. 
94 Schipani, “Case Study Method”, p. 93. 
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Bill Gilham has described a “case” as having the following attributes: 95 
1) It is a unit of human activity embedded in the real world; 
2) It can only be studied and understood in context; 
3) It exists in the here and now, and 
4) It merges into the context, so the case/context boundary is hard to 
determine. 
Development of a new drug or medical technology fits well into this definition of 
a case because it is a specific activity but, as I have shown earlier in this 
chapter, takes place – in the developed health economies of the United 
Kingdom and United States - in a wider context. Furthermore, in terms of 
medical technology development, this context has four aspects – the alleviation 
of human suffering and fulfilment of healthcare needs, the scientific endeavour 
of the pharmaceutical and bioscience industries, the practice of medicine and 
finally government financial investment in life sciences research. Indeed, all 
these contextual strands are merged in the ethical evaluation of drug 
development which, again, makes case study methodology appropriate for this 
work.  
In his discussion of case studies in practical theology, Schipani quotes Asquith’s 
definition of a case as “an organised and systematic way of studying and 
reporting various aspects of a person, family group or (in this case) a situation, 
using a structured outline of subjects and questions.” 96 The two case studies in 
this project are structured, systematic descriptions of two situations – the 
discovery and use of two types of drug – with the intention of evaluating these 
situations according to criteria for potential transhumanist developments, and 
analysing the ethical issues involved.  
The relevant literature discusses the strengths and benefits of case studies: 
 
95 Bill Gillham, Case Study Research Methods (London: Continuum, 2000), pp. 
1-9. 
96 Schipani, “Case Study Method”, p. 91. 
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1) Case studies are good for answering “how” or “why” questions, rather 
than questions with quantitative answers.97 A case study method is 
therefore suitable for theological ethical reflection. 
2) Case studies are useful for situations where the investigator has little 
control over the events.98 Both these case studies took place in the past, 
so they fit with this criterion. 
3) Case studies are useful for contemporary events.99 Although, as 
mentioned above, these two cases of drug development took place in the 
past, it was the recent past and, as shown in the case study chapters, 
these drug developments are “contemporary” in that their benefits are 
still being realised by human society at the current time. Furthermore, 
these cases are in the “here and now”, as described by Gillham’s 
definition of a case,100 inasmuch as they are actual and specific, as 
opposed to abstract. These case studies can therefore be regarded as 
contemporary in their relevance. 
4) Case studies can be used to assess multiple sources of evidence.101 
Thus, the case studies here encompass different domains of evidence 
from different types of literature – the scientific history of drug discovery, 
the impact of the drug on society and Christian ethical responses to the 
drug – in the same case study. 
5) Case studies are helpful for naturalistic research – the exploration of 
human phenomena embedded in the real world, which accounts for “real 
world” complexity.102 This, Gillham argues (rather stridently) is in 
opposition to the empiricism and positivism of the natural sciences. With 
a naturalistic approach, he states, there are three features: a) there are, 
in theory, no a priori theoretical assumptions and, although it is important 
to be aware of the related literature, it may not be relevant to the case in 
point; b) information derived from case studies is not “manufactured” in 
 
97 Yin, Case Study Research, pp. 2-5. 
98 Yin, Case Study Research, pp. 2-5. 
99 Yin, Case Study Research, pp. 2-5. 
100 Gillham, Case Study Research Methods, p. 1. 
101 Gillham, Case Study Research Methods, p. 1. 
102 Gillham, Case Study Research Methods, pp. 5-8. 
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the same way that experimental data in the natural sciences can be 
“manufactured” by the experimental conditions,103 and therefore, c) the 
conclusions of case studies are inductive, rather than deductive as 
natural science experimental method is. The cases used here are 
naturalistic, in that they use evidence from the real-world complexity of 
drug development to develop ethical principles. However, the study 
methodology used here is not entirely naturalistic, in that it imposes a 
structure on the case studies, and it assesses the cases according to 
particular objective criteria, in a way that might be analogous to the 
experimental conditions of natural sciences. 
6) Case studies are reflective, in that they enable theological reflection 
about a specific, practical situation.104 This, in my view, is an important 
element of any applied ethical study, and this reflexivity will be developed 
later in this thesis, especially during Chapter 5, and in the formulation of 
conclusions in Chapter 6.  
However, case study methodology has its drawbacks, and has been criticised 
for various reasons. This next section examines criticisms that have been raised 
about case studies and assesses how relevant these criticisms are for the 
cases in this study. 
Yin has given three criticisms of case studies as a method:105 
1) Case studies have been criticised for lack of rigour; they can be 
constructed in a non-systematic way, so that equivocal evidence or 
biased views could affect the conclusions of the study. 
2) Case studies provide little basis for generalisation; the case study is not 
a statistical “sample”, as scientific methodology might use, and it is 
generalisable only to a theoretical proposition, rather than to a 
population.  
 
103 Gillham’s contrast of “real world” data from case studies with “manufactured” 
experimental data in the natural sciences is as sharp a contrast as that between 
the naturalism of case studies and the positivism of natural sciences. 
104 Schipani, “Case Study Method”, p. 92. 
105 Yin, Case Study Research, pp. 10-15. 
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3) Case studies can be hard to define closely and are in danger of being 
“aimless” in their scope, and thus can result in large, unwieldy 
documentation. 
Concerning the first of these three criticisms, the danger of a lack of rigour can 
be averted by applying a clear structure and process to the presentation and 
evaluation of the case study – which has been done in this project – and by 
ensuring that the case is presented appropriately in the context of the whole 
project, which again has been done. Each of the two cases has a clear 
structure, comprising: a) scientific introduction, b) impact of the drug on society, 
c) motivations of the developers, d) Christian ethical responses to the 
development and e) theological and ethical critique of the drug according to the 
criteria for transhumanist developments proposed in Chapter 2.  
Concerning the second of these criticisms, about generalisability, this might, at 
first sight, appear to be a legitimate criticism of this project. These two cases of 
past drug development are indeed being used to inform ethical reflection on any 
possible future transhumanist biomedical technologies. The question is: can 
these two past case studies be representative of all past medical 
developments? However, as discussed above, these case studies are more 
naturalistic than empiricist, and their conclusions concerning ethics of future 
technological projects are inductive rather than deductive. In any case, as I will 
argue below, the two case studies in this project have been carefully chosen 
because they have the potential to be most relevant to transhumanist medical 
developments. 
Concerning the third criticism, about the scope, definition and length of case 
studies, the specific nature of the case studies and the way in which the 
material is structured in these two case studies will mitigate this problem. 
1.9. Rationale for the Cases Chosen 
This next section will explain why the two case studies in this thesis – the oral 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants – were chosen to develop an 
ethical dialogue with transhumanism. As described earlier, many of the drug 
discoveries during the therapeutic revolution years have had significant benefits 
for human health and wellbeing. For example: 
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 Development of penicillin and specifically acting modern antibiotics has 
significantly reduced mortality from serious systemic bacterial infections. 
 Availability of beta blocking agents to reduce heart rate and blood 
pressure has had a major impact on the incidence of heart attacks and 
stroke, and the mortality and morbidity associated with these conditions.  
 Use of inhaled salbutamol, as a bronchodilator, has made a significant 
difference to the quality of life and long-term health of individuals with 
asthma. 
 The development of cimetidine and other specific antiulcer drugs for 
gastric ulcers has revolutionised the treatment of what was previously a 
debilitating disease. 
 The development of increasingly sophisticated and specific cytotoxic and 
hormonal agents for cancer chemotherapy has improved the mortality 
rates and morbidity with various types of cancer.  
Any of the above therapeutic developments have had far-reaching health 
benefits, in terms of mortality (life expectancy) and morbidity (quality of life), 
which, in turn, have had an impact on human flourishing. However, these 
benefits have been primarily at an individual and a medical level, and they have 
only had an indirect effect on human society as a whole. 
The two case studies used in this study, however, have been chosen because, 
not only have they brought about health benefits for the individual, they have 
had an impact on society beyond the practice of medicine, and not merely on 
the health and wellbeing of society, but also on societal values and popular 
culture.  Because of this impact, the ethical implications of these medicines are 
broader than just the medical ethical principles associated with the treatment of 
the individual, and the role of the healthcare practitioner. In his reflection on the 
impact of psychopharmacology on the individual and on society, psychiatrist 
David Healy has pointed out how both psychopharmacological agents 
(antipsychotics and antidepressants) and contraception have the potential to 
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change human society.106 He claims that contraception has profoundly changed 
the sexual order, by changing the dynamics of sexual relationships and the role 
of women in society, and that psychopharmacology has changed the social 
order, by getting people out of mental institutions and into mainstream society, 
and eliminating the “hidden” population of mentally-ill people. Both these 
medical interventions – the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants – have 
had effects on society, not just the health of the individual, which is why they 
have come to the attention of the churches and of Christian commentators and 
have been subject to ethical critique.  
The contraceptive pill was the first drug to be widely distributed to a population 
that was otherwise healthy.107 Consequently, although the pill may have specific 
benefits as a treatment for a proportion of women with menstrual disorders,108 it 
is largely an “enhancement” for healthy women. This, in itself, raises ethical 
issues, and I would argue that the contraceptive pill has had a lesser impact on 
absolute human health outcomes than some other therapeutic developments - 
for example, the use of penicillin antibiotics for serious infections. But, because 
of its contraceptive effects, and therefore its impact on sex, marriage and sexual 
politics, the pill is more than just a medical intervention and has had a 
significant impact on relationships and on society as a whole. For this reason, 
Elaine May has described the pill as “a flashpoint for social transformation”,109 
and the use of the contraceptive pill rapidly came to the attention of Christian 
ethicists, and the moral theologians of the Catholic church, in particular. The 
opposition to hormonal contraception, largely on natural law grounds, by the 
 
106 David Healy, "Psychopharmacology and the government of the self", 
Colloquium at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Nature Medicine, 
2000. 
107 Robert Jutte, Contraception: A History, translated by V. Russell (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2008), p. 288. 
108 Luis Bahamondes, Valeria Bahamondes and Lee P. Shulman, "Non-
contraceptive benefits of hormonal and intrauterine reversible contraceptive 
methods" Human Reproduction Update, 21 (2015), pp. 640-651. 
109 Elaine Tyler May, America and The Pill: A History of Promise, Peril and 
Liberation (New York: Basic Books, 2010), p. 168. 
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Roman Catholic church is well-known.110 It has already been mentioned in this 
chapter and will be described in more detail in Chapter 3. 
In a similar way, although Prozac and other SSRIs were developed as specific 
treatments for clinical depression, they have been adopted for use in cases 
where the person has few or no symptoms of depression, to enhance 
personality and to help people feel “better than well”. This has led to the “Prozac 
phenomenon”, epitomised by the work of psychiatrist, Peter Kramer, which will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.111 Again, although SSRIs were an advance 
in the treatment of depression, and undoubtedly have reduced mortality relating 
to suicide because of their safety in overdose, they probably have not had as 
large an impact on health outcomes as some other therapeutic developments 
during the therapeutic revolution – for example, penicillin or beta blockers, or 
even some of the drug discoveries earlier in the history of psychopharmacology, 
such as the first antipsychotics. However, SSRI antidepressants have had an 
impact on society as a whole, due to their widespread use and their fine-tuned 
effects on personality and relationships. For this reason, psychiatrists, such as 
Kramer and Healy,112 have highlighted the possible ethical issues with these 
drugs, and again they have come to the attention of various Christian 
commentators.113 The Roman Catholic scholar, John-Mark Miravalle, has 
developed an ethical evaluation of SSRI use, based on Aquinas and natural 
law, analogous to the approach taken by the Roman Catholic church with the 
contraceptive pill.114 I will evaluate Miravalle’s work at length in Chapter 4. 
Overall, therefore, the societal effects of these two medical developments and 
their ethical implications, which are already recognised, make them the 
 
110 Adrian Thatcher, God, Sex and Gender: An Introduction (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011), pp. 211-233. 
111 Peter Kramer, Listening to Prozac, (New York/London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 
1-21. 
112 Kramer, Listening to Prozac, p. xv; David Healy, Let Them Eat Prozac: The 
Unhealthy Relationship Between the Pharmaceutical Industry and Depression 
(New York/London: New York University Press, 2004), p. 255. 
113 For example, John Stapert, "Curing an Illness or Transforming the Self? The 
Power of Prozac", Christian Century, 111 (1994), pp. 684-687. 
114 Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God, p. 59. 
50 
 
optimum cases of previous drug development to use to open a dialogue on 
therapeutic ethics with future transhumanist proposals. 
Nevertheless, I would like to make a few clarifications of scope with these 
cases. The case study of contraception concerns the use of the oral 
contraceptive pill only, as first launched in 1960 and developed from that time, 
because this is what has had the greatest initial impact on society, and this is 
what the Roman Catholic church significantly reacted to, with the publication of 
Humanae Vitae in 1968. This case study does not include other forms of 
hormonal contraception, such as depot injections (Depo-Provera) and implants 
(Norplant, NexPlanon etc); because of their long-acting nature and the potential 
for non-consensual administration, there are additional ethical issues with these 
forms of hormonal contraception,115 which will not be considered by this study. 
The case study of SSRI antidepressants will focus on the five selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors launched between 1988 and 1991 – namely, 
fluoxetine (brand name: Prozac), fluvoxamine (Faverin), sertraline (Lustral, 
Zoloft), paroxetine (Seroxat, Paxil) and citalopram (Celexa, Cipramil), since 
these are the drugs with the largest US market shares that will have contributed 
most to the SSRI cultural phenomenon, and that have attracted attention from 
ethicists.116 Other newer antidepressants, such as venlafaxine and mirtazapine, 
may have similar levels of efficacy and clinical utility, but are not included in this 
study. In addition, in this thesis, the term “SSRI antidepressants” is used to 
signify the whole group taken as a whole, and the term “Prozac” (the brand 
name for fluoxetine) is used in general terms to refer to any SSRI use in popular 
culture (e.g “the Prozac phenomenon”), as it is often used in that way in the 
relevant literature. 
1.10. Use of Objective Criteria 
In this project, particular objective criteria are used – both general criteria, to 
evaluate the extent to which a biomedical technology can be considered a 
 
115 See Betsy Hartmann, Reproductive Rights and Wrongs: The Global Politics 
of Population Control (Boston: South End Press, 1995), p. 202. 
116 For example, Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu, “Normal Human Variation: 
Refocussing the Enhancement Debate”, Bioethics, 29 (2015), pp. 133-143. 
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transhumanist development and specific criteria to facilitate their ethical 
evaluation. These criteria are applied equally to proposed transhumanist 
technologies in Chapter 2, the oral contraceptive pill in Chapter 3 and SSRI 
antidepressants in Chapter 4.The objective criteria chosen are an important tool 
for determining the extent to which the different therapeutic developments may 
be considered equivalent, and therefore the extent to which ethical issues 
raised with previous therapeutic developments are applicable to future 
transhumanist proposals, and might therefore add to, or modify, current 
Christian ethical views of transhumanism.  
Criteria (from the Greek krisis – points of judgement) are important in general 
terms because they provide an objective view from which to evaluate specific 
cases or instances, and they also set limits on, and provide structure to, the 
resulting discussion. The importance of structure in a case study methodology 
has already been discussed. Criteria are a means of making information 
coherent and intelligible. In his study of phronēsis (practical wisdom) as a via 
media between foundationalism and nihilism, Guarino asserts that “because all 
theories and forms of life are not equally true, criteria must be developed so as 
to distinguish coherency from incoherency, and rationality from irrationality.”117 
Another important role of criteria is to make existential questions universally 
intelligible. Jacobsen argues that, for universal and public understanding of 
existential questions, criteria accessible to all must be used to present their 
truth.118 I would argue that objective criteria therefore have an important role in 
the methodology of this study given that, in popular culture, scientific knowledge 
is often treated as a specialist, esoteric domain and the objective of this project 
is to formulate a universal and publicly intelligible ethical approach to future 
technologies based on experience with previous technologies.  
All these qualities of criteria are important when considering an evaluation of the 
transhumanism movement in particular. As will be shown in Chapter 2, the 
 
117 Thomas Guarino, “Between Foundationalism and Nihilism: Is Phronesis the 
Via Media for Theology?”, Theological Studies, 54 (1993), pp. 37-54. 
118 Eneida Jacobsen, “Models of Public Theology”, International Journal of 
Public Theology, 6 (2012), pp. 7–22. 
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transhumanist movement is broad and philosophically diffuse, with a varied 
range of adherents, and the use of criteria is therefore an important means of 
enabling a structured, coherent, rational and objective overall assessment of the 
movement and its proposed technologies. The transhumanist movement might 
seem like an esoteric sect but, from a preliminary view, the technologies it 
proposes would appear to have far-reaching implications for human life and 
flourishing, and how human life might be lived in the future. It is right, therefore, 
that the issues and ethical questions surrounding this are made publicly 
accessible and intelligible, and the use of criteria here facilitates this process of 
clarification. 
In this study, three sets of criteria are used to assess the biomedical 
technologies – one general set of criteria, to assess whether the technology can 
be considered a transhumanist technology, and two sets of theologically-
informed criteria, to facilitate the ethical evaluation of the technology. Between 
them, these three sets of criteria are used to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of a biomedical technology to understand its status as a 
transhumanist technology and the ethical issues associated with it.  
The general criteria for a transhumanist biomedical technology used in this 
study are derived from the work of transhumanist scholars, and are as follows: 
1) That it is a technology119 – in other words, it is a material means of 
effecting a task or process.  
2) That the technology is applied to a human person in some way.120 At the 
core of transhumanism is the transformation of the human condition, and 
the improvement of human society. 
 
119 Max More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism”, in The Transhumanist 
Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology and 
Philosophy of the Post-Human Future, edited by Max More and Natasha Vita-
More (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p. 13. 
120 World Transhumanism Association, “Transhumanist Declaration”, pp. 54-55. 
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3) That the technology is applied to the human person to improve human 
function, increase longevity or promote human flourishing.121  
4) That the human person has autonomy in the use of the technology – in 
other words, the technology is not being applied in a coercive way.122 
These criteria are as broad in scope as the transhumanist movement itself. 
Furthermore, as I will demonstrate in detail in Chapter 2, these criteria are 
derived from the literature of transhumanism and so their application to 
transhumanist technologies is, in a sense, a circular argument. However, it is 
instructive to apply these general criteria to the two therapeutic case studies, 
which concern pharmaceutical products that were developed mainly before the 
development of transhumanism as a movement – to evaluate the extent to 
which these pharmaceutical developments were, in their time, transhumanist in 
character. 
In addition, two specific sets of theologically informed criteria are used to 
assess the ethical aspects of the biomedical technologies in this project. 
The first of these sets is based on the work of theological ethicist, Neil Messer, 
who has developed four “diagnostic questions” about whether a 
biotechnological project is aligned with God’s saving work in the world, or not.123 
These diagnostic questions would be applicable to transhumanist 
developments, as radical biomedical enhancements are essentially 
biotechnology projects. These questions are as follows: 
1) Is the project good news for the poor? 
2) Is the project an attempt to be “like God” (in respect of Genesis 3v5) or 
does it conform to the image of God? (Genesis 1v26) 
3) What attitude does the project embody towards the material world 
(including our own bodies)? 
 
121 World Transhumanism Association, “Transhumanist Declaration”, pp. 54-55. 
122 More, “Philosophy of Transhumanism”, p. 13. 
123 Neil Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics, pp. 229-235. 
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4) What attitude does the project embody towards past failures? 
The second set of theologically-informed criteria are based on the work of 
Elaine Graham,124 who identifies three theological issues that are problematic 
with the concept of transhumanism – embodiment, autonomy and subjectivity – 
and which should be explored with any new biomedical technology. These 
issues are: 
1) Autonomy – the problem with transhumanist medical technologies is that 
they enable unbridled autonomy in a negative manner.  
2) Subjectivity – the problem with transhumanist medical technologies is 
that they are focused too much on the users’ subjective experiences. 
3) Embodiment – the problem with transhumanist technologies is that they 
interfere with the integrity of the individual body and can therefore have a 
disruptive effect on the corporate body – the community.  
The purpose of these two theologically informed sets of criteria is to define and 
describe what aspects of biomedical technology are problematic in respect of 
Christian ethics, and to determine the extent to which each of these 
technologies is desirable or permissible from a Christian ethical perspective. 
The utility of these specific theological criteria, and why they were chosen, will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, following a detailed analysis of the 
transhumanism movement. The final section of this opening chapter will outline 
the significance of this research from a medical ethical and pastoral 
perspective.  
1.11. Pastoral Significance of Ethics 
Ronald Cole-Turner has argued that medical technology is imposing a new 
metaphysics on human nature.125 Commenting on Peter Kramer’s book 
“Listening to Prozac”, Cole-Turner argues that reductionist biological arguments 
have caused humanity to conflate natural and spiritual considerations, and that 
 
124 Elaine Graham, “In Whose Image?” pp. 56-69. 




human society is now trying to solve spiritual problems with pharmacological 
solutions. Similarly, Michael Burdett has pointed out the potentially profound 
impact of future medical technologies, arguing that transhumanism applies 
biomedical technology directly to the human being in a way that “radicalises 
human transcendence and transformation, advocating going beyond the 
human”.126 For Burdett, the significance of transhumanist biomedical 
technologies is that they go beyond the purview of medicine and seek potential 
solutions to metaphysical issues.  
A brief overview of pharmaceutical medicine and its effects on the human 
population suggests that pharmaceutical developments to date have had a 
significant impact on human health outcomes and well-being. However, this 
impact is small compared to other areas of progress with health and welfare in 
society during the modern era, for example, better sanitation, hygiene and 
nutrition. Proposed transhumanist biomedical technologies would have a more 
radical effect on human life than current medicines and could therefore 
potentially have a greater positive effect on human health and wellbeing than 
current medical therapies. 
It is possible that, during the twenty-first century, there will be an “enhancement” 
revolution that will be more far-reaching than the “therapeutic revolution” of the 
twentieth century. However, this “enhancement revolution” will have medical 
implications. Transhumanist biomedical technologies may reduce mortality rates 
more significantly than pharmacological medicine to date and may lead to 
another shift in causes of death in future. Furthermore, given the current drive 
towards personalised medicine, the appropriate application of technologies that 
might be regarded as “high tech” and tending towards transhumanist – for 
example, gene therapy, medical nanotechnology or cybernetic enhancements – 
has the potential to enable truly personalised healthcare, by enhancing the 
human person in an individual, customisable way.  
 
126 Michael Burdett, Technology and the Rise of Transhumanism (Cambridge: 
Grove, 2014), p. 5. 
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There will be commercial factors driving the implementation of future 
transhumanist technologies, as there have been with previous medical 
technologies. However, with future “high tech” biomedical technologies - which 
will be expensive, at least at the prototype and early commercialisation stage - 
there may be considerable budgetary restrictions to the deployment of such 
technologies in the health services of developed countries as they currently 
stand, if current approaches to health policy are adhered to.  
However, during this “enhancement revolution” it will be important from an 
ethical perspective that what is good about the human person – and human 
society – is upheld and preserved. This would be a goal for people of goodwill 
of all religious traditions and none, although this thesis will examine this from a 
perspective of Christian theological ethics.  
Given that issues relating to Christian ethics have been raised with past medical 
technologies – pharmacological treatments, including the two case studies 
presented in this thesis – it is important to critique transhumanist biomedical 
technologies from a specifically Christian perspective, because these 
technologies may affect humanity in a way contrary to how humanity is 
envisioned in Christian doctrine. However, it is also important to do this ethical 
evaluation in the light of experience with past medical technologies, to 
determine which ethical issues with future technologies really are significant in 
terms of Christian ethics, and which issues are likely to be of lesser 
significance, because they have been encountered already, and have found to 
be unwarranted.  
This study has two important ethical implications. First, it will place the ethical 
evaluation of transhumanist technologies into its proper historical context, 
namely recent developments both in modern medicine and within the discipline 
of medical ethics. This will enable a nuanced and comprehensive - and realistic 
- ethical evaluation of future technologies, which will limit any unhelpful, “brave 
new world” popular perceptions and cultural assumptions and put any dystopian 
fears into perspective. In the earlier section of this chapter on the history of 
medical ethics, I indicated that to date there have been three phases of medical 
ethics, the Hippocratic phase, the Renaissance/Enlightenment phase and the 
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Late Modern phase. It may be that, in historical context, a new, fourth phase of 
medical ethics is needed to address the issues of transhumanism. Second, this 
study will provide an ethical framework which will allow theologians and 
scientists to consider the merits of future medical technologies that have not yet 
been discovered, and to consider ethical issues with medical technologies in a 
proactive way, when they are at the discovery, design and prototyping stages. 
The study also has important pastoral implications. The church’s reaction to 
medical developments is often a dissonant one. At an individual level, 
Christians seek health technologies to heal and control disease and improve 
quality of life, as much as any citizen in wider society. However, in preaching 
and public discourse, churches may give mixed messages about medical 
technology. On the one hand, medical technology is heralded as a gift to 
humanity from a God who is the creator and sustainer of all living things. But, on 
the other, churches are wary of exploring medical advances in any depth, either 
because of a lack of scientific knowledge about them, a cultural fear of their 
implications, or a theology that understands healing to be the prerogative of 
God alone. For this reason, there is little shared understanding of medical 
issues in the church, which leads to two pastoral issues. First, individual 
Christians may be left to face ethical decisions about medical treatment alone 
and without the church’s support - typically when these decisions are urgent 
and relate to serious illness or end of life care for themselves or their family. 
Second, the lack of coherent engagement of churches with medical 
technologies means that, unless they work in medicine and healthcare, 
individual Christians may not have the confidence to speak about medical 
issues from a Christian perspective, openly and with an appropriate vocabulary, 
at a time when such medical technologies are the subject of much popular 
speculation. 
My hope is that this project will make some contribution to all these important 
issues. These ethical and pastoral implications will be reviewed and expanded, 
based on the findings of this work, in the concluding chapter of the thesis. The 
next chapter, however, will develop this evaluation by describing 
transhumanism in its different forms, and applying the general and theologically 
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Chapter 2 – Humanity & Transhumanism 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the transhumanism movement, describe some issues 
in theological ethics with the transhumanism movement, discuss the objective 
criteria – the general criteria used to determine what a transhumanist 
technology is and the specific, theological criteria used to determine how the 
technology should be assessed ethically -  and apply those criteria to some 
proposed transhumanist medical technologies. The first sections of this chapter 
will define transhumanism and describe the origins and intellectual landscape of 
the transhumanism movement. Because of the diverse nature of the 
transhumanist movement, a wide range of scholars will be discussed in this 
opening section, and their contributions will be discussed thematically and then 
evaluated, so that a taxonomy of the transhumanism movement can be 
developed. This will help to define and understand the key concepts of 
transhumanist thought, and the theological and ethical responses to them. 
There will then be a discussion on how the concept of transhumanist biomedical 
enhancement relates to the development of medicine to date, as described in 
the first chapter of the thesis. 
After introducing the general criteria for a transhumanist development, the 
second part of the chapter will then provide a theological and ethical critique of 
transhumanist ideas, looking first at social ethics and then four issues in 
theological ethics, personal autonomy, nature, embodiment and the imago Dei. 
The third part of the chapter will then introduce the specific theological criteria 
that are used for ethical assessment of the  past and future biomedical 
technologies in this study as the means of assessing the technologies from a 
specifically Christian perspective and explain why they have been chosen as 
criteria in this project. In the last part of this chapter, these criteria will then be 
used to provide a preliminary ethical evaluation of some of the transhumanist 
technologies proposed to date. These general and specific criteria will then be 
used in the following two chapters to help to assess the  two previous 
therapeutic developments - the contraceptive pill and selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants – to determine whether they can be 
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classed as transhumanist technologies, and to evaluate their ethical 
implications. 
2.2. Definition of Transhumanism 
In this first section, some definitions of transhumanism are presented. As seen 
in the previous chapter, notwithstanding socio-cultural influences, the 
development of modern medicine has been largely a scientific and technological 
endeavour. By contrast, transhumanism is essentially a philosophical and 
intellectual movement, mainly because many of the technologies it envisages 
are not yet scientifically feasible and have not yet been developed. Thus, Max 
More has defined transhumanism as, 
“Philosophies of life…that seek the continuation and acceleration of the 
evolution of intelligent life beyond its current human form and human 
limitations by means of science, technology, guided by life-promoting 
principles and values”.127   
More helpfully states that the name “transhumanism” implies that 
transhumanism goes beyond what is currently considered to be human. 
Therefore, it is not just about the use of education or culture to refine human 
life, but about using biomedical technology to go beyond the current biological 
limits of human life.128 
In its literature, the World Transhumanist Association is slightly more specific, 
describing transhumanism as,  
“the intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and 
desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through 
applied reason, especially by developing and making widely available 
 
127 Max More, “The Philosophy of Transhumanism”, in The Transhumanist 
Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology and 
Philosophy of the Post-Human Future, edited by Max More and Natasha Vita-
More (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2013) pp. 1-17. 
128 More, “Philosophy of Transhumanism”, p. 5. 
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technologies to eliminate ageing and to greatly enhance human 
intellectual, physical and psychological capacities.” 129 
Another prominent transhumanist, Nicholas Bostrom, has defined 
transhumanism, more succinctly, as, 
“an interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the 
opportunities for enhancing the human condition that are emerging 
through advancing technology”.130  
The term “transhumanist” tends to be used to describe the process or 
technologies for human change, while the term “post-human” (as a noun) is 
used to describe the end point of transhumanism – the transformed human 
entity. Thus, More states that transhumanist technologies are applied so that 
humans may become post-human - that is to say, no longer recognisably 
human by current standards, but with greatly enhanced characteristics, such as 
greater physical capability, cognitive capacity, and extended life expectancy.131  
Confusingly, the terms “transhuman(ist)” and “post-human” are sometimes used 
interchangeably in the literature; for example, Anthony Miccoli refers to “post-
humanist scholars” in a way that suggests that, in fact, he is using the term 
post-humanism to describe the process, instead of transhumanism.132 
These definitions indicate that, while proposed transhumanist technologies may 
be biomedical in character, they are applied with the intention of transforming 
human life in more radical and different ways than has happened with medical 
technologies to date.  
 
 
129 World Transhumanism Association, “The Transhumanist FAQ, v2.1”, 2003, 
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2.3. The Origins of Transhumanism 
This section examines the origins and historical development of the 
transhumanist movement. Human beings have sought to acquire immortality or 
new capacities since time immemorial.133 The pseudo-science of alchemy was 
concerned with the notion of human transformation, and More has described 
the alchemists from the thirteenth century onwards as “proto-
transhumanists”.134 As discussed in Chapter 1, at the time of the Renaissance, 
nature and the human body became seen as legitimate objects of study and, 
subsequently, the Enlightenment focused on rationalism and empiricism. These 
intellectual changes enabled transhumanist aspirations to be envisaged, and 
the rise of modern science has made these aspirations realistic possibilities.  
There have been various influences on the development of transhumanist 
thought. The work of Charles Darwin on evolution and natural selection has 
understandably been foundational to the development of transhumanism,135 as 
it represented a sea change in the understanding of humanity, introducing the 
idea that there was no “fixed” human nature, but that human nature was still 
evolving and emerging. Accordingly, some transhumanists – for example, Ray 
Kurzweil and Hans Moravec - describe transhumanist technological 
development as continuous with, or analogous to, the process of human 
evolution. 
Nietzsche and the existentialists were also significant for the development of 
transhumanist thought.136 While Nietzsche was not interested in the role of 
technology in humanity per se, his ideas of individualistic experience, personal 
growth and cultural refinement arising from the incommensurability of human 
existence align well with the aims of the transhumanist movement. In addition, 
the works of scientist J.B.S. Haldane (“Daedalus: Science and the Future”), and 
 
133 Nicholas Bostrom, “A History of Transhumanist Thought” Journal of 
Evolution and Technology, 14 (2005), p. 1.  
134 More, “Philosophy of Transhumanism”, p. 9.  
135 Bostrom, “History of Transhumanist Thought”, p. 3.  
136 Bostrom, “History of Transhumanist Thought”, p. 4.  
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of science fiction writer Aldous Huxley (“Brave New World”) have described the 
use of technology to transform human life radically, and have therefore fed the 
imagination of transhumanists.137  During the 1960s, philosopher and author, 
F.M. Esfandiary, who subsequently changed his name to F.M. 2030, ran a 
series of classes entitled “New Concepts of the Human”. He described a 
transhumanist as a “transitional human who, by virtue of their technology usage, 
cultural values and lifestyle, constitutes an evolutionary link with the coming era 
of post-humanity.”138 F.M. 2030 said that a transhumanist was characterised by; 
a) their use of technologies, b) their absence of religious beliefs, and c) their 
rejection of traditional family values.139  In 1998, the World Transhumanist 
Association was formed by Nick Bostrom and David Pearce, in order to provide 
a respectable academic outlet for transhumanist ideas. The transhumanist 
movement began in North America, but transhumanism is gaining adherents 
throughout the western world,140 which is significant for the future of medicine, 
and for socio-cultural attitudes to healthcare in developed countries, an issue 
that will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
2.4. The Intellectual Landscape of Transhumanism 
The different protagonists of the transhumanist movement have taken different 
approaches to the transhumanist project, depending on their academic 
interests, and the worldviews underlying those interests. Nicholas Bostrom is a 
philosopher, and he rightly takes a holistic approach, viewing the transhumanist 
movement as part of the wider intellectual, cultural and social development of 
humanity, rather than simply a biotechnology project.141 Bostrom argues that 
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transhumanism has its roots in secular humanism;142 he appears to understand 
transhumanism as a means of improving the human condition, in the tradition of 
liberal optimism and progress.143  
Bostrom - perhaps naively - appears unconcerned about any loss of human 
values as a result of technological intervention, or about the possibility of the 
loss of human identity. He refers to the incompleteness of humanity, when he 
describes the transhumanist desire to make good the “half-baked” project of 
human nature.144 He states that, from a transhumanist perspective, moral status 
is independent of species membership, but is related to intellectual capacity, 
rather than human embodiment.145 As well as the theological concerns this 
raises in respect of embodiment, this view is also troublesome when 
considering the theological status of human beings who lack intellectual 
capacity for whatever reason, which has implications for the imago Dei, the 
understanding of how human beings bear the image of God. Both these 
theological issues will be explored later in this chapter.  
Bostrom takes a futurist approach to the transhumanism project, exploring how 
existential risks to humanity might lead to global security threats and human 
extinction, and how technological benefits might in future lead to socioeconomic 
benefits. He also acknowledges the risks inherent in technology itself, and the 
problems of technology deployment related to distributive justice.   
Bostrom has been described as transhumanism’s “most intellectually robust 
proponent”,146 and the social objective of transhumanism that he cites – the use 
of technology to improve wellbeing for all people – is one that is indeed in 
keeping with the optimism of liberal humanism. 
Max More, too, takes a philosophical view of transhumanism.147 As described 
earlier, he defines transhumanism as a life philosophy which, he argues, is 
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about actively seeking a better future, rather than praying to a deity to provide 
one.148 More is therefore dismissive of religion - inappropriately so, in my view, 
given its cultural significance, irrespective of any specific theological 
commitments. More’s life philosophy is devoid of any supernatural beliefs about 
physical transcendence, and yet his approach to transhumanism is, in fact, 
quasi-religious, inasmuch as he presents transhumanism as a life philosophy - 
a good way, or rule, for living life – in a way that seems analogous to religious 
belief and observance.  
More is famous for his slogan, “No more gods, no more faith, no more timid 
holding back. The world belongs to post humanity”, which suggests 
technological optimism, confidence about the importance of the transhumanist 
project, and perhaps humanistic hubris. He asserts that transhumanists do not 
fear death or loathe their physical bodies, and they are not interested in utopia. 
Also, in apparent contrast to Bostrom, More states that transhumanism is not 
about predicting the future, but is about seeking goals for humanity, rather than 
writing a schedule for human history. 
Unlike scholars with a technological background, such as Kurzweil and 
Moravec, More claims - again perhaps naively - that transhumanist technologies 
will not inevitably change humanity.149 That said, More still has a provisional 
view of humanity, arguing that human nature is not an end in itself; that it is not 
perfect, nor is it a given.150 
More has also discussed some key terminology of transhumanist thought.151 He 
states that, as well as greater physical capability, cognitive capacity, and 
extended life expectancy, the post-human may also have morphological 
freedom -  freedom of form - meaning that they may not take on a recognisable 
humanoid body shape.152 For example, the post-human person may be a 
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cyborg,153 or they may be disembodied, as would happen with mind uploading 
technology.154  
More also describes the idea of singularity – a point in history that might be 
reached when, due to environmental conditions or scientific discoveries, 
humanity can no longer continue in its current form of existence.155 Lastly, More 
describes the concept of extropy, a term that he himself has coined (a term 
complementary to the physicochemical concept of entropy), which describes the 
drive to improve humanity beyond its current constraints, and extend the human 
race beyond its current form.156 
Julian Savulescu is an ethicist, and his espousal of transhumanist 
enhancements arises from his consequentialist ethics.157 He makes ethical 
arguments in favour of enhancements, based on what he considers to be the 
consequential benefits for humanity. For example, he has proposed the concept 
of procreative beneficence, which states that parents have a right to select the 
“best possible” child available to them, based on the best available evidence.158 
Savulescu has a permissive attitude to the idea of biological enhancement – so, 
for example, he claims that the use of the drug modafinil to achieve greater 
mental alertness is no different ethically to drinking caffeinated drinks, which is 
a normal part of daily life at present.159 Savulescu is therefore interested in the 
ethical issues surrounding the enhancement potential of drugs that are already 
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in use – for example, the possible use of SSRIs, such as citalopram, for moral 
enhancement – not just the radical and biologically invasive forms of biomedical 
enhancement which might be available in the future.160 
Savulescu argues that biomedical enhancement will promote autonomy but, 
interestingly for someone taking the consequentialist ethical approach, does not 
seem to acknowledge the valid criticism that transhumanist enhancements may 
lead to injustice, or even oppression, in human society, an issue that will be 
discussed later in this chapter.161 Furthermore, Savulescu argues against 
“species-ism” – which he defines as any kind of privileging of human life over 
animal life for any reason.162 He rejects the idea that humanity is intrinsically 
more valuable than any other species. He argues that species-ism is morally 
equivalent to racism and sexism and makes the dubious claim that species-ism 
can reinforce exclusivist attitudes – racism, sexism - within human society,163 a 
claim that seems hard to support. 
By contrast, Hans Moravec is a computing and cybernetics specialist, rather 
than a philosopher. Moravec points to the increasing sophistication of 
computers, the development of artificial intelligence (AI) and the fact that 
computing power is increasing exponentially.164 He argues that a “break even” 
point of computer usefulness will occur at some point in the future, after which 
there will be rapid adoption of sophisticated computers and robotics in all areas 
of life, and a closer symbiosis between computers and humans will develop.165 
He asserts that intelligent machines already exist, and that humans must 
embrace the technological era, rather than shy away from it. Moravec claims 
that, although robots are limited in their applications now, humans often want 
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robots to be limited – because of their egos, humans don’t want to be upstaged 
by robots.166 
Moravec discusses the potential loss of personal identity, a problem that might 
arise from morphological freedom, as described earlier – for example, with 
someone whose brain was uploaded onto a computer.167 He addresses the 
identity issue by appealing to a distinction between body identity, where the 
person is defined by the material matter of their human body, and pattern 
identity, where a person is defined by their thought-patterns and processes.168 
This enables Moravec to address the embodiment problem that mind-uploading 
presents; however, he equates mind with brain, and makes the erroneous 
assumption that thought processes are the sum of human experience, when 
there are many other bodily, material and cultural aspects of human life. A 
criticism of the concept of pattern identity, as opposed to body identity, is that it 
can be described in computing/AI terms as a simulation, rather than real-life. 
However, More has countered this argument by questioning whether a 
simulation has less moral value than “real life”, and the difficulties, in some 
scenarios, of distinguishing between real life and simulation.169 
Moravec’s argument is rich with science-based speculation and technical 
possibilities, but details of the socio-cultural impact of transhumanism – what it 
will actually mean for human experience - are notably absent from the 
discussion and this, in my view, is a significant limitation of his work. 
Ray Kurzweil is a computer specialist, and his scientific premise is similar to 
that of Moravec. Kurzweil argues that computer memories are doubling in size 
every twelve months and, although computer intelligence currently exceeds 
human intelligence only in some narrow domains (for example, playing chess), 
this will change as computers become more sophisticated and, in future, it will 
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be hard to see the difference between computer and human abilities.170 
Kurzweil states that, 
“it will be increasingly difficult to draw any clear distinction between the 
capabilities of human and machine intelligence. The advantages of 
computer intelligence, in terms of speed, accuracy and capacity, will be 
clear. The advantages of human intelligence, on the other hand, will be 
increasingly difficult to distinguish.”171 
Kurzweil acknowledges the role of evolution in human development to date, and 
he argues that eventually computers will be able to evolve in a similar way to 
humans.172 He states that, 
“technology goes beyond the mere fashioning and making of tools. It 
involves a record of tool making and a progression in the sophistication 
of tools. It requires invention and is itself a continuation of evolution by 
other means.”173 
Like Moravec, Kurzweil deals with the identity issue of the disembodied person 
by appealing to pattern identity, rather than body identity.174 However, unlike 
Moravec, Kurzweil acknowledges the problem of disembodiment, stating that 
many of our human activities – for example, eating, sex and sport – don’t make 
sense without a body.175 He therefore explores how synthetic bodies, built with 
nanotechnology and sophisticated virtual interfaces, will enable future post-
humans to have sexual, creative and spiritual experiences.176 He proposes a 
timescale of technological change and suggests that, by 2099, the “reverse 
engineering of humanity will be complete, and carbon-based human life will be 
obsolete”.177 However, while Kurzweil’s vision is compelling scientifically and he 
 
170 Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed 
Human Intelligence (New York: Penguin, 1999), pp. 2-3. 
171 Kurzweil, Age of Spiritual Machines, p. 4. 
172 Kurzweil, Age of Spiritual Machines, p. 18. 
173 Kurzweil, Age of Spiritual Machines, p. 14. 
174 Kurzweil, Age of Spiritual Machines, p. 51-55. 
175 Kurzweil, Age of Spiritual Machines, p. 133-134. 
176 Kurzweil, Age of Spiritual Machines, p. 146. 
177 Kurzweil, Age of Spiritual Machines, pp. 188-190. 
70 
 
seriously tries to picture human experiences in a post-human context, he too 
provides little ethical assessment of the benefits and risks of technology in a 
post-human future. 
N. Katherine Hayles is a literary scholar, rather than a technologist, and her 
view of transhumanism is based on her study of the cyborg – the human/robot 
hybrid – in literature, and the semiotics of the human condition that emerge from 
that study.178 She is highly critical of Moravec’s espousal of mind-uploading, 
and his vision of a disembodied post-human person.179 She declares, 
“How, I asked myself, was it possible for someone of Moravec’s obvious 
intelligence to believe that mind could be separated from body? Even 
assuming that such a separation was possible, how could anyone think 
that consciousness in an entirely different medium would remain 
unchanged, as if it had no connection with embodiment?” 180 
Hayles argues that, while embodiment does not secure gender distinction, it 
shows that thought is “a broader function which depends on the embodied form 
specifically”.181 Hayles examines the meaning of human embodiment through a 
study of the cyborg and cybernetics in the texts of the science-fiction novelists 
Bernard Wolfe and Phillip K. Dick. 
Of Wolfe’s novel, Limbo, she states that, 
“the technical achievements of cybernetics are not at the centre of the 
text. Rather, they serve as a springboard to explore a variety of social, 
political and psychological issues…” 182  
For Hayles, like other scholars of the transhumanist movement, transhumanism 
is more than just about science and technology. Concerning Phillip K. Dick’s 
work, she observes that, “Dick is drawn to cybernetics themes because he 
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understands that cybernetics radically destabilises the ontological foundations 
of what counts as human.”183 Because it introduces the concept of hybridisation 
of flesh and machine in the human physical form, the cyborg appears to 
challenge the notion of body-mind dualism that, in one form or another, has 
often been significant in the understanding of human ontology from ancient 
times. She subsequently observes that “Moravec’s dream of downloading 
human consciousness into a computer would likely come in for some hard 
knocks in literature departments” because they “tend to be sceptical of any kind 
of transcendence, but especially of transcendence through technology.”184 On 
the contrary, transcendence is an important issue for theologians, but the idea 
of transcendence through technology alone is one that theologians would be 
wary of because of their commitment to the Christian account of eschatology 
through relationship with Christ. 
Hayles concludes that embodiment is an important aspect of humanity, and that 
the post-human person need not be anti-human or apocalyptic but can simply 
be a survivor of the human race. She states that, while post-humanity might 
evoke either the terror of human extinction, or the pleasure of a new way of 
being human, evolutionary history affects every aspect of humanity, so 
embodiment cannot be simply cast aside. She argues that,  
“The body is the net result of thousands of years of sedimented 
evolutionary history, and it is naïve to think that this history does not 
affect human behaviours and every level of thought and action.”185 
Hayles’ view of the importance of embodiment in human history and culture 
seems at first sight to be consonant with the Christian message of God who 
became embodied as Christ in human history. This contrasts with the problem 
of disembodiment with some transhumanist technologies, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter. However, Hayles’ claim that humans can “re-
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flesh” themselves with technology could suggest that all material human life is 
just “informational instantiation”, as Miccoli has argued.186  
Donna Haraway is a biologist, feminist and an historian of science and, in her 
work, she discusses the cyborg as a tool for mapping social and bodily 
reality.187 Her underlying agenda is that natural science is a social construct, 
and that its core knowledge is anti-liberationist. She argues that, 
“the degree to which the principle of domination is embedded in our 
natural sciences, especially in those disciplines which seek to explain 
social groups and behaviour, must not be underestimated.” 188 
She further argues that distinctions between pure and applied science and 
between nature and culture are all,  
“versions of the philosophy of science that exploit the rupture between 
subject and object to justify the double ideology of firm scientific 
objectivity and mere personal subjectivity.”189  
Consequently, she claims science is a “buttress of social control”, which 
historically has been used against women.190 This view of science seems to me 
to be excessively anti-realist, given that the purpose of science is primarily to 
elucidate and test theories about the natural (real) world, rather than to develop 
and reinforce social and cultural constructs concerning human experience. The 
endeavour of evidenced-based pharmaceutical medicine to date has certainly 
been concerned with the application of scientific interventions to deal with the 
problems and limitations of the real world. Haraway goes on to argue from 
differences in the interpretation of observational studies of the behaviour of 
langur monkeys - although not, in my view, persuasively - that gender is an 
unavoidable condition of observation in these studies.191 She states that “nature 
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has been theorised and developed through the construct of the life sciences for 
capitalism and patriarchy”.192 Like Hayles, Haraway also identifies the potential 
of the cyborg to challenge dualism. Technological culture, she claims, 
challenges various dualisms in Western thought – between male and female, 
nature and culture – because, with the cyborg, it is not clear who makes, and 
who is made.193 
2.5. Towards a Taxonomy of Transhumanism 
A review of various transhumanist scholars suggests that, although they might 
be diverse in their views, the main protagonists of transhumanism might be 
classified into three main groups. 
The first group of transhumanist thinkers might be classified as philosophical 
transhumanists. These are scholars who see transhumanism as a life 
philosophy, which will enrich human experience and provide a good way of life 
for adherents to follow. This group would include Max More and Nicholas 
Bostrom, and might also include ethicist, Julian Savulescu. 
The second group of transhumanists might be classified as technological 
transhumanists. These are scholars from a technological background – 
computing, artificial intelligence and cybernetics specialists – who see 
transhumanism from the perspective of the effects of technology on human life, 
and the benefits that it can bring. This second group includes Ray Kurzweil and 
Hans Moravec. These thinkers discuss the seemingly inexorable advance of 
technology, and how humanity needs to respond to this development, and 
harness it in a positive way. They might, however, differ in their ideas about how 
exactly humanity might adopt technology to enhance human experience.  
The third group of transhumanist scholars might be termed ideological 
transhumanists. This group explores the impact of transhumanist technology on 
human society; however, they do so in way that is neutral to technology per se 
but which, in my view, sees these technologies primarily as a tool for exploring 
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cultural and ideological issues. So, for example, Katherine Hayles uses the 
cyborg in literature as a means of exploring embodiment as an element of 
gender identity, and Donna Haraway presents the cyborg as a means of 
challenging patriarchal and anti-liberationist tendencies in Western scientific 
thought.  
Some transhumanists, such as Kurzweil and Moravec, are primarily interested 
in how technology will change humanity, but less interested in the social and 
cultural effects of the application of technology. By contrast, other 
transhumanists, such as Hayles and Haraway, are primarily interested in 
technology as a tool for exploration of ideological issues, such as feminism. 
However, despite the divergent trajectories and worldviews of specific 
transhumanist scholars, various common themes emerge across the 
transhumanist movement. These concern human nature and evolution, 
transcendence, the moral imperative of technology, identity and autonomy. 
As seen in the work of both Bostrom and More, a key theme in transhumanism 
is that human nature is unfinished. As stated earlier, More asserts that 
transhumanists believe that human nature is not an end in itself, and that it is 
not perfect, nor a given.194 Similarly, Nick Bostrom refers to the incompleteness 
of humanity, when he describes the transhumanist desire to make good the 
“half-baked” project of human nature.195. The technological transhumanist 
writers, Ray Kurzweil and Hans Moravec, both cite the evolution of computing 
and artificial intelligence and suggest that the development of transhumanist 
technology is analogous to human evolution. Furthermore, the philosopher and 
author, F.M. Esfandiary acknowledged the unfinished-ness of human nature, 
when he described a transhumanist as a “transitional human who, by virtue of 
their technology usage...constitutes an evolutionary link with the coming era of 
post-humanity.”196 While these views are consistent with the Darwinian notion 
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that there is no fixed human nature,197 they are in stark contrast to the concept 
of natural law in Christian theology, and this will be explored in greater detail 
later in this chapter.  
Another important theme in transhumanism is how biomedical technology will 
enable humanity to transcend itself. More’s concept of extropy describes the 
use of transhumanist technology to help humanity reach beyond its current 
constraints, and to extend beyond its current form.198 The main idea here is the 
opposite to the concept of entropy in chemical science, and is that humanity is 
no longer a closed system, but open to bigger possibilities. Similarly, in his 
critique of transhumanism, McNamee has observed that a key characteristic of 
the transhumanist movement is its refusal to accept the traditional limitations of 
humanity.199  Transhumanism, he states, “deplores the standard paradigms” – 
cultural expectations, political expedience, religion – “that seek to make the 
world comfortable at the expense of human enhancement and advancement”. 
Again, the implications of this for Christian eschatology will be explored later in 
the chapter.  
Adherents of transhumanism will often cite a moral imperative to embracing 
transhumanist developments. For example, Bostrom has argued that scientists 
have a moral obligation to develop new medical technologies to eradicate 
disease and extend life.200  Similarly, Freitas has emphasised the moral duty of 
humanity to explore new medical technologies, arguing that the loss of human 
life to disease is not only tragic at a personal level, but represents a tragic loss 
of knowledge and human capital.201 Moravec emphasises the imperative of 
humanity’s response to technology, when he asserts that intelligent machines 
already exist, and that humans must embrace the technological era, rather than 
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shy away from it.202 Here there is some common ground with medical science, 
where there is equally a moral imperative to use pharmaceutical medicine to 
alleviate human suffering and improve human welfare and the human 
experience. This aspect will be explored further in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Furthermore, the transhumanist movement has its roots in secular modernity,203 
and so it stresses the importance of being proactive, rather than reactive, about 
human goals, of creating better futures with technology, rather than praying to a 
deity to bring a better future. However, while modernity has been largely 
concerned with improving the lot of humanity through education and culture, 
transhumanism seeks to radically transform humanity specifically with 
technology.204 Although development of technologies, such as transportation, 
medicine and electronic communications, have indeed been a feature of the era 
of modernity, transhumanism applies biomedical technology directly to the 
human being in a way that, to quote Michael Burdett, “radicalises human 
transcendence and transformation, advocating going beyond the human”.205 
Transhumanist thought raises issues concerning personal identity. More states 
that transhumanist technologies are applied so that humans may become post-
human - that is to say, no longer recognisably human by current standards.206  
The post-human person may have greater physical capability, cognitive 
capacity, and extended life expectancy, but they may also have morphological 
freedom - freedom of form - so they may not take on a recognisable humanoid 
body shape. As noted above, this may be problematic for body identity, but 
some transhumanists address this by appealing to pattern identity, that a 
person’s identity is defined by their thought patterns and processes, rather than 
their bodily form. This seems to be at odds with the idea of embodiment, and 
importance of the body, as a material, biological entity, in Christian theological 
ethics, based on the doctrine of the incarnation and the New Testament 
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accounts of the bodily resurrection of Christ. This issue will be discussed in 
more depth in a later section of this chapter. 
Autonomy and personal choice are important in the transhumanist worldview, 
as might be expected because of transhumanism’s alignment to liberal 
modernity. Thus, the Transhumanist Declaration states that every human being 
should have the choice about whether to enhance their body and, if so, what 
enhancements to make.207 However, in contrast with the modern era, the 
potential influence of personal autonomy is much more far-reaching in a world 
where there are radically invasive biomedical technologies. In their critique of 
transhumanist medical technologies, McNamee and Edwards have advised 
caution if there is no clear medical end to the application of a technology, 
stating that biomedical enhancements cannot simply be libertarian extensions of 
free choice and consumption.208 
However, despite a number of common themes across transhumanism 
scholarship, More has rightly pointed out that the epistemology and 
metaphysics underlying transhumanist thought is mixed.209 More argues that 
many transhumanists are materialists, in that they see the functions of the 
physical human body as the sum of all reality. He also states that many 
transhumanists are functionalists, who believe that human mental function 
constitutes the person, and must be instantiated in a physical medium, but not 
necessarily a biological one, hence the idea of morphological freedom and the 
espousal of mind-uploading by Kurzweil and Moravec. More states that 
transhumanists are committed to what he describes as pan-critical realism - 
they emphasise the importance of critical thinking, scientific method, empiricism 
and a willingness to revise foundational beliefs. He claims that transhumanists 
therefore do not adhere to foundationalist principles – knowledge axioms based 
on specific metaphysical or philosophical frameworks, or a priori commitments. 
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However, this assertion of the sufficiency of enhancement as the means of 
human transformation might itself be regarded as a foundationalist principle. 
Another area of variation among transhumanist scholars is their attitude to the 
risks associated with biomedical technologies. For example, on the one hand, 
Moravec provides a bold vision of a technologically enabled future whereas, on 
the other, Kurzweil provides a more considered analysis of the problems of 
human experience in such a world. Transhumanists are sometimes perceived 
as gung-ho technological optimists, as is suggested by Max More’s slogan “No 
more gods, no more faith, no more timid holding back”.210 However, in fairness, 
some transhumanist sources acknowledge the risks of technology as well as 
proclaim the benefits. The Transhumanist Declaration, which was developed as 
a “mission statement” by the World Transhumanist Association in 1998, and 
was revised in 2002 and 2009, states that, 
“we need to carefully deliberate how to reduce risks…” [of technology], 
and that “policy making ought to be guided by responsible...moral vision, 
taking seriously both opportunities and risks….” 211  
Both Bostrom and More state that transhumanists admit that technology can be 
misused. 212 Furthermore, Bostrom asserts that transhumanists condemn the 
use of technologies for any state-sponsored eugenics programmes, whether 
motivated by race, gender or any ideological purpose.213  Bostrom’s view is that 
human beings are valuable and that the development of transhumanism does 
not mean that humanity must forego its currently established values - which 
would include abhorrence of genocide.214 
Another interesting area of variation among transhumanists concerns attitudes 
to religious beliefs. More states that, although acceptance of transhumanist 
principles does not rule out religious belief, there are very few Christians who 
 
210 McNamee and Edwards, “Transhumanism”, p. 513.  
211 World Transhumanism Association, “Transhumanist Declaration”, pp. 54-55. 
212 Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values”, p. 16; More, “Philosophy of 
Transhumanism”, p. 14.  
213 Nick Bostrom, “A History of Transhuman Thought”, Journal of Evolution and 
Technology, 14 (2005), p. 20.  
214 Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values”, p. 6, p. 9. 
79 
 
are transhumanists.215 Some of the points of conflict between transhumanism 
and Christianity will already be evident in this discussion and will be explored in 
greater detail later in this chapter. However, some transhumanist commentators 
have proposed positive points of contact between transhumanism and Christian 
faith. For example, Campbell and Walker argue that both transhumanism and 
religious faith offer a means of transcendence and perfectibility.216 However, for 
Campbell and Walker, the transhumanist project is re-contextualising humanity 
in terms of technology. They argue that those who embrace transhumanist 
technologies have a theological mandate to do so as co-creators with God, 
referring to Philip Hefner’s concept of humankind as a “created co-creator” 217 – 
i.e. created by God, yet sharing with God in other creative acts within the world. 
However, Campbell and Walker say, the use of technology to transform 
humanity should be limited by other theological parameters, such as 
embodiment and eschatology, and should be consistent with ethical principles, 
such as justice and respect. Campbell and Walker admit that, with 
transhumanism, attributes of personhood – embodiment and gender – are 
sacrificed in favour of biological attributes, such as strength, memory, and 
longevity.  
Hopkins asserts that both transhumanism and religious faith are a reaction to an 
“animal account” of humanity - a view, he says, that only secular humanists are 
happy with.218 Furthermore, exploring the link between the application of 
transhumanist technology and the imago Dei, the idea that humanity is created 
in the image of God, Garner states that both transhumanism and religious faith 
create social visions that engender hope for their adherents.219 On the one 
hand, he argues that there is a disconnect between transhumanism and the 
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imago Dei, because transhumanism, he claims, rejects species-ism, whereas 
(substantive) approaches to the imago Dei have often, in the past, been used to 
define humanity.220 On the other hand, however, he argues that if human 
society does not embrace transformative biomedical technology, it will be 
rejecting the social transformation that is inherent in the concept of imago Dei 
(presumably in a relational, functional or eschatological view of the imago Dei, 
as will be discussed later in this chapter). Nevertheless, Garner correctly 
identifies that the imago Dei is relevant in both a Christian and a transhumanist 
social vision and this will be explored in greater depth, in a theological critique 
of transhumanism in respect of the imago Dei later in this chapter, and then in 
Chapter 5 in relation to the case studies.  
More recently, Jeanine Thweatt Bates has engaged with Haraway’s work on the 
cyborg and has explored the possibility of developing a theological “post-
anthropology” that would be inclusive of the cyborg.221 In her methodology, 
Thweatt Bates draws a sharp distinction between the cyborg and transhumanist 
technologies, such as mind uploading, stating that the cyborg is not a subset of 
transhumanism.222 I disagree with her categorisation; the cyborg and mind-
uploading both represent radical biomedical technologies, but with differing 
degrees of altered embodiment. Thweatt Bates’ theological post-anthropology 
has several elements. She notes that the functional approach to the imago Dei, 
seen in Hefner’s created co-creator concept, provides a helpful means of 
dialogue between theology and the concept of the cyborg.223 She also notes the 
recent emergence of “body theology”, in contrast to previous approaches to 
human nature which she claims have been dualistic and have deprecated the 
body. Body theology has been important in recent theological developments on 
gender and sexuality – and such an approach, she contends, is important in 
understanding the cyborg because it takes seriously the theological significance 
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of bodily experiences.224 Turning to the issue of hybridity, she examines the 
Garden of Eden account and notes that Adam and Eve were, in fact, both 
hybrids, consisting of material dust and spirit from God. In the light of the first 
humans’ distinctive relationship with God, and the account of the Fall, she 
argues that, in the same way, cyborgs – who are hybrids – could, in a sense, 
have both relational capacity and moral agency.225 Thweatt Bates concludes 
her cyborg theology with a Christological reflection exploring the potential of 
redemption for the cyborg.226 She notes that Jesus, the divine-human hybrid, is 
a cyborg, and therefore represents the “ultimate” human. If this is the case, she 
argues, then Christ can still be a saviour in a future world of transhumanist 
technologies. While her observations are interesting, especially those 
concerning soteriology in scripture, all she seems to demonstrate is that cyborg 
nature can be accounted for theologically using “body theology”, and that 
hybridity is common in a material world (something that Elaine Graham has 
already observed).227 In my view, Thweatt Bates’ cyborg theology may provide 
some grounds for theological inclusion of cyborgs in humanity, but it does not 
provide any ethical basis for adopting cybernetic enhancements and will not 
contribute to a discussion about what good ethical ends are for humanity in a 
technological world, in a way this thesis seeks to do. 
Although these scholars have sought to find common ground between 
transhumanism and religion, many of the parallels identified by Campbell and 
Walker, and Garner – for example, concerning personal transcendence, 
perfectibility and a vision for the improvement of society – are, in my view, at a 
superficial level only; closer inspection of the values of transhumanism show 
significant divergences from Christian theological ethics, especially concerning 
the areas of autonomy, nature, embodiment and the imago Dei, and these will 
be discussed later in the chapter. 
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Much discussion of future transhumanist technology is concerned with 
enhancement – the application of biomedical technologies not primarily to heal 
the human being of disease or disorder, as has been done in the past, but to 
enhance the human being, to extend their function, cognition and longevity. 
Consequently, a definition of what constitutes a biomedical enhancement will be 
helpful in assessing both proposed transhumanist developments and past 
therapeutic case studies. The next section will therefore provide a definition of 
an enhancement, and a discussion about the moral status of enhancements. 
2.6. What is an Enhancement? 
Transhumanist thinkers Chan and Harris define an enhancement as “a 
procedure that improves our functioning; any intervention that increases our 
general capabilities for human flourishing.”228 
However, the definition of “enhancement” requires some exploration. The prima 
facie approach is to say that a treatment is an intervention that restores normal 
function in a person who is ill (dysfunctional), whereas an enhancement is 
something that gives a healthy person additional function and makes them 
“better than well”. Shapiro, however, argues that there are many things which 
could be considered enhancements at present – for example, drinking caffeine 
to improve alertness -  but they are not perceived as enhancements, because 
they are already accepted by society.229 Shapiro points out that a “disorder 
context” needs to be present for a technological intervention to be perceived as 
an enhancement – in other words, it may not be clear that an intervention is an 
enhancement, unless the context of the intervention is medicine or healthcare. 
For example, consumption of caffeinated drinks may be considered a means of 
enhancing mental function, but as it is an occurrence in everyday life, rather 
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than only in the context of a healthcare service, it is not perceived as an 
enhancement.  
Furthermore, the line between a treatment and an enhancement is sometimes 
an indistinct one. Brent Waters argues that a therapy given to an eighty-year old 
with heart failure that restores their cardiac function to that of a healthy eighty-
year old would be regarded as a treatment, but if the person responded very 
well to this therapy and cardiac function improved to that expected in a healthy 
forty-year old, the therapy would be considered an enhancement.230 Shapiro 
also notes that the ethical doctrine of double effect can apply with treatments 
and enhancements; a steroid can be taken with the intention of treating a bad 
knee, but have the unintentional “side-effect” of building muscles.231 
Enhancements are therefore relative; while Bailey suggests that only 
enhancements that take a person well beyond normal human functioning are 
interesting,232 Kahane and Savulescu take the view that even modest 
enhancements can be of ethical and social significance.233 
The other consideration is how “natural” the enhancement appears to be. 
Shapiro observes that it is common to classify a therapy as “natural” and an 
enhancement as “un-natural”.234 However, he argues, this is unhelpful because 
the link between nature and moral status is flawed, and natural law cannot 
apply universally. He gives the example that it is not, in fact, natural for humans 
to wear clothes, but it is certainly traditional for them to do so. However, he 
concedes that the question of how natural an enhancement is, provides a useful 
entry-point to the discussion. Hopkins argues that natural law advocates are 
often the most vociferous opponents of enhancements, but that their objections 
are not to technology per se, but to the anti-essentialist views of humanity often 
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seen in the social sciences.235 He asserts that most advocates of enhancement 
agree that there is a biologically-grounded human nature – otherwise, the 
concept of enhancement would be meaningless as there would be no “basic” 
humanity to be enhanced. The significance of nature and natural law in the 
ethical evaluation of both past biomedical therapies and proposed future 
biomedical enhancements is a major theme in this thesis and will be explored at 
length later in this chapter and in Chapter 5. 
2.7. The Moral Status of Enhancements 
If operating from the principle of natural law – i.e. asking how natural a 
proposed enhancement is - is an unhelpful way of ascertaining an 
enhancement’s moral status, how can the morality of an enhancement be 
adequately determined? The fact that enhancements may be relative – what is 
an enhancement for one person is a treatment for another (see Waters’ 
argument about cardiac function above) - suggests that the moral status of an 
enhancement is predicated on social factors, rather than simply on individual 
biological dysfunction. 
Where a person has a disease, which prevents them functioning normally in 
society, then a just and humane society has a moral obligation to offer a 
treatment via its health service. Correspondingly, if they are a good citizen, the 
person who is ill arguably has some moral obligation to avail themselves of the 
treatment (notwithstanding any extenuating factors concerning the person’s 
circumstances and the nature of the treatment) so as not to be a burden to the 
health service and to society in general. For an enhancement – a biomedical 
procedure that increases a person’s function to greater than normal - the moral 
framework is slightly different. Society does not have a moral obligation to 
provide enhancements to normally functioning individuals, in the same way that 
it has a moral obligation to provide treatments to dysfunctional individuals. 
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Furthermore, an individual who is functioning normally in society does not 
necessarily have a moral obligation to seek enhancement. 
However, if the baseline for normative human function in society were higher – 
for example, if a particular enhancement was used universally in society to 
provide an increased level of function in some way – then there would be an 
obligation for society to provide the enhancement for all citizens. Consequently, 
ter Meulen rightly argues that any discourse about enhancement should be 
considered in terms of societal goals and within the context of human rights.236 
This approach is certainly consistent with the increasing importance of human 
rights in medical ethics in the late 20th century, as described in Chapter 1. 
Moreover, Wolbring suggests the possibility of discussing enhancements 
outside of the framework of health and disease. He suggests that assessments 
of human abilities should be developed to determine able-ism, rather than 
diagnose disease and assess disability and that the concepts of able-ism and 
ability should be used as objective tests for the need for enhancement.237 
If, as argued here, the difference between “treatment” and “enhancement” is not 
always clear when a medical technology is being used in practice, then the 
fairest ethical position for a society is to deploy a biomedical technology to 
ensure that all citizens meet the same standard of ability, regardless of whether 
the technology should be defined as a treatment or an enhancement. In this 
scenario, the state does have a moral duty to provide biomedical 
“enhancement” technologies on the principle of citizen equity, to ensure that all 
citizens can achieve the same standard of function and wellbeing. Furthermore, 
in this scenario, citizens may have a moral obligation to avail themselves of the 
biomedical technology, on the principle of participation in a democratic society 
where equality is valued. I conclude therefore that there is a moral imperative 
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for the use of biomedical technology by a society to benefit human health and 
wellbeing, irrespective of whether the technology is considered a treatment or 
an enhancement. 
In theory, in a just society, access to enhancements should be possible either 
for all citizens equitably, or for no citizens. In practice, however, technologies 
become available and are marketed by the corporations that invent them, so 
what is needed is a regulatory system that enables fair access to 
enhancements by the citizens who need them most, according to transparent, 
objective and verifiable criteria.  
2.8. Transhumanist Technologies 
A diverse range of emerging and potential future technologies have been 
considered transhumanist by advocates of the transhumanism movement. 
Many of these proposed technologies may be radical in their effects on the 
human body, or highly invasive in nature. Some of the technologies are not 
scientifically possible at the time of writing but have been envisaged by some 
science fiction writers, as previously discussed, and because of their potential 
effects on human life are of interest in any case as ethical case studies.  
The proposed technologies that could be considered transhumanist include: 
1) Nanotechnology – the use of microscopic particles, tools and robots to 
interact with the body for medical applications. Freitas has discussed 
nanotechnology in detail, from a transhumanist perspective.238 
2) Genetic enhancements – including germ-line modifications. The potential 
applications of genetic enhancements have been discussed by Bailey.239 
3) Cybernetics – the use of prostheses and robotics to develop and 
enhance bodily function. There has been much philosophical and ethical 
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debate about the cyborg and what it says about human nature and the 
human person.240 
4) Cryonics – placing the human body in suspended animation using 
cryogenic techniques, so that a person can be revived in the distant 
future when radical new medical technologies are available. 
5) Mind Uploading – where all the information in the human brain is 
uploaded onto a computer, in order that a person can live on “in silico” 
without the biological substrate of the frail human body.241 
These technologies are listed above in order, beginning with those that are 
available now in the early 21st century, or that will be available soon, and ending 
with those that are more distant prospects. This list is not exhaustive, but these 
are the technologies which will be considered in some detail in this thesis, both 
in this chapter and in the reflective evaluation in Chapter 5.  
Pharmaceutical advances – for example, drugs that significantly enhance 
cognition, improve mental function and delay aging – might also be considered 
transhumanist technologies. The research question that this thesis addresses is 
whether some significant developments in pharmaceutical medicine to date can 
be regarded as transhumanist, and whether the ethical issues with these 
previous developments modify an ethical analysis of future transhumanist 
developments. 
McNamee and Edwards describe the positive aspects of transhumanism.242  
First, they argue that technology (a product of modernity, as described 
previously) is already being used to improve human life – for example, drainage 
and sewerage systems, drug therapy and computers – and that transhumanist 
technologies are, in a sense, no more than extensions and advances on the 
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technologies already in use. Second, they argue that technological advances 
give humanity the opportunity to make positive future plans, and to proactively 
deal with risks to human life. Third, they state that because, with 
transhumanism, moral status is bound to intellectual capacity and not human 
embodiment or species membership, it is a fairer way of addressing the natural 
variations of bodily function that occur in human life. However, this third claim is 
highly debatable in terms of Christian ethics because, by focusing moral status 
on intellectual capacity, it calls into question the human status of those who 
have learning disabilities or who in some other way lack intellectual capacity. 
2.9. Criteria for Transhumanist Developments 
Given the range of potential technologies that could be described as 
transhumanist, and the differing worldviews of the advocates of the 
transhumanist movement, there is a need to define objective criteria for what 
constitutes a transhumanist biomedical technology. Such criteria will enable 
detailed critical engagement with transhumanism as a movement. They will also 
enable evaluation of previous therapeutic technologies to determine whether, in 
their time, they were transhumanist in character, a key objective of this thesis.  
As mentioned previously, the criteria for a transhumanist technological 
intervention, as defined by the transhumanist literature, are very broad and 
wide-ranging. In summary, the key principles seem to be as follows: 
1) That it is a technology – in other words, it is a material means of effecting 
a task or process.243 This, of course, will include any physical or chemical 
effect or intervention – including pharmacological therapeutics - but may 
also include processes, policies and organisational methods. Bostrom 
notes that technology does not just include gadgets but “all 
instrumentally useful objects and systems that have been deliberately 
created.” 244 
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2) That the technology is applied to a human person in some way. Article 1 
of the 1998 Transhumanist Declaration states that “Humanity will be 
radically changed by technology in the future.” 245 In addition, More 
argues that transhumanism is not just about using education or culture to 
improve the human condition, but using technology to change it.246 At the 
core of transhumanism is the transformation of human life and 
experience, and the improvement of human society. This would therefore 
exclude, for example, computer programmes that make mathematical 
models of chemical structures because, although they are a technology, 
their use cannot directly manipulate human life and experience.  
3) That the technology is applied to the human person to improve human 
function, increase longevity or promote human flourishing. Article 4 of the 
1998 Transhumanist Declaration states that, “Transhumanists advocate 
the moral right to extend their mental and physical…capacities.” 247 
Bostrom claims that, “Transhumanists hope that by responsible use of 
science and technology…we shall eventually manage to become post-
human beings, with vastly greater capacities than present human beings 
have.” 248 Bailey simply claims that “enhancements will enable people to 
flourish.”249 
4) That the human person has autonomy in the use of the technology – in 
other words, the technology is applied in a self-determined way and not 
in a coercive way.250 Bostrom states that “transhumanists typically place 
emphasis on individual freedom and individual choice in the area of 
enhancement technologies.”251 MacNamee and Edwards also note that 
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transhumanists advocate free choice and that this perhaps reflects the 
western free market economy.252 
According to these criteria, a wide range of biomedical technologies could be 
classified as transhumanist in character. However, some of the technologies 
already listed would, if implemented, clearly have a significant impact on human 
life, especially in the light of a Christian understanding of human life and 
flourishing.  
Consequently, although some potential positive features of proposed 
transhumanist technologies have been described, unsurprisingly there have 
also been various ethical and theological critiques of transhumanism. I will now 
discuss these critiques in detail, and then go on to describe more specific, 
theological criteria for the evaluation of transhumanist technologies, which help 
to make an assessment of the technologies in the light of these criticisms.  
2.10. Criticisms of Transhumanism 
As shown in the previous sections, transhumanism is a diffuse movement, and 
approaches to transhumanism have been varied in their epistemic basis, their 
socio-political objectives and their attitudes to technology.253 Perhaps because 
of this, criticisms of transhumanism over the years have been equally varied, 
emanating from bioethicists, social theorists, philosophers and, not least, 
theologians. These criticisms have focused on the following areas: 
a) social ethical and justice issues arising from the economic impact of 
widespread immortality, or at least significant increases in longevity, due 
to transhumanist biomedical technologies; 
b) the effects of transhumanist technologies on personal autonomy and the 
risk of oppression in society due to effects of enhancement technologies 
on individual autonomy; 
c) the extent to which transhumanist biomedical technologies are contrary 
to nature and natural law; 
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d) the challenge of transhumanist biomedical technologies to the notion of 
embodiment, and the importance of embodiment from a Christian 
perspective; 
e) the implications of transhumanism for the imago Dei, the doctrine that 
human beings are made in the image of God and in particular, the 
criticism that transhumanism provides an alternative eschatology.  
2.10.1. Transhumanism & Social Justice 
Many commentators have urged caution about the transhumanist project from 
the perspective of social ethics, and they have been labelled - rather 
pejoratively - as “bio-conservatives” by advocates of transhumanism.254  
Francis Fukuyama, a social philosopher, has famously dismissed 
transhumanism as “the world’s most dangerous idea” because, in his view, it 
eliminates any notion of a “human essence” and thereby undermines any 
defence of legal and political equality of human beings based on a common 
understanding of humanity.255 This idea of a human essence, or an essential 
human nature, has been important in Christian theology in the past, in the 
scholastic natural law tradition, and also in substantive approaches to the 
doctrine of imago Dei, which have sought to understand what specific human 
attributes the imago Dei consists in. Both these will be discussed in later 
sections of this chapter.  
Leon Kass, Chair of the US President’s Council for Bioethics from 2001 to 2005, 
has warned of the possible social and ethical consequences of extended life, 
saying that “Finitude is a blessing for everyone, whether he knows it or not”.256 
Similarly, Stock and Callaghan have  stated that “no social good will come from 
the conquest of death” and, in a pointed critique of the transhumanist principle 
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of free exercise of personal autonomy, he added “and the worst possible way to 
resolve the question of life extension is to leave it to individual choice”.257 
There are various possible social consequences of increased longevity.258 
These include a glut of able-bodied people, with increasing numbers of older 
people in society, a consequent loss of innovation in society (because this is 
often driven by generational change), increased pressure on marriage as a 
means of emotional support for each partner, and on monogamy as a way of 
life. All these are valid concerns, which are already being observed to an extent 
in western society because of increasing longevity due to the availability of 
increasingly sophisticated medical techniques. These factors relating to 
longevity are likely to have an impact on personal relationships, the workplace 
and social care and welfare.  
In fact, theologian Celia Deane-Drummond argues that human finitude is a 
positive good of life.259 She asserts that, where individual choice and consent 
are elevated as ethical norms, immortality is inappropriately privatised.260  
Furthermore, while human perfectibility is seen by some transhumanists as a 
shared goal between transhumanism and religious belief (see, for example, 
Campbell and Walker,261 as discussed), Deane-Drummond argues that, in the 
western Christian tradition, perfectibility is only possible in union with God in the 
next world.262 She concludes that, in this world, a Christian vision of perfection 
 
257 Gregory Stock and Daniel Callahan, “Debates: Point-Counterpoint: Would 
Doubling the Human Life Span Be a Net Positive?” Journals of Gerontology 
Series A: Biological Sciences and Medical Sciences, 59 (2004), pp. B554–
B559. 
258 Bailey, “For Enhancing People”, pp. 327-344. 
259 Bernard Williams has argued philosophically, from human experience and 
desire that, even if immortality were conceivable, it would be intolerable. See 
Bernard Williams, “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of 
Immortality”, in Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers – 1956-1972, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 82-100. 
260 Celia Deane-Drummond, “Future Perfect? God, the Transhuman Future and 
the Quest for Immortality”, in Future Perfect? God, Medicine and Human 
Identity, edited by Celia Deane-Drummond and Peter Manley Scott (London: T& 
and T Clark International, 2006), pp. 168-182.  
261 Campbell and Walker, “Religion and Transhumanism”, pp. i – xv. 
262 Celia Deane-Drummond, “Future Perfect? God, the Transhuman Future and 
the Quest for Immortality”, in Future Perfect? God, Medicine and Human 
93 
 
must find a focus in good medical and bioethical decision-making, if it is to avoid 
anti-materialist Gnosticism.263 
Furthermore, theological ethicist Brent Waters has argued that, ultimately, 
human finitude and medical care are opposed.264 A human being will die and, 
as a means of preventing death, medical therapy will always be ultimately 
thwarted. The proper ethical end of medical care, he argues, is in the alleviation 
of suffering and the care of the vulnerable person. Waters concludes that 
Christians should place their hope in the resurrection of the body of Christian 
theology, not the immortality of the soul that transhumanism offers. The former, 
he claims, completes and fulfils creation, while the latter ultimately rejects it. 
The former is true to nature, while the latter negates nature. 
Another significant objection to the transhumanist project, voiced by both 
bioethicists,265 and theologians,266 is that transhumanist enhancements will lead 
to social inequality, injustice and even oppression, due to the socioeconomic 
differences between the enhanced and the unenhanced in society. Again, these 
are valid concerns, albeit ones that can be offset by wise public policy and good 
regulation of technology. In reply to this, Bailey has argued that there are many 
instances where political and moral equality have not rested on biological 
equality in the past, citing social systems in history, such as feudalism and 
slavery.267 However, these past social inequalities are not a good reason for 
perpetuating social injustice in the future through inequitable biological 
enhancement. 
As well as the ethical consequences of transhumanist technologies for society, 
the ethical consequences for the individual have also been debated. Of 
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particular importance is the issue of personal autonomy and how it is exercised, 
which has been a key feature of medical ethics to date. This will be explored in 
the next section.  
2.10.2. Transhumanism and Autonomy 
As already indicated, the use of transhumanist biomedical technologies raises 
significant questions concerning the exercise of personal autonomy. A stated 
aim of the transhumanist movement, as described earlier, is that individuals 
who are seeking biomedical enhancement can choose to use the biomedical 
technology, or not, autonomously, as a matter of free, personal choice. The 
corresponding theological response to this, raised by Elaine Graham, is that 
transhumanist biomedical technologies therefore are problematic because they 
enable unbridled autonomy in a negative manner.268 This section will therefore 
define autonomy, examine in detail the concept of personal autonomy and 
describe the possible effects of biomedical technologies on autonomy. 
The notion of personal autonomy has become the standard of participation in 
the healthcare system, from the perspective of the recipient of care, and a 
central concept of modern medical ethics. Autonomy is one of the Four 
Principles of medical ethics described by Beauchamp and Childress in 1979,269  
along with beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. The exercise of autonomy 
is essentially about an agent’s capacity for self-government and may be defined 
as “to be one’s own person, to be directed by considerations, desires, 
conditions and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one 
but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self.” 270 I 
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have chosen this particular definition as it is general in context, worded in non-
technical language and yet is sufficiently nuanced to take to account different 
aspects of personal autonomy.  
The concept of autonomy as self-government, or self-rule, appears to be in 
tension with the Christian belief that God is sovereign over all creation and that 
humans are invited to live under his kingly rule (e.g. Psalm 95v3-7, Isaiah 
43v15). Furthermore, the modern notion of autonomy has come from secular 
origins, in the thought of Immanuel Kant and J.S. Mill, whom I will discuss later 
in this section. As a result, Christian ethicists have expressed caution about 
autonomy. Oliver O’Donovan notes that, while liberal political thought has been 
a feature of western society for a long time, the use of medical technologies on 
the otherwise healthy body has highlighted the problem of unhindered personal 
autonomy in the healthcare context.271 With reference to abortion, O’Donovan 
succinctly summarises the situation: “The freedom of self-determination which 
was accorded to the mother was won at the cost of the physician’s freedom”. 
Neil Messer, too, has critiqued autonomy as a factor in biomedical decision-
making.272 He notes, correctly, that there are limits to the goodness of 
autonomy. Autonomy might be in tension with beneficence – for example, when 
a person chooses to refuse a life-saving treatment.  Messer is also sceptical 
about the conditions for true personal autonomy.  
It might seem inappropriate, then, that the exercise of autonomy should be a 
criterion in a Christian ethical evaluation of biomedical technologies. However, I 
would argue that self-determination is a necessary pre-requisite to the exercise 
of Christian moral responsibility. Personal autonomy is not necessarily in 
opposition to divine sovereignty, because the scope of human actions is 
ultimately limited in comparison that of God’s actions. The idea that God gives 
humanity limited autonomy – for example, naming the animals – as a gift is 
seen in Genesis 2-3. Furthermore, although autonomy may not appear to be a 
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Christian concept, freedom certainly is. The New Testament emphasises the 
concept of personal freedom in Christ, through the work of the Holy Spirit (see 2 
Corinthians 3v17 and Galatians 5v13-26). This freedom would not be possible - 
or valuable - if a person were unable to choose it because their ability to 
exercise self-determined choice was limited by other factors.  
Consequently, I contend that personal autonomy – the ability to make a self- 
determined decision – is not incompatible with a Christian understanding of 
divine authority and is a necessary prerequisite to being able to exercise moral 
agency of any type, which would include Christian moral responsibility. The 
functional approach to the imago Dei – which I will discuss later in this chapter – 
holds that humans display the image of God because of their function – their 
role and vocation in the world - implies that a person must make ethical 
decisions about their actions in the world to fulfil their vocation. For this to be 
possible, the person would need a degree of autonomy. Indeed, Christian moral 
responsibility and personal autonomy can be seen as part of the process of 
Christian ethical action in the world. Moral responsibility provides the motivation 
for ethical action, and personal autonomy provides the ability for ethical action.  
As stated earlier, the idea of autonomy as a factor in a Christian ethical study of 
transhumanist biomedical technologies may be particularly problematic given 
the associations of transhumanism with modernity. However, the concept of 
autonomy is important in contemporary medicine, and discussion of autonomy 
in relation to future biomedical technologies will ensure that ethical issues about 
such technologies are intelligible from the perspective of contemporary 
bioethics as well as from theological ethics.  
Autonomy is concerned with self-determination and, in his recent defence of a 
theistic basis for moral decision making, Keith Ward states that, “humans are 
free agents who (partly) self-determine their acts by reason” and that self-
determining moral agents have causal power.273 However, an important factor 
in personal autonomy is the extent to which self-government is affected by 
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factors that are external to the person. An externalist view of autonomy will 
acknowledge that a person’s motivation to act is in response to a wide range of 
arguably external factors.274 These may be coercive socio-political pressures 
which are clearly external, or the constraints of acting in someone else’s best 
interest, which is an external factor, yet with internal causation, because of the 
emotional commitment to the act. These are factors that, for example, may 
influence a woman’s choice to take the contraceptive pill; there may be social 
pressures to do so, or she may feel that she is acting in the best interests of her 
partner or family by doing so. 
A complicating factor with understanding autonomy is that it is difficult to 
distinguish empowering and coercive factors that arise from within the person, 
and their effects on self-government.275 At the most basic level, an agent who 
can make a decision has the authority to determine how he or she will act (if at 
all) in response to the decision, regardless of the external factors that may have 
contributed to it. The person’s motivation to act may be aligned with, or 
coherent with, the person’s character as a moral agent, or it may not. 
According to a coherentist account of autonomy, an act is autonomous if it is 
coherent with the values, motives and desires that arise from the character of 
the person, as a moral agent. However, even if the person’s motivation is 
coherent with their desires or wishes, this does not necessarily mean that the 
decision is made in a truly autonomous way. For example, according to a 
coherentist view, a drug addict’s decision to take an addictive drug may be 
classed as autonomous because their action is aligned with their desires (their 
craving of the drug), but it cannot be regarded as truly autonomous because of 
the addictive nature of drug use. Drug addiction and brain washing are two 
scenarios cited in philosophical literature as being problematic to the concept of 
personal autonomy.276 Both these scenarios are clearly relevant with the use of 
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psychopharmacological agents and will be explored further in Chapter 4, in 
relation to the case study of SSRI antidepressants.  
Before any further consideration of the effects of biomedical technologies on 
autonomy, it is worth considering the nature of personal autonomy in the 
context of healthcare provision. In a medical context, personal autonomy is 
demonstrated when a person can give informed, explicit and non-coerced 
consent for a medical intervention. 
Saad has provided a concise review of the development of autonomy in modern 
medicine, from its origins in the Hippocratic tradition, through its development 
as a modern concept in the Enlightenment thought of Rousseau and Kant, to its 
primacy in contemporary medical ethics.277 While the survey of the history of 
medical ethics in Chapter 1 of this thesis suggests that the Hippocratic tradition 
was concerned primarily with the actions and motivations of the practitioner 
rather than the autonomy of the subject, Saad argues persuasively that the 
dominance of paternalism in ancient medical practice is a caricature and that 
the concept of autonomy was in fact present in the Hippocratic code, but simply 
not made explicit. She argues that the idea of autonomy has been made explicit 
in the Enlightenment era through new ways of expressing morality 
independently of religious revelation. She describes two Enlightenment views of 
autonomy; Rousseau’s vision of autonomy as a personal, rational attribute, 
rather than a political one, where morality is worked out by social contract, and 
Kant’s view, where morality can be discerned from within, objectively deduced 
from a universal moral law (the categorical imperative). She then charts the 
establishment of the concept of autonomy in modern bioethics, in the work of 
Paul Ramsey,278 and Beauchamp.279  
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As well as Rousseau and Kant, another key figure in the development of the 
modern idea of autonomy was John Stuart Mill. In his great work, “On Liberty”, 
Mill described the nature of individual liberty in relation to authority, and this 
included the freedom of thought and emotion, and the freedom to act on those 
thoughts.280 Gillon notes that, for Mill, personal autonomy was important on 
utilitarian grounds, as the means by which the outcome of the greatest good for 
the greatest number could be safeguarded. 281The flaw in this argument, 
however, is that, according to a consequentialist view, personal autonomy will 
only contribute to an overall good consequence if the majority of people have 
the freedom to act in a manner that will lead to a good outcome for the greatest 
number. However, if personal autonomy is a good in its own right, then it is a 
good thing for an individual to have autonomy, and indeed for as many people 
as possible in a society to have autonomy, regardless of the consequential 
impact on society as a whole. Indeed, if autonomy is not an innate good then 
the greatest good for the greatest number in society would be better served by 
no-one in society having personal autonomy – i.e. a totalitarian state.  
This account of the history of autonomy is consistent with the claim that 
transhumanism, with its emphasis on radical personal autonomy in the 
application of enhancement technologies, is a natural development from 
Enlightenment liberal humanism.282 
Saad notes three important characteristics of autonomy as described by 
modern bioethics: 
a) Choices made by autonomous subjects in modern healthcare scenarios 
may not be inherently moral choices. 
b) Autonomy in the modern healthcare context is often individualistic in 
nature, about the wishes of the individual, and does not reflect society’s 
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response. She notes that the duty derived from personal autonomy is, in 
fact, the duty of others (healthcare practitioners) to respect the subject’s 
person’s autonomy.  
c) The sanctity of choice and the principle of non-interference in that choice.  
This introduces the issue of the role of relationships in the autonomy of an 
individual. As mentioned previously, when understanding autonomy, it is hard to 
distinguish internal motivational – or demotivational – factors, from external 
reinforcement or coercion factors. However, commentators have rightly pointed 
out the deficiency of ethical decision-making based on considerations of 
autonomy alone, expressed in the medical context as informed consent, as an 
enabler of human flourishing. In his paper, Sick Autonomy, Tauber argues that 
autonomy is not an individualistic tool for protecting threatened identity, as it is 
often perceived in the lived experience of practitioners in the modern healthcare 
context; rather, it should form part of a wider morality of relationships and 
care.283 He rightly concludes that a broader approach to autonomy helps 
bioethics to balance concerns about actions and decisions with wider issues of 
relationships and responsibilities. Stoljar notes that informed consent, in its 
medical context, is insufficient for autonomy if relationships are taken into 
account.284 She argues – correctly, in my view, given the way that informed 
consent operates in the real-world healthcare context – that informed consent 
simply requires the health professional to seek an opportunity for the patient to 
give permission, whereas true autonomy is developed in the context of a wider 
relationship, a relationship which is not restricted to the individual clinical 
encounter, where the practitioner seeks permission and the patient simply gives 
it. Sandman argues that a relational approach in healthcare is more complicated 
for the healthcare practitioner.285 He contends that a paternalistic relationship 
between patient and practitioner is easy to determine, as it is about compliance 
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by the patient, but a more relational approach to the therapeutic relationship 
involves adherence and concordance, requires negotiation and is much harder 
for either party to determine.  
This reduction of personal autonomy to the process of informed consent in 
medicine and healthcare has wider political implications. Onora O’Neill has 
argued that public trust in science and medicine has declined, despite efforts to 
respect persons and to promote autonomy in society.286 She contends that this 
is due to self-interest on the part of various stakeholders, such as the medical 
profession, politicians and the healthcare industries and that, with the increasing 
emphasis on personal autonomy across society, the autonomy of the powerful 
increases as well as, if not more than, that of the less powerful and 
marginalised. She notes that debate, especially on social media, about new 
medical procedures is shrill, and there appears to be a widespread culture of 
blame in society concerning medical errors, even though the risks of medicine 
are no greater than in earlier generations. O’Neill concludes that this decline of 
public trust in medicine is partly because scientific education of the public is 
lacking, and partly because doctors and scientists do not always communicate 
in an accessible way. She also notes that the contemporary team approach to 
healthcare undermines trust, because the patient is unable to develop a 
relationship with a single practitioner. I would challenge O’Neill’s observation 
about the risks of medicine; in my view, the risks of medicine are greater 
currently because of the availability of more invasive procedures - and will 
become more so as even more radical biomedical technologies become 
available. However, I agree fully with her analysis of the reasons for loss of 
public trust in medicine, and her overall argument that the exercise of autonomy 
in healthcare decision-making is not the sole determinant in public trust in the 
healthcare system.  
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The application of “high-tech” biomedical technologies, such as some of those 
proposed by transhumanism – for example, mind uploading, cybernetics or 
genetic enhancements – has the potential to make radical changes to human 
function and longevity. These changes may undermine individual moral agency 
– and therefore personal autonomy. For example, a cybernetic arm with 
complex computer control software, could include an anti-tamper mechanism 
which might cause the prosthesis to automatically shut down and stop 
functioning – against the will of the person to whom it is attached – if a surgeon 
interfered with it. Also, with a person whose mind has been uploaded on a 
computer, their personal identity may be preserved, but their ability to act in a 
certain way as a person in the world – which is the basis of moral agency – will 
be to some extent compromised by the loss of their body, even if there are 
some artificial interfaces that might compensate to enable the uploaded person 
to engage in some ways with material life.  
The use of such technologies could therefore over-determine the attributes of 
human life for those in whom they are deployed. Miccolli argues that 
transhumanism leads to an abdication of human responsibility and, with an 
eschatological flavour, he asserts that, in the technology-enabled world, 
“technology is God, and all will ultimately submit to it.”287 Consequently, in a 
future technologically-enhanced world, individual autonomy and responsibility 
may be subverted by the will of those who develop, distribute and apply radical 
technologies, and the individual themselves may collude with this loss of moral 
agency by their acceptance and use of these technologies.  
In his work on reproductive technologies, O’Donovan states that, in the modern 
era, the uncritical assumption in society is that medical technologies achieve 
necessary purposes, must be used if available and that the practitioner must 
arrange access to the technology.288 Yet, as discussed above, personal 
autonomy is, to all intents and purposes, a genuine attribute for most people at 
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most times of life (although less so at the beginning and end of life). 
Consequently, the individual can choose whether they wish to use a biomedical 
technology, irrespective of societal expectations. Autonomy is therefore 
significant scientifically and theologically, as well as desirable from a standpoint 
of liberal modern society. 
From this, I would argue that, as a general principle, medical technologies 
should not be adopted uncritically and without any reflection on their 
implications. Instead, they should be explicitly evaluated and deployed in 
accordance with a reasonable assessment of their potential benefits and risks. 
In particular, given the above reflections on autonomy in the use of technology, 
control of medical technologies by humanity, and their critical assimilation into 
human society, is a valid Christian response to their availability, and is 
consistent with current approaches to evidence-based medicine.289 The polar 
alternative is the situation that Miccolli describes; where the technology – or, at 
least, the culture surrounding the technology - controls humanity instead. There 
are indications that this is already happening with the adoption of digital media 
and personal devices, which are now highly pervasive in human society, and 
have considerable potential to manipulate human behaviours.290 
However, the nuances of autonomy should be considered. As discussed above, 
human autonomy is genuine at most times of life, in that it is based on the 
desires and will of the individual, which can be acted upon at the basic level. 
However, autonomy may present itself with varying degrees of efficacy and 
applicability, depending upon the external factors, the different situations and 
circumstances that a person might face. In many situations, a person can 
exercise genuine moral agency – self-determination based on their authentic 
 
289 Steven Woolf, “Evidence-Based Medicine: A Historical and International 
Overview”, Proceedings of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, 31 
(2001), pp. 39-41. 
290 See, for example, Benedikt Ley, Corinna Ogonowski, Jan Hess, Tim 
Reichling, Lin Wan and Volker Wulf, "Impacts of new technologies on media 
usage and social behaviour in domestic environments", Behaviour and 
Information Technology, 33 (2014), pp. 815-828. 
104 
 
desires and will – but sometimes that moral agency may be undermined by 
external controlling factors. 
This ambiguity of autonomy may be difficult for those assessing new 
technologies. However, autonomy has always been an ambiguous concept in 
medical ethics, because of the possibility of unintended consequences of 
medical treatment. A person might choose to receive a large dose of an opiate 
analgesic for relief of severe pain. However, the same dose of opiate might lead 
to respiratory depression and death – which the person may not have chosen. 
Thus, the same action might either uphold or diminish a person’s autonomy, 
depending on the effects of the action on that person’s body. In medicine, 
unintended consequences are an important factor in whether a person or 
practitioner can exercise true autonomy when making treatment choices, and 
the doctrine of double effect in medical ethics protects and upholds the good 
motivations of the practitioner against the uncertainty of unintended 
consequences.  
In addition to the question of autonomy, defined as self-determination by the 
individual, and what might undermine it, there is the separate question of the 
morality of the choice made by the autonomous person. As highlighted 
previously, the capacity for autonomous choice may be consciously exercised 
by a person for good ends or for bad ends. The moral agent may choose to do 
good works in human society, creating a just and fair society and nurturing a 
positive and generous culture. Alternatively, the agent may choose to act 
selfishly, for vanity or personal gain, or to exploit the weak and marginalised in 
society for their own benefit. While the fact of having autonomy might have 
some innate moral value, the choice made by the autonomous individual will 
also contribute to the moral significance of the situation. 
One response to this issue of appropriate use of autonomy might be to use 
biomedical technology for “moral enhancement”, to ensure people always make 
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good moral choices.291 Although moral bio-enhancement is medically possible, 
it would be problematic for understanding autonomy. If the moral enhancement 
agent changes the individual’s desires and will so that they always want to 
make the right choice – and therefore they do always make the right choice – 
then with a coherentist understanding of autonomy (the course of action chosen 
is aligned with the person’s desires), the person’s autonomy would not actually 
be compromised, even though the person is indeed being influenced by an 
external factor. As far as autonomy is concerned, the problem with biomedical 
interventions for “moral enhancement” is their potential to short-circuit the 
process of a person reacting to, and reflecting upon, a situation where a moral 
decision needs to be made.292 This process of reaction and reflection, where a 
person discerns moral factors and implications in a situation as a prerequisite of 
making good decisions about that situation, is important if moral agency is to be 
truly self-determined, or autonomous. In other words, there is moral value in a 
person having autonomy to make a good or bad moral choice, reflecting on the 
choice and then making a good choice. 
Savulescu and Persson propose that pharmaceutical products can be used for 
moral enhancement and increasing individual autonomy.293  However, in 
response, Sparrow contends that the autonomy provided by pharmaceutical 
enhancements is illusory and that there is a risk that enhancements simply 
provide a “fig leaf” for abuse of power and vested interests in a technically-
advanced society.294  Apart from the question of precisely what interventions 
might be considered pharmacologically-mediated “moral enhancement”, 
Sparrow argues that possible inequalities between enhanced and unenhanced 
persons could infringe the autonomy of the unenhanced.295 Savulescu and 
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Persson propose the somewhat abstract concept of a “god-machine” as an 
inhibitor of unbridled autonomy, a regulatory system or process which would 
intervene if an enhanced person chose to act immorally in that society. 
However, Sparrow replies that human beings would still not be free in this 
situation. He cites Phillip Pettit’s republican principle of non-domination as a 
criterion for freedom – i.e. that, for a person to be truly free, they must not be 
subject to domination by another person, group or a political system.296 Sparrow 
argues that a person is therefore not free even if they are dominated by a 
“benevolent” dictator, such as Savulescu and Persson’s proposed “god 
machine”, because it is still a dictator.  
Sparrow concludes that humans would be less free in a future, technological 
world than in the world as it is at present. He argues that, paradoxically, the 
principle of personal autonomy would be undermined, not supported, by 
extensive and radical use of biomedical technology at will. Sparrow compares 
“moral enhancement” – development of moral agency – by pharmacological 
means, with moral agency inculcated by moral and cultural education, and 
concluded that these two modalities for developing moral agency cannot be 
ethically equivalent. Moral advancement by education has implicit in it the 
freedom provided by education, with the potential for debate, dialectic and 
counterargument. By contrast, drug enhancement is a technical intervention. It 
is instrumentalist - i.e. it is a pragmatic intervention towards a specific end, 
rather than something of moral value in itself -  and it treats the person 
enhanced as an object to be manipulated, rather than a personal subject who is 
able to make decisions freely as a moral agent. Sparrow argues persuasively, 
therefore, that personal autonomy is, in fact, reduced after moral enhancement 
by pharmacological means. If biomedical technology were regularly applied to 
human beings in this instrumentalist manner, this would be morally deficient as 
it would make personal autonomy and the exercise of the will routinely 
dependent on the effects of a biomedical technology, which could be deployed 
in society in an oppressive way. 
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The effects of biomedical technologies on personal autonomy and the ability of 
these technologies to objectify a person as an artefact to be manipulated at the 
expense of their subjectivity as an authentic self are both important themes in 
this thesis and will be explored in detail in subsequent chapters. However, I will 
now explore in more detail natural law objections to radical biomedical 
technologies.  
2.10.3. Transhumanism & Nature 
Although the concept of natural law (as distinct from civil law) was seen in the 
work of some classical philosophers – for example, Aristotle, and implicitly in 
the work of Plato – natural law was developed in its fullest form during the 
scholastic era in the twelfth  and thirteenth centuries, through the work of 
theologians such as Thomas Aquinas.297 Aquinas developed a detailed and 
systematic theological account of natural law, drawing on Patristic sources, 
Aristotle, Stoicism and Roman legalists.  The objective of natural law was to 
develop a comprehensive Christian legal and ethical framework to enable the 
church to respond to new situations and new forms of learning that were arising 
in the rapidly changing society of the high Middle Ages. 
The basic tenet of natural law, derived from Aristotle, is that “the good of every 
organism is to attain fully its natural activity.”298 In other words, all creatures are 
directed towards good ends by virtue of their nature. Consequently, any 
phenomenon that prevents a creature fulfilling its nature will frustrate the good 
ends of that creature’s nature. Aquinas expressed his natural law theory in Q90-
94 of Summa Theologica.299 
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The key principles were: 
 There are four laws – eternal law, natural law, divine law and human law 
(Q90, Art 1). 
 Natural law is reasonable and arises from the wisdom of God. Humans 
are therefore rational creatures (Q90, Art 3; Q91, Art 2). 
 Natural law is directed towards flourishing, the common good and virtue 
of all creatures (Q90, Art 2, 3; Q94, Art 3). 
 Natural law is the means by which subjects are directed to their good 
ends (or “proper virtue”) (Q92, Art 2). 
 General principles of truth and morality apply to all people, and are 
equally known by all people (Q94, Art 3). 
Thomistic natural law therefore has a teleological element – natural law is 
directed towards the goal of human flourishing, the exercise of virtue (which 
Aquinas defines as “that which makes something good”) and the common good 
of all people. Thomistic natural law emphasises the importance of reason in 
moral decision-making, as a reflection of the divine wisdom of God. Aquinas 
considered the good of human flourishing to be life, procreation, social life, 
knowledge and rational conduct.300 Furthermore, and of importance for this 
thesis, natural law does not regard things that are artificial as intrinsically evil.  
Thomistic natural law in the Roman Catholic church was revived in the 
nineteenth century, following the publication of Aeterni Patris by Pope Leo XIII 
in 1879. This re-emergence of natural law was also in response to rapidly 
changing conditions in European society, and this publication addressed 
workers’ rights and associated pastoral issues in the increasingly developed 
industrial society of the Victorian era.301 This laid the foundations for the use of 
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Thomistic natural law in Roman Catholic moral deliberation on hormonal 
contraception in the twentieth century, which I will explore in Chapter 3.  
Since Aquinas, there have been various other natural law theorists. These 
included, in the early modern era, Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes, both of 
whom downplayed any theological basis for natural law, and also the 
teleological aspect of natural law.302 Grotius sought to develop a framework of 
natural rights, as opposed to natural law, attempting to develop natural law as a 
universal political system. Hobbes, on the other hand, interpreted natural law in 
radically individualist, subjectivist terms, where the central good of human life 
was self-preservation. The retreat from teleology in natural law in the modern 
era led to the naturalism of modernity, where moral conclusions were drawn 
from observations from nature. David Hume criticised this approach, arguing 
that it is not possible to derive moral precepts from non-moral phenomena (i.e. 
natural attributes), an argument known as the “is-ought” problem.303 
In the twentieth century, the so-called “New Natural Law theorists”, such as 
Germain Grisez and John Finnis, expressed natural law in a way that was 
independent from theology and any notion of virtue, individualistic rather than 
emphasising the common good, and which described the goods of humanity in 
personalist terms.304 
As I implied above, there is therefore a major distinction between Thomistic 
natural law, to which teleology is intrinsic, and the naturalism of modernity, from 
which biological teleology has been eliminated. In my discussion of natural law 
in relation to biomedical technologies - both previous biomedical technologies in 
Chapters 3 and 4 and future biomedical technologies in Chapter 5 – I shall be 
referring to the Thomistic model of natural law, rather than more modern 
approaches. This is for three reasons. First, natural law ethical engagement 
with medicine by the Roman Catholic church to date has been from a Thomist 
 
302 Pope, “Natural Law and Christian Ethics”, p. 74-77. 
303 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L.A. Selby‐Bigge 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 469. 
304 Pope, “Natural Law and Christian Ethics”, pp. 78-79. 
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perspective, as will be discussed in the two case study chapters. Second, the 
Thomist approach is very clearly rooted in theology, and so is most appropriate 
for a Christian ethical evaluation. Third, the Thomist approach seems to be 
clearly committed to the common good, which is important given the social, 
public and political aspects of biotechnology development which I will discuss in 
Chapter 5.  
The main advantage of natural law as a foundation for ethical reflection is that, 
because it is based on human reason, it claims to be universally applicable to 
all cultures and it affirms the innate moral capacity of every person. Morality 
grounded in human nature should, in theory, be the same in all societies and for 
all people.  
There are, however, problems with natural law as a source of ethics.  Natural 
law has been criticised theologically for three main reasons. First, at the 
Reformation, Martin Luther claimed that, because of its emphasis on human 
reason, natural law could not be salvific; humans were completely unable to 
determine morality by reasoning because human reason suffers from the effects 
of original sin. Second, natural law downplays the role of revelation in the 
Christian moral life; for this reason, natural law was criticised by the Reformers 
in the sixteenth century, and by Karl Barth in the twentieth century. Third, 
because natural law is focused on the reasoning of the individual, it does not 
account for the supernatural transformative power of the Holy Spirit, nor does it 
acknowledge the Christian community as an arbiter of morality. 
As well as the philosophical and theological problems described above, natural 
law has also been criticised from a scientific basis, because its key concepts 
appear to be undermined by the findings of evolutionary biology.305 The idea of 
a fixed and unchanging order of nature is challenged by the evolutionary 
principle that nature is changing and evolving. Furthermore, scientific evidence 
 
305 Stephen Pope, “Theological Anthropology: Science and Human Flourishing”, 
in Questioning the Human: Toward a Theological Anthropology for the Twenty-
first Century, edited by Lieven Boeve, Yves De Maeseneer and Ellen Van 
Stichel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 16-17.  
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reveals aspects of nature that appear flawed and that, from an ethical 
perspective, humans should in some circumstances struggle against nature, 
rather than conform to it. Kevin Vanhoozer has similarly argued that the human 
sciences have led to the conclusion that there is no one human nature.306 
This debate questions the ability of natural law to be an adequate foundation for 
ethics of medicine and biotechnology in the twenty-first century when many of 
these technologies are able to manipulate nature itself. This question, in relation 
to past therapeutic discoveries and proposed future biomedical technologies, 
will be discussed at length later in the thesis. 
There may be a parallel between transhumanism and Christian belief in terms 
of teleology, in that both are concerned with changing humanity to escape 
corruption and improve the human experience. However, there seems to be a 
tension between transhumanism and natural law concerning the fixity of human 
and animal nature that natural law appears to suggest. Inherent in 
transhumanism - for example, in F.M. Esfandiary’s description of the 
transhumanist as a “transitional human” constituting “an evolutionary link with 
the coming era of post-humanity”,307 and in the evolutionary understanding of 
transhumanism shown by Kurzweil, Moravec and Hayles - is the idea that 
human nature is eminently malleable and changeable. This, however, seems to 
be in contradiction to the notion of a fixed order of creation and of human nature 
that natural law suggests.  
In any case, there are some goods of life that may not be aligned to the natural 
world. Hopkins quotes Thomas Aquinas as saying that happiness is the ultimate 
human goal, but argues that this cannot be fulfilled in a flawed material world.308 
Conversely, he states that, while advocates of technology might wish to argue 
that greater knowledge of, and control over, the natural world is desirable, this 
 
306 Kevin Vanhoozer, “Human Being: Individual and Social”, in Cambridge 
Companion to Christian Doctrine, edited by Colin Gunton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 161.  
307 Fereidoun M. Esfandiary and FM-2030, Are You a Transhuman? Monitoring 
and Stimulating Your Personal Rate of Growth in a Rapidly Changing World. 
(New York: Warner, 1989), p. 149. 
308 Hopkins, “Is Enhancement Worthy of Being a Right,” p. 351.  
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knowledge and control can be exercised in an arrogant and hubristic way, and 
thus be immoral. Bailey, a supporter of transhumanism, points out that the 
application of biomedical technology does not preclude virtuous moral 
behaviour on the part of the users.309 He argues that people are not necessarily 
less moral or loving in a technological age, pointing out that parental love has 
not been affected by in vitro fertilisation (IVF) to aid conception. The argument 
that the use of supposedly unnatural biomedical technology does not undermine 
virtue is significant, because natural law theory has historically been the basis 
for the Roman Catholic church’s moral pronouncements about biomedical 
technologies, such as the contraceptive pill. This will be discussed in greater 
depth in the next chapter and in Chapter 5.  
In an analogous way, some theologians have pointed out that the effects of 
medical technologies on the nature of the human person do not necessarily 
constitute a violation of spiritual life. In her review of the theological implications 
of transhumanist technologies, Elaine Graham has argued that the effects of a 
medical technology on human nature do not preclude spiritual life.310  Ronald 
Cole Turner has argued that medical technology is imposing a new metaphysics 
on human nature – what could be described as a “meta-technology”.311 He 
examines Peter Kramer’s controversial book “Listening to Prozac” (which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 on SSRI antidepressants) and has argued 
that reductionist biological arguments have caused humanity to conflate natural 
and spiritual considerations, and that human society is now trying 
inappropriately to solve spiritual problems with pharmacological solutions. Both 
Graham and Cole-Turner envisage a distinctively spiritual component of human 
life, which the use of biomedical technology does not necessarily undermine.  
Consequently, distinctions between what is natural and unnatural are relatively 
unhelpful in the technological world, although the natural/unnatural distinction 
may provide a useful starting point. Rather than thinking of nature and natural 
 
309 Bailey, “For Enhancing People”, pp. 331-332.  
310 Elaine Graham, “In Whose Image? p. 69. 
311 Ronald Cole-Turner, “Towards a Theology for the Age of Biotechnology”, in 
Beyond Cloning: Religion and the Remaking of Humanity, edited by Ronald 
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law as a yardstick against which new technologies can be measured, it might be 
better to think of nature as a scalpel with which new technologies can be 
dissected, to evaluate them and understand what is important about them. The 
limitations of natural law as a means of ethical evaluation of future biomedical 
technologies, in the light of past experience, will be developed and explored in 
detail in Chapter 5. 
2.10.4. Transhumanism & Embodiment 
In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the human body has an innate moral value, as 
indicated by Old Testament scriptural emphasis on the sanctity of life (for 
example, seen in Genesis 9v6, Exodus 20v13). In addition, there are various 
strands of Christian thought that come together to support the Christian 
significance of embodied life. 
First, there is the goodness of created humanity (Genesis 1v31). Second, there 
is the incarnation, the belief that God himself assumed the human form as 
Jesus Christ (Philippians 2v5-7). Third, there is the compassion of Jesus 
towards the bodily needs of those around him during his earthly life, for example 
with his healing miracles (see, for example, the woman with a bleed (Mark 
6v25-34), blind Bartimaeus (Mark 10v46-52, and the crippled man by the pool 
(John 5v1-15)). Fourth, and most obviously connected with a Christian 
evaluation of life-extending medical technologies in future because of its 
eschatological dimension, is the resurrection of Jesus and the New Testament 
concept of the resurrection body – both Christ’s resurrection body, and the 
resurrection bodies that Christian believers will ultimately inherit.312 The concept 
of the resurrection body emphasises the fact that bodily identity remains 
significant after death, from a perspective of Christian eschatology, and 
therefore implies that the body is significant in Christian terms during life. 
 
312 Leon Morris, “Resurrection”, in New Bible Dictionary, edited by Iain Marshall, 




This contrasts with the dualism of Platonism, which was a key feature of the 
Greco-Roman thought-world during the New Testament era.313 This dualism 
maintained that the mortal body has an immortal soul within it and, when the 
mortal body dies, the immortal soul is released from the “envelope” of the body. 
Indeed, this idea of the immortal soul living forever after bodily life has found its 
way into popular belief about the resurrection.314 The conflict between the 
importance of embodied life and the significance of the resurrection body in 
early Christianity on one hand, and the prevailing body-soul dualism of Platonist 
thought in wider society at that time on the other, stimulated significant teaching 
about the issue in the Corinthian church (1 Corinthians 15).  
Nevertheless, despite this sharp contrast between Christian and Platonic 
accounts of the body, Christian attitudes to the body have been ambivalent and 
by no means wholly positive about human bodily experience.315 First, Platonist 
thought may have exerted a negative influence on the early Christians and their 
attitudes to the body (hence the need for Paul’s teaching on body-related issues 
– for example, on sex in 1 Corinthians 5-7). Second, Moltmann-Wendel 
suggests that “at a very early stage” (presumably during New Testament 
history), some Christians may have embraced the Stoic principle of the body as 
“a necessary evil”, as a compromise which enabled them to reject Platonism, 
but remain coherent and intelligible to the philosophical thought forms of the 
world around them.316 Third, the value of human life in that era, together with 
the Christian hope of resurrection, may have meant that the early Christians 
held lightly to bodily life, and were less troubled by the prospect of death and 
martyrdom. As Paul said to the Philippian church, “To live is Christ, and to die is 
gain” (Philippians 1v21). However, Paul has also upheld the value of the body in 
his rebuttal of the consequences of dualism, because of the spiritual 
 
313 For a summary, see Delbert Burkett, An Introduction to the New Testament 
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significance of the body (for example, in 1 Corinthians 6,19, against sexual 
licence, “do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit?”). 
Some theologians – for example, Origen and Augustine – have, in fact, taken a 
dualistic approach to theological anthropology and have emphasised the 
importance of spiritual things in the Christian life over the significance of the 
physical body, and this dualistic approach has had a significant place in the 
history of Christian thought. Because of this, it is all the more remarkable that  
such a positive view of the body is seen in the Bible and in the early church, 
especially in a pre-modern age when diseases were not treatable and human 
life was not valued in the same way as it is in the early twenty-first century. As 
well as arising from the Christian doctrines of the incarnation and the bodily 
resurrection of Christ, this emphasis on the significance of the material body 
may be also related to the idea of shalom as human wholeness, wellness and 
flourishing in the material sense.317 
In any case, because of this strand of Christian thought emphasising the 
somatic significance of human existence, Christian critiques of transhumanist 
medical technologies are right to be suspicious of those technologies – for 
example, mind uploading and cybernetics – which deprecate the body, and 
undermine the goods of bodily human life. What might be the problems of a 
non-embodied existence from a Christian perspective? After all, it could be 
argued that transformation is transformation, and that transformation of the 
human body with radical medical technology is no different, in ethical terms, to 
transformation of the human body from an earthly body to a resurrection body 
by the power of the risen Christ, as envisaged by New Testament resurrection 
doctrine (1 Corinthians 15v51: “we shall all be changed”). 
Brent Waters has extensively critiqued the aims of transhumanism from the 
perspective of transhumanist attitudes to the body.318 He notes that, although 
transhumanists are seeking the perfection of humanity, this perfection comes at 
 
317 Apolos Landa, “Shalom and Eirene: The Full Framework for Health Care”, 
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318 Brent Waters, This Mortal Flesh: Incarnation and Bioethics (Grand Rapids: 
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a high price. “The price of perfection for humanity is its deconstruction,” he 
claims.319 Drawing on two short stories by Nathaniel Hawthorne, he notes - 
wisely in my view - that, with some technological interventions, there is no going 
back, and that the consequences of human invulnerability are uncertain. Along 
with nihilism and Pelagianism, Waters points to Manichaeism as a key 
theological influence on transhumanists. The Manichaeists of St Augustine’s 
time wanted to be rescued from the imperfections of their bodies, and the 
prospect of transhumanist technologies does just this, Waters claims. I would 
argue, however, that Waters possibly overstates his case. Divestiture of the 
body is not a central motivation for all transhumanists; for example, Bostrom is 
primarily seeking a better society 320 and More a better body.321 Nevertheless, 
embodied life is important from a perspective of Christian doctrine, as I have 
discussed in this section, and Waters is right to point to the embodied aspects 
of the life of Jesus as counter-arguments to transhumanist technologies which 
deprecate the body. In the incarnation of Christ, the necessity of human finitude 
and mortality of the body are affirmed, Waters claims.322 Furthermore, the 
resurrection of Christ makes possible the resurrection body of the believer, and 
the renewal of creation. Drawing on the work of Oliver O’Donovan, Waters 
argues that moral life is constituted in the ordering of the new creation; he 
argues, correctly in my view, that an embodied nature is vital to obtain the 
proper goods of marriage, because people can only love each other 
meaningfully as embodied creatures.323 
There are two specific areas where the concept of embodiment is important to 
sustain a Christian account of authentic human life, and where Christian 
theologians are justified in their criticism of biomedical technologies which 
negate the body. The first of these is in relation to bodily experiences. Some 
experiences central to human life – for example, sex and eating – are 
inextricably linked to having a body, and existing as a body, as admitted by 
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Kurzweil, despite his advocacy of radical transhumanist technology.324 This is 
reflected in Christian marriage, which is traditionally predicated, to a greater or 
lesser extent, on the physical union of the husband and wife. This also reflected 
in the consumption of the eucharistic sacrament, which is an essential part of 
religious observance for many Christian traditions.  
Being an uploaded mind, rather than living an embodied life, would eliminate, or 
at the very least seriously undermine, these physical aspects of human life, both 
of which are “sacramental” in the broadest Christian terms, and are important in 
a Christian way of life in any culture, in a way which might transcend 
denominational affiliation.325 Any attempt to recreate these experiences 
artificially in an in silico world (and indeed Kurzweil discusses the use of, for 
example, artificial interfaces to simulate sexual experience 326) would be, at 
best, contrived and, at worst, meaningless. With the development of 
sophisticated artificial intelligence in the future, it is possible that an uploaded 
person’s virtual world could be made to be indistinguishable from physical 
reality. However, the fact remains that, however realistic the experience was, it 
would not actually be physical reality, and the material importance of bodily life 
would be undermined.  
The Christian believer, living life as an uploaded mind, bereft of his or her body, 
would be deprived of both bodily union with a spouse, and spiritual union with 
Christ in the Eucharist. These important material things in the Christian life 
would be robbed of their power in a non-embodied world. This would be 
detrimental for the body of the individual Christian believer, and also for the 
body of the church, given the centrality of the sacraments in the ministry of 
Christ and the role of the sacraments, and their implications for ecclesial 
communion, in the life of the church on earth.  
 
324 Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed 
Human Intelligence (New York: Penguin, 1999), pp. 133-134. 
325 The Eucharist and Marriage are both broadly sacramental in nature. With 
Baptism, the Eucharist is one of the two dominical sacraments (the sacraments 
instituted by Christ), and marriage is a sacrament of the Roman Catholic 
church.  
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The second area is in relation to personal identity. The existence of the 
eschatological resurrection body (1 Corinthians 15v35ff) is linked with personal 
post-mortem identity. The risen Jesus retained his identity in his resurrection 
body, and he was recognisable by the disciples, even though his body was 
different (John 20v10-20). In his discussion of anthropology of identity and the 
resurrection of the body, Fernando Vidal states that “According to established 
doctrine, the bodily and psychological identity of resurrected individuals will be 
the same as that of the persons they were while alive.”327 A key element in the 
link between the body (resurrection or otherwise) and identity, Vidal helpfully 
points out, is that resurrection bodies are numerically identical to physical 
bodies – that is to say, they tally up. Nevertheless, Vidal rightly warns that the 
current notion of “identity”, characterised by “radical reflexivity, a first-person 
standpoint and disengagement from the body, is essentially a modern concept, 
and would not have been recognised and understood as such by the early 
church.328 There are therefore complexities in the doctrine of the resurrection 
body about how exactly pre-mortem identity in the earthly body relates to post-
mortem identity of the resurrection body. Nevertheless, in both cases, bodily 
attributes are linked somehow with personal identity, although the identity of the 
resurrection body is linked with that of Christ (see 1 Corinthians 15v49).  
This is in contrast to transhumanist views which suggest that bodily identity is 
not necessary at all, and that personal identity can be established purely as 
pattern identity – the thought-forms and world of the mind alone.329 As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, Ray Kurzweil and Hans Moravec have both 
appealed to pattern identity as a way of safeguarding personal identity in the 
possible future scenario of mind uploading, where an individual’s mind could be 
uploaded onto a computer. Feminist commentator Amy De Baets has claimed 
that pattern identity is a form of dualism which enables the material body to be 
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“forgotten” or discarded, in what she describes as a “Cartesian trick”330 
However, the dualism between body and mind that she describes is not a 
Cartesian dualism because it is not a substance dualism; with pattern identity, 
the mind and its thought forms that constitute identity are not regarded as a 
substance, but a contingent property that can be instantiated in a completely 
different substrate – in a computer rather than in a biological brain and body.  
This contrasts with the monistic view held by Christian theologians such as 
John Polkinghorne,331 and non-reductive physicalist philosophers such as 
Nancey Murphy.332  
In any case, even if the individual whose mind has been uploaded onto a 
computer could assert their personal identity in that state, as Moravec 
supposes, they would not be able to escape their history of previous 
embodiment. This is because they will have memories and reflections related to 
their previous bodily existence, which may be significant for personal identity 
formation. This seemingly inextricable link between consciousness and 
embodiment is one of the reasons why Katherine Hayles rightly asserts the 
importance of bodily life and rebuts Moravec’s arguments for mind uploading.333 
To quote Hayles, “Embodiment has a history”.334 Also, the claim by 
transhumanist Nick Bostrom that intellectual capacity is more significant for a 
person than species membership is also problematic for the idea of human 
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embodiment, because it undermines the distinctiveness of human bodily form, 
as distinct from non-human creatures.335 
Embodiment is not only important for human experience and personal identity, 
in terms of self-understanding, it is also important to enable humans to 
understand themselves in relation to the created world. The specifically 
embodied nature of a human being is highly significant for human engagement 
with the material concerns of the world’s environment – for example, 
maintaining good natural habitats free from pollution, and using the earth’s 
resources in a sustainable manner – because of the specific role of embodied 
human beings as producers and consumers of the earth’s resources.  
These considerations emphasise the dualistic – and, in my view, deficient - 
nature of pattern identity in the non-embodied person. With pattern identity, the 
individual, disembodied essence of a person is emphasised over, and at the 
expense of, the rest of the material world. The individual, disembodied essence 
of a person could possibly be classed as a material entity, in that it is comprised 
of data units expressed in the state of silicon,336  but few would regard such an 
essence as embodied, in that it bears any resemblance to any current realistic 
understanding of human life and experience. One is left wondering whether the 
morphological freedom which some transhumanists advocate is at all 
compatible with the many features and goods of human life, which are 
grounded in human bodily experience. 
On the question of identity, Celia Deane-Drummond argues that the Christian 
vocation of “fusion” with God is about the discovery of one’s true identity, 
whereas the transhumanist project is about changing and eliminating identity, 
through biomedical manipulation of functional and cognitive attributes.337 
Miccoli’s critique of the potential consequences of the transhumanist project 
also touches on the issue of identity.338  He argues that transhumanists do not 
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acknowledge their real motivations for using technology to transform human 
society; transhumanists want to embrace technology to expand themselves – to 
enhance their identity - but in fact the technology embraces them and changes 
them instead, thus diminishing their identity. He argues that, with technology, 
humans believe that they can master the world whereas, by using radical 
technology, humans sacrifice the opportunity of experiencing the world, and 
instead objectify the means through which the world should be experienced – 
the human body itself. Using radical biomedical technology denigrates the body 
by rendering it an object to be manipulated rather than a personal subject.  
Elimination of the human body from human personal identity would have other 
ethical implications too. With the application of the doctrine of double effect in 
medical ethics, an action is morally permissible even if it causes inadvertent 
harm, so long as it is done for the right motives. As mentioned previously, 
situations where the doctrine of double effect is invoked in medicine are 
predicated on the natural, inter-individual variations in bodily function, which 
would include variations in therapeutic effects of medicines between individual 
people, due to metabolic and pharmacogenetic factors. In a world of 
disembodied humanoid life, personal function and identity would rely decisively 
on artificial systems and technology, and this would present problems. The 
more nuanced functional variations in complex artificial cognitive systems may 
well introduce some indeterminacy of cause and effect. This would mean that, 
while the cognitive system is, in theory, more controllable than a human 
organism, there might be areas of “coding” whose operation is not clear to the 
external technician. Therefore, it may, in fact, be harder to resolve problems in 
the posthuman person, than in a physical human body, in the light of three 
millennia of medical experience. The potential controllability of the cognitive 
system also raises the possibility of the disembodied person being controlled by 
external influences, with malign intent. This would constitute a loss of personal 
autonomy due to external factors, as defined earlier. The uploaded mind might 
appear to be a solution to the “problems” of bodily life but treating the 
“pathologies” of the posthuman person -  the uploaded mind - in the future may 
turn out to be every bit as complex as treating the dysfunctional physical human 
body at present. 
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I conclude here that, from a Christian ethical perspective, embodiment is an 
important, and probably necessary, prerequisite for human flourishing, because 
it is the ground for authentic human experience and identity. I would argue that 
material aspects of the Christian faith – in particular the eucharist and marriage 
– and their significance, to a greater or lesser extent, in Christian life and 
observance - would be undermined by technologies that negate human bodily 
life, for example, mind uploading. As well as undermining the qualities of human 
life from a perspective of Christian praxis, technologies that negate the body will 
also have profound effects on the ethics of medical treatment. I will explore this 
further in the light of the two therapeutic case studies in Chapter 5.  
2.10.5. Transhumanism & The Imago Dei 
The Christian doctrine of the image of God – that humanity is made in the 
image and likeness of God (Genesis 1v26) - has important implications for 
understanding human nature, and the relationship of human beings to God, and 
to each other. Before a discussion of the implications of transhumanism for the 
doctrine of imago Dei, a background discussion of the imago Dei is necessary.  
The doctrine of imago Dei is derived from various Biblical texts in the Old 
Testament (Genesis 1v26-27, 5v1-3 and 9v5-6) and in the New Testament (for 
example, Colossians 1v15, 2 Corinthians 4v4, Ephesians 4v24). The meaning 
of imago Dei, as derived from Biblical exegesis, has been hotly debated.339 
However, in the history of Christian thought, four main approaches to imago Dei 
theology have been proposed – the substantive, functional, relational and 
eschatological approaches.340 
The substantive approach attempted to determine which attributes of substance 
are responsible for the imago Dei in human beings and was largely the 
approach taken in the development of the doctrine by theologians such as 
 
339 Westermann has given an overview of the exegetical issues with the Gen 
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Augustine and Aquinas. Traditionally, the substantive attribute most commonly 
thought to represent the imago Dei in humans was rationality or reason. 
However, the substantive approach has various flaws.341 First, it has the 
potential to be dualistic, in that a divinely given substantive attribute, such as 
rationality, is contrasted with material bodily life, and this can lead to human 
embodiment being downplayed. Second, because it takes a “bottom up” 
approach, which seeks the divine attribute in humans, it is often individualistic 
and does not accord well with a social world and the corporate dimension of 
faith and salvation envisaged in the biblical revelation. Third, an emphasis on 
specific substantive attributes as the imago Dei can lead to reductionism, as 
attributes that are supposedly distinctive of humans are then explained in 
biological terms and identified in other species in animal behavioural 
experiments.342 A key criticism of the substantive imago Dei, however, is that it 
has a static view of human nature, rather than a dynamic view, and this is 
particularly important when considering the expected effects of a biomedical 
intervention on a person from a Christian perspective. I will explore this further 
in Chapter 5.  
The functional approach takes the view that the imago Dei is not about the 
attributes of substance that human beings have, but the role, task or vocation 
they have in the world. The functional approach focuses on a “royal 
representative” exegesis of Genesis 1v26 concerning humankind ruling over the 
created world, and sees humanity as representative of God, in their task or 
office in the world.343 However, the functional view has been criticised because 
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it is often associated with the domination of humans over the non-human 
creative world, and the consequent anthropocentrism with which the world 
might be viewed. It is also problematic when considering the humanity of people 
who are seriously disabled or ill, and who may not have the authority of 
purposive function in the world. Herein lies another issue with the functional 
approach; it implicitly assumes some substantive attributes on the part of a 
person, in order that they might be able to function in the world. For example, 
one could argue that functioning in the world requires a human person to have 
attributes such as rational thought or moral capacity.  
The functional approach to the imago Dei has been expressed in the idea of 
stewardship, that humanity images God by exercising a vocation to look after 
world that God created, on his behalf. Southgate has discussed the concept of 
stewardship as a model for the relationship between humans and the non-
human creative world and has summarised its problems.344 One criticism of the 
idea of stewardship is that it can be exploitative and treat the earth as a 
commodity. Another is that stewardship is anthropocentric, focusing on the role 
and ability of humans to act as stewards, and does not sufficiently account for 
the “wildness” of the world. However, for Southgate, a key critique of 
stewardship – and one I endorse - is that it is ethically cautious and not 
sufficiently future-oriented, in that the goal of stewardship is to leave the world 
in no worse a state than it was before. A stewardship approach to the exercise 
of human vocation in the world is therefore probably less applicable in the 
assessment of the adoption of future technologies in the world because it is 
insufficiently future-oriented.  
A better approach to the exercise of human ethical responsibility in the care of 
the natural world in a technological world is the idea of humanity as created co-
creator. Philip Hefner’s concept of the “created co-creator”, states that the 
purpose of human beings is to be “the agency, acting in freedom, to birth the 
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future that is most wholesome for the nature that has birthed us” and that 
“exercising this agency is said to be God’s will for humans” 345. On this basis, 
scientists have a moral and theological mandate to exercise their vocation to 
understand the created order by alleviating human suffering and enhancing 
human life, so long as it is consistent with ethical principles, such as justice and 
respect.346 
Ted Peters argues that, as a created co-creator, humanity has a moral 
obligation to use science to transform the world so that it conforms more closely 
to the vision of God’s new creation.347 For Peters, created co-creator-ship is an 
inherently ethical task, as it is directed towards the human destiny of the 
renewal of creation, and this, in my view, is its strength. Nevertheless, Peters 
acknowledges a key criticism of the created co-creator concept, that humanity 
must be cautious in their co-creativity in order to avoid utopian idealism. 
Michael Northcott has made a sustained Christian critique of the idea of the 
created co-creator. 348 Drawing on two examples, a work of concept art by 
Damien Hirst and the cloned sheep, Dolly, Northcott argues that, in different 
ways, both modern art and cloning are a denial of the beauty of life, and that not 
all things made by human hand have aesthetic appeal. He states correctly that 
all human technology is influenced in some way or other by economic or social 
factors, and therefore careful attention should be paid to the purpose of the 
technology, an area that will be central to my discussion in Chapter 5. He 
argues that the morality of human making depends on an ability to frame that 
making in the God-given purposes of the original creator and, following Ricoeur, 
argues that modern art is an “idolatrous expression of the volitional self”. In my 
view, this criticism does not obviate the need for humanity to exercise the role of 
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created co-creator in the use of technology, because the ethical imperative to 
harness inevitable technology adoption for good ends, consistent with the new 
creation, is still there. However, this ethical imperative does place a 
considerable burden of responsibility on humanity in its created co-creator role; 
in particular, on scientists and therapists as they develop and evaluate new 
biomedical technologies.  
The relational approach proposes that the imago Dei is not about what a person 
is, or what they do, but is about the person’s relationship with God and with 
others. It has its roots in the Reformation, but was developed in its fullest form 
in the twentieth century by Karl Barth.349 The relational approach to imago Dei 
has much to commend it, and has important implications for interpersonal 
relationships, the development of personhood and social and political theology. 
However, the relational approach has been criticised for not being sufficiently 
grounded on biblical exegesis, and also for focusing on certain human 
relationships at the expense of others.350 
Following from New Testament passages describing Christ as the visible image 
of God (Colossians 1v15), the eschatological approach asserts that the imago 
Dei in human beings is perfected in relation to Christ, as the believer is 
conformed to Christ. However, the eschatological approach proposes that the 
imago Dei is still developing and will be ultimately perfected in humanity in 
perfect relationship with God at the eschaton. The German theologian, Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, was a key proponent of the eschatological approach and 
described human nature, and its natural dynamic movements to its destiny of 
life with God using the term exocentricity (Weltoffenheit) - an openness to the 
world, to each other and to our self-consciousness.351  Pannenberg argues that 
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human beings are characterised by having a unique openness to, and freedom 
to enquire into, the world. The eschatological approach therefore takes 
seriously the dynamic nature of the imago Dei, as emphasised by the New 
Testament texts, and the concept of “human becoming” that has been proposed 
by theologians such as Arthur Peacocke.352 Pannenberg’s eschatological 
approach to the imago Dei, with its emphasis on openness to the world and 
freedom to enquire into the world is also consistent with the idea of autonomy, 
defined as self-determination, in response to the world, as discussed earlier. A 
key problem with the eschatological approach to the imago Dei is that the imago 
Dei motif in Genesis 1v27 is introduced in the context of the creation account, 
and its significance seems more likely to be protological than eschatological. In 
addition, the eschatological approach has also been criticised for being 
individualistic, with insufficient emphasis on social structures and ethical action 
in the world, and potentially deterministic.353 
Although these four approaches to imago Dei have been proposed, it is unlikely 
that any one of these alone can provide a definitive description of humanity, in 
the light of current scientific knowledge about human beings. Human life is, at 
the same time, dynamic, embodied, relational, functional, and teleological, so 
actually there would be elements of all four of these approaches in any 
contemporary theological description of human life. 
Some proponents of transhumanism cite the imago Dei – that humanity is 
created in the image of God - in support of the transhumanist project. For 
example, Campbell and Walker ask how the frailty of the human body can be 
reconciled with the idea of humanity being in the image of God, and therefore 
argue that biomedical enhancements would, in effect, restore the image of God 
in humanity.354 In a similar vein, Garner argues that, if medical enhancement 
technologies are not harnessed by humanity, humanity will be rejecting the 
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positive social transformation that is inherent in the human vocation to be in the 
image of God. 
Some theologians have taken a similar approach. Ruth Page has made what 
appears to be a positive argument about the use of medical technology from the 
imago Dei, citing the problem of imago Dei and disease or disability.355 She 
argues that, if a person is diseased or disabled, they are “imperfect” and so 
cannot image a perfect God. She states that it is often assumed that 
biotechnological interventions have the potential to distort the image of God but, 
in this scenario, it could be argued that medical enhancements would restore 
the perfect image of God in someone who is diseased or disabled. On this 
basis, Page concludes, “playing God” would surely be a vice-regal duty, from a 
functional imago Dei perspective. 
These arguments are all problematic. First, they suggest that the imago Dei is 
distorted – and so somehow incomplete - in disabled, or even just unenhanced, 
people.356 Second, they imply that technology (which may not be realistically 
available) may be needed to somehow enact the imago Dei in the disabled or 
unenhanced person, to validate that person. Third, it suggests the imago Dei 
can be completed in human beings by human will, with the application of 
medical technology, whereas the Christological dimension of the imago Dei 
would suggest that human beings can only be perfected by God’s initiative 
through being in Christ, who is the perfect image of God (Colossians 1v15).  
However, there are several other criticisms of transhumanism that arise from 
imago Dei theology. First, transhumanists tend to focus on the individual as the 
subject for enhancement, and on individual autonomy in choosing 
enhancements. This, however, is in tension with functional and relational 
approaches to the imago Dei which are not individualist in nature. The 
functional approach to the imago Dei, based on the “royal representative” 
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exegesis of Genesis 1v26,357 states that humans exercise representative 
authority on behalf of God on earth, and that they have a vocation or office 
which necessarily brings them into relationship with the world around them. Ng 
argues that, just as in the Old Testament, the king had a covenantal relationship 
with God and a duty of ethical and social responsibility to the kingdom, 
analogously, with the functional view of the imago Dei, humans have an ethical 
and social responsibility for the whole of creation by virtue of being part of 
creation.358 Along similar lines, Brent Waters argues that, whether or not they 
remain human by biological criteria, those who undergo radical transhumanist 
enhancements cease to be bearers of the imago Dei precisely because they 
reject their election or calling by God to be co-regents in the world.359 Waters’ 
argument here is that the adoption of radical transhumanist enhancements 
impairs the eschatological imago Dei because it prevents the person from 
progressing to their eschatological destiny from a Christian perspective – 
finitude and union with Christ. Set against this, however, is the possibility that a 
transhumanist enhancement might enable a person to live a better, more moral, 
life in this world. This is a key aspect of the debate about the Christian 
acceptability of radical transhumanist enhancements, which I shall be exploring 
further in Chapter 5.   
The relational approach to the imago Dei focuses on relational aspects of 
human life – vertically with God, and horizontally with other humans – rather 
than specific human attributes. So, for example, in his account of the imago Dei 
in relational terms, Alistair McFadyen has examined the vertical relationship, the 
dialogical relationship that humans have with God, and the horizontal 
relationships with fellow humans.360 He claims that, if these horizontal 
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relationships with other human beings fully reflect God’s image, they too will be 
dialogical and outward-looking. Christ perfectly communicates God to humanity 
(in a dialogical, other-centred way), so faith is therefore transformative for 
relationships, and the church should model this to the world. Although there is 
the potential for the Christological dimension of the imago Dei to be 
individualistic, because it is about the individual’s relationship with God in 
Christ, conformation to Christ (“the image of the invisible God” (Colossians 
1v15)) as the eschatological goal (telos) for humanity is ultimately not an 
individual and private matter, but a corporate matter, in line with the New 
Testament idea of the body of Christ (1 Corinthians 12v12-27) and of the city of 
God (Revelation 21).361  
Both Scott Midson and Matthew Zaro Fisher have attempted to develop a 
transhumanist theological anthropology, based on an appeal to the relational 
aspect of the imago Dei. In his recent publication, Cyborg Theology, Scott 
Midson has explored whether theological anthropology can accommodate the 
challenges to human/machinic boundaries presented by the cyborg.362 Midson 
acknowledges the problems of the human-machine boundary that the cyborg 
presents, as identified previously by Haraway, and furthermore claims that the 
cyborg has been “othered” – treated with suspicion as alien – in literary and film 
portrayals. This cyborg technophobia, he argues, is precisely because of 
previous approaches to human distinctiveness, in which human nature has 
been strictly defined. Midson then examines the different approaches to the 
imago Dei, to determine whether the cyborg can, in any sense, share the imago 
Dei with humanity.363 He quickly dismisses the substantive approach – rightly 
so, in my view – as a point of contact with the cyborg because it emphasises 
exclusive human characteristics and has been associated with human 
domination, as described above. He is also critical of a functional approach to 
the imago Dei as a means of developing a cyborg anthropology. He argues, 
reasonably, that the exercise of human function in the world can also assert 
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human dominance and that, because it assumes human attributes, function is 
merely an extension of the substantive approach. However, in my view, Midson 
does not adequately describe the vocational element of the functional approach, 
the idea that function is concerned with the God-given human vocation to care 
for the world. This is an important area in the ethical consideration of 
biotechnologies, which I shall explore in Chapter 5. Midson favours a relational 
approach to the imago Dei as the basis of a cyborg theology. He argues that the 
relational approach is concerned with relational capacity, rather than human 
distinctiveness, and this downplays the boundary between the human and the 
cyborg. Furthermore, noting Anna Case Winters’ observation that humans are 
co-constituted by their relationships, Midson argues that the dynamic 
understanding of identity that the relational imago Dei posits is helpful in 
accommodating the ontological ambiguity of the cyborg. He therefore concludes 
that the actor in a relationship need not be human, but could be a cyborg or an 
artificial intelligence, and in that sense a non-humanoid intelligence could bear 
the imago Dei.364 However, in my view, this relational argument does not take 
into account the importance of embodiment. As discussed in the previous 
section, there are some aspects of life that do not make sense without a body 
and, from a Christian perspective, the body plays an important part in human 
identity. 
Inspired by Thweatt Bates’ work on the cyborg, Matthew Zaro Fisher contends 
that the uploaded mind, as a relational entity, bears the imago Dei, according to 
the relational approach to imago Dei.365 He argues that the uploaded mind is 
not truly disembodied because it still needs a material element to exist, even if 
that is a computer, rather than a biological body. He then claims that a relational 
theological anthropology could still accommodate the uploaded mind as a 
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relational entity. He appeals to Karl Rahner’s idea of Vorgriff.366 This is the 
approach to self-transcendence in which matter and spirit in the human person 
are not separate entities but are mutually constitutive, and the spirit is not a 
separate substance, but consists in matter’s self-realisation. Zaro Fisher argues 
that, because of Vorgriff, a person can encounter God, others and themselves 
in a relational way, and the encounter is agnostic of the material nature of the 
person, which could equally be a biological body or a computer. From this, he 
concludes that the uploaded mind, or an artificial intelligence, could have the 
self-presence of personhood and, in that sense, bear the relational imago Dei. 
I am unconvinced by this argument. Rahner’s concept of Vorgriff is certainly 
helpful for understanding human personhood. However, if self-transcendence is 
material self-realisation, according to the Rahnerian account, then the material 
self-realisation of the embodied human and that of the uploaded mind will be 
different precisely because the materials involved are different in each case.  
Although adherents of transhumanism may publicly proclaim the benefits of 
biotechnology for society and human flourishing, a close examination of the 
literature of the transhumanist movement shows that transhumanism is largely 
concerned with enhancement of the individual, as opposed to medical 
treatment, for personal benefit other than the healing of diseases, and is guided 
by individual human will. Unsurprisingly, this tends to be an individualistic and 
private endeavour. It is no coincidence that the rejection of traditional family 
values was one of the criteria for transhumanism proposed by philosopher F.M. 
2030.367  
Second, the transhumanism project is concerned with the attributes of the 
individual human being, often at the expense of other aspects of human life, 
such as relationships and culture. While this transhumanist aim is purportedly 
for good ethical ends – the survival and flourishing of humanity – an approach 
to humanity and the goods of human life that is focused on human attributes 
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only represents a deficient view of humanity as created in the image of God. As 
discussed earlier, a substantive approach to the imago Dei, which focuses on 
the attributes of substance of the human being – for example, reason – is only 
one approach, which alone does not do justice to a comprehensive 
understanding of humanity as created in God’s image, based on the Biblical 
imago Dei texts. A person is more than the sum of their attributes, and cannot 
simply be reduced to those attributes, so an attribute-based measurement of a 
human being, such as transhumanists might propose, is a deficient view of the 
human being, from a perspective of the imago Dei. Indeed, such a reductionist 
view is similar to that proposed by reductionist, atheist scientists such as 
Francis Crick.368 
Third, transhumanism challenges an eschatological approach to the imago Dei 
because it provides humanity with an alternative eschatology. In her 
commentary on transhumanism, Elaine Graham argues that the imago Dei 
points to a framework of values by which the proper ends of humanity might be 
adjudicated, whereas transhumanism provides a realised eschatology of 
immortality and escape from biological contingency.369    
The implications of transhumanism for eschatology have been the subject of 
intense theological criticism of transhumanism and therefore will be discussed 
at length here. Celia Deane-Drummond argues that any secular eschatology 
that seeks immortality, but undermines any basis for that immortality, will not 
satisfy the human need for transcendence.370 Prolonging human life, she 
argues, is one thing, but seeking eternity is quite another. Furthermore, she 
states, Christian eschatology deals with sin, but the secular eschatology of 
transhumanism does not. 
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The key problem here is the transcendence-finitude paradox, which has been 
expressed very well by Noreen Herzfeld, in her evaluation of Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
substantive approach to the imago Dei.371 Both Augustine and Aquinas saw 
rationality as being a key attribute of humanity, and Aquinas described the 
“rational soul” as the prime component of human nature. Niebuhr followed 
Augustine in stating that the imago Dei was grounded in rationality but took the 
view that it was a rationality that went beyond the self, which he termed “self-
transcendence” 372 Although a natural capacity for self-transcendence makes it 
possible for humans to perceive a transcendent God, it also makes humans 
naturally more reluctant to accept finitude. Adoption of transhumanist 
biomedical enhancements seems therefore to be an attempt to seek the best of 
both worlds – to overcome finitude and to seek a self-transcendence of one’s 
own making, rather than expressing self-transcendence in a relationship with a 
transcendent God.  
Brent Waters has examined the implications of biomedical technology for 
Christian eschatology. He argues that the postmodern view of the world 
assumes a sharp dichotomy between an open and a deterministic view of the 
universe.373 He asserts that theology influenced by postmodernity tends to 
adopt an open view of the universe. This downplays the notion of pre-
destination, he contends, but it also undermines human purpose and destiny. 
Waters goes on to argue that, if there is no eschatological telos for humanity, 
then there is no concept of divine providence, and therefore no purpose to the 
ordering of creation.374 This argument is compelling given the evident 
interrelation of the doctrines of creation and providence. This leads to what 
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Waters describes as a “eviscerated eschatology”.375 As he pithily describes it, 
“the postmodern world is going nowhere, because it’s got nowhere to go” 376 
Waters claims that theology is faced with a stark choice if it wishes to embrace 
the postmodern values that underpin the use of radical technologies: it must 
either discard eschatology or redefine it in realised terms. In other words, if 
there is no robust eschatology, then every moral choice is a moment of 
judgment, where a person may be condemned because of their actions. Waters 
concludes that, in ethical terms, a postmodern approach to technology, as 
advocated by transhumanism, leads to slavery rather than freedom. This is 
consistent with the philosophical reflections by Sparrow on the loss of autonomy 
in a technology-enabled world.377 
Moreover, Waters argues, eschatology cannot be rejected on a scientific basis 
because of the phenomena of emergence and convergence.378 The idea of 
emergence is that biological life has developed from the physicochemical 
components of the universe, but it is irreducible to its lower-level components. 
Convergence concerns the independent evolution of two species towards the 
same biological characteristics.  Waters contends that, because the ideas of 
emergence and convergence both suggest direction and purpose in the 
universe, they are teleological in nature, and are therefore consistent with the 
Christian idea of an eschaton. 
While I agree broadly with Waters’ eschatological analysis, he does not seem to 
distinguish adequately between modernity and postmodernity as influences on 
technology adoption. As discussed earlier in this chapter, transhumanism has 
its roots in liberal modernity, and a key aspect of the culture of modernity has 
been the notion of “progress” in society and human living conditions, with the 
ethical implications this brings. With postmodernism, however, and its emphasis 
on individual experience, rather than corporate authority or epistemology, this 
element of progress is absent, and the adoption of technology becomes an 
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individualistic, experiential endeavour. This would lead to a subtly different 
interpretation of the transhumanist movement as a world-improving philosophy.  
Both Deane-Drummond and Waters identify a realised eschatology in 
transhumanism, which contrasts with the Christian eschatological hope. With 
transhumanist technologies, hope of perfection is realised – or not – when the 
technology is applied to the human person. From that point onward, hope is 
diminished because the eschatological destiny has already been realised, and 
there is nothing more to hope for.  
The individualised and privatised eschatology of transhumanism, which is 
inward looking and realised, is in tension with the outward-looking exocentricity 
of human destiny, portrayed in Pannenberg’s eschatological approach to imago 
Dei.379 Vanhoozer suggests that Pannenberg’s exocentricity goes beyond 
Niebuhr’s self-transcendence, in that it is not just about the transcendent self at 
any one time, but about humans finding their destiny by being open to moving 
beyond their cultural framework.380 
Against this, the realised eschatology of transhumanism seems to be a human 
self-restriction of eschatological freedom. Christian soteriology provides a 
means of transformation and perfectibility, but when human beings restrict 
themselves to technology as the primary means of transformation, as 
transhumanists generally do, they foreclose other means of achieving their 
destiny. It is ironic that transhumanists use the word extropy, to denote that 
humanity is an “open system” – when, in fact, manipulation of the human body 
to gain biomedical immortality places a limit on humanity, compared with the 
hope of immortality offered by Christian eschatology. 
Pannenberg’s exocentric eschatology is a better hope for human destiny than 
the false hope of transhumanism, for two reasons. First, there is a proleptic 
element to Pannenberg’s eschatology. The perfect fellowship of redeemed 
humanity with God at the eschaton is, according to Pannenberg, disclosed in 
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380 Vanhoozer, “Human Being: Individual and Social”, p. 173. 
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the fellowship of the church now,381 and this links the eschatological future with 
human experience now. In a similar way, Shults therefore contends that an 
eschatological approach to the imago Dei provides people with a hope-filled 
way of being an embodied human, and one that frees them from the need for 
self-preservation. 382 This is ultimately more reassuring than the potentially 
unintended consequences of either medical therapy now or of radical 
transhumanist technologies in the future.  
Second, for Pannenberg, the imago Dei is double-sided – it is about human 
destiny in the eschatological future but, at the same time, it is about human 
nature now – so, in theory, Pannenberg’s eschatology can incorporate an 
ethical dimension.383 However, it has been suggested that Pannenberg’s 
approach might appear deterministic because of his insistence that human 
destiny is determined from the future by God, in a way that downplays the 
importance of responsibility and moral agency in human society.384  
A fourth area of concern with transhumanism and the imago Dei is the Christian 
prohibition of idolatry. Wenzel Van Huyssteen explored this issue in some detail 
in his account of the imago Dei from the perspective of human 
distinctiveness.385 Genesis 1v26 states that human beings are made in the 
image of God, suggesting a material image,386 but elsewhere in the Old 
Testament (for example, Exodus 20), idols are prohibited. Van Huyssteen 
argues that the imago Dei is the one exception to the prohibition, saying that it 
was God’s prerogative to create humans in his image, but this privilege does 
 
381 Looking at the church as a flawed human institution in contemporary society, 
it is hard to agree with this view.  
382 F. LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the 
Philosophical Turn to Relationality (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 235 -242 
383 J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in 
Science and Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), pp. 139-143. 
384 Jacqui Stewart, Reconstructing Science and Theology in Postmodernity, 
pp.151-152. 
385 Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? pp. 116-132. 
386 Gordon Wenham, World Biblical Commentary: Genesis - Volume 1 (Waco: 
Word Books,1987). pp. 26-33. Wenham notes that possible roots of the word 
tselem (image) include “to cut or hew” (from Arabic), which fits well with the idea 
of the image of God as a material representation. 
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not extend to human creativity, and humans cannot create God in their image. 
This raises the question of whether the use of transhumanist technologies to 
change human nature is an act of idolatry. The perfected imago Dei - the visible 
image of the invisible God (Colossians 1v15) - is Jesus, so it could be argued 
that transformation that leads to conformation to Christ is the kind of 
transformation that is seeking and worshipping God, rather than seeking to 
worship a material idol. This relates also to the idea that application of medical 
technology treats the body as an artefact to be engineered, rather than a 
personal subject in relationship with others and with God, an argument which 
has been advanced by the Anglican ethicist, Oliver O’Donovan.387 In my view, 
O’ Donovan’s distinction between person and artefact is helpful from a 
perspective of a Christian ethical evaluation of biomedical technology for two 
reasons. First, it shows how the application of technology can seek to 
undermine the uniqueness of God’s creative power, in favour of self-creation of 
the human body by humanity, where the body becomes an idol. Second, the 
treatment of the body as a “thing” rather than a person shows that 
indiscriminate application of biomedical technology to the body may be 
problematic for human dignity, even if not for personal autonomy. Even if a 
person chooses freely to apply some form of medical technology to themselves, 
it may undermine their dignity as a human being.  
Yet some theologians have argued that the use of biomedical technology in 
human beings does not necessarily impair the expression of the imago Dei in 
humanity. Elaine Graham states that in a world where there is an evolutionary 
understanding of human life, concepts of humanity can no longer be fixed and 
absolute, and she argues that human beings enact the imago Dei when they 
engage in technological innovation.388 Graham reflects that just as humans are 
created in the image of God, yet are continuous with the animal world, so 
humans have always been “mixed up” and hybridised with the technologies that 
they use, which have become a part of them. What is happening in the material 
world, and what it means to be human, does not detract from human spiritual 
 
387 O’Donovan, Begotten or Made, pp. 1-6. 
388 Graham, “In Whose Image?” p. 65.  
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life, but it is a necessary pre-condition. She argues that, if the aspiration of 
being in the image of God is the Christian goal of conformation to Christ, then a 
right response to technology use would be humility, rather than hubris; in other 
words, technology would be used with care, in a way that respects the 
sovereignty of God and does not detract from God’s ultimate purposes for 
humanity. 
Peter Manley Scott has explored the relationship of the imago Dei to its social – 
and technological – context.389 He engages with Heidegger’s reflections on 
technology – that humanity is alienated by technique, that the world is ordered 
as a “standing reserve” for human use (which suggests the commodification of 
technology), and especially Heidegger’s appeal to a god (“only a god can save 
us”) and to contemplation, as a means of “escaping” technology. He argues that 
Heidegger’s appeal to a god is “too easy” and undercuts any notion of the social 
context of technology. 
Scott asserts that the various approaches to the imago Dei have developed due 
to a complex interrelationship of tradition and context, an assertion borne out by 
the history of thought on the imago Dei as summarised earlier in this section. 
Scott argues that an approach to the imago Dei which stresses a fixed aspect at 
its core – which would apply to a substantive approach – means that the imago 
Dei is untouched by social contingency and historical becoming. Instead, he 
argues that temporality shows how important it is that human beings image God 
through their social contingencies.  
He concludes that, in the past, theologians have abstracted the imago Dei from 
its theological and social context; however, a concept of imago Dei with social - 
and therefore spatial and temporal - dimensions is needed to make sense of a 
technological world. This seems a reasonable conclusion, given that 
technologies are developed and used within a particular human or social 
context, as I demonstrated in my overview of pharmaceutical medicine in 
 
389 Peter Manley Scott, Anti-Human Theology: Nature, Technology and the 
Post-Natural (London: SCM, 2010), p. 93. 
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Chapter 1, and as will be seen in the scientific history relating to the two case 
studies.  
Scott asserts that neither nature nor technology can offer redemption, and that 
creatureliness cannot be separated from technology,390  an observation that is 
consistent with those of other theologians, such as Elaine Graham 391 and Celia 
Deane-Drummond.392 He also makes the important observation that technology 
must not be anti-social – i.e. go against the grain of social progress and trends 
– nor must it be used as a Deus ex machina to solve social problems. In reply to 
this, it is a reasonable moral objective that technology should be used to 
ameliorate or resolve social problems, if appropriate, but that the objectives for 
technology use should be considered as part of public policy in an objective and 
holistic way, as researchers such as ter Meulen have recommended.393  This is 
consistent with the potential of modern pharmaceutical medicine to benefit the 
whole of society by its effects on the health and wellbeing on individuals.  
Theologians critical of transhumanism have suggested that the transhumanist 
view of humanity is characterised by a privatised, individualised attitude to 
human life, in which personal autonomy and exercise of the will concerning 
individual lifestyle choices plays a dominant part.394 Transhumanism appears to 
place significant emphasis on the attributes of the individual human being, and 
the way in which they are used in the individual’s interactions with the world. I 
would argue that this view of humanity is aligned largely with a substantive 
approach to the imago Dei, at the expense of the functional and relational 
approaches. I contend that, in imago Dei terms, a human person is more 
complex than the sum of his or her substantive attributes. Indeed, a person 
should be more than the sum of their substantive attributes, if they are to 
flourish in a world where they are one creature among many, a world where 
 
390 Peter Manley Scott, Anti-Human Theology, p. 93. 
391 Graham, “In Whose Image?”, p. 68. 
392 Deane-Drummond, Theology and Biotechnology, pp. 88-89.  
393 ter Meulen, “Human Enhancement: A Policy Perspective for the European 
Union”, pp. 9-12. 
394 See, for example, Deane-Drummond, Future Perfect? pp. 168-169. 
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they must negotiate relationally with other creatures – human or otherwise – to 
achieve good ends which promote the flourishing of the whole creation. 
This is in contrast with the human destiny that would be provided by radical 
transhumanist biomedical enhancements. This destiny is a realised eschatology 
– and indeed, a self-realised one – as described by Brent Waters.395 According 
to Waters, the person who undergoes radical biomedical enhancement as an 
individualistic consumer choice may be trying to improve their experience as a 
human being. However, they are attempting to “complete” their experience as a 
human being, and achieve perfection through technological manipulation, rather 
than through being in Christ. However, from the perspective of the 
eschatological imago Dei, such a person is, in effect, “completing” their own 
history and, given that hope has a future dimension, they are giving up hope of 
any future personal transformation.  
As mentioned earlier, the view of human destiny described by an eschatological 
imago Dei is a hope-filled way of being human, that frees humanity from self-
preservation. In contrast, radical transhumanist enhancement, deployed with 
unbridled individual autonomy, is supremely about self-preservation, yet 
ironically, it denies any hope of a shared future destiny, which is a central 
feature of Christian eschatology. 
This discussion shows that the different aspects of the imago Dei are important 
for a comprehensive understanding of theological anthropology now, and to 
determine what biomedical technologies might support a Christian approach to 
human flourishing in the future, in terms of valuing all people and the goods of 
human life for all. Proposed future transhumanist biomedical technologies 
overemphasise the substantive attributes of human life and have little sense of 
an eschatological perspective, with their individualistic, privatised approach to 
human life.  
I will draw upon this analysis and critique when making an ethical comparison of 
current medical therapies and proposed future transhumanist biomedical 
enhancement technologies in Chapter 5. However, I will be assessing both past 
 
395 Waters, From Human to Posthuman, pp. 123-125. 
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and future forms of technology to determine what factors might make them 
transhumanist in nature by means of objective criteria. I have already 
introduced some general criteria for transhumanist developments, as proposed 
by the literature of the transhumanist movement. However, in the light of these 
theological criticisms of transhumanism, I will now return to the theologically 
informed criteria that I introduced in Chapter 1. I will discuss and define the 
criteria in more detail, giving a rationale for why I chose them.  
2.11. Theological Criteria for Transhumanist Developments 
To determine a theological assessment of a proposed biomedical technology, 
the general, broad criteria for what might constitute a transhumanist technology 
would need to be overlaid by some specific theological criteria, which would 
facilitate a Christian ethical evaluation of those technologies.  
Neil Messer has proposed four “diagnostic questions” about whether a 
biotechnological project is aligned with God’s saving work in the world, or not, 
and these would be applicable to transhumanist developments.396 
1) Is the project good news for the poor? 
2) Is the project an attempt to be “like God” (in respect of Genesis 3v5) or 
does it conform to the image of God? (Genesis 1v26) 
3) What attitude does the project embody towards the material world? 
(including our own bodies)? 
4) What attitude does the project embody towards past failures? 
Messer’s criteria are useful because they have been proposed in the context of 
a study of ethical issues with biotechnology, and how biotechnology relates to 
the doctrine of creation, which is a good place to start to evaluate scientific 
interventions as material phenomena. The strengths of these criteria are that 
they are clearly ethical in nature (concerned with attitudes, justice and the 
goods of human life), and that they are firmly located in a Christian view of 
 
396 Neil Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics: Theological and Ethical 
Reflections on Evolutionary Biology (London: SCM, 2007), pp. 229-235. These 
criteria have been published in a revised form in Neil Messer, Respecting Life: 
Theology and Bioethics (London: SCM, 2013), p. 37. 
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relationships between humanity and God, and within human society. The key 
weakness of Messer’s criteria is that they do not explore the issue of personal 
autonomy and choice which, as noted earlier on in this chapter, is likely to be a 
significant factor in an ethical discussion of transhumanist biomedical 
technologies, and which is an important principle of medical ethics as it has 
developed to date.  
Another approach to the theological evaluation of medical technologies is seen 
in Elaine Graham’s analysis of transhumanism.397 This identifies three 
theological issues – embodiment, autonomy and subjectivity – which should be 
explored in respect of new biotechnologies:  
1) Autonomy – the problem with transhumanist medical technologies is that 
they enable unbridled autonomy in a negative manner.  
2) Subjectivity – the problem with transhumanist medical technologies is 
that they are focused too much on the users’ subjective experiences. 
3) Embodiment – the problem with transhumanist technologies is that they 
interfere with the integrity of the individual body and can therefore have a 
disruptive effect on the corporate body – the community.  
As criteria with which to assess transhumanist biotechnologies, Graham’s three 
theological issues are not comprehensive in their scope but are significant in 
their impact. One concerns autonomy, which helpfully complements Messer’s 
criteria, and which will be a useful tool to explore the role of autonomy in the 
use of transhumanist technologies. Another concerns subjectivity, which will be 
useful for exploring the phenomenon of individual experience and the 
objectification of the human body by technology, at the expense of the human 
as a personal subject. The third, on embodiment, overlaps with Messer’s 
criteria, but introduces the helpful additional concept of corporate “embodiment” 
as the community.  
 
397 Graham, “In Whose Image?”, pp. 56-69. 
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The next section will provide a preliminary evaluation of the proposed 
transhumanist biomedical technologies listed earlier against these criteria.  
2.12. Preliminary Evaluation of Transhumanist Developments 
A previous section of this chapter outlined five future technological interventions 
that transhumanists have proposed. They are: 
1) Medical nanotechnology – the use of microscopic particles, tools and 
robots to interact with the body for medical applications. 
2) Genetic enhancements – including germ-line modifications.  
3) Cybernetics – the use of prostheses and robotics to develop and 
enhance bodily function. 
4) Cryonics – placing the human body in suspended animation using 
cryogenic techniques, so that a person can be revived in the distant 
future when radical new medical technologies are available. 
5) Mind Uploading – where all the information in the human brain is 
uploaded onto a computer, in order that a person can live on “in 
silico” rather than in a biological body. 
In previous sections of the chapter, it has been argued that approaches to 
transhumanism – philosophical, technological and ideological – are diverse and, 
although transhumanism is broadly aligned to secular modernity, the different 
approaches to transhumanism vary in their metaphysics and in their 
epistemology. 
However, the various technologies cited by scholars as transhumanist 
technologies are different technologically too, and have different effects on, and 
implications for, the human person. So, for example, the technological 
resources and processes used to enable genetic enhancements are different 
from those required for mind uploading, and the specific implications for human 
life will be different. This section will look at these technologies, using the 
criteria developed in the previous section. 
In terms of the general criteria for transhumanist technologies, derived from the 
transhumanist literature, all the transhumanist technologies described – medical 
nanotechnology, genetic enhancements, cybernetics, cryonics and mind-
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uploading – fulfil the first two criteria, that each is a technology (a material 
means of effecting a task or process) and that it is a technology applied to the 
human person, to make a difference to human experience. Concerning the third 
criterion, that the technology is applied to the human person to improve human 
function, increase longevity and promote human flourishing, the situation is less 
clear. All these transhumanist technologies are certainly intended to have a 
beneficial effect on human function or longevity. However, because the 
interventions they propose are radical (some more so than others), it is less 
clear whether they can or will actually improve human flourishing, for reasons 
that will be explored in the forthcoming section. However, that the 
transhumanist technologies cited here fulfil these three criteria is largely 
unremarkable, as these criteria are themselves derived from the transhumanist 
literature. 
However, whether the fourth criterion applies – that the human subject has 
autonomy in the use of the technology, and that the technology is not applied in 
a coercive manner – is debatable. Individual users of these technologies may 
have the autonomy to choose to use these technologies at the outset, with an 
informed understanding of the risks involved. This is no different to informed 
consent to established medical treatments and procedures in the current 
healthcare system. However, as discussed by Michael Burdett, transhumanist 
technologies have the potential to effect radical changes to the human person 
at will, which elevates personal choice to a level of significance that it has not 
previously had in healthcare.398 The expansion of personal choice in the 
application of future radical technologies clearly has implications for the 
exercise of autonomy.  
Consequently, if the consequences of the transhumanist technologies here are 
considered in more detail, concerns about autonomy and choice emerge. 
Medical nanotechnology is relatively unproblematic, although, as with all 
medical technologies that are highly specific in their biological actions, there 
may be unintended consequences, which may raise questions about the 
 
398 Burdett, Technology and the Rise of Transhumanism, p. 5 
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ongoing autonomy of the subject. However, genetic enhancements may well be 
chosen freely by a person but, if they are germ cell modifications which affect 
the genetic profile of that person’s offspring, then the person’s children and 
subsequent generations will be affected. These offspring cannot exercise 
autonomy because they did not choose the enhancement, and the 
enhancement is therefore applied to them in a coercive way. Cybernetics raises 
the issue of whether the person has full control over their cybernetic 
components; if an in-grafted robotic arm was used to commit an offence, would 
it be the responsibility of the person, or a fault with the prosthesis? Lawyers 
might attempt to argue the latter, in the person’s defence. With cryonics, a 
person might freely consent to being cryogenically frozen so that they could 
avoid death from an incurable disease and remain in suspended animation until 
a cure was discovered. However, their life in suspended animation would then 
be in the hands of others and they would have no autonomy or power of choice 
concerning the time and circumstances of their revival, if it happened at all. With 
mind-uploading, a person might freely choose the procedure, but the procedure 
is radical and irreversible, and may lead to unintended consequences because 
the person has a disembodied existence, and these could have serious 
repercussions for life choices and personal autonomy, as highlighted in the 
previous section on autonomy in this chapter.  
These concerns with autonomy on application of transhumanist technologies 
align well with Sparrow’s argument about the deficiency of medical intervention 
as a means of developing moral agency, in comparison with moral and cultural 
education. Sparrow argues that, because biomedical enhancement is a radical 
technical intervention, it is instrumentalist - a pragmatic means of achieving a 
specific outcome with no inherent moral value – and it treats the human body 
merely as an object to be manipulated. Sparrow therefore argues that medical 
enhancements reduce personal autonomy, as a component of moral agency, 
rather than enable it. 
The use of medical enhancements in the wider social and cultural context also 
has implications for personal autonomy. Societal trends and peer pressure may 
coerce an individual to have an enhancement that they might not be happy with 
personally. If the use of a certain enhancement is almost universal in society 
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and the government recommends that enhancement because of its purported 
benefits for personal security, wellbeing and access to public services, it would 
be hard for an individual to choose not to have the enhancement, without good 
reason. This is analogous to, for example, the almost universal use of mobile 
phones in current society. In this situation, the use of medical enhancements by 
some individuals in the population may restrict the personal choices of other 
individuals. For example, if it was routine for all jockeys to have genetic 
enhancements that enabled them to have a small body size, significantly faster 
reactions and longevity and physical durability to enable them to have a racing 
career of over one hundred years, this would effectively restrict a career in 
horse racing to those who were thus enhanced, and would exclude those who 
were not. 
Further ethical and theological concerns about transhumanism become 
apparent if transhumanist technologies are assessed theologically using Neil 
Messer’s four “diagnostic questions”.399 
First, is the project good news for the poor? All the technologies described 
above – nanotechnology, genetic enhancements, cybernetics, cryonics and 
mind-uploading – would be potentially resource-intensive, both in terms of 
materials and technical expertise. Even if they were all technically feasible at 
present, they would be very costly and would not be realistically available to 
citizens all over the world, but only to the wealthiest citizens of Europe and 
North America. For example, cryogenic preservation is still at an experimental 
stage and the Alcor Life Extension Foundation of Scottsdale, Arizona, offers this 
service for (at the time of writing) a minimum of $200,000.400 Even relatively 
modest biotechnological interventions that are routinely available now are 
relatively expensive, compared to the small molecule medicines of the 
“therapeutic revolution” era of the twentieth century, and therefore realistically 
available only through the health services of first world countries. Swindells 
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argues that neither government prohibition nor an unfettered free market for 
biotechnology will support equity of access to these technologies, but some 
form of compromise is needed, in terms of government funding support.401 He 
also makes the important point that, like “hi tech” medicines and biotechnology 
at present, future transhumanist technologies will need to be distributed at scale 
for costs of the technology to decrease.  
Furthermore, when considering the impact of biomedical technology on the 
poor, various other ethical factors come into play, in addition to the basic 
affordability of the technology. If biomedical enhancements were used to 
support personal and societal wellbeing, then they may be good news for the 
poor, but if they were deployed by those in power for exploitation of vulnerable 
sectors of society or for social engineering, they would not be good news for the 
poor. Biomedical enhancements would be good news for the poor if regulation 
and health service resource allocation is such that the same enhancements can 
be offered to all in a society on an equal basis, so that all had the same socio-
political opportunities.  
Second, is the project an attempt to be “like God” (referring to Genesis 3v5) or 
does it conform to the image of God? (Genesis 1v26). As previously discussed, 
the imago Dei may be described substantively, functionally, relationally or 
eschatologically, and has a dynamic dimension. However, the vision of human 
life promoted by transhumanism, with its focus on the individual attributes of the 
human being, is consistent with an approach to the imago Dei that is largely 
substantive, and which does not reflect other approaches to the imago Dei, and 
so provides a distorted view of the human being. Indeed, it is ironic that the 
transhumanism movement, which is in part predicated on the evolution of 
humanity, reflects a substantive approach to the imago Dei, bearing in mind that 
that such substantive approaches to the imago Dei are of less contemporary 
value, in part because of the insights of evolutionary biology. 
 
401 Fox Swindells, “Economic inequality and human enhancement technology”, 
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As mentioned previously, the problems with transhumanism are: a) it is 
individualistic because it is concerned primarily with the attributes of the 
individual person (a similar criticism can be made of the substantive imago Dei); 
b) it focuses on human attributes, at the expense of other aspects of human life, 
such as relationships, culture and corporate identity and values, which are not 
simply based on individual attributes, and c) it provides an alternative, over-
realised eschatology, which is excessively inward-looking and privatised and 
provides immortality now, but which does not deal with the reality of sin and 
human moral responsibility.  
Moreover, Peters has argued that a major criticism of transhumanism is that it 
assumes that human nature is infinitely malleable and that the human being can 
be absolutely manipulated by technologies applied by humanity, to achieve the 
functional objectives of enhancement.402 This would suggest that, according to 
Messer’s criteria, transhumanist biomedical technologies are indeed an attempt 
to be like God, rather than to enable humanity to conform to the image of God. 
Some of the technologies described – for example, mind-uploading or 
cybernetics – represent highly visible and tangible attempts to manipulate 
human bodily life and to remake human being in their own image, rather than 
God’s image.  
Third, what attitude does the project embody towards the material world? 
(including our own bodies)? Earlier in this chapter, I outlined the significance of 
the body and bodily life in Christian theology and also referred to the material 
connotations of the imago Dei in Genesis 1v26. I have previously noted that 
transhumanists have differing attitudes to the material world.403 Some 
transhumanists are materialists in that they see the functions of the physical 
human body as the sum of all reality. However, some transhumanists are also 
functionalists, who believe that human mental function constitutes the person, 
and must be instantiated in a physical, material medium, but not necessarily a 
 
402 Ted Peters, “Perfect Humans or Trans-Humans?”, in Future Perfect?: God, 
Medicine and Human Identity, edited by Celia Deane-Drummond and Peter 
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biological one. Some transhumanist scholars, such as Hans Moravec,404 are 
unconcerned by the prospect of disembodiment, and are happy to rely on 
thought for identity (pattern identity) whereas others, such as Katherine 
Hayles,405 see embodiment as an essential prerequisite of humanity, regardless 
of what other technologies might be employed for human enhancement.  
The transhumanist technologies described here demonstrate this variation of 
views concerning embodiment. Medical nanotechnology and genetic 
enhancement are both technologies that elicit beneficial effects in and through 
the functioning of the human body and may be considered affirming of human 
embodiment. In fact, cryogenic preservation is concerned with preserving the 
human body at any cost, even when the body is threatened with incurable 
disease or apparently irreversible degeneration. On the contrary, however, 
cybernetics appears to be a technology that does not affirm the human body. 
The premise of cybernetics is that parts of the human body can be replaced by 
prostheses and robotic enhancements that will function better than – or 
differently to - the original biological body parts. For some transhumanism 
advocates, for whom personhood is largely related to functional ability, the 
concept of the cyborg - the human-robot hybrid - would be seen positively and 
would present no specific problems. Nevertheless, as Hayles observes, the 
concept of the cyborg destabilises established ways of understanding human 
ontology,406 so might prompt some objections from Christian and other religious 
commentators on the grounds of natural law. 
At the far end of the anti-embodiment spectrum is the proposed transhumanist 
technology of mind-uploading, where the information in a person’s mind is 
uploaded onto a computer, so they can live life in silico, without a human body. 
With this technology, the human body is totally deprecated, and morphological 
freedom is prioritised over human embodiment. As noted above, 
transhumanists who advocate mind-uploading, such as Ray Kurzweil and Hans 
Moravec, deal with the problem of maintaining personal identity in a 
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disembodied existence by appealing to a distinction between body identity, 
where the person is defined by the material matter of their human body, and 
pattern identity, where a person is defined by their thought-patterns and 
processes. However, Kurzweil admits that disembodiment is problematic for 
human existence, given that many human experiences are essentially bodily 
experiences – for example, eating, sex and sport – and are meaningless without 
a body. Furthermore, as argued previously, his proposals for complex sensory 
interfaces to mediate these experiences to a disembodied mind are aspirational 
and overly optimistic. 
Fourth, what attitude does the project embody towards past failures? From a 
Christian perspective, the most appropriate way for scientists and technologists 
to view past failures, especially those that have been exploitative or at great 
human cost, would be an attitude of humility to future endeavours. At first sight, 
this question seems to be pitching transhumanist hubris against Christian 
humility but a close inspection of the meaning and scope of humility as a 
Christian grace suggests that this issue is more complex. In her definition of 
humility, Helen Oppenheimer notes that pride is a sin, but humility is not so 
much a virtue as a grace (a gift from God).407 She highlights the ambivalence of 
humility, drawing on Aquinas’s assertion that it is possible to be proud of being 
humble, and she asks whether humility might be ruined by its attainment. She 
also notes the strange situation that, according to Matthew 23v12, the reward 
for humility seems to be exaltation, which suggests that humility might be a 
means to a non-humble objective, rather than a virtue in itself. Consequently, 
she wonders whether humility can ever be a lasting good of life. Helpfully, 
however, she identifies five important components of humility: 
1) It should not be false, 
2) It should not be about self-loathing, 
3) It should be an objective lowliness – acknowledging one’s unimportance 
as an individual, which paradoxically is important to God, 
 
407 Helen Oppenheimer, “Humility”, in A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, 
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4) It should concern reverence in acknowledging glory not one’s own (1 
Corinthians 4v7), 
5) It should be ultimately about agape – self-emptying for the sake of others 
(Philippians 2v5-11). There is a paradoxical self-confidence in this kind of 
humility, in that the individual can afford to take delight in attending to the 
needs of others (which would be a good motive for using biotechnology 
well according to Messer’s fourth criterion). 
In her essay on the grace of humility, Avril Cameron also highlights some of the 
paradoxes of humility.408 Humility is self-effacing, and yet many occupations in 
life – for example, politics, acting and academic scholarship – necessarily 
involve self-promotion. Humility often has an element of display, and therefore it 
brings with it the danger of hypocrisy – if someone proclaims their humility by 
word or deed, then they are not being humble. Cameron wisely observes that, 
at the current time, with the cult of the individual so much part of western social 
and political life, the self is ostensibly exalted. However, this also means that 
the self is exposed and uncertain, and she cites the fact that many people do 
not have a sense of self-worth and may seek therapy for it. She concludes that 
true humility is concerned with knowing one’s limitations and should be linked 
with a proper pride in one’s capacity and agency, and that to achieve this takes 
real wisdom and knowledge. She also acknowledges that undue pride should 
also be tempered by the responsibilities of living in communities and not alone. 
I would argue that the kind of humility needed to act responsibly in a 
technological world has components cited by both these scholars. Of prime 
importance is Oppenheimer’s fourth element – humility is reverence in 
acknowledging a glory that is not our own – in other words, the detailed 
scientific processes underpinning the natural world, a world that was ultimately 
created by God, not humanity. A common theme in the Psalms is that a natural 
response of humanity to the created world is one of wonder and awe – as 
illustrated, for example, in Psalm 8 and Psalm 19. From this sense of awe 
would develop the response, as Cameron suggests, of knowing one’s 
limitations when faced with the glory and mystery of the universe and also living 
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– and making biomedical decisions - as part of a community, rather than as an 
individual.409 This kind of humility can be set in an explicitly Christian 
framework; Elaine Graham argues that, if the aspiration of being in the image of 
God is the Christian goal of conformation to Christ, then a right response to 
technology use would be humility, rather than hubris.410 
However, a study of the various strands of transhumanism suggests that many 
of these aspects of humility are absent. On the contrary, main advocates of 
transhumanism speak in terms of throwing off the shackles of human limitation. 
More’s famous “No more gods, no more faith…the future belongs to post-
humanity,” epitomises a human-centredness that allows no wonder or awe in 
response to a greater glory. Individualism and individualistic autonomy are an 
important part of the transhumanist endeavour, and these negate the humility of 
community living – and community bioethical decision-making. All the 
transhumanist technologies mentioned above could, depending on how they are 
used, represent the human Promethean desire to rebel against “given” human 
nature.  
What conclusions can be drawn about these transhumanist technologies in the 
light of Elaine Graham’s three theological concerns about transhumanism? 411 
Her first concern is embodiment. The problem with transhumanist technologies, 
she states, is that they interfere with the integrity of the individual body and can 
therefore have a disruptive effect on the corporate body – the community. 
In relating changes to the individual body to changes in the corporate body of 
the community, Graham wisely roots this discussion in the concept of the 
church as the body of Christ, as found for example in Romans 12v4-8, 1 
Corinthians 12 or Ephesians 4v4-13. I would argue that her theological concern 
here is warranted with the transhumanist technologies being considered. 
Regardless of their specific objectives, all the transhumanist technologies 
described here – nanotechnology, genetic enhancements, cybernetics, cryonics 
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and mind uploading – affect the structure and functioning of the human body in 
one way or another, and bring about significant changes in human life because 
of this – in terms of longevity, freedom from disease, but also in terms of motor 
and cognitive function. Although these effects are primarily effects on the 
individual human body, they also have an impact on the corporate body of 
society, as previous discussions in this chapter on the social ethical implications 
of enhancement have shown – for example, the implications of biomedical 
enhancement for health and welfare provision, for working patterns, and for 
marriage as an important institution in human society. Given the discussion 
about embodiment earlier in this chapter, Graham’s concerns about the 
implications of transhumanist technologies on both individual and corporate 
bodily life are therefore justified. 
Graham’s second point concerns autonomy. She states that a problem with 
transhumanist medical technologies is that they enable unbridled autonomy in a 
negative manner. This is partly true in that the radical nature of transhumanist 
technologies and their ability to make profound changes to the human 
experience makes personal choice a far more significant factor in decision-
making about enhancements than it has been previously in healthcare. 
However, as argued earlier in this chapter, it is debatable whether personal 
autonomy can be maintained during all stages of technology use due to the 
nature of the technologies and their unintended consequences. It is not true, 
therefore, to say that transhumanist technologies enable “unbridled autonomy” 
Furthermore, transhumanist technologies need not be chosen in a “negative 
manner”. A person’s attitude to the use of technology is important, as seen in 
the discussion of Messer’s fourth diagnostic question above; an attitude of 
humility, rather than hubris, is more in keeping with scriptural descriptions of the 
wonder of creation (Psalm 8, Psalm 19), and the limits of human wisdom (Isaiah 
55v8-9). Furthermore, there are many instances in medicine at present where 
biomedical technology can be intentionally adopted and used in a positive way, 
so this could equally apply to future technologies. 
Thirdly, Graham warns about the problem of subjectivity, that transhumanist 
medical technologies are focused too much on the subjective experiences of 
the technology user. This seems to be a valid criticism of transhumanist 
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technologies – these technologies may be applied to individual bodies 
according to the individual’s will, to enhance subjective human experience. As 
previously discussed, absolute personal choice and autonomy in choosing 
enhancements is a major component of transhumanist thought,412 and this has 
been strongly criticised by opponents of transhumanism, because of the 
potentially detrimental effects of the technologies on society, as a result of the 
whims and self-centred choices of individuals.413 Transhumanism is concerned 
with individual human attributes, which reflects a largely substantive approach 
to the imago Dei, and this is at odds with current approaches to the imago Dei, 
which downplay the substantive, and emphasise functional, relational and 
eschatological elements.  
However, the irony is that, although transhumanist technologies enhance 
personal, subjective experience, they are ultimately problematic because they 
objectify the human body, so that the body is in danger of becoming an artefact 
to be engineered and manipulated at will, rather than a human person.414 In his 
exploration of the distinction between person and artifice in the application of 
reproductive technologies, Anglican theologian Oliver O’Donovan argues that 
the deployment of reproductive technologies runs the risk of making the human 
being a product or artifice to be engineered, rather than a person who is in 
relationship with a personal God.415 The danger, therefore, is that biomedical 
technologies depersonalise the human person and objectify the human body, 
rather than allow the human being to have true personhood, as a personal 
subject. 
2.13. Concluding Comments on Transhumanism 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the various approaches to transhumanism, and 
outlined the major theological and ethical critiques of them. I have outlined 
general and specific (theological) criteria with which to assess transhumanist 
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developments. I have shown, in a preliminary evaluation of various 
transhumanist proposals, that transhumanism is mixed – both in terms of its 
metaphysical and epistemological claims, and in terms of its ethical goods for 
humanity. Transhumanist technologies may ostensibly provide some benefits, in 
terms of improvement of human function and longevity, and these benefits may 
be proposed and applied with good intentions. However, on examination of the 
technologies according to some general and specific theological criteria by 
which transhumanist technologies may be evaluated, various problems and 
complexities emerge, and it is questionable whether these technologies truly 
enable human flourishing from a perspective of Christian social and medical 
ethics.  
The next two chapters will describe the development of two important areas of 
therapeutics over the last sixty years during the “therapeutic revolution” era – 
the oral contraceptive pill and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) 
antidepressants. Each chapter will evaluate these developments against the 
criteria for a transhumanist technology, as outlined above, and will consider the 
ethical issues presented by the therapeutic case and the extent to which it is a 
transhumanist development of its time, according to the criteria. The findings of 
the case studies will then inform an ethical re-evaluation of transhumanism. The 




Chapter 3 – Case Study – The Contraceptive Pill 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the origins, claims and ideas of the transhumanism 
movement were discussed, and a taxonomy of the transhumanism movement 
developed to illustrate the differing approaches and emphases of transhumanist 
scholars. The chapter then made a theological and ethical critique of 
transhumanist technologies, looking at social ethics and then four significant 
theological issues – autonomy, nature, embodiment and the imago Dei. The 
chapter cited and explained some objective criteria for the evaluation of 
biomedical technologies. These included general criteria, developed from the 
transhumanist literature, to determine whether a technology could be classified 
as transhumanist, but also specific, theological criteria, which Christian ethicists 
might use to evaluate a transhumanist technology, drawing on the work of Neil 
Messer and Elaine Graham. Finally, in the chapter, a preliminary assessment 
was made of some specific transhumanist proposals to date using these 
objective criteria. 
The outline conclusion of the chapter was that, although transhumanist 
technologies were applied to human beings with the stated aim of improving 
human flourishing, the use of these technologies was in some tension with 
Christian theological ethics. This is because their effects on personal autonomy 
are ambivalent, they have a variable attitude to embodiment, and they reflect a 
substantive approach to the imago Dei, at the expense of other approaches to 
the imago Dei which would define humanity more fully. While transhumanist 
technologies have the capacity to enhance a person’s subjective experience, 
they also have the potential to objectify the human body. Furthermore, although 
the transhumanist movement maintains that users of these technologies have 
autonomy in choosing and adopting them, there are potential ethical concerns 
surrounding their equitable use and attitudes to their use in society.  
This chapter will present the first of two case studies of previous therapeutic 
developments, which took place during the “therapeutic revolution” years (1950-
1990) – the development of the oral contraceptive pill, which was introduced in 
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1960. The first section of the chapter will describe the history of the oral 
contraceptive pill, discussing the events that led to its introduction and 
widespread use. The second section will discuss the effects of the pill on the 
lives of women and men, on marriage, and on society. It will then examine the 
Roman Catholic church’s theological and ethical concerns with the pill following 
its introduction. Finally, the contraceptive pill will be assessed against the 
criteria for evaluation of transhumanist technologies developed in Chapter 2, to 
determine the extent to which, in its time, the pill could have been regarded as a 
transhumanist development, and to evaluate it from the perspective of 
theological concerns about transhumanist technologies.  
3.2. The Development of Oral Contraception. 
Although the practice of contraception has a long history, dating back to 
classical times,416 the development of the oral contraceptive pill in the 1950s 
was highly significant, and has arguably represented a “contraceptive 
revolution”, for two reasons.417 Firstly, the pill was the first contraceptive 
technology that enabled the technology for contraception to be separated from 
the sex act itself, enabling greater romance and spontaneity in sex. Secondly, 
with the pill, the method of contraception was controlled by the female 
partner.418 This has enabled women to control their fertility and plan their 
families, in a way that had not been possible previously. Consequently, as well 
as its benefits to women, the contraceptive pill has had a significant impact on 
marriage, sexual politics and socioeconomic developments in the western 
world, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  
The development of the pill was the result of a detailed understanding of the 
role of the sex hormones controlling the menstrual cycle – oestrogen and 
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progesterone – following the isolated organ experiments in the nineteenth 
century, and the popularity of “organotherapy” for sexual disorders in the early 
twentieth century.419 Crucially, though, the development of the contraceptive pill 
as a marketed pharmaceutical product in the 1950s was only enabled by the 
ability of pharmaceutical manufacturers to produce these sex hormones 
synthetically, rather than from natural sources, and therefore to be able to 
produce them in large quantities,420 a development that took place in the mid-
twentieth century. The pill is significant in pharmacological therapeutics in that it 
was the first drug affecting the whole body ever to be given to a healthy 
population on a large scale.421 Given its purpose and its mass-distribution, it is 
therefore not surprising that the oral contraceptive pill has had far-reaching 
consequences for human society and culture.  
However, in the 1950s, research into contraception was seen as a disreputable 
business, which neither the government nor the pharmaceutical industry would 
fund, and the public were reluctant to accept contraception research as a 
legitimate and respectable scientific activity.422  Consequently, the story of how 
the first oral contraceptive pill reached the market in 1960 is a remarkable one, 
involving three key protagonists.423 Margaret Sanger was a socialist and 
feminist from a working-class background, who had imagined the benefits to 
modern society of a contraceptive pill as long ago as 1912. Sanger’s long-time 
friend, Katharine Dexter McCormick, was, by contrast, from a privileged 
background and was only the second woman to graduate from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where she studied biology. She 
subsequently married combine harvester millionaire, Stanley McCormick, and 
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gained control of his large fortune, which she invested in various feminist and 
philanthropic causes. Sanger and McCormick believed that there was a need 
for a form of contraception that could be “managed entirely by the women who 
used it”.424 The third protagonist, Gregory Pincus, was a reproductive biologist. 
Pincus had previously genetically altered a rabbit embryo in the laboratory and, 
although this experiment had been a significant scientific advance, he had been 
reviled by the media as an unscrupulous eugenicist. He therefore had a dubious 
public image and he established the Worcester Foundation for Experimental 
Biology, as he was unable to get academic tenure at Harvard.425 In 1950, 
Pincus was famously invited to a dinner party hosted by Margaret Sanger and 
she asked him just how much the development of an oral contraceptive might 
cost.426 Pincus hazarded a guess at $2 million dollars – a substantial sum of 
money at the time - and Sanger subsequently asked her friend, Katherine 
McCormick, for the money. Consequently, the contraceptive pill was developed 
with no state or public funding,427 which is remarkable considering the 
collaboration and investment that would be required for such a medical 
development at the current time.  
In order to set up clinical trials, Pincus approached John Rock, a Boston 
gynaecologist and devout Catholic, who had been treating women with 
oestrogen/progestogen combinations for menstrual disorders. Rock immediately 
saw that a contraceptive pill had potential benefits for society, and he regarded 
oral contraception as a “natural” form of contraception, which did not trouble his 
Catholic conscience, a stance that would eventually bring him into conflict with 
the Catholic Church. Because of the lack of public support for contraceptive 
research, Rock was unable to recruit many volunteers for his clinical trials, and 
so various involuntary subjects were recruited to the trials – including fifteen  
psychiatric inpatients from the Worcester State Hospital.428 Although use of 
coerced subjects is not ethically acceptable by  twenty-first century standards of 
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clinical research, it was commonplace in the 1950s. In due course, in order to 
recruit larger numbers of subjects to the trials to improve their statistical power, 
Rock and his colleagues looked at recruiting for the trials in countries other than 
the United States. The island of Puerto Rico was chosen for the contraceptive 
trials as it had a dense population, living in poverty and disease, and therefore 
women there were longing for adequate birth control. In addition, there were no 
local laws against contraception, and birth control clinics had already been 
established in that country.429 
The first oral contraceptive pill, Enovid, produced by G.D. Searle and  Co, was 
approved by the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) and introduced to the 
American market in 1960.430 However, the oral contraceptive pill was 
considered too politically and morally sensitive for the British market at that 
time,431 and Searle’s product (branded Enavid in the UK) was not introduced 
into British family planning clinics until 1961.432 
As might be expected with a hormonal medicine with a range of biological 
actions, the oral contraceptive pill has been shown to have various non-
contraceptive beneficial effects too.433 These include control of the menstrual 
cycle, alleviation of pre-menstrual tension (PMT), reduced incidences of 
ovarian, endometrial and colorectal cancer,434 and possible beneficial effects on 
cardiovascular disease and depression.435  
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The contraceptive pill has been widely adopted in human society. In 1962, two 
years after the pill was launched, 2 million women in the United States were 
taking it; by 1964, 6.5 million American women were using oral contraception.436 
In 2010, it was estimated that 10.6 million women – 28% of all women of 
reproductive age who were using contraception – were taking the contraceptive 
pill.437 This is despite varying pill use over the years, because of adverse 
events, and decreasing use of the pill in general over time due to recent 
development of long-acting injectable forms of hormonal contraception, and a 
revival of barrier contraception in the last twenty years, due to the risk of HIV 
and sexually transmitted diseases. 
Following its introduction in the US, the pill began to be adopted in other 
developed countries. By 1966, Wood estimated that 10 million women in the 
world were taking the oral contraceptive pill.438 Furthermore, in a review of 
British contraceptive practice in 1991, Swarewski and Guillebaud estimated 
that, at that time, there were 3 million women in the UK alone using the oral 
contraceptive pill, and stated that the contraceptive pill was particularly popular 
with young women who had never had children.439 
3.3. The Social & Cultural Impact of Oral Contraception 
Compared to some other medical developments during the therapeutic 
revolution years of the twentieth century - for example specific antibiotic therapy 
or beta blockers for cardiovascular diseases – widespread use of the 
contraceptive pill has not led to an appreciable reduction in mortality. However, 
longitudinal data on mortality rates with the contraceptive pill published in 2010 
suggest that the pill may be associated with a slight overall reduction in 
mortality, probably due to the reduction of the incidence of certain types of 
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cancer.440 Nevertheless, the availability of the oral contraceptive pill has had 
positive effects on women’s health in other respects, due to its multisystemic 
actions, and it has had far-reaching societal effects beyond the individual user - 
on sexual practices and politics, relationships and family roles, and laws and 
policies.441 This section will explore these influences. 
Social acceptance of oral contraception in western society was for a variety of 
socio-political and humanitarian reasons. Although Gregory Pincus and his 
colleagues explored the use of sex steroids for contraception as a scientific 
endeavour, they were very much a minority. On the contrary, Margaret Sanger 
and Katherine McCormick saw the pill in terms of its social effects and took a 
feminist view that oral contraception was a means of liberating women, and 
enabling women to take control of their contraceptive needs.442 Sanger saw 
“birth control”, as she termed it, as a working-class rebellion, a method of 
avoiding supplying the capitalist market with the human resources it needed for 
a workforce.443 In 1950’s America, as a result of the post-war baby boom, many 
were concerned about possible population explosion, and its consequent effects 
on poverty and social order.444 The issue of population control was by no means 
new to western thought - in 1798, Malthus had brought the issues of excess 
fertility and over-population into public debate – but, in post-war America, this 
issue took on a new political urgency, because of the Cold War. Many US 
commentators reasoned that, if poverty could be alleviated through population 
control, then social unrest could be avoided, and the scourge of communism 
would be kept at bay. Conversely, however, some leading anti-communists in 
American society – for example, Senator Joseph McCarthy – saw contraception 
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as a communist conspiracy to weaken the country.445 Others, for example, the 
gynaecologist John Rock, who conducted clinical trials on the pill, advocated 
the pill for humanitarian reasons.446  As a clinician, Rock had seen first-hand the 
suffering of women both in childbirth and with debilitating menstrual disorders, 
and he wanted to do something to alleviate that suffering, and to give women 
control of their fertility, for their health and wellbeing. However, despite the 
health, social and political issues, for many of the women who took the pill, their 
motivation was purely personal – they simply wanted the convenience of being 
in control of their own fertility.447 
Women have been the prime beneficiaries of the availability of the oral 
contraceptive pill. Louise Tyrer has claimed that being able to control the timing 
of childbearing has had positive consequences for women in respect of both 
mental and physical wellbeing.448  The pill is a highly effective contraceptive and 
is convenient to use. It does not have the unromantic connotations of barrier 
and spermicidal methods of contraception,449 and separates the contraceptive 
technology from the sex act, and so does not interfere with the intimacy of 
sex.450 
Most significantly, the pill was the first contraceptive method where the woman 
had control over the contraceptive process and the man was correspondingly 
absolved – or sometimes deprived – of this responsibility.451  This is the exact 
opposite of the era prior to the pill, where the standard method of contraception 
was condoms, which were sourced and used by the man. Indeed, as it was 
controlled by the woman, the pill was the “ideal” method of contraception that 
Margaret Sanger and Katharine McCormick had envisaged prior to its 
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development.452 Because it could be used by a woman without even the man’s 
knowledge, the pill was liberating for women, and therefore celebrated by 
feminists.453 
Nevertheless, while the pill has undoubtedly revolutionised women’s lives and 
provided various benefits to women – both medical and non-medical – it has not 
always been seen in a positive light by women. The pill is a prescribed medicine 
so, although the woman can take responsibility for using hormonal 
contraception, she does not have complete autonomy to do so, as the pill must 
be prescribed for her by a doctor (and, in the early years of marketing the pill, 
this would most likely have been a male doctor). Consequently, feminists 
(ironically) have also criticised the pill, claiming that it has been used as a 
means of objectifying and medicalising the female body, and that use of the pill 
has led to the disembodiment of women.454 Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that, far from emancipating women, the pill has, in fact, increased the extent to 
which women are exploited by men. With the arrival of the pill came what is 
referred to as the coital imperative – with the risk of unwanted pregnancy 
removed, there was no reason for a woman to withhold sex.455 Consequently, in 
recent years, there has been considerable social pressure for young women to 
have penetrative sex with their partners in a way that was not expected in 
previous centuries.456 
The development of the pill has also had a significant impact on the lives of 
men. May has pointed out that, for every woman taking the pill, there is at least 
one man involved too.457 Use of the pill has enabled a man to enjoy sex, free of 
the risk of pregnancy, and to leave the responsibility of contraception to his 
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partner. However, while some men liked the freedom of not being liable to 
impregnate their partner, some found the power and autonomy the pill gave to 
their partner an affront to their masculine ego.458 For the man, loss of 
responsibility for contraception has been accompanied by loss of control of 
contraception. This loss of control has become even more apparent, in recent 
years, as contraceptive services have become more likely to be provided by 
female practitioners. Also, along with control over her fertility, the pill gave a 
woman control over her career and lifestyle, which her partner may have found 
threatening.  
Consequently, the pill has had an impact on the marriage relationship, and roles 
in marriage. One popular argument often put forward is that the oral 
contraception has fuelled the sexual revolution which has taken place since the 
1960s, and has undermined marriage as an institution.459 However, this is 
controversial; historians have maintained that sexual behaviour remained 
conservative during the 1960s, that pre-marital sex was largely with intended 
spouses and that sexual excesses came to prominence in later decades.460 The 
consensus view is that the “sexual revolution” would have taken place anyway, 
and that the pill was a trigger or catalyst.461 Furthermore, there is little evidence 
from the history of the development of the pill that it was intended to bring about 
a sexual revolution. First, the pill’s protagonists did not intend to downplay the 
role of marriage and promote extramarital sexual activity.  For example, John 
Rock was an influential advocate of the pill, yet he was a devout Catholic and a 
social conservative, who disapproved of sex outside marriage, and certainly did 
not envisage the use of the pill to facilitate multiple sexual relationships outside 
marriage.462 Second, when the pill was first marketed, its use was restricted to 
married women only.463 Third, in the mid-60s, marriage was still seen as the 
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normal environment for sex; May cites a survey done at the University of 
Kansas in 1964, where the vast majority of women surveyed stated that they 
believed pre-marital sex was wrong.464  
Another important question considered by social commentators concerning the 
pill is whether the availability of the pill has led to a greater level of sexual 
activity with multiple partners in society. The effect of the oral contraceptive pill 
on sexual behaviour has been debated ever since it was first introduced. 
Interestingly, however, there is very little information about this in the medical 
literature. A study was conducted by Linken and Wiener in 1970 looking at 
sexual behaviour in 44 males and 89 females.465 This study found that the 
contraceptive pill was a predominant form of contraception in women who were 
classed as “promiscuous” (in this study, by the now conservative definition: 
more than one partner in a six-month period). However, the fact that the pill was 
the most commonly used form of contraceptive for all sexually active subjects in 
the study does not suggest a causal link between pill use and sexual activity 
with multiple partners, but rather that the pill is a form of contraception used by  
women who have sex with multiple partners. This is consistent with Helen 
Brooke’s observation that sexual activity with multiple partners is a symptom of 
some other underlying issue.466  While the contraceptive pill is often associated 
culturally with sexual activity with multiple partners 467 and opponents of 
deregulation of the pill are often concerned about this,468 there is no clear 
evidence that the use of the contraceptive pill has increased levels of sexual 
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activity with multiple partners, above those that naturally occur. Indeed, the 
uncertain relationship between the advent of the contraceptive pill and the 
beginning of the so-called sexual revolution,469 and the fact that sexual 
behaviours did not change radically in the years after the introduction of the pill, 
470 suggest that the oral contraceptive pill, in itself, has not had a negative 
impact on human virtue, at least in terms of sexual behaviour. 
Rather than facilitating sexual activity with multiple partners, oral contraception 
enables planned parenthood, which has the potential to promote marital stability 
through the health and wellbeing of both partners.471 Furthermore, the 
availability of contraception may contribute to positive moral choices within 
marriage.472 May contends that the pill has enabled couples to have good 
conversations about sex, arguing that the pill has liberated married sex, and 
contributed to a greater openness about matters relating to sex.473 
In addition to its impact on human society and relationships, hormonal 
contraception has had an impact on the environment, due to excretion of 
synthetic steroids in oral contraceptives from the human body, leading to 
increased levels of these “endocrine disrupting” agents in the ecosystem, which 
might interfere with other life forms. At the current time, this phenomenon is well 
recognised and has been a subject of controversy, due to the potential effect on 
drinking water.474 However, there are various chemical processes that can be 
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used to extract oestrogenic contaminants during the process of water 
purification.475 
Along with Prozac and SSRI antidepressants, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter, the contraceptive pill is arguably the pharmaceutical product that 
has had the most impact on popular culture. Notwithstanding the debate about 
whether the pill caused the sexual revolution, the pill has become a powerful 
symbol of the sexual revolution and was associated with utopian dreams – or 
dystopian fears – that sex was being liberated from marriage.476 Back in the 
1960s, many women were enamoured of the idea of the pill – the legend of the 
pill – even if they did not actually take it.477  The idea of the pill was as potent as 
the reality.  Yet, despite the pill’s promise of uninhibited sex, interestingly, the 
theme of sexual liberation as a result of the pill was not greatly developed in the 
films and popular culture of the time.478 However, Cook has argued that the pill 
“precipitated a transformation in sexual mores” and that, by reducing the real, 
social and economic impact of pregnancy, the pill transformed attitudes to 
sexuality. 479 Similarly, May has described the pill as not simply a method of 
contraception, but “a flash point for major social transformation.”480 
Unsurprisingly, then, because of its implications for marriage and the family, use 
of the contraceptive pill has become a matter of ethical controversy for the 
churches. The next section will discuss the Roman Catholic church’s response 
to the development of hormonal contraception in the twentieth century. 
3.4. Contraception and the Church 
Because of the importance of procreation for marriage and family life, and the 
perceived moral implications of interfering with procreation, Christian churches 
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have historically been opposed to contraception. Childress reports that, prior to 
the twentieth century, Christian churches prohibited contraception on natural law 
grounds because procreation is an important end of marriage, and of sexual 
intercourse in marriage, and contraception prevents marriage being directed 
towards that natural end.481 A discussion of natural law, and the problems 
associated with it, was presented in Chapter 2, and this section will describe 
how a natural law-based approach was used in the prohibition of the pill by the 
Roman Catholic Church.  
The Roman Catholic Church, in particular, has trenchantly opposed the use of 
oral contraception throughout its history on natural law grounds, arguing that it 
prevents the outworking of the moral goods of marriage in procreation.482 Other 
Roman Catholic concerns with contraception are that it dehumanises women, 
and reduces them to mere instruments of men’s desire, and also that it 
introduces “moral deficits” and “sinful mentalities” because it encourages selfish 
behaviour. The Catholic Church described “the contraceptive mentality”, as one 
of four “sinful mentalities”, along with the hedonistic mentality, the consumer 
mentality and the anti-life mentality.483 The 1995 papal encyclical Evangelium 
Vitae took an even stronger approach, describing contraception as a “culture of 
death”.484 Contraception is also prohibited because it is a sin against life; 
Roman Catholic theologians would argue that, because life begins with the 
fertilised egg, then some forms of contraception – those which prevent 
implantation of the fertilised ovum – are a form of homicide.485  
To fully understand the Roman Catholic opposition to the oral contraceptive pill, 
it would be helpful to review the historical development of that opposition during 
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the twentieth century. Roman Catholic opposition to artificial contraception grew 
stronger as the twentieth century proceeded. Following the publication of Marie 
Stopes’ book Contraception in 1923, there was increasing public interest in 
contraception in Britain, and so the Church of England’s position on 
contraception was considered by the 1930 Lambeth Conference of Bishops. 
This Conference approved the use of contraception in certain circumstances. 
The guiding principles were that contraception should only be used within 
marriage, and that contraception should not be used for reasons of “selfishness, 
luxury or convenience”, but only when parents have a moral obligation to avoid 
parenthood. The conference asserted that abstinence was morally superior to 
contracepted sex, and that there should be a morally sound reason why 
abstinence is impossible.  
The Roman Catholic Church responded rapidly with Casti Connubi (“On Chaste 
Marriage”) which asserted robustly that all contraception was a vice opposed to 
Christian marriage, and that the only possible option for Catholic couples 
wishing to avoid parenthood was abstinence. However, in due course, the safe 
period (rhythm method) of contraception was permitted by Catholics, as it was 
not considered to be acting against nature. However, any human intervention 
that affects fertility can be regarded as a manipulation of the natural world.  
The Church of England reaffirmed its position on contraception at the 1958 
Lambeth Conference, where the Bishops argued that human beings are not 
bound by natural law because they are not wholly embedded in nature, but are 
also above nature, and transcendent.486  While a human person is a child of 
nature, they are also, in a sense, a spirit standing outside nature – and so there 
is a sense in which sex is supranatural, rather than just natural. The 1958 
Lambeth Conference therefore reaffirmed the position of the 1930 conference - 
that there were some circumstances in which contraception was acceptable.  
It was into this religious landscape that the oral contraceptive pill was 
introduced in the 1960s. As stated previously, John Rock, the Catholic 
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gynaecologist involved with the clinical development of the pill, saw the pill as a 
“natural” form of contraceptive, that Catholics could use with a good 
conscience. Consequently, during the 60s, many Catholics hoped for a change 
of heart from their church concerning contraception. However, their hopes were 
dashed with the publication of the papal encyclical, Humanae Vitae in 1968, 
which upheld the Catholic church’s position on contraception.487 Humanae Vitae 
specified that marital sex had two meanings: a) the reproductive, or procreative, 
meaning, and b) the personal, or unitive, meaning, and that there was an 
inseparable connection between them established by God - which humans 
could not interfere with using contraceptive technologies.488 Indeed, the 
argument of the encyclical was that, since procreation was the natural purpose 
of intercourse, then anything that obstructs that purpose is intrinsically evil.  
Yet, despite this strong prohibition, statistics on contraception published in the 
1970s suggested that a significant proportion of Catholics ignored the church’s 
official teaching, and practised contraception anyway.489 May has argued that 
many Catholics in the US ignored the church’s position on contraception in 
favour of simple economics and convenience.490  
There are various problems with the prohibition of contraception on natural law 
grounds, as expressed by Humanae Vitae. Pope notes that Humanae Vitae has 
been criticised as an overly physicalist application of natural law which does not 
take into account the complexity of individual circumstances, the importance of 
mutuality and intimacy in marriage and the difference between valuing the gift of 
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life in principle and requiring this value to be expressed in openness to 
conception at each sex act.491 
Bernard Hӓring, one theologian who opposed the Catholic church on 
contraception, therefore did so on the grounds of totality.492 Hӓring argued that 
biological functions could be subordinated to the good of the whole person and 
of community life, and therefore that contraception, as a biological intervention, 
had the potential to be ethically beneficial.  Contraception, he argued, ensured 
marital stability and planned parenthood and so, in moral status, could be 
regarded as the equivalent of a blood transfusion, or the use of insulin in 
diabetes.493  
A key consequence of the physicalist interpretation of natural law in Humanae 
Vitae is that it leads to an atomistic view of the sexual act, without 
acknowledging the broader, relational context of sex in marriage as a whole. 
The reason for this atomistic approach on the part of the Roman Catholic 
Church is because, according to natural law, the good ends of sex and marriage 
are procreation and childbirth, and each sex act always has the potential for 
conception. 
Thatcher notes, however, that marriage is better seen as a totality which should 
be open to new life, and that sexual morality should be about the flourishing of 
the whole person, not just the status of sex acts.494 He also notes that this was 
the stance taken by Anglican bishops by the 1958 Lambeth Conference when 
they affirmed that humans were not bound by natural law, because of their 
supra-natural self-transcendence, and that contraception was morally 
acceptable in certain circumstances. Anglican theologian Oliver O’Donovan 
summarised this issue well, stating that, “To break marriage down into a series 
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of disconnected sexual acts is to falsify its true nature.” 495 In terms of human 
flourishing, O’Donovan’s argument is a valid one. It is ironic therefore that 
Catholic natural law objections to contraception insist that contraception is 
unnatural because of its suppression of procreation, and yet treat a marriage as 
a series of sex acts which do not represent the true nature of marriage, as an 
ongoing and integral relationship between a man and woman, and therefore 
treat the marriage in an “unnatural” manner. 
Thatcher also notes the wider ethical implications of the Roman Catholic 
Church’s prohibition of contraception. There is no consideration that 
contraception might be used for a virtuous end; for example, a couple may 
postpone having children, in order to pay off their student debts.496 Furthermore, 
he claims that Catholic arguments about moral deficits seem harsh and 
judgemental, and lead people to question the relevance of the church in modern 
society.497 Thatcher has argued - reasonably, in my view - that the Roman 
Catholic Church has lost the respect of its members, because of its intransigent 
position on contraception and, for this reason, its theological insights, which are 
often of considerable depth, are overlooked. 
The approach taken by Humanae Vitae of separating the procreative and the 
unitive functions of marital sex is problematic scientifically, as well. A basic 
understanding of the human reproductive system shows that the procreative 
and unitive functions of marital sex can be separated in some “natural” 
circumstances - for example, during the menopause, because of infertility or 
simply during the infertile times of the menstrual cycle – not just by artificial 
means - which undermines this argument as a prohibition of hormonal 
contraception.498  
Another complicating factor is the notion that humanity may have a created role 
that is distinctive in creation and the natural order. As mentioned previously, at 
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the 1958 Lambeth Conference, the Church of England Bishops argued that 
humans are not bound by natural law, because they are not wholly embedded 
in nature, but are also above nature, and transcendent.499 Theologians have 
explored this complex relationship between humanity and nature. For example, 
John Polkinghorne states that humans are part of the natural world as 
creatures, yet distinct from it by virtue of their self-consciousness, and their 
awareness of the divine.500  
Stephen Pope has argued that the Roman Catholic canonists have continued to 
invoke  natural law, and to formulate their moral theology despite the 
significance of scientific developments of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.501 Pope contends – correctly, in my view, given the current cultural 
context – that with a simplistic natural theology, as opposed to a Thomist 
understanding of natural law, creation tends to be seen in only impersonal 
terms, as a machine for processing and constructing moral precepts. This, 
however, is inimical to the notion that human beings are personal beings, 
created by a personal God, and are called to have a personal – and moral – 
relationship with God and with each other.502 This argument is especially 
relevant for applying natural law to medical technologies that intervene in 
human reproduction. Consequently, in my view, the physicalist interpretation of 
natural law in  Humanae Vitae ultimately presents a deficient view of marriage, 
in the way it regards sex acts in marriage on an individual basis and does not 
place them within the broader context of the marriage relationship as a whole. 
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On the contrary, the developers of the pill - and, indeed, other voices in society 
at the time - saw the potential of the pill to improve the human condition, and 
provide real ethical benefits for individuals, and for society. Conversely, there 
has been little evidence that the pill has actively led to unethical behaviour in 
human society, over and above routine ethical variants in fallen humanity, or 
has been the sole factor in the marginalisation of marriage as a human 
institution.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Ronald Bailey, a supporter of transhumanism, points 
out that the application of biomedical technology does not preclude virtuous 
moral behaviour.503 A similar argument can be applied to the use of the 
contraceptive pill in the context of a loving, sexual relationship. Humans have 
not necessarily become less moral or loving as a result of the introduction of 
hormonal contraception.  
3.5. The Contraceptive Pill & Transhumanism 
In this section, the contraceptive pill – its features and its impact on society - will 
be assessed against the criteria for evaluating a transhumanist development 
that were set out in the previous chapter. As discussed in Chapter 1, medical 
technologies may have benefits for humanity but may also be associated with 
risks and unintended consequences which can have a significant wholescale 
impact on society. Therefore, medical technologies should not be accepted 
uncritically simply because they exist and are available but should be evaluated 
carefully from a perspective of Christian theological ethics. 
One factor that should be considered is the motivations of those people who 
were responsible for the development of the contraceptive pill. Is there any 
evidence that Sanger, McCormick, Pincus or Rock saw the contraceptive pill as 
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a “transhumanist” development - something that would have a significant impact 
on human flourishing and society, not just on individual human lives? 
It is well recognised that both Margaret Sanger and Katharine McCormick were 
motivated to support the development of the contraceptive pill because of their 
feminist ideology, and they believed that women should have the capacity of 
choice about fertility and childbirth.504 Sanger, especially, was motivated by her 
deeply-held political beliefs concerning social justice and equality, and had a 
far-reaching understanding of the implications of birth control for humanity. As 
long previously as 1912, she said that she saw birth control as about “voluntary 
motherhood”, not necessarily contraception, a view for which she was branded 
as a eugenicist.505 Furthermore, the controversy caused by the distribution in 
England in 1923 of Sanger’s pamphlet on birth control demonstrates that her 
views were radical at the time.506 Sanger expressed her vision, writing to 
McCormick, saying, 
“I consider that the world and almost our civilisation for the next twenty-
five years is going to depend upon a simple, cheap, safe contraceptive to 
be used in the poverty-stricken slums, jungles and among the most 
ignorant people. I believe that now, immediately there should be national 
sterilisation for certain dysgenic types of our population who are being 
encouraged to breed and would die out were the government not feeding 
them.”507  
Gregory Pincus, too, wanted to change the natural order, through the 
development of new scientific possibilities for animal and human life. Because 
his work was scientific, its implications for “nature” were more clearly in view for 
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contemporary society, and this earned him the opprobrium of the academic 
community, the media and wider American society.508 
Yet there is nothing to suggest that, in wanting to make a positive improvement 
to human flourishing, the protagonists wanted to destabilise the sexual and 
marital norms of society. As previously argued, Rock and Sanger did not intend 
to promote sexual licence and to fan the flames of a sexual revolution. Sanger 
and McCormick were seeking social justice and the improvement of society, as 
a whole – and both these objectives are consistent with Christian social ethics. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding his social conservatism, John Rock, the 
prominent clinical trialist in the development of the pill, was clearly motivated by 
his duty as a doctor to alleviate human suffering and improve the lives of his 
patients and saw the pill as a positive advance in that respect, and one that 
went beyond the remit and limits of interventional medicine at the time.509 
The stance of the protagonists is remarkable given government and scientific 
opposition to contraceptive research at the time, concerns in society about 
contraception as a legitimate social issue and about possible eugenic 
consequences - and, of course, the Roman Catholic Church’s doctrinal 
opposition to artificial contraception. However, the development of the 
contraceptive pill should also be considered in the context of the whole history 
of therapeutics. As discussed in Chapter 1, the role of luck, or “serendipity” as 
the pharmacological literature describes it, in drug discovery is well-
recognised,510 and many new drugs have found their way to the market by a 
process of coincidences and unintended consequences.511 The development of 
the pill was, in many respects, a notable exception in that it was developed in 
such an intentional way. Because of the “serendipity” factor in drug 
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development, the motivations of the developers must be regarded as a 
subjective, secondary measure of whether a medicine was indeed a 
transhumanist development of its time. The objective criteria, as previously 
outlined, will provide a better foundation to determine whether a development 
may be classed as transhumanist and for discussion of the relevant issues 
pertaining to theological ethics. 
Another issue that should be acknowledged is the diverse nature of the 
transhumanist movement, and the broad definition of a transhumanist 
technology. As I argued in the previous chapter, transhumanist scholars can be 
delineated into three different groups – philosophical transhumanists, who see 
the use of transhumanist technologies as the basis of a good way or rule of life; 
technological transhumanists, who are interested in the technological 
possibilities of transhumanism, but possibly at the expense of ethical 
implications, and ideological transhumanists, who are interested in 
biotechnological enhancements, as a means of exploring an ideological 
agenda. Analogously, I would argue that advocates of the contraceptive pill can 
be similarly grouped into, a) those who had a therapeutic agenda – such as 
John Rock, with his concerns for the humanitarian impact of oral contraception, 
and its effects of the health and wellbeing of women; b) those interested 
primarily in the technology, for example, Gregory Pincus, and c) those with an 
ideological agenda, such as Margaret Sanger and Katharine McCormick, with 
their feminist principles. Furthermore, the contraceptive pill has an impact on 
human life at all these levels – therapeutic, technological and ideological – 
which suggests that it has the characteristics of a “pre-transhumanist” medical 
technology.  
3.6. Evaluation of the Contraceptive Pill Against Transhumanism Criteria 
I will now evaluate the contraceptive pill from the perspective of the objective 
criteria described in Chapter 2. As explained previously, the general criteria for 
a transhumanist biomedical technology, used here to determine whether the 
technology is transhumanist in character, are those derived from the literature of 
transhumanism, and therefore reflect the understanding of these technologies 
180 
 
by advocates of transhumanism themselves. These criteria are very broad and 
all-encompassing. 
First, a transhumanist development is a technology 512 – a material means of 
effecting a task or process, which will include any physical or chemical reaction 
or intervention (including pharmacological therapeutics) but may also include 
processes, policies and organisational methods.513 The contraceptive pill is a 
form of chemical or pharmacological intervention, and so is a technology. 
Furthermore, while the components of the contraceptive pill are analogues of 
natural sex hormones, in the pill, they are synthetically produced and are 
introduced into the body artificially to elicit an effect. This undermines John 
Rock’s view that the contraceptive pill was a “natural” product, whose use 
should be acceptable to the Roman Catholic church. Therefore, the 
contraceptive pill is undoubtedly a technology according to this criterion.  
Second, a transhumanist development is a technology that is applied to a 
human person to exert its effect.514 At the core of transhumanism is the 
transformation of human biological life and experience, and the improvement of 
human society. Pregnancy is part of normal human function rather than a 
disease or disorder, and this has implications for the type of technological 
intervention that the pill is. Consequently, the pill is not therapeutic, because it is 
not taken primarily to restore human function in a person who is dysfunctional 
(although it has some therapeutic applications). Nor is the pill prophylactic in the 
true sense, because it is not being taken to prevent an illness or an adverse 
event. Consequently, I would argue that the ability to control fertility and avoid 
pregnancy for social reasons is an enhancement of normal human function. 
Furthermore, the use of the contraceptive “enhancement” has a wider impact 
than just on the woman taking the pill – as discussed, it affects her partner, and 
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widespread use of the pill will have a wholescale effect on human society. The 
pill therefore fulfils this second criterion in that it is a technology that exerts its 
effects by being applied to the human person.  
Third, a transhumanist development is a technology that is applied to the 
human person to promote human flourishing, by improving human function, or 
increasing longevity.515 As argued earlier in this chapter, the contraceptive pill 
has only a modest effect on longevity, but there are many health and social 
benefits of the contraceptive pill to human life. First, the pill has positive effects 
on human life and welfare that were envisaged by those who developed it. As 
with other forms of contraception, the pill allows a couple to make positive moral 
choices about when to have children and how many to have. Moreover, the pill 
enables a woman to have control over her body, which will have emotional and 
medical benefits for her. It will also contribute to the emotional wellbeing of the 
whole family which, in turn, will contribute to the stability of society. In this 
respect, the pill is a “moral enhancement” in that enables people to make good 
personal lifestyle choices. Second, as mentioned earlier, the pill has additional 
health benefits which are unrelated to its contraceptive effects, which include 
control of the menstrual cycle, reduced incidence of pre-menstrual tension, 
increased bone density (thus reducing the risk of fractures), among others. 
These health benefits constitute unintended consequences that were not 
considered when the pill was first launched but which have emerged in the 
decades since. Third, the pill also reduces the emotional and socioeconomic 
burden of unwanted pregnancy. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the 
contraceptive pill was the first drug affecting the whole body ever to be given to 
a healthy population on a large scale. There is therefore considerable evidence 
that the contraceptive pill has indeed had a positive effect on human flourishing 
on a large scale and has realised some of the aspirations of its developers. 
Fourth, with a transhumanist development, the human person should have 
autonomy in the use of the technology – in other words, the technology is not 
 
515 World Transhumanism Association, “Transhumanist Declaration”, pp. 54-55. 
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being applied in a coercive way.516 When it was first launched, the contraceptive 
pill was hailed as the ideal means to enable a woman to exercise choice about 
sex and pregnancy and for couples to exercise choice about family planning.517  
At first sight, therefore, the pill has had a positive effect on the exercise of 
personal autonomy, defined in Chapter 2 as uncoerced self-determination. 
However, a closer examination of the social impact of the contraceptive pill 
indicates that the introduction of the pill has, in fact, had an ambiguous effect on 
personal autonomy, and in some respects has taken choices away as well as 
enabled them. 
The contraceptive pill has limited human choice and freedom in several ways. 
As discussed in this chapter, the use of the contraceptive pill by his partner has 
the potential to take choices about contraception away from the man in a 
relationship because, with the pill, the woman has control over the means of 
contraception, and the timing of pregnancy. Also, the excretion of synthetic 
steroids into the environment by users of oral contraceptives may mean that 
individuals other than pill users and their partners are exposed to these 
substances and their potentially harmful effects without their knowledge or 
consent.  
There have also been concerns in the past that the contraceptive pill has been 
distributed in a coercive way in some third world countries. In the mid-60s, the 
Johnson administration made population control a key feature of the US 
government’s foreign aid policy, and American foreign aid programmes often 
included contraception services.518 However, US-funded population control 
programmes in the developing world have been criticised for being examples of 
American imperialism, since the contraceptive pill was developed and marketed 
largely from the United States.519 In addition, these programmes have been 
 
516 More, “Philosophy of Transhumanism”, p. 13. 
517 McLaren, A History of Contraception, p. 2. 
518 May, America and the Pill, p. 43. 
519 See May, America and the Pill, pp. 23-25. May states that the development 
of the oral contraceptive pill is essentially “an American story”. However, given 
the involvement of Schering and Bayer (Germany) in the development of oral 
contraceptives, and the rapid launch of the Searle product and others in Britain 
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criticised from a feminist perspective. For example, Hartmann has argued that, 
in developing countries, women have often not been adequately screened for 
suitability to take the pill, that the side-effects of the pill have been trivialised 
and that women have been not been adequately informed of the risks of taking 
the pill.520  Furthermore, she has identified a patronising attitude with US-funded 
population control programmes, where there is an underlying assumption that 
only American (while, middle-class, male) gynaecologists can possibly be 
qualified to give contraceptive advice to women in the third world. These factors 
have all affected the extent that women in developing countries can exercise 
true informed consent when offered the contraceptive pill. 
In fact, women themselves may experience a loss of autonomy or personal 
choice because they are taking the contraceptive pill. Women are dependent on 
a doctor or healthcare professional to prescribe the pill, and feminists have 
argued that the pill has therefore “medicalised” women and their fertility and 
made them the subject of health service intervention and assessment.521 This is 
especially ironic given the fact that, as stated earlier, pregnancy is not a disease 
or disorder. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the pill has introduced into 
society the concept of the “coital imperative” - if a woman is on the pill, and the 
risk of unwanted pregnancy is removed, there is no apparent reason for her to 
withhold sex.522 Consequently, in recent years, there has been considerable 
social pressure for young women to have penetrative sex with their partners in a 
way that was not expected in previous centuries.523 Because of the pill, women 
may be coerced into sexual relationships that they might not otherwise have, 
which undermines their personal autonomy. 
In any case, when considering the contraceptive pill and its effects on personal 
autonomy in the context of the sexual relationship, the ambiguous nature of 
 
in 1961, I would contest this claim, which could itself be regarded as American 
imperialism. 
520 Hartmann, Reproductive Rights and Wrongs, pp. 189-219. 
521 Jutte, Contraception: A History, p. 111. 
522 Thatcher. God, Sex and Gender, p. 221. 
523 Thatcher, God, Sex and Gender, pp. 214-216; Cook, The Long Sexual 
Revolution, pp. 1-3. 
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sexual desire itself with respect to autonomy must be acknowledged.524  On one 
hand, sexual desire is a pleasurable response to human beauty and physical 
attractiveness, and must be regarded as good, because of the goodness of 
creation (Genesis 1). On the other hand, however, David’s desire for Bathsheba 
(2 Samuel 11) led him to sin – against her, against her husband, and ultimately 
against God. The crux of this ambiguity is that sexual desire is about 
abandonment and loss of self-control – effectively, the surrender of personal 
autonomy - but Christianity, paradoxically, has emphasised the importance of 
controlling this desire. One cannot give oneself up to desire and control that 
desire at the same time. Consequently, sexual desire has the capacity to be 
both a virtue and a vice – and the reality is that sexual desire is on a moral 
continuum and can be good or bad depending on the circumstances. This issue 
has probably been at the root of the uneasy relationship between sexual desire 
and spiritual desire which, notwithstanding the implications of apophatic 
theology relating to desire,525 has led to some of the ascetic and dualistic views 
of spirituality that were common in the Patristic era and later.526 Furthermore, 
Christian mystics - for example Teresa of Avila – who have used the language 
of sexual desire to express their love for God, have been treated with suspicion 
by the Western church.527 With a long history of tension between bodily desire 
and spiritual life in Christianity, it is especially interesting that, in their 
pronouncement about contraception at the 1930 Lambeth Conference, the 
Church of England Bishops – men not generally bound by a vow of celibacy - 
 
524 Thatcher, God, Sex and Gender, pp. 57-69. 
525 Pseudo-Dionysius, the writer originally assumed to be Dionysius the 
Areopagite (Acts 17v34) saw God in apophatic terms, describing him as 
reaching out to his creatures, and yet returning to himself, a motion that is 
essentially one of erotic desire. Correspondingly, Pseudo Dionysius described 
the ecstasy of the believer, whose soul goes out of itself and is united with the 
divine. For Pseudo Dionysius, the ecstasy of the believer is about love and 
union, erotic love is a legitimate response to the divine and is centred on the 
object of longing (i.e. God) (see Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian 
Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1981), pp. 154-173. 
526 Philip Sheldrake, Befriending our Desires (London: Darton, Longman and 
Todd, 1994), pp. 54-57.  
527 Sheldrake, Befriending our Desires, p. 56.  
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advised that abstinence is preferable to contracepted sex. The question is 
whether this advice was based on natural caution, given their knowledge of the 
complexity of the Christian teaching and tradition in this area, or whether it was 
due to negative, repressive personal attitudes to sex on their part.  
In Chapter 2, I defined autonomy as non-coerced self-determination “to be 
one’s own person, to be directed by ...desires... that are not simply imposed 
externally upon one but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s 
authentic self.”528 According to this definition, self-abandonment to sexual desire 
is not loss of autonomy if the desire is an expression of the person’s authentic 
self. However, as Christman points out, if the desire is a product of “addiction” – 
for example, drug addiction - the pursuit of that desire may not be a truly 
autonomous activity because it is not an expression of the authentic self.529 This 
might also apply to sexual desire, for example, in extreme cases of sexual 
addiction. In any case, the internal factors affecting self-determination, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, in the context of sexual relationships must be 
considered when evaluating how the use of the contraceptive pill might affect 
personal autonomy.  
There is also the question of how autonomy might be used. The contraceptive 
pill has certainly enabled couples to have more choice about family planning. 
But, during the last fifty years, has the freedom provided by the contraceptive 
pill been used to enable people to make wise choices about family planning for 
the good of human welfare, or to pursue selfish desires and aims, at the 
expense of humanity as a whole? As stated earlier, there is little evidence that 
the pill has increased the incidence of sexual activity with multiple partners in 
society. Furthermore, some theological responses to contraception, such as 
that of Bernard Häring, have suggested that planned parenthood has positive 
 
528 Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy”, Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
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moral value in that it can uphold good ethical decisions and moral agency in the 
individuals concerned.530 However, the technology itself is neutral in ethical 
terms.  
Consequently, although use of the contraceptive pill may, at first sight, enhance 
personal autonomy for the user, I have shown here that use of the contraceptive 
pill has ambiguous effects on autonomy, in a similar way as future 
transhumanist technologies may do, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
However, to determine a theological ethical view of the technology, these broad 
general transhumanist criteria would need to be overlaid by some specific 
criteria for how a technology might be regarded by theological ethics. How does 
the contraceptive pill, as a medical technology, evaluate against Neil Messer’s 
diagnostic questions about the ethical implications of biotechnology? 
First, is the contraceptive pill good news for the poor? McLaren has argued that 
contraception has enabled women to be in control of their working life, as well 
as their sex life and their family life.531  There is evidence that the contraceptive 
pill has had an impact on female poverty and hardship. In an analysis of US 
census data from 1960 to 1990, Browne and LaLumia demonstrated that 
access to the oral contraceptive pill from the age of 20 has reduced subsequent 
poverty among women due to unplanned pregnancy and childbirth, regardless 
of employment status.532 In theory, the pill has enabled women to make more 
choices about their working lives, to achieve career ambitions and gain a 
foothold in industries that have typically been male-dominated – all with wider 
societal implications, and potential benefits in terms of economic growth. There 
is little direct evidence to show that this is the case, but this theory is supported 
by Swarewski and Guillebaud’s 1991 review of contraceptive use in Britain, 
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which showed that the contraceptive pill was particularly popular with young 
women who had never had children.533  
As noted previously, there have been some ethical concerns about the 
distribution of hormonal contraception in the developing world, concerning 
whether people in those countries have real freedom of choice when offered 
contraception services. There is evidence to suggest that, where contraceptive 
services are available in developing countries, they have significant effects on 
reducing health and welfare costs in those countries.534 These benefits arise 
from the reduction of the population, which alleviates poverty and famine, and 
which also benefits the environment and enables development to proceed more 
efficiently in those countries. They also arise from the positive effects of the pill 
on the health of women, sparing them from unwanted childbirth. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, a key factor in whether biomedical technologies are 
good news for the poor is how accessible they are to the poor. As is the trend 
with many medicines, the costs of contraceptive pill formulations have 
decreased significantly since the launch of the first contraceptive pill in 1960. 
This has been partly due to the increased number of products available, due to 
the development of second and third generation pills with improved side-effect 
profiles, ensuring cost reduction due to competition. Consequently, at the 
current time, the contraceptive pill is more affordable for developing countries 
than it was when it was first introduced. Use of hormonal contraception 
worldwide, however, is still not universal. United Nations (UN) statistics show 
that, in 2011, throughout the world, an average of 63% of women who were 
married or partnered were using contraception.535 However, this figure of 63% is 
an average, and ranges from 70% or more of women in Europe, North America, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, to only 31% of women in Africa. The highest 
 
533 Szarewski and Guillebaud, “Contraception: Current State of the Art”, pp. 
1224-1226. 
534 Ushma Upadhyay and Bryant Robey, "Why Family Planning Matters", 
Population Reports. Series J, Family Planning Programs, 49 (1999), pp. 1-31. 
535 United Nations, “Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2013) World Contraceptive Patterns 2013”, 2013, at 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/family/worl
dContraceptivePatternsWallChart2013.pdf. (accessed March 2020). 
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figure was 88% in Norway, and the lowest was 4% in South Sudan. On a 
worldwide basis, the most popular forms of contraception were female 
sterilisation (19%), intrauterine device (IUD)(14%), the contraceptive pill (9%) 
and condoms (8%). However, use of less reliable traditional methods of 
contraception (rhythm method, douching and folk medicine) is still prevalent in 
some parts of the world, especially mid-Africa and western Asia. These UN 
statistics identified one in five women as having an unmet contraceptive need, 
with no access to contraception, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Pacific islands. Consequently, many commentators argue that there are unmet 
needs for oral contraception in the developing world, and that more distribution 
of the pill is needed.536 In conclusion, on balance, the contraceptive pill is good 
news for the poor, dependent on whether the pill can, in fact, be made available 
to all world citizens in an equal and fair way.  
Second, does the project conform to the image of God or does it attempt to be 
“like God”? Here, the answer is nuanced. At an individual level, use of the 
contraceptive pill enables individuals to control their fertility and plan their 
families and, at a societal level, the pill and contraceptive services enable 
governments to exercise control over population growth. The contraceptive pill 
could therefore be regarded as an attempt to be “like God” in that people are 
using the pill to control and manipulate human life, and to have a power and 
knowledge which might be regarded as God-like, and in contravention of natural 
law, in terms of a creation divinely ordered under a sovereign creator. Concern 
over this level of control would be consistent with the Roman Catholic’s church’s 
natural law objections to the contraceptive pill.  
Conversely, to what extent does the pill conform to the image of God? For the 
purposes of answering this question, I would interpret conformation to the 
image of God as the extent to which the use of the pill, and its effects on 
individuals or society, reflects a comprehensive understanding of the imago Dei, 
taking into account the different theological approaches to the imago Dei that 
 
536 For example, Bahamondes et al, "Non-contraceptive benefits of hormonal 
and intrauterine reversible contraceptive methods", pp. 640-651. 
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have been described. In Chapter 2, I argued that transhumanist biomedical 
technologies reflected a limited understanding of the imago Dei. The imago Dei 
reflected by the use of transhumanist technologies in humanity is one that is 
excessively substantive, focussing on human attributes, at the expense of being 
relational or functional, and in a way that is individualistic and inward-looking, in 
eschatological terms. With that worldview, there is a danger that, instead of 
human beings worshipping God, because they are made in his image, they 
would instead worship the technologically enhanced posthuman person as a 
god instead. There is a danger that human beings will look to technology for 
perfection rather than seek spiritual perfection and transformation in union with 
Christ, which the Christological dynamic of the imago Dei would point towards.  
As described earlier, the contraceptive pill, as an enhancement, confers a 
specific attribute to humanity – the ability to postpone or delay pregnancy in a 
controllable manner. The pill may also confer other attributes on the user – for 
example, a regular menstrual cycle or increased bone density. Like proposed 
transhumanist technologies, the pill therefore does affect certain human 
attributes, and this does reflect a substantive theological view of the imago Dei. 
However, as seen earlier, use of the pill also has an impact on human 
relationships - in particular, on the relationship of men and women in marriage - 
and this has implications for the imago Dei. The imago Dei doctrine in Christian 
history has been criticised for being androcentric, because of the interpretation 
of Bible passages such as 1 Corinthians 11v7. For example, Mary Catherine 
Hilkert has argued that “the imago Dei doctrine has been the cause of 
oppression and discrimination against women in the past and needs rethinking.” 
537 During the 20th century, feminist theologians have strived to redress the 
balance, and have developed understandings of the imago Dei that are 
inclusive of women - for example, those of Hilkert and also Mary McClintock 
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Fulkerson.538 The contraceptive pill has enhanced the marriage relationship by 
changing its dynamic and redressing the balance of power and influence in 
favour of women in marriage. Consequently, use of the contraceptive pill 
reflects a more gender-neutral imago Dei in the context of human relationships. 
This helps to address feminist concerns about the role of women in humanity 
and moves beyond previous views of imago Dei that are androcentric and have 
been subject to gender-related critique. Furthermore, I would suggest that, 
because the relational imago Dei in humanity is upheld by effects of the 
contraceptive pill on relationships, this may also have a positive effect in 
emphasising the functional approach to the imago Dei. Because relationships in 
human society are recast in a positive way in human society, this may enable 
men and women to more properly exercise their specific vocations as men and 
women in God’s world. 
Third, what attitude does the project embody towards the material world 
(including our own bodies)? Although it has systemic effects, the contraceptive 
pill does not make wholesale material changes to the body in a negative way, or 
in a way that denigrates the body, in the way that some transhumanist 
technologies do - for example, mind uploading or cybernetics. The pill mimics 
the actions of naturally occurring sex hormones, and so it is a biomedical 
technology that exerts positive effects through its actions on the human body, 
and therefore upholds the significance of the body. 
However, the contraceptive pill does provide a technological means of 
regulating and manipulating the body. This may be used for good ethical ends – 
for example to promote planned parenthood and provide family stability - but 
may also be used for ends that are not consistent with a Christian ethic – for 
example, the avoidance of parenthood for selfish reasons, or to enable sexual 
activity with multiple partners  or adultery. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Cole-Turner has argued that pharmacological solutions should not be sought for 
 
538 Mary McLintock Fulkerson, “Contesting the Gendered Subject: A Feminist 
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spiritual problems.539 I would suggest that, in the same way, pharmacological 
manipulation of the body is no substitute for good ethical decision-making.  
As previously mentioned in this chapter, the contraceptive pill has only a 
modest effect on mortality so, as a biomedical technology, it is not opposed to 
human finitude in the way that some proposed transhumanist medical 
technologies are, such as cryogenic preservation or mind uploading. However, 
as stated, the pill has benefits for individual quality of life – control over fertility, 
family planning, and other health benefits. Furthermore, the availability of 
contraception has enabled couples to participate more fully in activities outside 
of marriage and family life – careers, hobbies, sports and social life - with the 
potential social, cultural –and material – benefits that those activities might 
provide.  Consequently, even though the contraceptive pill does not significantly 
prolong life and therefore affect human finitude, it does have the potential to 
enhance the material nature of human life, in the broadest sense. This may be 
ethically positive, if the material gains to society as the result of contraceptive 
use provide moral goods in society. However, in some circumstances, these 
material gains may detract from spiritual life, if they are employed in an 
individual, hedonistic or exploitative way. 
Fourth, what attitude does the project embody towards past failures? The 
development of the contraceptive pill has been a great success in many ways; 
indeed, as described in an earlier section of this chapter, it has been hailed as 
the fulfilment of the search for the “ideal contraceptive” and as a triumph of 
control over human fertility, with far-reaching consequences for society, so it 
could be regarded as a hubristic technological development. The development 
of the contraceptive pill and its impact on human society has been described in 
fulsome terms by scholars and commentators. Because of its advantages over 
previous forms of contraception (namely, that it is a non-invasive method, which 
can be controlled by the woman), McLaren has described the pill as a 
 
539 Ronald Cole-Turner “Towards a Theology for the Age of Biotechnology”, in 
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“contraceptive revolution”.540 Cook has argued that the pill “precipitated a 
transformation in sexual mores” and that, by reducing the social and economic 
impact of pregnancy, the pill has transformed attitudes to sexuality.541  Similarly, 
May has described the pill as, not simply a method of contraception but “a flash 
point for major social transformation”.542 Furthermore, at the time of its 
introduction, the contraceptive pill was regarded not only as a convenient form 
of contraception, but as a solution to a range of socio-political problems. It was 
hailed as the solution to the problem of exponential population growth, a 
“clean”, scientific solution to the problem of contraception and unwanted 
pregnancy. The pill was easy to prescribe, and it required no invasive or messy 
process, and therefore it sanitised contraception.543 Many doctors also saw the 
pill as a clinical approach to contraception, which was consistent with their 
professional ethics and aspirations. 
In short, there is evidence to suggest that the contraceptive pill has indeed been 
adopted confidently by western society, as a panacea for various social 
problems, in a way that Cole-Turner has warned against.544 In reference to the 
definition and discussion of humility in Chapter 2, the contraceptive pill does 
appear to have been developed and distributed with confidence, even hubris, as 
a man-made innovation, rather than with humility as a product of the natural 
world, which reflects a glory which does not belong to humanity. However, this 
confidence in the pill has to some extent been misplaced, with various 
unintended consequences over the years, such as the “pill scares” (the risk of 
blood clotting-related side effects with the pill) and also the inability of the pill to 
protect against sexually transmitted diseases, which became apparent with the 
spread of HIV and more recently, the increased incidence of chlamydia. 
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Another approach to the theological evaluation of medical technologies is seen 
in Elaine Graham’s analysis of transhumanism, where she outlined three 
problematic theological issues relating to medical technologies – concerning 
embodiment, autonomy and subjectivity.545 Below these issues are described 
and related to the impact of oral contraception on society. 
First, the problem with transhumanist technologies is that they interfere with the 
integrity of the individual body and can therefore have a disruptive effect on the 
corporate body – the community. As argued earlier in this section, the 
contraceptive pill does not have a negative material impact on the individual 
human body and, because of its positive effects on human relationships, it may 
have material benefits for the corporate body of humanity - human society in 
general. These benefits have been noted especially in developing countries, 
where the effects of contraception programmes in specific countries have been 
studied in detail.546 However, the impact of the pill on the corporate body of 
society will be dependent on the ethical choices made by individuals, 
concerning contraception, relationships and family planning, and also on 
government policies on the availability of, and accessibility to, contraception. 
Thus, in relation to this criterion, the contraceptive pill does not resemble a 
transhumanist technology because there is evidence to indicate that the pill has 
positive effects on society – on humanity at a corporate level – as well as 
humanity at an individual level.  
Second, Graham argues that transhumanist medical technologies enable 
individuals to exercise unbridled autonomy in a negative manner. However, as I 
have argued earlier in this chapter, the effects of the pill on autonomy and 
personal choice are ambiguous. While the availability of the pill ostensibly gives 
women (and men) choice about family planning, its widespread use may, in 
practice, restrict men’s choices about contraception, and also be an instrument 
of coercion for women, because of the so-called coital imperative and also 
 
545 Graham, In Whose Image?  pp. 57-64.  
546 Upadhyay and Robey, "Why Family Planning Matters", pp. 1-31. 
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exploitative distribution of the pill in certain societies. In this respect, the effect 
of the contraceptive pill on autonomy bears a striking resemblance to the likely 
effects of future transhumanist technologies on autonomy, as outlined in the 
transhumanism enhancement literature – the technology may be adopted at the 
outset with autonomy, but autonomy may be restricted in some situations where 
the technology is used. Moreover, as mentioned previously in this section, 
autonomy is an ethically neutral phenomenon – it may be used to inflict selfish 
desires on other people, or it can be used to pursue good ethical ends. The 
contraceptive pill certainly does not confer unbridled autonomy on the 
individual.  
Third, Graham is concerned that transhumanist technologies are suspect 
because they are focused on the subjective experience of the user. The 
subjectivism inherent in transhumanism may derive from the strong emphasis 
on autonomy (self-determination) in choosing enhancements, which has been a 
key feature of transhumanist thought.547 However, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
the irony is that, although transhumanist technologies enhance subjective 
experience, they are ultimately problematic because they objectify the human 
body, and treat it as an artefact rather than a human person.548 
Some feminist writers have argued that the contraceptive pill can objectify the 
user – i.e. render the woman using the pill an object of sexual desire.549 This is 
analogous to the way some transhumanist technologies – for example, 
cybernetics or gene alterations – treat the body as a product to be engineered. 
However, because the pill exerts its effects within and through the human body, 
in a way that does not negate embodiment, I would argue that, with the pill, the 
user does not become an artefact to be manipulated at will, as with some 
proposed transhumanist technologies. On the contrary, the pill provides benefits 
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to the individual person which are experienced subjectively in sexual, marriage 
and family relationships.  
The findings of this chapter indicate that the contraceptive pill conforms to the 
criteria for transhumanist developments in that it is a technology which is 
applied to the human person to exert its effects and is one that, largely, has a 
beneficial effect on human flourishing. Furthermore, the contraceptive pill has 
had a significant impact on human society, not just on the experience of the 
individual. The use of the contraceptive pill has both objective and subjective 
components, in that it has the potential to objectify the user, as an object of 
sexual desire, and yet enhances the user’s subjective experience. Furthermore, 
given that it was planned, in part, as a means of controlling the population for 
socio-political reasons, rather than just as a means of preventing or delaying 
conception, I would argue that the contraceptive pill has been seen as the 
culmination of the search for effective contraception over the centuries, and so 
the pill has been regarded with extreme confidence, even hubris, as a triumph 
of human technological achievement, in a similar way to proposed future 
transhumanist technologies. This contrasts with a humility that derives from 
scientific engagement with the mysteries of nature which reflect a glory that 
ultimately is not human glory.  
Unlike radical, “high-tech” transhumanist technologies - for example, mind 
uploading or cryogenics - the contraceptive pill has the potential to be beneficial 
to the poor, because of its low cost relative to high-tech medicine and its ability 
to help women on low incomes to plan their families and their working life. 
Unlike approaches to transhumanism that emphasise human attributes, and 
therefore a more substantive approach to the imago Dei, as outlined in Chapter 
2, I have argued in this chapter that the effects of the contraceptive pill reflect 
an approach to the imago Dei that is more balanced and is relational and 
functional, as well as substantive. Unlike forms of transhumanist technologies 
which are essentially anti-materialist, such as mind-uploading, the contraceptive 
pill exerts positive effects in and through the human body and its mechanisms 
and does not negate biological life. 
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However, the contraceptive pill raises significant questions for personal 
autonomy. A stated aim of the transhumanist movement is that individuals who 
are seeking biomedical enhancement can adopt a biomedical technology 
autonomously, as a matter of free, personal choice. Correspondingly, a key 
theological criticism of transhumanist technologies, raised by Elaine Graham, is 
that they enable unbridled autonomy in a negative manner. The evidence from 
the development and use of the contraceptive pill suggests that neither of these 
extremes is true. While individual users of the contraceptive pill can exercise 
autonomy in choosing it at the outset, a number of factors – for example, the 
impact on men’s choices, the possibility of the “coital imperative” for women, 
equity in the marketing and distribution of the pill and indeed the ambiguous 
nature of sexual desire - can ultimately lead to negative effects of the 
contraceptive pill on personal autonomy. 
In the next chapter, we will turn our focus to SSRI antidepressants, and 
consider whether these might be regarded as a transhumanist medical 





Chapter 4 – Case Study – Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRI) 
Antidepressants 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter described the development of the oral contraceptive pill, 
the effects of the pill on human society, and the Roman Catholic church’s 
theological and ethical objections to the pill. In the latter part of the chapter, the 
contraceptive pill was evaluated against the criteria for evaluation of 
transhumanist technologies developed in Chapter 2, consisting of general 
criteria to describe transhumanist technologies, based on the writings of 
transhumanists, and specific theological criteria for ethical assessment of 
transhumanist technologies, drawing on the work of Neil Messer and Elaine 
Graham. 
This case study showed that the contraceptive pill resembled a transhumanist 
biomedical technology in general criteria, that as a pharmacologically active 
pharmaceutical product, it is a technology, it is applied to the human body to 
exert its effects and has a positive effect on human flourishing. However, as 
with proposed future transhumanist biomedical enhancements, the effects of 
the pill on personal autonomy are ambiguous – it can have negative as well as 
positive effects on personal autonomy. Furthermore, the pill seems in danger of 
objectifying the human body (in making the body an object for sexual desire), 
yet at the same time the pill leads to a heightened subjectivity on the part of the 
user, where subjective, individual experiences of sex and relationships become 
more significant as societal norms. Unlike some of the future transhumanist 
technologies described in Chapter 2, the contraceptive pill as a medical 
technology upholds human embodiment and is consistent with human bodily life 
and flourishing, rather than contrary to it. In general terms, the contraceptive pill 
may be good news for the poor, in terms of its potential effects on poverty and 
working patterns among women. However, there are potential ethical concerns 
with the pill surrounding its equitable distribution and use in different countries 
and cultures.  
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This chapter will present the second case study of previous therapeutic 
developments, which took place during the “therapeutic revolution” years (1950-
1990) – the development of the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) 
antidepressants which were marketed in the late 1980s - for example, 
fluoxetine, marketed by Lilly as Prozac. In the same way as in the last chapter, 
the first section will describe the history of SSRI development, and how SSRIs 
arose from previous developments in rational psychopharmacology. The 
second section will discuss the impact of SSRIs on society, both their 
therapeutic effects on patients with clinical depression and their use as mood-
altering drugs in individuals who are not depressed. The chapter will go on to 
discuss a Christian ethical response to the use of SSRIs, engaging with the 
work of Catholic scholar John-Mark Miravalle.550 In this discussion, the nature of 
depression and the way it is treated will be explored, with reference to Aquinas’ 
classification of human attributes, and their implications for psychology, and I 
will present a critique of Miravalle’s argument. The third section of the chapter 
will then assess SSRI antidepressants against the criteria for evaluation of 
transhumanist technologies developed in Chapter 2, to determine the extent to 
which, in their time, they could have been regarded as a transhumanist 
development, and to evaluate them from a Christian ethical perspective.  
4.2. The Development of SSRIs 
The development of Prozac (fluoxetine) and other selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants in the late 1980s was arguably the climax of 
the post-war rational psychopharmacology endeavour. So, for example, Lopez-
Munoz and Alamo note that there have been no therapeutic advances for 
depression since the 1990s,551 and Perez Caballero et al contend that use of 
 
550 John-Mark Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God: A Catholic Moral 
Perspective on Antidepressants (Chicago: University of Scranton Press, 2010). 
551 Francisco López-Muñoz and Cecilio Alamo, “Monoaminergic 
Neurotransmission: The History of the Discovery of Antidepressants from 1950s 
Until Today”, Current Pharmaceutical Design, 15 (2009), pp. 1563-1586. 
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SSRIs has, in fact, suppressed the exploration of new models of depression, 
and the investigation of new drugs.552 
Edward Shorter has described the remarkable history of 
psychopharmacology.553 Prior to the twentieth century, there were no known 
specific treatments for any mental illnesses. In the western world, if people had 
mental illnesses that rendered them unable to function in society, as it was at 
the time, or caused them to be a hazard to other people or themselves, they 
were housed in institutions which simply managed their behaviour and 
segregated them from mainstream society. This was done in a way that was 
sometimes cruel and unjust, and that reinforced the stigma of mental illness. 
Psychiatrist David Healy describes the mental hospitals of the past as “no more 
than jails with brutal guards.”554 The early twentieth century saw the introduction 
of two groups of drugs which had some benefits in mental illnesses: a) 
amphetamines and other stimulants, which were of some value in patients with 
profound depression, and b) barbiturates, which were tranquillisers, and 
therefore were helpful in patients with mania or agitation.555 However, both 
groups of drugs had significant side-effects and were open to abuse; 
barbiturates also were highly toxic, and often led to accidental death. 
However, some serendipitous discoveries after the Second World War laid the 
foundation for the development of specific, targeted drug therapies for mental 
illnesses. First, in 1949, an Australian psychiatrist, John Cade, conducted 
experiments to determine whether a specific toxin was excreted in the urine of 
patients with mania but found – coincidentally - that lithium salts had a calming 
effect in patients who had mania or bipolar disease. This eventually led to 
 
552 Laura Perez-Caballero, Sonia Torres-Sanchez, Lidia Bravo, Juan Antonio 
Mico and Esther Berrocoso, “Fluoxetine: a case history of its discovery and 
preclinical development”, Expert Opinion in Drug Discovery, 9 (2014), pp. 1-12. 
553 Edward Shorter, Before Prozac: The Troubled History of Mood Disorders in 
Psychiatry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 11-33. 
554 David Healy, "Psychopharmacology and the government of the self", 
Colloquium at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Nature Medicine, 
2000. 
555 Shorter, Before Prozac, pp. 18-33. 
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lithium salts becoming a standard treatment for bipolar disease. 556 Second, in 
1955, May and Baker Ltd marketed chlorpromazine, the first effective medicine 
for schizophrenia, which was an unexpected by-product of the M and B 
antihistamine research programme.557 Third, in 1957, Roche developed the first 
monoamine oxidase inhibitor (MAOI) antidepressant. Roche had acquired a 
large amount of hydrazine-containing rocket fuel from the German military in the 
aftermath of World War Two and were investigating several hydrazine-based 
drugs for their anti-tubercular properties. However, they fortuitously discovered 
that one of them, iproniazid, had a positive effect on patients’ moods, and 
therefore had potential as an antidepressant.558 
This set the scene for research in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when 
scientists began to realise that the monoamine neurotransmitter substances in 
the brain, noradrenaline and serotonin, had a profound effect on mood and 
mental illness, due to their actions on the relevant receptors.559 At this time, the 
so-called “monoamine hypothesis” of depression was formulated,560 which 
stated that the underlying cause of clinical depression is a depletion in the 
levels of serotonin and noradrenaline in the central nervous system.561 This led 
to the development of drugs which prevented the reuptake of noradrenaline and 
serotonin in the brain - the tricyclic antidepressants, amitriptyline and 
imipramine. During the 1960s and 1970s, various tricyclic antidepressants were 
launched, such as trimipramine, clomipramine, nortriptyline and others. These 
tricyclic antidepressants were a significant breakthrough in the treatment of 
depression, because they enabled people who had debilitating depressive 
illness to live relatively normal lives, when previously they would have been 
unable to function normally in society. However, these tricyclic agents had 
 
556 Shorter, Before Prozac, p. 65. 
557 Shorter, Before Prozac, p. 46. 
558 López-Muñoz and Alamo, “Monoaminergic Neurotransmission”, pp. 1563-
1586; Shorter, Before Prozac, p. 53. 
559 See discussion on receptor theory in Chapter 1. 
560 López-Muñoz and Alamo, “Monoaminergic Neurotransmission”, pp. 1563-
1586; Shorter, Before Prozac, p. 68. 
561 David Healy, Let Them Eat Prozac: The Unhealthy Relationship Between the 
Pharmaceutical Industry and Depression, (New York/London: New York 
University Press, 2004), p. 9. 
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pharmacological effects in all parts of the body, not just in the brain. They 
therefore had many physiological side-effects – for example, increased heart 
rate, palpitations, sedation, blurred vision and dry mouth - side effects which 
could be marked at high doses. Such side effects therefore limited the dose that 
could be given and made it difficult to treat patients with severe depression with 
high doses. The side-effects also meant that tricyclic antidepressants were toxic 
in overdose and, given the propensity for depressed patients to consider suicide 
and use their drugs as the means, this was a serious problem. 
Many scientists in the United States believed that the reuptake of noradrenaline, 
rather than that of serotonin, was the key factor in pharmacological treatment of 
depression.562  However, following new work by Carlsson and colleagues in 
1969 on the effects of antihistamine structure on serotonin depletion in the 
brain,563 the focus of research moved to serotonin-reuptake inhibiting 
antidepressant candidates.564 The thinking was that these agents might be as 
effective as antidepressants, but with a more favourable side-effect profile than 
the tricyclic antidepressants. 
Another important feature of the treatment of depression from the 1960s 
onwards was the increasing classification of personality characteristics as 
subtypes of depressive illness. The mental illness classification, the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), was first introduced in 1952, 
as a means of classifying various specific psychiatric disorders, a task made 
particularly urgent by the numbers of veterans returning from World War Two, 
who were exhibiting a variety of symptoms of mental illness. However, as more 
detailed knowledge of psychopharmacology became available, the DSM 
classification became more granular, with an increasing number of different 
disease categories. Schermer notes that no less than four hundred new disease 
 
562 Healy, Let Them Eat Prozac, pp. 9-10. 
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categories have been added to the DSM since its introduction in 1952.565 The 
DSM therefore became more catch-all in its categories and what had previously 
been regarded as character or personality attributes were increasingly listed by 
the DSM as subtypes of depressive illness. So, for example, Harvard 
psychiatrist Joseph Glenmullen notes that “perfectionism” has come to be 
included under the penumbra of depression in the DSM classification.566 This 
implied that all behaviour had a biological or biochemical cause and could 
therefore be “treated” with antidepressants – the so-called “biological model” of 
depression.567 
The biological model of depression has been subject to considerable criticism 
because it is in apparent conflict with a person-centred approach to mental 
healthcare. Glenmullen claims that the biological approaches to psychiatry have 
led to an inversion of the diagnostic process.568 Rather than medicines being 
developed to treat diseases and to meet the needs of the person, instead 
diseases were being modelled on the drugs produced by the pharmaceutical 
industry that could be used to treat them. This argument is valid, in my view, 
given the high-throughput screening approach adopted by the pharmaceutical 
industry in the search for new therapeutic candidates in psychopharmacology. 
Furthermore, Glenmullen argues that the biological approach to psychiatry 
leads to mechanistic, rather than holistic, treatment, and is therefore 
reductionist in nature.569 He states that the biological model of depression has 
been cited as “proof” that depression is genetically inherited, but he argues – 
persuasively – that claims about genetic causation of depression cannot be 
proven, due to non-equivalence of animal models and the use of surrogate end 
points in studies. He therefore dismisses theories of genetic predisposition of 
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depression, based on the biological model of depression, as ideologically driven 
“Darwinian propaganda”, albeit in a somewhat polemic manner.  
British psychiatrist David Healy is another trenchant critic of the biological model 
of depression; he claims that the disease modelling in this way encourages 
biological treatment of “diseases” that are essentially social problems, rather 
than pathological illnesses.570 Healy argues that, from an ethical perspective, 
this modelling paradigm represents a slippery slope to social engineering and 
ultimately eugenics. While this is a sweeping claim, it is not without foundation. 
In a similar way, Ronald Cole-Turner has identified the reductionist tendency of 
the biological model of depression, arguing that, with psychopharmacology, 
humans are reaching out for molecular solutions for what are essentially 
spiritual problems.571 This reductionism undermines some hitherto important 
approaches to medical ethics, as described in Chapter 1, for example, ethical 
approaches that focus on the motivations of the medical or healthcare 
practitioner, or on assessing the consequences of a particular treatment for the 
patient.  
These criticisms of the biological model are valid but, in my view, the 
polarisation between the biological model of depression and person-centred 
mental healthcare is a false dichotomy. A nuanced approach, accounting for 
both biological and person-centred factors, is more helpful. This recognises 
that, on the one hand, mental disorders may be grounded in real biological – 
neurochemical – characteristics but, on the other, they cannot simply be 
reduced to neurochemistry, and that both aspects must be understood in order 
to provide high-quality and truly person-centred care. This debate, with its 
implications concerning biological reductionism and human emergence, is an 
important one for an ethical understanding of antidepressants as a biomedical 
technology, and I will return to this later in this chapter.  
 
570 Healy, Let Them Eat Prozac, p. 255. 
571 Ronald Cole-Turner, “Towards a Theology for the Age of Biotechnology”, in 
Beyond Cloning: Religion and the Remaking of Humanity, edited by Ronald 
Cole-Turner (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2001), p. 144.  
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It was in an environment of rapidly developing psychopharmacological 
knowledge, together with an increasing willingness to embrace a biological 
model of psychiatry, that the SSRI antidepressants were developed, as 
“rational” antidepressants. Based on the previous work on serotoninergic 
actions of antihistamines, Bryan Molloy, a research chemist at Lilly Research at 
Indianapolis, US, developed a range of phenoxy-phenyl-propanolamine 
molecules, which were structural analogues of antihistamines. Among these 
was the compound, LY-110 140, which was named fluoxetine in 1975, and 
which would eventually be marketed as Prozac.572 However, although fluoxetine 
was discovered and its pharmacology investigated in the mid-1970s, it did not 
emerge on the market as a new antidepressant until 1988. This was for several 
well-documented reasons.573 
First, as was typical with the rational drug discovery process at the time (see 
Chapter 1), fluoxetine was just one of many compounds being screened by Lilly 
for antidepressant properties. Although fluoxetine came to the attention of Lilly 
Clinical Research, headed by David Wong, during the 1970s, the molecule 
appeared to have only mild effects on mood but, unusually for an 
antidepressant, it had marked alerting and stimulant properties.574 
Consequently, it was not immediately recognised as an obvious candidate for 
marketing as an antidepressant. For this reason, it was not until 1980 that Lilly 
Pharmaceuticals finally committed themselves commercially to fluoxetine as a 
pipeline drug.575 
Second, due to various factors, such as the social and financial costs of the 
Vietnam War, escalating healthcare costs and a distrust of scientists that had 
arisen during the Nixon era, there was little federal government funding for 
psychopharmacology research in the US by the end of the 1970s.576 Yet, at this 
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time, psychiatry was becoming complex diagnostically, due to the granular 
disease classifications described earlier, and the success of earlier drug 
innovations meant that patients and relatives had higher expectations of mental 
health and psychiatric treatments than ever before. 
Third, a crucial factor was that the clinical trial methodology at the time of its 
discovery did not adequately demonstrate fluoxetine’s antidepressant activity.577 
Following its initial development, fluoxetine was tested against placebo (an 
inactive tablet) for antidepressant activity, as was standard practice at the time, 
but the trials showed that fluoxetine was no more effective than placebo in six 
out of eight clinical studies.578 On this basis, the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), the US drug licensing agency, advised Lilly that fluoxetine 
was not worth pursuing as a new antidepressant. However, it was not 
appreciated then that there was a high placebo response rate in all 
antidepressant clinical trials – in other words, a patient with depression will 
respond to an inactive placebo, as a purely psychological effect. Once this fact 
was established, new antidepressants were trialled against other 
antidepressants instead of just a placebo, and the clinical trial requirement that 
the active agent should be superior to the comparator was relaxed.579 Trials of 
fluoxetine under this new methodology gave a very different picture of the drug. 
When compared with the established tricyclic antidepressant, imipramine, 
fluoxetine was shown to be at least as effective as imipramine as an 
antidepressant, but with considerably fewer side-effects, because of its 
serotonin-specific action. 
Therefore, Lilly Pharmaceuticals finally had the positive clinical evidence - and 
marketing messages - about fluoxetine, and it was marketed as Prozac in the 
United States in 1988, and then in the United Kingdom in 1989. At about that 
time, several similar SSRI antidepressants were launched – fluvoxamine 
(branded Faverin) by Solvay, sertraline (branded Zoloft (US) and Lustral (UK)) 
by Pfizer and paroxetine (branded Paxil (US) and Seroxat (UK)) by 
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GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). All the medicines in this class have had a profound 
impact on the treatment of clinical depression. However, Prozac has been the 
biggest selling drug of the class and has become most well-known – with an 
impact on popular culture, as well as on medicine. This impact will be explored 
in the next section. 
4.3. The Social & Cultural Impact of SSRIs 
Peter Kramer, the psychiatrist and author of the iconic book, Listening to 
Prozac, claims that, once on the market, Prozac was popular “like no previous 
antidepressant”.580 Sales of Prozac were estimated as $125 million in 1988, 
during the drug’s first year on the market, and then $350 million in 1989.581 Two 
years after its launch, there had been 650,000 prescriptions for Prozac.582 
Furthermore, Stapert estimates that, by 1993, 8 million people were taking 
Prozac and, by 1994, 10 million people, mainly in the US, were taking it.583 
There were several factors behind the massive success of Prozac. First, as 
stated previously, Prozac fulfilled an unmet clinical need for an effective 
antidepressant, but without the side-effects and toxicity of older drugs. Because 
of these properties, Prozac was safer if taken in overdose, compared to older 
agents, and this was important, given that mortality due to suicide in patients 
treated with antidepressants was not only a tragic loss of human life and 
potential, but a major public health issue for society. Prozac’s low toxicity in 
overdose was exploited heavily in Lilly’s promotional campaign for the drug.584 
Second, Lilly’s marketing of Prozac in the UK was aligned to the national 
“Defeat Depression” campaign, which highlighted the financial and social 
disease burden of depression, encouraged health professionals to be on the 
 
580 Peter Kramer, Listening to Prozac, (New York/London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 
1-21.  
581 Shorter, Before Prozac, p. 198. 
582 Kramer, Listening to Prozac, pp.1-21, pp. 246-300; John Stapert, "Curing an 
Illness or Transforming the Self? The Power of Prozac", Christian Century, 111 
(1994), pp. 684-687. 
583 Stapert, “Curing an Illness or Transforming the Self?”, pp. 684-687. 
584 John Donoghue, “Prozac: Is it worthy of the hype?”, Pharmaceutical Journal, 
280 (2008), pp. 57-58. 
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alert for signs of untreated depression, and shamed sceptical clinicians into 
actively treating the disease.585 The net result was that Lilly appeared to be 
promoting a disease, rather than a treatment, and this was criticised by 
opponents of the biological model of depression, referred to earlier, who 
accused Lilly of “disease mongering”.586 Nevertheless, this led to a greater 
awareness of depression, and a greater willingness to prescribe an “ideal” 
antidepressant.  
Third, psychopharmacology commentator John Donoghue argues that Prozac 
was launched at just the right time.587 In both the US and the UK, the late 1980s 
were a time of economic buoyancy, he argues. Society was undergoing rapid 
change, there was an optimistic mood and attitudes to mental health and 
emotional wellbeing were changing. Donoghue claims that, in the late 1980s, 
people were more willing than ever before to openly express emotional pain and 
distress. Furthermore, Mauro cited the constitutional right to happiness in the 
US Declaration of Independence, and claimed that, in the US in particular, 
many people began to feel that this right to happiness could be definitively 
realised through the use of Prozac and SSRIs.588 Nevertheless, Carl Elliot has 
wisely challenged this notion of universal happiness, arguing that “happiness” is 
not thwarted by clinical depression, but by what he describes as existential 
“alienation” from the world, due to its suffering and difficulties, and that 
antidepressants and psychiatry cannot in themselves provide a resolution for 
this alienation.589 
Fourth, in his critique of SSRIs, Glenmullen has argued that Prozac, as the 
“optimum” antidepressant, was able to thrive in the insurance-based US 
healthcare system in the early 1990s.590 Antidepressant drugs were a relatively 
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cheap means of treating depression in comparison with counselling/therapy, 
where practitioner time was costly. Furthermore, the overall improved cost-
effectiveness profile was especially true with the SSRIs, with their improved 
safety profile compared with older tricyclic agents. Health Maintenance 
Organisations (HMOs), the commissioners of healthcare services in the US, 
could therefore establish depression treatment protocols for provider physicians 
to follow, and the pharmaceutical industry could negotiate significant bulk 
purchase deals with the HMOs for the use of their branded antidepressants. 
Consequently, the use of Prozac and other SSRIs therefore became particularly 
widespread in the US health system during the 1990s.  
Healy claims that another important factor in physician choice to prescribe 
Prozac and other SSRIs was the fact that these drugs arrived on the market 
shortly after the widespread use of benzodiazepines (such as Valium) had been 
discredited.591 Benzodiazepines had been widely prescribed for anxiety in the 
1970s, but had been found to lead to dependency and withdrawal effects, and 
there had been lawsuits against the benzodiazepine manufacturers for failing to 
warn of these adverse effects.592 Healy argues that this meant that, if a doctor in 
the early 1990s was faced with an anxious patient, they would be wary of 
treating for anxiety with a benzodiazepine, and would be more likely to treat the 
patient for depression with an SSRI instead, and this contributed to the 
widespread prescribing of SSRIs.593 However, I would suggest that this 
argument may not reflect the reality of clinical practice at the time, where there 
might equally have been caution in prescribing any new class of drug, in the 
wake of the benzodiazepine controversy. In any case, a withdrawal effect with 
SSRI antidepressants is also observed,594 which has relevance for discussions 
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about autonomy in the use of SSRI antidepressants, and which I will return to 
later in this chapter.  
Possibly because its relative safety, combined with the increasing number of 
subtypes of depression in expanding disease classifications, within a few years 
of its launch, fluoxetine began to be prescribed to people who were not clinically 
depressed, and who were functionally well - but who wanted to be “better than 
well”.595 This practice – together with its implications for society and for medical 
ethics – was explored by psychiatrist, Peter Kramer, in his seminal book 
Listening to Prozac, published in 1994.596 Kramer describes a patient named 
Tess, a woman who had many problems - an abusive parent, an unhappy 
marriage and a stressful working life – and who had what he described as “soft 
signs” of depression, but who otherwise presented well, and may have been 
concealing her illness.597 Kramer wanted to give his patient the best possible 
treatment, so he cautiously prescribed Prozac, which was then a relatively new 
agent. Within two weeks, Tess had changed profoundly; not only was she no 
longer depressed, she had increased energy and enhanced personal 
confidence.  
Kramer went on to describe how fluoxetine could improve energy and 
confidence in other patients, and he described fluoxetine as “cosmetic 
psychopharmacology”, the equivalent of cosmetic surgery on the personality.598 
Kramer suggests that fluoxetine and SSRIs could therefore be used to “treat” 
personality traits that had not previously been considered illnesses – for 
example, shyness, timidity, fastidiousness, low self-esteem and many others.599 
While Kramer was not necessarily advocating the use of fluoxetine in all of 
these cases, he was saying that, because of their broad-ranging actions, SSRI 
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antidepressants - and the prospect of psychotherapeutic enhancement – could 
not simply be ignored by society.600 
“Once we are aware of the unconscious, once we have witnessed the effects of 
Prozac” Kramer writes, “it is impossible to imagine the modern world without 
them.”601 Listening to Prozac became an international bestseller and was a key 
factor in Prozac having a wider significance in society, far beyond the treatment 
of depression. Glenmullen makes the interesting observation that, whereas in 
the 1960s, recreational use of psychoactive agents was advocated by the 
counterculture of the time, Kramer’s opinions concerning non-therapeutic use of 
drugs in the 1990s were those of the medical establishment.602 
The social implications of Kramer’s work have been discussed at length. John 
Donoghue described how fluoxetine did not just treat depression, but “offered 
opportunities for pharmacological personality reconstruction”, thus medicating 
unhappiness.603 In his review of the social and cultural impact of Prozac, Elliott 
has claimed that Prozac has become an American cultural icon, “talked about 
on chat shows, on the celebrity circuit and in magazines”.604 Mauro describes 
the cultural phenomenon of Prozac as a lifestyle drug in America.605 As 
mentioned previously, he discusses the constitutional right to happiness, and 
argues that the authors of the US Declaration of Independence probably did not 
envisage laboratory-manufactured drugs as the ultimate means of happiness. 
Moreover, Mauro argues that fluoxetine has been popular in the US, despite its 
stimulant properties, because, he claims, “Americans have always liked 
stimulants”, 
However, Healy – unsurprisingly, given his opposition to the biological model of 
depression - has cautioned against the “Prozac phenomenon” and the cosmetic 
psychopharmacology movement, saying that the popular notion that fluoxetine 
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is a lifestyle drug that will make a person feel “better than well”, is an urban 
myth, with its roots in the mistaken assumption that low serotonin levels always 
lead to depression.606 Healy argues - correctly, in my view, if somewhat 
pedantically - that fluoxetine does not make every person who takes it 
consistently “better than well”, and that neuroimaging and pharmacogenetics 
tests are needed to fully understand a person’s baseline personality disposition, 
and to tailor psychopharmacological treatment accordingly. Similarly, Stapert 
argues that the “better than well” effects of fluoxetine that Kramer describes are 
serendipitous.607 However, the use of fluoxetine as a mood enhancer has 
become part of the wider phenomenon of neuroenhancement – the use of drugs 
to enhance mental performance - which is widespread in American society.608 
Other examples of this might include students using modafinil to reduce fatigue, 
or methylphenidate to improve alertness. 
Commenting on the popular perception of fluoxetine as a panacea for all known 
mental flaws, Mauro suggests that “perhaps the bad news for Prozac is that 
there is no bad news.” 609 On the contrary, however, in the years following its 
launch, several drawbacks were noted with Prozac. First, not every patient 
treated with fluoxetine responds immediately to treatment; clinical trials indicate 
that only about 30% of patients have an immediate initial response to SSRI 
antidepressant treatment.610 This may be because the patient will not respond 
at all to the drug being used, but it may also be because the starting dose is too 
low; Halfin recommends that an SSRI should be started at the highest tolerated 
dose, in order to ensure the greatest probability of successful treatment.611 
Second, because of its alerting properties, fluoxetine has the potential to cause 
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anxiety and wakefulness, which can be distressing for patients.612 Third, and 
most seriously, from 1990 onwards, reports began to emerge of SSRI 
antidepressants being associated with suicidal ideation in certain types of 
people, which was perceived as a worsening of depressive illness in these 
people.613 
4.4. Theological & Ethical Engagement with SSRIs 
While the theological and ethical response of the Roman Catholic church to oral 
contraception is well-documented, and has been discussed in the previous 
chapter, there has been less theological engagement with SSRI 
antidepressants. Furthermore, theological and ethical discussion about the use 
of SSRI antidepressants was not a response to the actual launch and initial use 
of Prozac and other SSRI antidepressants in the late 1980s. Instead it was a 
response to cosmetic psychopharmacology, and the “Prozac phenomenon”, 
which came later in the mid-1990s, popularised by Kramer and colleagues, and 
the subsequent use of SSRIs by people in Western society who wanted to feel 
“better than well”. 
The most significant contribution to a theological and ethical understanding of 
SSRI antidepressants is from the American Roman Catholic scholar, John-Mark 
Miravalle, in his 2010 book, The Drug, The Soul and God: A Catholic Moral 
Perspective on Antidepressants.614 In this section, I will evaluate this publication 
at some length. 
Miravalle examines the contemporary use of antidepressants in the light of 
Thomas Aquinas’s categories of human attributes. He presents an integrity 
ethic to support the use of antidepressants as an adjunct treatment but not as a 
substitute for the use of talking therapy to understand the thought processes 
underlying depression. He then cites Terruwe and Baars’ theory of wholeness, 
which is based on Thomist principles, as a more fruitful approach to 
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understanding depression.615 Miravalle’s approach is analogous to the Roman 
Catholic church’s natural law objections to the contraceptive pill. 
Miravalle argues – contentiously, in my view - that a Thomist account of 
psychology is more holistic than that of modern medical psychiatry.616 He 
contends that Aquinas’s psychology provides a fuller understanding of the 
nature of depression because it is based on the Thomist categories of human 
attributes. According to Aquinas, Miravalle argues, depression falls into the 
category of sorrow.617 Sorrow is a form of passion, which is always a response 
to a certain perception of reality. In terms of Thomist ontology, sorrow is a 
sensitive, rather than a rational, appetite; in other words, while sorrow may not 
always be apprehended rationally, it elicits a sensory response.618 Moreover, 
Miravalle states, the cause of sorrow may be the experience of a perceived evil, 
but the reality is that the evil is no more than a lack of, or an inappropriate 
absence of, a good.619 
Consequently, Miravalle concludes, sorrow, as a passion, is not necessarily a 
bad thing of itself, because it cannot be identified directly with the evil that 
causes it.620 Instead, sorrow is an aversion to a form of evil, and therefore a 
reasonable and appropriate human response. Nevertheless, Miravalle argues 
that, according to Aquinas, passions have a moral aspect and can be 
controlled, either through self-restraint, or by practising that which is good.621 
Consequently, passions do not lessen the freedom - and therefore moral 
culpability - of any action arising from them. Therefore, according to Aquinas, 
 
615 Anna Terruwe and Conrad Baars, Psychic Wholeness and Healing: Using 
ALL the Powers of the Human Psyche (New York: Alba House, 1981), pp. 14-
21. 
616 Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God, p. 24. 
617 Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God, p. 26, citing Thomas Aquinas, 
“Summa Theologica Q23 Article 4”, 2010, 
https://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1225-
1274,_Thomas_Aquinas,_Summa_Theologica_%5B1%5D,_EN.pdf. (accessed 
September 2020).  
618 Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God, p. 27. 
619 Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God, p. 36. 
620 Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God, p. 38. 
621 Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God, pp. 31-32, citing Aquinas, “Summa 
Theologica, Q24, Article 1”. 
214 
 
the person who desires moral good will neither seek to eliminate the passions, 
nor give them free rein, but use them to strive for the good.622 
Miravalle claims that contemporary neuroscientific studies support Thomas’s 
view on affectivity. First, he states that LeDoux has shown that fear conditioning 
causes both an instinctual reaction and a conscious-rational analysis, but that 
both trigger an emotional response.623 However, the problem with Miravalle’s 
interpretation of this study is that it is hard to demonstrate experimentally that 
both mental processes – the instinctual and the rational – are equally causative 
of the emotional response. Second, he cites Oschner’s finding that negative 
emotional stimuli elicit a less negative reaction on re-exposure.624 However, this 
phenomenon could equally be due to habituation - neurochemical 
downregulation of the response - rather than increased emotional control on the 
part of the person experiencing the response. Consequently, Miravalle’s claim 
that contemporary neuroscientific studies support Thomas’s classification is 
hard to substantiate.  
Miravalle states that, while sorrow is a form of pain, it is not a self-indulgent 
gloominess; instead, he argues from Thomas, appropriate sorrow is a virtue, 
and sorrow can be an impetus for people to better themselves.625 He lists 
Aquinas’s proposed remedies for sorrow: 626 
 Pleasure of any kind, 
 Weeping (because it is a form of release which connects the interior or 
exterior life), 
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 Sympathy of friends, and 
 Physical therapies (for example, sleep and baths; Miravalle adds, rather 
speculatively, that Aquinas would have approved of massage and 
aromatherapy). 
However, notwithstanding the fourth of these therapies, Miravalle argues that 
the remedy for sorrow is not a material one, and that physiological measures for 
the treatment of depression will be ultimately insufficient. 
Miravalle then examines the treatment of depression from the standpoint of 
integrity - the wholeness of the human person. He rightly states that it is not 
possible to divorce ethical norms in human life from the need to encourage 
human flourishing. He describes the basic moral principle of integrity - that 
human beings should act consistently in all areas of life, and at all levels.627 
Miravalle argues, however, that not all areas of human fulfilment need be 
pursued to the same extent, citing the moral good of celibacy in the priesthood, 
which forecloses the possibility of married life and procreation. The problem 
with this argument, however, is that it could, in fact, be used to support the use 
of contraception, as a means of preventing conception and birth of children, in 
order to achieve moral goods in other areas of life, or a greater overall moral 
objective in life.  
Miravalle then turns his attention to the Roman Catholic teaching on oral 
contraception.628 He cites the inseparable link between the procreative and 
unitive functions of marriage described in Humanae Vitae as an example of the 
principle of integrity.629 He states the central tenet of the encyclical, that 
“marriage and conjugal love are by their nature ordained towards the begetting 
and education of children and that contraception rids sexuality of its procreative 
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nature and therefore contradicts the nature of man, woman and marriage.” 630 
Miravalle argues from this that, just as “the personal functions of sexual union 
and procreation are not to be disfigured or robbed of their proper ends ...nor… 
are the personal functions of the emotions, specifically sorrow, to be disfigured 
or robbed of their proper ends” (by antidepressants).631 
Miravalle’s overall conclusion is that the antidepressant culture of the post-
Kramer era is “the product of a misunderstanding of, or a non-awareness of, the 
meaning and significance of suffering”.632 Contemporary secular society, he 
argues, sees pleasure as the ultimate good and sorrow as the ultimate evil, and 
so depression has been demonised. For this reason, he claims, the cultural 
response is to treat depression at all costs. Consequently, in a fast-moving 
society which looks for rapid results and where people do not have the patience 
for considered analysis and reflection, there will be a temptation to use drugs, 
because they are convenient, and have a rapid onset of action. However, from 
a Thomist perspective, sorrow is not an evil in itself, and there is a need for the 
depressed person to regain balance by re-forming their judgements according 
to reality, and then re-aligning their emotions in line with those judgments.633 
Miravalle argues that antidepressants prevent this re-alignment, leading to a 
state of internal disharmony – a variance between cognition and emotion. 
Miravalle concludes that, although the use of antidepressants is not “intrinsically 
evil” 634, in that they have an important role in the treatment of urgent symptoms 
of depression, they are no substitute for the use of psychotherapy to deal with 
the root cause of the person’s sorrow, and should only ever be used in 
conjunction with psychotherapy. He quotes the guidance of the Pontifical 
Council for Pastoral Assistants; “Drug therapy is helpful if it does not obfuscate 
or interfere with the healing of a root problem.” 635 Miravalle’s dispute does not 
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seem to be with the therapeutic use of antidepressants per se, but the 
“antidepressant culture” that Kramer envisages, where the drugs are used 
indiscriminately to induce “better than well” personality changes. Miravalle’s 
advocacy of antidepressants only as an adjunct to psychotherapy is supported 
by clinical trial results with SSRIs, which show that, while there is little difference 
in efficacy between antidepressants and psychotherapy in short-term use, 
psychotherapy has greater efficacy in long-term treatment.636 
There are various problems with Miravalle’s evaluation of SSRI 
antidepressants. First, there is a methodological problem in the way in which he 
constructs his argument. On p. 59 of the book - before he has made any 
sustained analysis of antidepressants on natural law grounds - Miravalle states, 
“It seems to me that antidepressant drug use is not in itself intrinsically 
evil…However, it is not morally permissible to use these drugs as the sole or 
fundamental treatment for depression, since to do so would constitute an 
unnatural perversion of the appetitive power away from the apprehensive 
power..”.637 This gives the unfortunate impression that Miravalle’s verdict on 
antidepressants is a foregone conclusion, because of his prior commitment to 
the Roman Catholic magisterial stance on contraception. This suggests that his 
intention is to apply the same natural law ethical principles – uncritically – to 
SSRI antidepressant use, without any consideration of the social and medical 
ethical issues that are specific to SSRI antidepressants.  
Second, in justifying his Thomist approach to psychiatry, Miravalle claims that 
psychiatry cannot critically evaluate the problem of antidepressant use because 
it “does not have a well-defined anthropology (understanding of the human 
person)”. 638 This seems to be a sweeping claim, given the person-centred roots 
of modern psychiatry, and the desire of many practitioners for psychiatry to be 
holistic in nature, issues often cited as criticisms of the biological model of 
depression.639 
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Third, a crucial problem is Miravalle’s absolute rejection of the biological model 
for depression. At various points in the book, Miravalle dismisses the notion that 
depression has any biological basis – i.e. that depression might be due in part 
to a chemical imbalance or a genetic predisposition, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter.640 Miravalle has good reasons to downplay the role of a biological 
model of depression. The biological model is at odds with Miravalle’s Thomist 
metaphysics, because it assumes that human behaviour arises substantially 
from the operation of the material human body. Furthermore, Miravalle is 
probably keen to avoid any notion of biological reductionism, as many Christian 
commentators would be when faced with scientific developments with 
significant social and ethical implications for human life. Whereas psychiatrist 
Glenmullen rejects the idea of genetic inheritance of depression as ideologically 
driven “Darwinian propaganda” on scientific grounds, 641 Miravalle most likely 
rejects reductionism on religious grounds, because of his commitment to 
Roman Catholic natural law-based morality. 
However, Miravalle’s complete rejection of the biological model of depression is 
out of step with a scientific understanding of antidepressant action, in the light of 
the monoamine hypothesis and subsequent developments in 
psychopharmacology, as described previously in this chapter. There are indeed 
problems with the biological model for depression – for example, inability to 
measure levels of noradrenaline and serotonin in vivo, the use of surrogate 
endpoints in animal studies and the difficulties of quantifying results.642 
However, the biological model cannot simply be ignored or discounted. While 
response factors to antidepressants are complex and cannot be easily 
correlated to effects on specific biochemical systems, other evidence from 
psychopharmacology – for example, the role of thyroid hormone and cortisol in 
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the regulation of depressive illness - indicates that non-neuropharmacological, 
biological factors are indubitably involved in the pathology of depression.643 
Interestingly, in his acknowledgement of the psychological effects of SSRIs, 
Miravalle seems to implicitly accept that the action of these antidepressants has 
a biological basis.644 In doing this, Miravalle is advocating a dualism of the 
human person, which is consistent with Aquinas’ classification, but is not 
aligned with more recent theological anthropologies which take into account 
scientific understandings of humanity and advocate a non-dualistic view of the 
human person – for example, the non-reductive physicalism of Nancey Murphy 
and colleagues,645 or the dual-aspect monism of John Polkinghorne.646 
Fourth, and again significantly, Miravalle’s natural law-based arguments 
concerning the use of SSRI antidepressants are flawed. His stated objective is 
to apply the same natural law argument to SSRI antidepressants that has been 
used previously to oppose hormonal contraception.647 The teleology of the 
natural law approach seems to appeal to Miravalle.648 However, for Miravalle, 
this teleology appears to be predetermined and therefore seems to restrict self-
determination, and therefore the exercise of moral agency of the individual 
through personal autonomy. Miravalle argues that “man does not create himself 
but rather finds himself and the world around him to have a definite structure, 
with conditions for perfection and flourishing already determined.” 649 He claims 
– strikingly – that “man cannot change his structure, so cannot reinvent 
conditions for fulfilment and that he can but accept them.” Miravalle’s assertion 
here is in marked contrast to the transhumanist notions discussed in Chapter 2 - 
that morphological freedom (ability to exist in different forms) is eminently 
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possible and that human nature is infinitely malleable. In particular, Miravalle’s 
assertion is at odds with the transhumanist tenet that human beings can change 
themselves at will due to unrestricted personal autonomy. Given the conflict 
described in Chapter 2 between natural law and transhumanism, Miravalle’s 
approach here is unsurprising. Miravalle seems to contradict himself when he 
claims that man can make choices.650 But, for Miravalle, these choices seem to 
be restricted to abstract moral choices framed in the traditional natural law 
discourse of the Roman Catholic church. 
On close inspection, there are further problems arising Miravalle’s natural law 
arguments. As he develops his argument, Miravalle states that “there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with a person using chemicals for his own wellbeing even if 
(they)…affect his spiritual wellbeing.” 651 This suggests that any drug use to 
promote “wellbeing” (however that might be defined) would, in theory, be 
permissible – which could be interpreted as endorsing the unrestricted use of 
recreational drugs to induce hedonistic experiences.  
Furthermore, the doctrine of double effect is problematic for Miravalle in his 
argument about the use of hormonal contraception. He argues that the 
contraceptive pill may be used “appropriately” for the regulation of the menstrual 
cycle.652 Yet, in this scenario, the pill would nevertheless still be exerting a 
contraceptive effect, and its use would still be contrary to nature, even if the 
woman using it was not doing so with the intention of preventing conception. 
Yet another problem with Miravalle’s natural law arguments is that he defends 
the use of analgesics for the treatment of physical pain, arguing that it is 
important to suppress pain to enable normal bodily function.653 He then asks 
(rhetorically?): why would one suppress soul pain? The answer, however, would 
be: for the same reason as one would suppress physical pain - to enable 
normal functioning and provide humane treatment of a suffering person. He also 
defends the consumption of alcohol, stating that alcohol is consumed for many 
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reasons, not just its mood-altering properties.654 However, many people 
undoubtedly consume alcohol for its mood-altering properties, and possibly not 
for any other reason. Miravalle’s approach here is interesting, in the light of 
Peter Kramer’s claim that, with the non-therapeutic use of Prozac, the 
boundaries between licit and illicit drug use are blurred and that people use 
street drugs all the time to feel good.655 
There are further issues with Miravalle’s overall argument. For example, he 
readily dismisses what he terms “inadequate objections” to antidepressant 
use.656 These include, for example, a) the fact that depression may be an 
adaptive trait and may have some positive personality benefits, for example in 
driven, creative and artistic people, b) the concept of pharmacological Calvinism 
(the idea that using drugs is a sign of weakness, and that they must be avoided 
in order to “toughen up” in life) and, c) that antidepressants may be a tool for 
cultural manipulation and oppression, a consequence envisaged by Peter 
Kramer.657 
These objections to antidepressant use by an individual person may be 
“inadequate” in Miravalle’s view, from the standpoint of Catholic natural law, but 
they cannot be dismissed easily when considering the wider societal 
implications of the use of antidepressants - for example, issues surrounding fair 
distribution of antidepressants in society, or the impact of antidepressant use on 
cultural expectations in society. These are issues I will discuss in the next 
section of this chapter.  Indeed, the notion of “pharmacological Calvinism” is 
highly relevant to Miravalle’s own remarks concerning “soul pain”, as opposed 
to physical pain, and how it should be treated.   
The issue of cultural oppression through widespread use of specific medical 
interventions has huge implications for social ethics. Widespread non-
therapeutic use of SSRI antidepressants may mean that more individuals will 
have a positive outlook on life as their default mood. This will adjust the 
 
654 Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God, pp. 78-79. 
655 Kramer, Listening to Prozac, p. 16. 
656 Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God, p. 60. 
657 Kramer, Listening to Prozac, pp. 269-272. 
222 
 
prevailing culture concerning, for example, bereavement or justice in the 
workplace. If people taking SSRI antidepressants non-therapeutically do not 
grieve in the same way as in previous generations, there will be an increased 
expectation that people will be able to handle a loss and “move on” more easily, 
which would be unfair and unkind to the unenhanced person. The church would 
need to take this into account in its bereavement ministry. If people taking SSRI 
antidepressants non-therapeutically are likely to be more assertive and driven in 
the workplace, this may lead to a changed perception of what behaviour is fair 
and reasonable in the workplace, which would be disadvantageous to the 
unenhanced person.  
Also, early on in his book, Miravalle dismisses the side-effect profile of SSRI 
antidepressants as irrelevant to any ethical consideration of whether and how 
antidepressants should be used.658 But, in my view, in the light of the history of 
psychopharmacology, the low side-effect profile of SSRI antidepressants 
compared to older agents is an important benefit in their use, and contributes 
positively – and in a tangible way - to the overall impact of these drugs on 
human flourishing. They therefore cannot be discounted from an ethical 
evaluation of these drugs. Conversely, any troublesome side-effects of SSRI 
antidepressants are an important dis-benefit of the drugs. Malcolm Jeeves has 
argued – correctly, in my view – that, although the popular understanding is that 
newer antidepressants such as the SSRIs have fewer side-effects compared to 
older agents, they do have side-effects, and the impact of side-effects cannot 
simply be discounted.659 
To conclude this section, Miravalle sets out an argument against cosmetic 
psychopharmacology with SSRI antidepressants firmly based on Aquinas’ 
understanding of human nature and a Roman Catholic natural law-based 
approach to moral reasoning. However, if the wider social – and especially 
clinical - experience of SSRI antidepressant use is taken into account, a number 
of significant ethical flaws in the argument become clear. This suggests that a 
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broader approach to the ethical evaluation of psychopharmacology is needed. 
The next section of this chapter will assess the use of SSRI antidepressants 
according to the three sets of criteria for transhumanism, to determine the 
extent to which Prozac and SSRI antidepressants can be regarded as 
transhumanist biomedical technologies. 
4.5. SSRIs & Transhumanism 
Development of Prozac and other SSRIs was the result of previous scientific 
advances. In the same way that the development of the contraceptive pill was 
dependent on a reasonable understanding of reproductive hormonal activity and 
the ability to produce sex hormones synthetically, so SSRI development was 
dependent on the establishment of the monoamine hypothesis of depression 
and an understanding of the neurotransmitter actions of serotonin. However, the 
motivations of the developers were different. With the contraceptive pill, Sanger, 
McCormick - and probably Pincus too -  understood the pill from a non-
therapeutic perspective and had a vision of the positive benefits of the pill on 
society, a vision that was realised with the social impact of the pill after its 
launch. By contrast, Prozac was developed as a potential antidepressant and 
there is no evidence that the implications of non-therapeutic use were 
considered at the time of its development. This was mainly because depression 
is a disease, whereas pregnancy is not. However, it was also because of the 
scientific and regulatory framework in the pharmaceutical industry at that time, 
which was very different to the culture of the industry when the contraceptive pill 
was launched.660 By the 1970s, pharmaceutical companies would routinely 
develop a large range of compounds as therapeutic candidates, to ensure that 
there would be at least one which would satisfy increasingly stringent clinical 
trial and regulatory requirements. Consequently, in response to the research on 
serotonin action, Bryan Molloy and colleagues at Lilly Research produced a 
range of molecules that had potential as serotonin-active antidepressants, of 
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which fluoxetine was just one.661 Subsequently, David Wong of Lilly Clinical 
Research saw the potential of fluoxetine as an antidepressant from its basic 
pharmacology, but the molecule did not show clinical efficacy, according to the 
clinical trial methodology of the time, and it was only when the methodology was 
changed - and this change accepted by the licensing authorities – that 
fluoxetine could be considered as a commercial possibility. 
Despite Lilly’s objective of developing an effective, modern antidepressant, 
Prozac’s “better than well” effects, and their cultural impact, were essentially 
serendipitous.662 However, I would argue that Peter Kramer, with his exploration 
of the wider use of Prozac for “cosmetic psychopharmacology”, and its potential 
social, political and ethical implications, saw the transhumanist potential of 
Prozac more clearly than the industry inventors of the drug. Kramer writes, “My 
own sense was that the media, for all the attention they paid Prozac, had 
missed the main story. The transformative powers of the medicine – how it went 
beyond treating illness to changing personality, how it entered into our struggle 
to understand the self – went largely unnoticed.” 663 Moreover, David Healy, a 
critic of the biological model of depression and the “antidepressant culture”, has 
nevertheless been quick to point out how psychopharmacology has changed 
the social order, by getting people out of mental institutions and into mainstream 
society, and eliminating the “hidden” population of mentally-ill people.664 
The forthcoming section, however, will evaluate the extent to which Prozac and 
the SSRI antidepressants were, in their time, a transhumanist development 
according to the objective criteria for evaluation of a transhumanist 
development, as defined in Chapter 2, and as previously used to evaluate the 
contraceptive pill in Chapter 3.  
4.6. Evaluation of SSRIs against Transhumanist Criteria 
This section will evaluate SSRI antidepressants against the three sets of 
objective criteria described in Chapter 2. As explained previously, the general 
 
661 Healy, Let Them Eat Prozac, p. 20. 
662 Stapert, “Curing an Illness or Transforming the Self?”, pp. 684-687. 
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664 Healy, "Psychopharmacology and the government of the self." 2000. 
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criteria for a transhumanist biomedical technology are those derived from the 
literature of transhumanism, and therefore reflect the self-understanding of 
these technologies by advocates of transhumanism of different types, and are 
used to explore whether or not the technology is transhumanist in character. 
The second and third sets of objective criteria, proposed by Neil Messer and 
Elaine Graham respectively, explore the technology from a perspective of 
theological ethics.665 What assessment of SSRI antidepressants can be made 
against the general criteria for transhumanist developments, elucidated from the 
transhumanist literature? 
First, as a chemical agent, which exerts an effect on the human body – and, in 
this case, on the human brain – SSRI antidepressants are indeed a technology; 
a material means of effecting a task or process. However, with SSRI 
antidepressants, especially in the light of the debate about the biological model 
of depression, it is fair to raise a query about what exactly that task or process 
is. At the basic level, the process could be defined as the relief of depression by 
enhancing the levels of serotonin in the brain.  
Second, regardless of possible therapeutic processes, SSRI antidepressants 
are clearly a technology that is applied to the human person, in order to effect 
those processes. For example, Kahane and Savulescu describe the use of 
SSRI antidepressants such as citalopram for moral enhancement and claim that 
the ethical implications of this are no less important than the use of radical - and 
biologically invasive - forms of biomedical enhancement which might be 
available in the future.666 
Third, does the human person using SSRI antidepressants have autonomy over 
their use? Are SSRI antidepressants used in a way that is not coercive? Given 
 
665 Neil Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics: Theological and Ethical 
Reflections on Evolutionary Biology (London: SCM, 2007), pp. 229-235; Elaine 
Graham, “In Whose Image? Representations of Technology and the Ends of 
Humanity”, in Future Perfect? God, Medicine and Human Identity, edited by 
Celia Deane-Drummond and Peter Manley Scott (London: T and T Clark 
International, 2006), pp. 56-69. 
666 Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu, “Normal Human Variation: Refocussing 
the Enhancement Debate”, Bioethics, 29 (2015), pp. 133-143. 
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the history and experience with SSRI antidepressant use, this third criterion is 
highly debatable. 
In current Western healthcare systems and culture, with their emphasis on 
informed consent to treatment, people considering treatment with SSRI 
antidepressants ostensibly have autonomy - as uncoerced self-determination - 
to make an individual, informed and free choice about treatment at the outset. 
This is also the case with the contraceptive pill, and indeed with some of the 
proposed future transhumanist biomedical developments, as discussed 
previously. 
However, I would argue that there may be subsequent scenarios where 
personal autonomy might be eroded in people taking SSRI antidepressants. An 
individual may choose to use a psychoactive drug in an ostensibly autonomous, 
self-determined way at the outset, but that autonomy may be impaired 
subsequently by the effects of the drug, which may affect future decisions -  
either any subsequent decision to discontinue the drug, or life choices while 
taking the drug. For example, a person’s autonomy might be impaired in cases 
of suicidal ideation as an adverse effect of SSRI antidepressants; these are 
well-documented, but thankfully rare.667 In a similar way, autonomy might be 
affected by involuntary effects of the drug; drug-induced diminished 
responsibility was cited as a defence for Wesbecker, a man from Kentucky, who 
went on a shooting spree, while being treated with Prozac.668 As well as these 
extreme examples, SSRI antidepressants may also be associated with 
withdrawal effects on routine use, where a person may experience adverse 
effects when discontinuing the drug.669 Whether there is a specific dependence 
syndrome with SSRIs, as there was with benzodiazepines, has been 
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extensively debated.670 Nevertheless, this withdrawal effect may influence the 
willingness of patients to take the drug and raise concerns about its safety.671 
Kramer considers the unintended consequences of Prozac on human 
characteristics in Listening to Prozac.672 He states that society is comfortable 
with the idea of someone taking a drug to make small differences to their own 
life, but less happy for a drug to be an agent of change at a wider societal level. 
He considers how society might change if more people were taking a drug 
which, for example, enhanced their sexual appeal, or improved their business 
acumen. Taking one example, Kramer surmises that, if over-seriousness and 
introspection could be “cured” using Prozac, then society might lose its taste for 
brooding, melancholic, artistic people, which would have far-reaching 
implications for the arts and popular culture.673 In addition, Kramer considers 
whether more widespread use of Prozac as a “mood brightener” might lead to 
harsher cultural expectations concerning time to grieve after a bereavement.674 
He also wonders how use of Prozac for personality enhancement might lead to 
a re-negotiation of the doctor-patient relationship.675 
These observations are consistent with more recent debates about the impact 
of SSRI antidepressants on personal autonomy, when used for moral 
enhancement, previously described in Chapter 2. Savulescu and Persson 
propose that the SSRI antidepressant citalopram can be used for moral 
enhancement and increasing individual autonomy.676 In response, however, 
Sparrow contends that the autonomy provided by pharmaceutical 
enhancements is illusory, that there is a risk that enhancements simply provide 
 
670 For a summary of this debate, see David Nutt, “Death and dependence: 
current controversies over the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors”, Journal 
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a “fig leaf” for abuse of power and vested interests in a technically-advanced 
society, and that possible inequalities between enhanced and unenhanced 
persons could infringe the autonomy of the unenhanced.677  Sparrow compares 
“moral enhancement” (development of moral agency) by pharmacological 
means with moral agency inculcated by moral and cultural education, and 
concludes that pharmacological moral enhancement is instrumentalist in 
character, compared to the influence of education or culture, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Indeed, Sparrow concludes that humans would be less free in a 
future, technologically enhanced world than in the world as it is at present. 
While moral enhancement with SSRI antidepressants is clearly a different 
proposal to the treatment of depression with SSRI antidepressants, the dividing 
line between treatment and enhancement is often blurred, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Furthermore, the doctrine of double effect comes into play. A 
medical technology may have two effects; it may act as a therapy in one 
scenario, but an enhancement in another.678 The doctrine of double effect would 
apply here as it would provide an ethical defence for a practitioner who gives a 
therapeutic intervention that is intended as a treatment, but which then acts 
unintentionally as an enhancement. The doctrine of double effect applies to the 
contraceptive action of the contraceptive pill when it is used therapeutically to 
regulate the menstrual cycle, and also to the “better than well” personality 
effects of SSRI antidepressants, when they are prescribed primarily to treat 
depression. 
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Moreover, observations concerning autonomy in the treatment of individual 
depressed people with SSRIs support Sparrow’s concerns about autonomy in 
society when SSRI antidepressants are used for enhancement. SSRI 
antidepressants may confer personality advantages on individuals who take 
them, which may lead to inequity between the enhanced and the unenhanced in 
society, and give rise to abuse of power, injustice and oppression in society.  
The method of distribution of SSRI antidepressants may also affect personal 
choice concerning whether to take the medicine. As discussed previously, the 
US healthcare system has been able to distribute SSRI antidepressants widely, 
so that they are an easily affordable medical intervention which is quicker and 
cheaper to implement that psychotherapy, and this may have exerted pressure 
on a large number of stressed Americans to avail themselves of SSRI 
antidepressant treatment, simply because it is available. This raises ethical 
concerns, because it could be construed as coercion of patients by health 
commissioners and providers. Furthermore, since the system is such that the 
uninsured do not have access to these treatments, the system may be regarded 
as unjust, in the light of the ethical principle that a government should provide 
an adequate level of healthcare to all its citizens.  
Concluding this section on autonomy, while individuals may exercise apparent 
autonomy when commencing SSRI antidepressant therapy, this autonomy may 
be impaired at subsequent points in therapy. This may be due to a direct 
psychopharmacological effect, such as the specific adverse effect of suicidal 
ideation, or the effects of SSRIs on the individual’s personality, or it might be 
due to indirect effects, for example changes in cultural expectations or 
development of oppressive social tendencies due to widespread use of SSRI 
antidepressants.  
Fourth, are SSRI antidepressants, as a medical technology, applied to human 
beings in order to improve human function, increase longevity and promote 
human flourishing? SSRI antidepressants are effective in relieving clinical 
depression, a potentially distressing and debilitating medical condition.679 In 
 
679 Donoghue, “Prozac: Is it worthy of the hype?”, pp. 57-58. 
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addition, as noted, SSRI antidepressants have the potential to enhance 
attention, energy and alertness.680 Furthermore, studies suggest that SSRI 
antidepressants may improve quality of life, as well as symptoms of 
depression,681 and that relief of depression with SSRI antidepressants was 
associated with improved quality of life and daily physical and mental 
functioning.682 In addition , SSRI antidepressants have a direct effect on 
longevity in some specific cases, where their reduced toxicity prevents a 
depression-related suicide by attempted overdose. There are therefore various 
strands of evidence to suggest that Prozac and SSRI antidepressants have 
largely a positive and beneficial effect on human flourishing.  
In conclusion, SSRI antidepressants resemble a transhumanist technology, 
according to these general criteria for transhumanist technologies, with the 
crucial feature that their impact on personal autonomy is ambiguous, a similar 
finding to that shown with the oral contraceptive pill in the previous chapter. But 
how do SSRI antidepressants measure up against the theological criteria for 
ethical evaluation of biomedical developments? 
I will evaluate SSRI antidepressants in the light of Neil Messer’s four diagnostic 
questions. First, is Prozac good news for the poor? The economic costs of 
depression, as a debilitating disease, are well-recognised.683 Halfin estimates 
that the direct cost of depression treatment (in a US context) is $3.5 million per 
1000 patients.684 This figure is based on patients on health insurance plans, so 
does not account for the cost to society of untreated depression in those who do 
not have health insurance. Furthermore, Halfin notes that depression is often 
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under-diagnosed, and that the actual social and economic burden of 
undiagnosed depression is much higher, even in the insured population. 
Donoghue and Pincus note that depression is likely to be associated with 
considerable indirect costs, because of impaired relationships, absenteeism and 
reduced productivity at work, and health costs that are not related directly to the 
treatment of depression.685 Furthermore, in their review of the economic burden 
of depression, Lane and McDonald quite rightly argue that any evaluation of the 
economic costs of depression should take into account not just the acquisition 
costs of antidepressants, but the overall value of the treatment, in terms of long 
term efficacy, improved compliance, and reduced accident potential.686 
However, in their economic evaluation of fluoxetine, Wilde and Benfield note 
that many of the available studies focus primarily on the acquisition cost of 
ingredients, and are from the perspective of the cost to the payor, not the cost 
to the patient.687 Consequently, while these studies provide evidence of the 
cost-effectiveness of SSRIs to health providers, they do not demonstrate any 
direct financial benefits to the individual person receiving the therapy. 
Consequently, although, in theory, SSRI antidepressants certainly will have a 
positive impact on the lives of poor and marginalised people, there is less direct 
evidence to show this.  
In an American study of low-income and minority women, Miranda et al found 
that the use of antidepressant medication, as opposed to psychotherapy or 
community support, was associated with better outcome gains, in terms of 
treatment of depression.688 This suggests that ensuring access to, and cost-
effective distribution of, SSRI antidepressants in low-income populations in the 
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US, or other Western countries has the potential to make a significant difference 
to depression treatment and associated quality of life for poor people. A study 
by Souetre et al in France has examined the effects of depression on work loss 
(absence from work), and the impact of four antidepressant therapies (including 
fluoxetine (Prozac)) and placebo.689 This study, unsurprisingly, noted a positive 
correlation between depression severity and the risk of work loss/absence, and 
found that fluoxetine treatment was associated with the best antidepressant 
response, and the lowest level of absence from work. However, the power of 
this study is diminished by having five study groups, the demographics of the 
participants was biased towards women and those in urban areas, and it is 
unclear on how these results were weighted according to work type and 
professional characteristics. 
The costs of depression to society are well-recognised, and the costs of 
antidepressants for health providers have been studied extensively. 
Furthermore, the benefits of antidepressant use – both as therapy and 
enhancement – largely by middle-class professionals - have been discussed in 
the medical and popular literature. In theory, SSRI antidepressants will have 
benefits in poor and marginalised populations and there is some evidence 
available to demonstrate this, but this evidence is limited compared to the 
considerable body of evidence about economic benefits to health providers. In 
my view, this represents an important area of opportunity, both in terms of 
health provision to the poor and marginalised, especially in developing 
countries, and research into the benefits of that provision.  
Second, is the project an attempt to be “like God” (with reference to Genesis 
3v5) or does it conform to the image of God? This can be argued both ways. On 
one hand, SSRI use for cosmetic psychopharmacology – to remould someone’s 
personality, as envisaged by Kramer, and change their nature - is an attempt to 
be “like God”. For John-Mark Miravalle, with his natural law objections to the 
sole use of SSRI antidepressants in depression, and his claim that SSRI 
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antidepressants short-circuit the link between cognition and emotion and thus 
undermine the good ends of human life, indiscriminate use of SSRI 
antidepressants certainly appears to be an attempt to be “like God”. 
On the other hand, however, use of SSRI antidepressants responsibly enables 
humans to conform more closely to the image of God, because their use aligns 
with a theological understanding of the imago Dei that is functional and 
relational, not just substantive. The natural law approach to therapies, which the 
Roman Catholic church has used as the basis of its moral theology to date, is 
based on the idea that human nature is fixed, unchanging and immutable,690 
and this reflects a substantive approach to the imago Dei – i.e. that the image of 
God in humanity consists of innate attributes of substance of the human person. 
This notion that has been challenged scientifically, by both the theory of 
evolution and experimental behavioural studies.691 On the contrary, functional 
and relational approaches to the imago Dei emphasise both human function (in 
terms of vocation or calling in the world) and human relational capacity as 
aspects of the image of God, rather than just substantial nature. These 
approaches to understanding the imago Dei in humanity align with observed 
benefits of SSRI therapy. SSRI therapy improves human biological and mental 
function, and thereby improves a person’s relationships with others, and 
enables their meaningful and positive engagement with human society. These 
two factors enable the person to fulfil their vocation from a Christian perspective 
of human flourishing.  
As mentioned previously, clinical studies indicate that Prozac and other SSRIs 
have the potential to restore normal physical and mental function in patients 
who are most disabled by clinical depression.692 Biological function alone is an 
ethically neutral concept – a functioning human body can be used for good or 
 
690 Stephen Pope, "Theological Anthropology, Science, and Human 
Flourishing”, in Questioning the Human: Toward a Theological Anthropology for 
the Twenty–First Century, edited by Lieven Boeve, Yves De Maeseneer and 
Ellen Van Stichel (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), pp. 13-19.  
691 Stephen Pope, "Theological Anthropology, Science, and Human 
Flourishing”, pp. 13-19.  
692 Lin, “Relief of depression and pain”, pp. 93-8. 
234 
 
bad ends. However, as well as being itself a good of human wholeness and 
integrity, restoration of human function is a prerequisite for a person to achieve 
their full potential in society, and to be able to exercise their true vocation in the 
world. Restoration of human function with antidepressants therefore supports 
human vocation and is consistent with a functional approach to the imago Dei.  
Furthermore, as seen from the work of Peter Kramer, SSRIs have wide-ranging 
effects on mood and personality, and therefore have an impact on human 
relationships.693 Kramer’s work highlighted several examples of cases where 
taking Prozac had an impact on individual relationships. First, in his case study 
of his patient, Tess, Kramer described how Tess had had a history of parental 
abuse, and this caused her to enter into “degrading” relationships on an 
ongoing basis, at cost to her wellbeing.694 However, treatment with Prozac 
enabled Tess to be energised and confident, which had a positive effect on her 
relationships. Second, Kramer cites the example of individuals who take Prozac 
to improve their alertness and performance at work, which has an impact on 
their working relationships.695 Third, Kramer described the case of Mrs B, who 
was prescribed Prozac for compulsive behaviour (hair pulling), but who found 
that the drug made her more content with her personal life, and less anxious 
and needy about her romantic relationships.696 In her study of the use of SSRI 
antidepressants among university students, both therapeutically and for 
personality enhancement, McKinney and Greenfield cite the case of Natalie, a 
student who began treatment with Prozac with much reluctance, due to 
negative attitudes from her family, but who found that treatment with the drug 
was a liberating experience, which radically changed her relationship with her 
family.697 Indeed, there are indications that antidepressants do not just have an 
impact on interhuman relationships, but on a person’s relationship with God; 
Stapert describes the case of Marjorie, a woman taking Prozac, who discovered 
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a “fresh sense of God” as her treatment proceeded.698 The use of SSRI 
antidepressants therefore also reflects relational approach to the imago Dei as 
well as a functional one.  
To summarise, there is evidence that the use of SSRI antidepressants supports 
a view of human nature consistent with a comprehensive understanding of the 
imago Dei. SSRI antidepressant use supports functional and relational aspects 
of the image of God in humanity, and is not just concerned with substantive 
human attributes, which is the focus of many transhumanist technologies and 
proponents of transhumanism.  
Third, what attitude does the project embody towards the material world, 
including our own bodies? Like oral contraception and some proposed future 
medical technologies, such as medical nanotechnology and cryogenics, but 
unlike some other proposed technologies, such as mind uploading, SSRI 
antidepressants are affirming of the material world and bodily life, in that they 
exert positive effects, which facilitate human flourishing, in and through the 
material processes of the human brain and body, rather than as a therapeutic 
placebo or as a biotechnology that deprecates the human body. Because they 
are used for their effects on mood and personality, the use of SSRI 
antidepressants, as material technologies, could reinforce a dualistic approach 
to humanity, with separate rational and material (bodily) aspects of human life. 
However, precisely because there is some biological basis for depression, 
depression has somatic symptoms. The treatment of depression therefore has 
somatic benefits; as stated earlier, SSRI antidepressants improve attention, 
energy and alertness, as well as improving mood. Consequently, SSRIs do not 
simply improve individual mental function, but contribute to human flourishing 
holistically through their positive effects, both directly on the human body, and 
indirectly on human society, through individual bodily function and activity. 
Therefore, the possibility that SSRI antidepressant use leads to mind-body 
dualism seems unlikely in the light of these clinical findings. 
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Fourth, what attitude does the project embody towards past failures? As 
described previously in this chapter, SSRI antidepressants have been hugely 
popular in Western society, in terms of both consumption and commercial sales. 
They therefore have become significant in popular culture. However, the 
popularity of something does not necessarily equate to pride or hubris 
concerning its availability and use. Bottled mineral water is popular, both in 
terms of consumption and commercial sales, but it is not generally regarded as 
the pinnacle of human technological achievement.  
Just as the oral contraceptive pill has been described as the “ideal” 
contraceptive, so Prozac was developed as the “ideal” antidepressant, with 
good efficacy in the treatment of depression, combined with a favourable side 
effect profile and lack of toxicity in overdose. With reduced withdrawal potential 
compared to benzodiazepines, SSRI antidepressants were an advance on the 
“past failure” of benzodiazepines in psychopharmacology, and there is some 
evidence that clinicians were more wary about psychotherapeutic prescribing 
after the benzodiazepine scandal.699 The development of SSRI antidepressants 
seems to represent the climax of rational psychopharmacology, in that there 
have been no therapeutic advances for depression since the 1990s,700 and use 
of SSRIs has suppressed the exploration of new models of depression, and the 
investigation of new drugs.701 This itself might be evidence of technological 
hubris and triumphalism.  
Lilly’s marketing campaign for Prozac could be regarded as ruthless, in the way 
it discredited competitors, and exploited various opportunities.702 However, this 
may not necessarily reflect a belief in Prozac specifically as an agent of social 
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transformation, but rather pride in the corporate image of Lilly, or in the 
development of a “blockbuster” drug in general terms, at a time when 
“blockbuster” drugs were much sought after by the pharmaceutical industry.703 
Nevertheless, Prozac’s status as a cultural phenomenon, rather than just a 
medicine for depression, suggests that many people saw Prozac as a panacea 
for society’s ills and had elevated expectation of its value to society. Elliott 
describes how Prozac became an American cultural icon and was featured 
prominently in the popular media – in magazines, on the celebrity circuit and on 
chat shows.704 One such magazine article, by Mauro, declared that “the bad 
news for Prozac might be that there is no bad news”, and that it really is a 
panacea.705 Notwithstanding what might be regarded as cultural and media 
hype, not related directly to the use of the drug, there is certainly some 
evidence that SSRI antidepressants have been regarded by society with 
hubristic pride.  
Having reviewed Messer’s diagnostic criteria, we now evaluate SSRI 
antidepressants against Elaine Graham’s areas of concern with transhumanist 
developments. Graham’s first area of concern is that transhumanist 
technologies interfere with the integrity of the individual body and can therefore 
have a disruptive effect on the corporate body – the community. As previously 
argued, unlike some other proposed future transhumanist technologies, such as 
mind uploading, SSRI antidepressants do not negate the body and biological 
life but exert positive effects through embodied life and bodily mechanisms, 
therefore affirming bodily life. The positive effects of SSRI antidepressants 
uphold the integrity of the individual body, which may in turn have a positive 
impact on the corporate body of society, as previously discussed. However, 
there is some evidence here that the positive effects of SSRI use for the 
individual do not necessarily benefit society, and that the effects of SSRI use on 
 
703 David Herzberg, “Blockbusters and controlled substances: Miltown, 
Quaalude, and consumer demand for drugs in Postwar America”, Studies in 
History of Philosophy, Biology and Biomedical Science, 42 (2011), pp. 415-26. 
704 Carl Elliott, “Prozac: The Elvis of Pharmaceuticals”, British Medical Journal, 
313 (1996), p. 950. 
705 Mauro, "And Prozac for all...", pp. 44-50. 
238 
 
the corporate body of society may, in fact, be ambiguous. As argued by Kramer, 
SSRI antidepressant use may lead to cultural redefinition of important human 
experiences such as bereavement, which may change the dynamics of the 
doctor-patient relationship, both of which may have negative consequences for 
society.706 Sparrow argues that use of SSRI antidepressants as a form of moral 
enhancement in society has the potential to reduce the autonomy of some 
people, depending on how the drugs are distributed and used in society, 
because “the enhancers will be wielding power over the enhanced”, which may 
lead to injustice and oppression.707 Sparrow further notes perceptively that, 
compared to development of moral agency through education, with its methods 
of debate, discourse and reflexivity, use of SSRI antidepressants for moral 
enhancement is individualistic and instrumentalist – manipulating a human 
person towards a specific objective -  and, while both approaches may have 
some moral value, they cannot be ethically equivalent. 
Graham’s second area of concern is that transhumanist medical technologies 
enable unbridled autonomy in a negative manner. The availability of SSRI 
antidepressants gives people the option for treatment of depression, when in 
previous generations, no treatment option existed, and people ostensibly have 
choice about their treatment at the outset. However, as I argued earlier, the 
impact of SSRI antidepressants on autonomy and personal choice are 
ambiguous, and the course of SSRI antidepressant treatment is by no means 
associated with “unbridled autonomy”. In any case, as mentioned in the 
previous case study, autonomy is an ethically neutral phenomenon – it may be 
used to inflict selfish desires on others, or it can be used to pursue good ethical 
ends. SSRI antidepressants may be used for good ethical ends – to enhance 
mental function so that a person can be more effective in their job or 
relationships and thereby contribute positively to society – or for bad ethical 
ends – for hedonism and self-indulgence.  
Graham’s third area of concern is that transhumanist medical technologies are 
focused too much on the user’s subjective experiences. The individual 
 
706 Kramer, Listening to Prozac, pp. 13, 254. 
707 Sparrow, “Better Living through Chemistry?”, pp. 23-32. 
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subjectivism inherent in transhumanism may derive from the strong emphasis 
on autonomy and personal choice in choosing enhancements, which has been 
a key feature of transhumanist thought,708 but it may also arise from the 
postmodern incommensurability of human experience which seems to be 
prevalent in some forms of transhumanism.709 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the irony is that, although transhumanist 
technologies have the potential to enhance personal subjective experience of 
human life, because of their radical enhancement effects, they are problematic 
because they ultimately objectify the human body, so that the body is in danger 
of becoming an artefact to be engineered and manipulated at will, rather than a 
human person.710 
SSRI antidepressants have a direct effect on the clinical course of depression in 
the patient – but also large-scale treatment of depression in society affects the 
functioning of society and reduces the economic burden of depression. I would 
therefore argue that, while SSRIs do enhance the subjective experience of a 
person, due to their mental effects, when they are used in a widespread 
manner, their use affects society as a whole and so their use cannot be a wholly 
individualistic experience.  
Sartorius suggests that the incidence of depressive illness may increase in 
future, due to demographic changes, increased life expectancy and increasing 
incidences of iatrogenic depression (depression induced by medical treatment). 
In this situation, the use of new antidepressant treatments, which do not require 
extensive intervention by specialist mental healthcare personnel, will become 
an ethical imperative.711 I tend to agree with this view, and therefore would 
argue that the need for a Christian ethical evaluation of these therapies is 
pressing. The evaluation of SSRI antidepressants against the criteria defined in 
 
708 World Transhumanism Association, “Transhumanist Declaration”, pp. 54-55. 
709 See Bostrom on FM 2030 (Bostrom, “History of Transhumanist Thought”, pp. 
1-25). 
710  Cole-Turner, “Towards a Theology for the Age of Biotechnology”, pp. 142-
143, 147 
711 Norman Sartorius, “The economic and social burden of depression”, Journal 
of Clinical Psychiatry, 62 (Suppl) (2001), pp.  8-11. 
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Chapter 2, to determine the extent to which they were, in their time, a 
transhumanist development, helps to provide this assessment, in a way that 
goes beyond the natural law-based ethical approaches that have characterised 
previous Christian responses to both the contraceptive pill and SSRI 
antidepressants.  
The findings of this chapter indicate that, like the contraceptive pill, SSRI 
antidepressants conform to the criteria for transhumanist developments, in that 
they are a technology which is applied to the human person and is one that, 
largely, has a beneficial effect on human flourishing. Furthermore, SSRI 
antidepressants may have significant impact on human society as a whole - not 
just the experience of the individual. The effects of SSRI use are therefore both 
individual and corporate. Furthermore, given their success as a therapy and 
their potential for “cosmetic” use following the Kramer phenomenon, SSRI 
antidepressants have been regarded by some as the supreme achievement of 
rational psychopharmacology in a hubristic way, in a similar way to proposed 
future transhumanist technologies. 
Unlike transhumanist technologies that are highly technological in nature in 
comparison with conventional drug therapy,712 (for example, mind uploading or 
cryogenics), SSRI antidepressants have the potential to be beneficial to the 
poor, although evidence is as yet limited. Unlike approaches to transhumanism 
that emphasise human attributes, and therefore a more substantive approach to 
the imago Dei, I have argued in this chapter that the effects and benefits of 
SSRI antidepressants in clinical use reflect a comprehensive understanding of 
the imago Dei, which is functional and relational, not just substantive. Unlike 
some forms of transhumanist technologies, such as mind-uploading, which are 
anti-materialist, SSRI antidepressants, like the contraceptive pill, exert positive 
 
712 The term “high tech” therapy is currently used to describe some medicines 
that are administered by specialist routes and devices – for example, parenteral 
nutrition. See Getty Huisman‐de Waal, Theo van Achterberg, Jan Jansen, Geert 
Wanten and Lisette Schoonhoven, "‘High‐tech’ home care: overview of 
professional care in patients on home parenteral nutrition and implications for 
nursing care", Journal of Clinical Nursing, 20, (2011), pp. 2125-2134. 
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effects and benefits by working through the human body and its mechanisms, 
rather than by negating biological life. 
Most significantly, SSRI antidepressant use raises significant questions for 
personal autonomy, in the same way as contraceptive pill usage may do. A 
stated aim of the transhumanist movement is that individuals who are seeking 
biomedical enhancement can adopt a biomedical technology autonomously, as 
a matter of free, personal choice. Correspondingly, a key theological criticism of 
transhumanist technologies, raised by Elaine Graham, is that they enable 
unbridled autonomy in a negative manner. The evidence from the use of SSRI 
antidepressants suggests that, in a similar way to the contraceptive pill, neither 
of these extremes is true. While individual users of SSRI antidepressants can 
exercise autonomy in choosing them at the outset of use, adverse effects and 
unintended consequences with individual use, and changes in cultural 
expectations and societal norms if they are used widely in society, can lead to 
erosion of personal autonomy for the individual.  
The next chapter will re-evaluate the Christian ethics of future transhumanist 
medical technologies, in the light of these findings from these two case studies 
of past therapeutic developments, the contraceptive pill and SSRI 






Chapter 5 – A Re-evaluation of Transhumanism 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter will re-evaluate ethical issues with the future transhumanist 
technologies described in Chapter 2, in the light of previous experience with 
chemical therapeutics, as seen in the two case studies presented in Chapters 3 
and 4. The chapter will begin by summarising the findings of the case studies 
concerning the extent to which these medicines can be classified as 
transhumanist developments in their time, according to the general criteria 
derived from the transhumanist literature, and the theological criteria, based on 
Messer’s diagnostic questions,713 and Graham’s three theological 
considerations.714 
Based on those findings, the chapter will then address the four research 
questions proposed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, namely: 
1) What are the various issues of theological ethics presented by 
transhumanist developments? 
2) To what extent were past therapeutic developments transhumanist 
technologies in their time? 
3) What were the ethical concerns with past therapeutic developments? 
Have these ethical concerns been warranted in the light of subsequent 
experience? 
4) How do issues identified with previous therapeutic developments inform 
the evaluation of future biomedical technologies? 
The answer to the first of these questions will involve an extended discussion of 
the theological and ethical issues that have been identified with transhumanist 
technologies, as described in Chapter 2. The discussion will focus on four 
 
713 Neil Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics: Theological and Ethical 
Reflections on Evolutionary Biology (London: SCM, 2007), pp. 229-235. 
714 Elaine Graham, “In Whose Image? Representations of Technology and the 
Ends of Humanity”, in Future Perfect? God, Medicine and Human Identity, 
edited by Celia Deane-Drummond and Peter Manley Scott (London: T&T Clark 
International, 2006), pp. 56-69. 
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specific theological areas that were identified through the case studies as being 
significant areas for ethical reflection – autonomy, nature, imago Dei, and 
embodiment. The final part of the chapter will then discuss how the ethical 
criteria for transhumanist developments proposed in Chapter 2 can be refined, 
revised and developed in the light of the findings of the case studies. 
5.2. Review of Case Study Findings 
Both case studies of past therapeutic developments - the contraceptive pill and 
SSRI antidepressants - arose from, and were enabled by, previous scientific 
discoveries. In Chapter 3, I argued that the contraceptive pill was developed in 
a planned and deliberate manner, and those involved in its development – 
Sanger, McCormick and Pincus – had a clear vision of the pill as a means of 
transforming human society. Furthermore, the contraceptive pill is not a 
preventative treatment for a disorder - as pregnancy is not a disorder - but alters 
the function of a healthy woman. It was the first medicine to be used widely in 
an otherwise healthy population and so constitutes an early form of biomedical 
enhancement. However, due to the mass screening approach taken by the 
pharmaceutical industry for drug discovery during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
development of Prozac and the SSRI antidepressants was more serendipitous 
in nature. There were many drug candidates available, and several 
circumstantial factors led to the marketing of Prozac in particular. Furthermore, 
the potentially profound effects of Prozac on human society were not intended 
by its developers, who saw Prozac simply as a possible treatment for clinical 
depression. Rather, they were as a result of the experience of psychiatrists - 
and patients themselves - of the use of Prozac as an “enhancement” for 
manipulating the personality to make healthy people feel “better than well”, a 
phenomenon that has been described as “cosmetic psychopharmacology”. This 
interest in using Prozac and other SSRI antidepressants as personality 
enhancements has been described by scholars and commentators as the 
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“Prozac phenomenon.” 715 In both cases, there are features relating to the use 
of the drug that resemble those of a transhumanist technology. 
However, the application of objective criteria for a transhumanist technology, as 
defined in Chapter 2, to these two cases enables a more detailed and nuanced 
analysis. In terms of the general criteria for transhumanist developments – 
those derived from the writings of transhumanist scholars themselves – both the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants conform to three out of four of 
these criteria, in that each is a technology (a material means of effecting a task 
or process) which is applied to the human body to exert an effect and the effect 
is largely a beneficial one, as far as human flourishing is concerned. 
The fourth general criterion for a transhumanist development is that the human 
person has autonomy in the use of the medical technology, and the technology 
is not used in a coercive way in human society. I have shown that, for both the 
contraceptive pill and for SSRI antidepressants, it is uncertain whether, as 
medical technologies, they can always be used by human beings in a truly 
autonomous way, with informed personal choice, arising from self-determination 
as a moral agent, without any form of coercion, as defined in Chapter 2. This 
may be because of possible unintended consequences of the use of the 
medicines themselves, due to their effects and adverse effects, but may also be 
because of coercive influences and cultural expectations concerning the use of 
these medicines at an individual level. In addition, it may be because of issues 
of justice and equity in the marketing and distribution of these products at a 
societal level. I will explore these issues concerning autonomy, and their 
implications for ethical evaluation of transhumanism, in more depth in the next 
section. 
Concerning the specific theological criteria for consideration with a proposed 
transhumanist development, as developed by Neil Messer and Elaine Graham, I 
 
715 See, for example, Joseph Glenmullen, Prozac backlash: Overcoming the 
dangers of Prozac, Zoloft, Paxil, and other antidepressants with safe, effective 
alternatives (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), pp. 7-28. 
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have made the following observations about the contraceptive pill and SSRI 
antidepressants: 
 The contraceptive pill has the capacity to be “good news for the poor”, in 
that there is evidence of clear benefits to poor people, because of the 
pill’s ability to help women on low incomes to plan their families and their 
working life. In contrast, expensive, “high-tech” proposed transhumanist 
technologies, such as cryogenics and cybernetics, would probably, if 
available, only benefit a small percentage of wealthy people, and could 
be used to oppress the rest of the population. Concerning SSRI 
antidepressants, there is evidence that they are a cost-effective way of 
treating depression from the health provider’s perspective. However, 
there is limited evidence that they have direct benefits for the poor, 
although in theory they should, because of their low cost and recognised 
effects on cognitive function and quality of life. Nevertheless, with both 
medicines, benefits to the poor may be compromised by coercive and 
inequitable marketing and distribution arrangements for these drugs, or 
lack of access to the medicine, especially in third world health 
economies. 
 Does the project enable humanity to conform to the image of God, or is it 
an attempt to be like God? I have shown that the effects of both the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants in humans are consistent 
with a comprehensive approach to the imago Dei in humanity, which is 
functional, relational, and possibly eschatological, not just substantive. 
This contrasts with some approaches to transhumanism that emphasise, 
or are solely concerned with, human attributes, and therefore reflect a 
largely substantive approach only to the imago Dei, at the expense of the 
other approaches to the imago Dei. Indeed, rather than enabling 
humanity to fully conform to the image of God, transhumanist 
technologies are a means of being like God, in that they emphasise the 
use of technology to manipulate, redesign and “re-create” the body at 
will. The past therapies described cannot manipulate the body as 
radically as some future technologies may be able to (for example, with 
cybernetic body components). 
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 Concerning the attitude of the project towards the material world, 
including the human body, both the contraceptive pill and SSRI 
antidepressants are affirming of bodily life in that they exert their positive 
effects in and through the biological human body, and therefore do not 
negate bodily and biological life. This contrasts with some proposed 
transhumanist technologies, such as mind uploading, which are 
essentially anti-materialist, and which deprecate the human body, and 
downgrade experiences that are bodily in nature or that are mediated 
through the body. In addition, as shown earlier, the contraceptive pill has 
significant positive effects on society – the corporate body of humanity – 
as well as the health and wellbeing of the individual human body, 
because of its positive effects on the wellbeing of women, the role of 
marriage in society and the stability of family life. However, the potentially 
negative effect that the contraceptive pill can have on the environment, 
through pollution of water courses with excreted sex steroids from 
women using the contraceptive pill, should be noted. The effect of SSRI 
antidepressants on corporate society, due to their effects on the 
personalities and relationships of individuals, is more ambiguous; they 
may have both positive and negative effects on personalities and 
relationships, and the net overall effect on society is hard to evaluate. In 
any case, with both therapeutic developments, there is the question of 
exactly how individuals might use the beneficial effects of the therapy on 
their material bodies, and in their material lives. For example, the 
contraceptive effect of the contraceptive pill could be used to enable 
sexual activity with multiple sexual partners, rather than responsible 
family planning (although, as seen in Chapter 3, there is little evidence to 
suggest that this is the case). Similarly, positive mental effects of SSRI 
antidepressants could be used to enable a reckless, hedonistic and 
destructive lifestyle, rather than to promote good mental health for the 
individual, and a positive, selfless contribution of the individual to human 
society.  
 What is the attitude of these projects to past failure? I have argued that 
introduction of the contraceptive pill has been regarded with hubris in 
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some societies, as a triumph of human technological achievement, 
similar to the way in which  some transhumanist scholars - for example, 
Bostrom and More – view proposed future transhumanist 
technologies.716 Nevertheless, the contraceptive pill did overcome some 
of the shortcomings of previous forms of contraception, and the 
protagonists in the development of the pill intended it to have a positive 
impact on previously significant issues in society, relating to family 
planning and human welfare, at both an individual and a social level. 
Furthermore, given their massive success as a therapy and their 
potential for “cosmetic” use following Peter Kramer’s publication, 
Listening to Prozac, SSRI antidepressants have also been regarded by 
some as the supreme achievement of rational psychopharmacology in a 
way that again could be regarded as hubristic, in a similar way to some 
attitudes to proposed future transhumanist technologies. The fact 
remains, however, that, despite their faults, SSRI antidepressants were 
also an improvement on previously available interventions. They were 
designed in order to overcome the problems of tricyclic antidepressants 
in clinical use, although they were not developed specifically to address 
social problems, in the way that the contraceptive pill was.  
 Are these technologies focused excessively on the users’ individual, 
subjective experiences? As discussed in Chapter 2, the irony is that the 
effects of transhumanist technologies, in relation to whether the user is a 
subject or an object, are paradoxical. Transhumanist technologies are 
associated with radical consumer choice and individualism in the way 
they are applied, which has the potential to enhance the subjective 
experience of the user, and their status as a personal subject. At the 
same time, however, transhumanist technologies treat the body as an 
 
716 Nicholas Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values”, Journal of Philosophical 
Research, 30 (Supplement) (2005), pp. 3-6.; Max More “The Philosophy of 
Transhumanism”, in The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary 
Essays on the Science, Technology and Philosophy of the Post-Human Future, 




artefact, and therefore they objectify the human body – in other words, 
they treat the body as an object. This problem is clearly present for both 
the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants. This is more so with 
these agents than with classes of medicine whose pharmacological 
effects on the human body are less intrusive to human personal and 
social experience – for example, antihypertensive agents. The pill gives 
women choice about pregnancy, family life and careers, and therefore 
enhances the subjective experience of the user. Yet the use of the pill 
enables fertility to be manipulated at will, which can be done at scale in 
society, and therefore it has the potential to treat the female body as an 
object to be engineered, rather than a personal subject. In relation to this, 
the pill may therefore also contribute to the phenomenon of 
objectification of the female body in sexual relationships, as described by 
some feminist commentators.717 The mental effects of SSRI 
antidepressants can also increase the subjective experience of the user, 
both positively or negatively. However, they too have the potential to 
objectify the human body, and treat it as an artefact to be engineered, 
when they are used to manipulate the personality, in a way that might be 
regarded as instrumentalist – i.e. it is a pragmatic intervention towards a 
specific end, rather than something of moral value in itself. This contrasts 
with personality changes which take place due to life experiences, such 
as culture or education, which have moral value in themselves. SSRI 
antidepressants have a direct effect on the clinical course of depression 
in the patient – but also large-scale treatment of depression in society 
affects the functioning of society and reduces the economic burden of 
depression. I would therefore argue that, while SSRIs do provide a 
benefit to the individual person, which is subjectively experienced by that 
person, their use as “cosmetic psychopharmacology” is a means of 
treating the person as an artefact that can be (self) manipulated at will. 
 
717 For example, Betsy Hartmann, Reproductive Rights and Wrongs: The Global 
Politics of Population Control (Boston: South End Press, 1995), p. 189, and 
Robert Jutte’s commentary in Contraception: A History, translated by V. Russell 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p. 288. 
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These findings demonstrate that the two case studies of therapeutic 
developments, the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants, could be 
classed as transhumanist technologies, because of three specific features:  
a) their attributes as medical technologies, because their pharmacological 
effects are wide-ranging and have profound systemic effects on the 
individual human body; 
b) the total impact they have had on society, rather than just on the health 
and wellbeing of the individuals who take them, and  
c) the understanding of their application to humanity as transformational 
medical technologies in both scholarly and popular discourse. 
However, when the specific theological criteria for transhumanist developments 
are applied to these two case studies to facilitate ethical analysis, a more 
nuanced picture of these technologies emerges. The two therapeutic case 
studies resemble transhumanist developments in some respects, but not others. 
For example, the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants could be 
regarded as examples of technological hubris – developments which are the 
height of rational, scientific development in their fields, which some medical 
practitioners and pharmaceutical industry personnel have taken for granted, 
rather than treated with awe and respect, and in which they have placed 
excessive confidence as panaceas for human suffering. This is similar to the 
uncritical optimism with which proposed radical transhumanist biomedical 
technologies are regarded by some transhumanist thinkers – see, for example, 
Max More.718 
In other respects, however, there may be significant differences between these 
therapeutic cases and transhumanist technologies, depending on the type of 
technology. For example, both the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants 
mediate their positive effects through the human body; they affirm bodily life and 
assume a view of the world where human bodily experience is good and of 
moral value. This, however, is in stark contrast to some proposed transhumanist 
 
718 As exemplified by his “No more gods, no more faith, no more timid holding 
back” slogan (Max More, “Philosophy of Transhumanism”, pp. 1-17). 
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technologies such as mind-uploading and cybernetics, which denigrate the 
human body, and consider it of lesser importance than mental life and cognitive 
function. 
The issues concerning autonomy are particularly problematic. There are two 
issues regarding autonomy that have been identified with biomedical 
technologies, both of which have been identified in the two case studies. First, 
there is the question of whether the technology can be adopted with true 
autonomy and second, there is the question of the capacity of the technology 
itself to enable or disable the personal autonomy of the user. It is a key tenet of 
the transhumanist movement that technologies may be applied to the human 
body in an individualistic and autonomous manner and this follows logically from 
the roots of transhumanism in secular humanism. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, scholars such as Sparrow,719 and McNamee and Edwards,720 have 
questioned whether there can be true autonomy in a world of transhumanist 
technology, due to the way these technologies are then likely to be deployed in 
human society. With both the past therapeutic case studies presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4, the medical technology may be initially adopted by an 
individual with autonomy – uncoerced self-determination, as defined in Chapter 
2 – by an individual. However, widespread deployment of the technology in 
human society may lead to coercive factors in how the technology is adopted 
and use of the technology itself may disable personal autonomy by introducing 
coercive factors. This suggests that autonomy is a key area for ethical reflection 
with future technologies and should be explored at some length in developing 
an ethical response to future transhumanist technologies.  
The points of convergence between the evaluation of the two therapeutic case 
studies according to the objective criteria for transhumanism, and real-world 
experience with these therapies in practice, suggests that there are some 
aspects of current therapeutics that are beneficial, of moral value and which 
 
719 Robert Sparrow, “Better Living through Chemistry? A Reply to Savulescu 
and Persson on Moral Enhancement”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31 (2014), 
pp. 23-32. 
720 M.J. McNamee and S.D. Edwards, “Transhumanism, medical technology 
and slippery slopes”, Journal of Medical Ethics, 32 (2006), pp. 513-518. 
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raise no particular ethical concerns. For example, experience has shown that 
the contraceptive pill has indeed had a positive impact on human health and 
flourishing, especially in poor and marginalised populations. This suggests that 
there may be some aspects of some future technologies that will be positive, 
and consistent with a Christian ethical approach to the goods of human life, and 
later in this chapter, I will explore these aspects in more detail.  
Nevertheless, the discussion of the case studies in Chapters 3 and 4, and in 
this introductory section of Chapter 5, indicates there are four aspects of 
theological ethics arising from experience of the two previous therapeutic case 
studies, and the application of the theological criteria to them, which warrant 
extended discussion as key areas of the ethical evaluation of future biomedical 
technologies. These are: 
a) The extent to which the biomedical technology affects personal 
autonomy and with what outcomes (for both the individual moral agent 
and for the community). 
b) The status of biomedical technologies as natural or artificial 
interventions, and the appropriateness of their ethical evaluation using 
natural law theory. Note that this area of discussion does not directly 
arise from the application of the criteria to the cases, but it is a significant 
area of discussion given that natural law ethical objections have been 
raised by the Roman Catholic Church in the past with the contraceptive 
pill and by a Roman Catholic scholar with SSRI antidepressants, the two 
case studies in this thesis.  
c) The extent to which the biomedical technology affirms the material body 
as a prerequisite for earthly human existence and life.  
d) The approach to the imago Dei that the technology-enhanced human 
being reflects. 
These four areas – autonomy, nature, embodiment and the imago Dei - will be 






5.3. Question 1: What are the issues of Theological Ethics presented by 
Transhumanist Developments? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, given the broad scope of transhumanism, both 
scientifically and epistemologically, corresponding theological and ethical 
concerns about transhumanism have been equally broad. These have included 
social ethical concerns, such as the impact of immortality or extreme longevity 
on human social issues, such as work, marriage, housing etc, potential for 
inequality of access to technologies, and social and cultural oppression due to 
inequity of access. As well as social ethical issues, theological ethical concerns 
have been raised with transhumanist biomedical technologies, and four specific 
areas of theological discussion were introduced and defined in Chapter 2. 
These four domains are: a) Autonomy – the effect of the technology on personal 
autonomy, b) Nature – the extent to which a technology is “natural”, c) 
Embodiment – the extent to which a technology supports or undermines human 
embodiment, material life and identity, and d) Imago Dei – the extent to which 
the user of the technology conforms to an imago Dei which reflects the various 
approaches that have been described in the literature of theological 
anthropology, as all the different approaches are important in a Christian 
understanding of humanity. 
These four domains merit further exploration because, following application of 
objective criteria, they have been identified as issues with both past therapeutic 
developments and they are also potential issues with proposed future 
transhumanist technologies. They therefore provide a link between past and 
future biomedical technologies, and thus a common platform for the ethical 
evaluation of these technologies. These issues will therefore be as relevant to 
future biomedical technologies as they have been to past therapeutic 
developments. Furthermore, there are various ambiguities inherent in these 
areas, which are likely to be key areas of debate in Christian ethical responses 
to future adoption of biomedical technologies. I will now discuss each of these 




 5.3.1. Autonomy 
As already indicated, the use of transhumanist biomedical technologies raises 
significant questions concerning the exercise of personal autonomy. A stated 
aim of the transhumanist movement, as described in Chapter 2 of this thesis, is 
that individuals who are seeking biomedical enhancement can choose to use 
the biomedical technology - or not - autonomously, as a matter of free, personal 
choice. The corresponding theological response to this, raised by Elaine 
Graham, is that transhumanist biomedical technologies therefore are 
problematic because they enable unbridled autonomy in a negative manner.721  
However, the evidence from the development and use of both the contraceptive 
pill and SSRI antidepressants suggests that, in fact, neither scenario is true and 
that the relationship between the use of a technology and the autonomy of the 
user is a complex one. While there may be ways in which some biomedical 
technologies can be applied with true autonomy - defined as uncoerced self-
determination - there are also situations where the biomedical technology may 
limit that autonomy when used as an enhancement at a societal level. This 
issue has been raised in respect of enhancement technologies by Sparrow, as 
noted in Chapter 2.722 
The capacity for a widely used biomedical technology to limit personal 
autonomy has also been observed in respect of the two case studies. The 
introduction of the contraceptive pill led to the so-called “coital imperative” 
where women felt compelled to have sex because there was no reason not to, 
since the risk of pregnancy was removed by use of the pill.723 Also, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, the methods of distribution of the contraceptive pill in 
developing countries in the past by some US family planning services have 
been criticised as coercive, in a way that does not respect the rights of local 
 
721 Graham, “In Whose Image?”, pp. 56-69. 
722 Robert Sparrow, “Better Living through Chemistry? A Reply to Savulescu 
and Persson on Moral Enhancement”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31 (2014), 
pp. 23-32. 
723 Adrian Thatcher, God, Sex and Gender: An Introduction, (Oxford, Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011), p. 221. 
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women;724 Hartmann, in particular, has argued from a feminist perspective that 
women in developing countries have often been disempowered by such 
services, because of their lack of respect for local culture and the lack of 
information and choice provided to women.725 These factors have all 
contributed to the autonomy of these women being compromised. This is an 
external influence, arising from the activities of the family planning services, but 
may also be an internal coercive factor due to assimilation of western attitudes. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, this issue has arisen again more recently with the 
use of injectable and implantable hormonal contraception – for example, Depo-
Provera, Norplant and NexPlanon. The risk with these forms of contraception is 
that they are given as an injection, and they therefore do not require the woman 
to participate in the process, so they have the potential to be administered with 
scant regard to the woman’s personal autonomy, especially in cultures where 
subservience is valued in a woman. There are therefore various aspects of the 
use of the contraceptive pill which might constitute the application of significant 
coercion on the woman’s personal autonomy, according to the definition of 
autonomy given in Chapter 2. 
There are also concerns about personal autonomy arising from the use of SSRI 
antidepressants in some situations. As discussed in Chapter 2, drug addiction 
and brain washing are two scenarios cited in philosophical literature as being 
problematic for the concept of personal autonomy.726 Both these issues are 
potentially applicable to the effects of SSRIs on personal autonomy in some 
situations. As described in Chapter 4, the withdrawal effects of SSRI 
antidepressants, as a result of biochemical dependence, may have a negative 
impact on the autonomy of users of these medicines, as they make it harder for 
a person to stop treatment when they want to, and may exert a psychological 
pressure on them to continue treatment or to dissuade them from discontinuing 
treatment. This scenario is essentially the “drug addiction” scenario – the 
 
724 May, America and the Pill, p. 43. 
725 Hartmann, Reproductive Rights and Wrongs, pp. 200-203. 
726 Sarah Buss, “Personal Autonomy”Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 




individual finds it hard to stop using the drug, even though they might want to, 
because of the effects of the drug – and this compromises autonomy as an 
expression of self-determination, because the person cannot act in an entirely 
self-determined way due to the biochemical effects of the drug. Furthermore, in 
some people, the use of SSRI antidepressants may lead to suicidal ideation – 
the presence of suicidal thoughts independently of symptoms of depressive 
illness – and, in some rare cases, have been associated with criminal 
actions,727 and the drug has been cited as a factor in the legal defence. 
Although SSRI antidepressant use usually enables a user to be more rational, 
due to relief of clinical depression, in these cases, the person’s rational 
functions are diminished, so this constitutes “brain washing”, where the person’s 
autonomy as a self-governing moral agent is compromised, by an inability for 
rational thought induced by the drug. 
In a future world of widespread, sophisticated medical interventions, one 
solution to the problem of negative effects of biomedical technology on personal 
autonomy, due to unintended consequences of use of the technology, might be 
to employ biomedical technologies specifically for “moral enhancement”, to 
ensure people always make good moral choices.728 Moral bio-enhancement has 
been discussed in the literature, and medical interventions have been proposed 
for moral enhancement.729  
However, moral enhancement technology would be problematic for autonomy, 
in my view, for two reasons. First, the fact that the biotechnology would “make” 
the person make good moral decisions is problematic for the concept of 
personal autonomy as defined in Chapter 2 – i.e. the self-determination of a 
person to act according to their desires and character. According to this 
 
727 See David Healy, Let Them Eat Prozac: The Unhealthy Relationship 
Between the Pharmaceutical Industry and Depression, (New York/London: New 
York University Press, 2004), p. 64. Wesbecker, a man from Kentucky, went on 
a shooting spree and killed several people while being treated with Prozac. His 
lawyers cited his treatment with Prozac in a “diminished responsibility” defence. 
728 Thomas Douglas, “Moral Enhancement”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25 
(2008), pp. 228-245. 
729 Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson, “Moral enhancement, freedom and 
the God machine”, The Monist, 95 (2012), pp. 399–421. 
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definition, if a person is not free to make bad decisions arising from a flawed 
character or perverted desires – without the influence of mind-altering drugs – 
then, even though the consequences of those immoral decisions might be bad, 
their personal autonomy is compromised. Even though, from a Christian 
perspective, it might seem beneficial to be biomedically enhanced to always 
make good decisions, a biomedically-restricted autonomy is no substitute for 
good decisions that are freely made by a moral agent as an exercise of free will 
and with a clear understanding of personal responsibility. 
Second, if the moral enhancement agent changes the individual’s desires and 
will so that they always want to make the right choice then, although the 
person’s course of action will be aligned with their desires, those desires will 
arise from the neurochemical changes induced by the biotechnology, rather 
than from the psychological changes associated with character formation. With 
a coherentist view of personal autonomy, as described in Chapter 2, the 
person’s will to act arises from the desires of their essential self. Consequently, 
the use of a moral enhancement biotechnology agent might appear to enable 
personal autonomy, but in fact it undermines it. This is because, although the 
development of character comes from exposure to external influences as well 
as innate genetic factors, the external factors in character development are 
likely to comprise a range of experiences of the world over time, where the 
person has the opportunity to reflect upon and maybe challenge those 
experiences. However, a biomedical technology represents a single external 
factor which may rapidly cause profound coercion of the person’s autonomy, 
possibly coupled with a lack of insight on the part of the person concerning the 
technology’s actions on the mind. For this reason, a technological cause of 
character change is less valuable morally than a non-technological cause of 
character change in respect of the exercise of autonomy.  
In short, the problem with biomedical interventions for “moral enhancement” is 
their potential to short-circuit the process of a person reacting to, and reflecting 
upon, a situation where a moral decision needs to be made. This process of 
reaction and reflection, where a person discerns moral factors and implications 
in a situation as a prerequisite of making good decisions about that situation, is 
an important factor if moral agency is to be truly self-determined, or 
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autonomous. In other words, there is moral value in a person having autonomy 
to make a good or bad moral choice, reflecting on the choice and then making a 
good choice, uninfluenced by the application of biomedical technology. This 
issue has been identified in discussions about autonomy with potential future 
biomedical technologies,730 and I have shown here that this has been an issue 
with the two case studies of previous biomedical technologies in this thesis.  
The importance of reaction and reflection in the formation of autonomous moral 
agency has two important implications for the case studies presented in this 
thesis. First, the biological model of depression, as described in Chapter 4, has 
an underlying notion of reductionism, which suggests that depressive illness 
and other mental symptoms are solely the result of biochemical processes in 
the brain. This approach might suggest that the individual does not have 
conscious insight into their mental processes, and from a legal perspective, this 
lack of insight would undermine moral culpability for a criminal act relating to 
use of a drug.731 Conversely, if the individual had capacity and insight into their 
illness, taking the drug would not in itself diminish the person’s moral 
responsibility for committing the crime. So, even if one did accept the biological 
model of depression, with its reductionist premise, the personal autonomy of the 
person being treated is genuine if they have insight into their mental state, and 
therefore the capacity to react to and reflect on their desires, and this is 
recognised by law in human society.  
Second, although medical technologies, such as SSRI antidepressants and the 
contraceptive pill, may be imposed upon, or alternatively restricted in, certain 
countries or cultures in a way that might be coercive for the people affected at a 
societal level, this does not prevent individual people from taking personal 
responsibility and exercising personal autonomy – i.e. self-determination 
according to the desires of the essential self - to resist coercion or to make good 
decisions about their health in other respects.  
 
730 Sparrow, “Better Living through Chemistry?”, pp. 23-32. 
731 As with the Wesbecker case, cited above. See David Healy, Let Them Eat 
Prozac, p. 64. 
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Experience with these case studies shows that the exercise of personal 
autonomy in respect of biomedical technologies has always been ambiguous. 
Limitations of personal autonomy are always possible with any medical 
technology, past or present, either due to unintended consequences or to 
societal or commercial external coercion. However, in most circumstances of 
modern life, personal autonomy is genuine and valuable, and individuals can 
make real choices about how to apply technology in a liberal western state. 
However, if appropriate a priori choices are not made about the deployment and 
use of any technology, then there is the risk that technology will be assimilated 
uncritically into society and, given the invasive, radical nature of some future 
technologies, that the technology might manipulate humanity, rather than vice 
versa. 
In that situation, the technology may become dominant, and become an idol 
that is worshipped instead of God. Instead, humanity should exercise 
discernment in evaluating technologies, controlling their deployment and use 
with appropriate regulation and public policy, to ensure that the autonomy of 
individuals using biomedical technologies is safeguarded. This is itself is an 
important act of responsibility – and indeed autonomy - on the part of human 
society and is consistent with the human vocation to be a created co-creator, 
under God’s authority.732 God has acted freely in creating the world and he 
invites human creatures to exercise their will and share with him the 
responsibility of being creative in human society. 
Saad’s observation that autonomy in medicine to date has been excessively 
focused on the issue of consent and is insufficiently relational is an important 
one.733 With future, more radical biomedical technologies, the procedure of 
personal consent will play only a small part in the autonomy with which they are 
adopted. Most people will freely consent to use a technology if they experience 
personal benefits; this phenomenon has already been seen in the almost 
 
732 Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion, 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), pp. 255-277. 
733 Toni Saad, “The History of Autonomy in Medicine from Antiquity to 
Principlism”, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 21 (2018), pp.125-137. 
259 
 
universal adoption of mobile telecommunications and would no doubt be seen 
again if, for example, retinal implants become a widely available and socially 
acceptable way to greatly increase visual acuity beyond current biological 
standards for eyesight. What will matter in future is that such technologies are 
introduced in such a way that the autonomy of the personal individual is 
safeguarded and respected in the context of the whole human community in 
which they are situated, not just through the atomistic process of individual, 
personal consent. For this to happen, appropriate public policy will be needed to 
ensure equitable funding and adoption of such technologies, so that anyone in 
that society can choose to apply a technology to themselves as a free personal 
choice, without external coercion, and it supports relationships in society not 
just the rights of the individual.  
Although I have highlighted some of the ways in which the contraceptive pill and 
SSRI antidepressants as biomedical technologies can compromise personal 
autonomy, it is fair to say that, reviewing the history of their use, both these 
biomedical technologies have also had liberating effects. The contraceptive pill 
has freed women – and couples - to make personal choices about having sex 
and planning pregnancies, and about the lifestyle issues that accompany these 
decisions. SSRI antidepressants have enabled people with depression to avail 
themselves of effective treatment without the debilitating side-effects that were 
a problem with previous classes of antidepressants. Both these technologies 
were advances in terms of the personal choices that they offered individual 
users, and the benefits of choice with these advances have been significant for 
humanity because of the large populations in which these drugs have been 
used. It is possible that the more widespread use of future, more radical, 
biomedical technologies might also have liberating effects for a significant 
proportion of the population, depending on how they are introduced.  
Autonomy has ambiguous aspects in medicine - and always has - but the 
ambiguity of autonomy should not detract from the importance of individuals 
and communities making good moral decisions about all aspects of life, 
including the good application of medical technology. In terms of future 
transhumanist technologies, this will be about understanding how exactly a 
medical technology can interfere with personal autonomy and affect a person’s 
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agency to act morally in the world. This interference might be at the level of 
desire or will, or at the level of external coercive forces. Does the cybernetic 
body component have functionality which might act against the host’s desires or 
will? Is the uploaded person’s will or ability to act compromised by their 
disembodied nature? Does the distribution of either technology in society 
restrict how different individuals and groups in society exercise personal 
autonomy, in relation to each other? These problems will be addressed by 
users having a comprehensive knowledge about the technology and its 
consequences - and by developers being honest with users about the features 
of the technology, within the limits of current experience. Nevertheless, both 
these approaches might be limited by any unintended consequences of the 
technology. Furthermore, it is important that governments, health services and 
users consider all the implications of technology use prospectively, before a 
technology is deployed in a widespread way. Often the adoption of technologies 
is driven by commercial or market factors and governments and public bodies 
struggle to catch up. With something as important as personal autonomy – 
personally, socially and politically – it is important that a more rigorous and 
holistic approach is taken.  
5.3.2. Nature 
As discussed in Chapter 2, natural law theory proposes that there are good 
ends to human life, and that what is natural in the world – and for a human 
being – is directed towards what is morally good. In short, if something is 
natural, or occurs naturally in the world, it must be good, or be an expression of 
that which is good.734 Natural law appears to assume that there is a teleology – 
a goal or end - of the universe. This has led some theologians such as Stephen 
Pope and Kevin Vanhoozer to claim that natural law is therefore incompatible 
with modern, post-Darwinian biological science because, they claim, this 
 
734  Stephen Pope, “Natural Law and Christian Ethics”, in Cambridge 
Companion to Christian Ethics, edited by Robin Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), pp. 67-86. 
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scientific approach has undermined the idea of teleology, or purpose, in the 
universe.735  
As discussed in Chapter 2, a key theme which has emerged from transhumanist 
scholarship is that nature is “unfinished”.736 This implies that any new 
biomedical technology which might enhance human attributes may have the 
potential to “complete” human nature. However, as discussed at length in 
Chapter 2, this idea is problematic because it could suggest that, because of 
their “flaws”, some people might not conform to the imago Dei now - which has 
implications for the person’s current status and rights as a human being. It also 
implies an obligation to use technology to get all human beings to the “required” 
standard of function. This implies that “perfection” is something that can be 
determined and achieved solely by human will. However, considering the 
Christological dimension of the imago Dei, I will argue later in this chapter that 
all human beings fall short of perfection in Christ, as the perfect image of God 
(see Colossians 1v15).  
I have shown in the previous section that transhumanism, with its tenet of 
adoption of technology with complete personal autonomy, is problematic given 
the ambiguities with autonomy that have been seen with previous biomedical 
technologies. However, transhumanism, with its underlying ethos that human 
life can be manipulated at will with biomedical technology, also appears to be in 
tension with the concept of natural law, which emphasises the concept of a 
fixed order of creation.737 Indeed, transhumanist thinkers, such as Bostrom,738  
 
735 See Stephen Pope, “Theological Anthropology: Science and Human 
Flourishing”, in Questioning the Human: Towards a Theological Anthropology 
for the 21st Century, edited by Lieven Boeve, Yves De Maeseneer and Ellen 
Van Stichel (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), pp. 13-19; Kevin 
Vanhoozer, “Human Being: Individual and Social”, in Cambridge Companion to 
Christian Doctrine, edited by Colin Gunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p. 167.   
736 Nicholas Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values”, Journal of Philosophical 
Research, 30 (2005), p. 3.  
737 Patrick Hopkins, “Is Enhancement worthy of being a right?”, in The 
Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, 
Technology and Philosophy of the Post-Human Future, edited by Max More and 
Natasha Vita-More (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p. 351. 
738 Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values”, p. 3.  
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take the view that human nature can – and should – be manipulated by 
biomedical technology. If human “nature” is indeed malleable – and medical 
technology to date, especially in the area of reproductive science, suggests that 
it is – then, in a technology-enabled world, there can no longer be an 
unquestionable link between the “nature” of a creature and the moral ends to 
which it is directed.  
The two therapies presented in the case studies of this thesis – the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants – have the potential to manipulate 
aspects of human life that have previously been regarded as “natural” – namely, 
fertility and personality respectively. Consequently, both these therapies have 
been criticised on natural law grounds by Roman Catholic theologians or by the 
Roman Catholic church at an institutional level. However, I have demonstrated 
the problems of sole use of natural law as a mode of ethical evaluation of the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, 
by reviewing the benefits of, and the experience with, these pharmacological 
interventions. If modes of ethical evaluation other than natural law are used to 
evaluate the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants, then it would be 
difficult to conclude that the effects of these interventions on the human body 
make them “innately evil". 
Furthermore, if radical biomedical technologies are able to alter human nature 
easily and extensively, as will happen in the future, then the “nature” of a person 
would no longer reflect good moral ends. Natural law would therefore be 
diminished further as a mode of ethical evaluation of biomedical technologies. 
  Instead, a better way of assessing the moral value of the technology – the 
goodness, or otherwise, of its use – is by assessing  actions of the users or the 
consequences of its use, to a greater or lesser extent, rather than its effects on 
nature.  
In any case, using natural law as a means of ethical assessment of biomedical 
technologies is complicated by how “natural” is defined. This is seen in the two 
previous case studies. John Rock, the gynaecologist who did early work on the 
contraceptive pill, was content to regard the pill as a “natural” intervention, 
because it was composed of substances (oestrogen and progestogen) which 
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were similar to the reproductive hormones found naturally in the body, and 
which therefore mimicked their natural actions. From a scientific and medical 
perspective, this was a reasonable assumption. However, the church regarded 
the contraceptive pill as “unnatural” because it was an external agent, not 
originating from within the body, but which affected the normal function of the 
body. This was an equally reasonable assumption given the history and 
development of natural law theory from Aquinas onwards, but it led to a different 
conclusion about the acceptability of the contraceptive pill from a natural law 
perspective. A similar definitional issue has been at play in the development of 
psychopharmacology and SSRI antidepressants. During the late twentieth 
century, as disease knowledge of psychiatry has increased and more 
sophisticated treatments have become available, the DSM classification of 
mental health conditions has expanded, and characteristics that were previously 
regarded as part of normal behaviour – and therefore “natural” – have been 
medicalised and have been reclassified as “unnatural” disease states. 
The natural law assumption is that a biological entity or process that is 
operating according to nature is natural and therefore directed to good ends, 
whereas a biological entity or process that can be manipulated at human will is 
“artificial”. While the idea of artifice is not itself immoral in natural law, such an 
artifice would be immoral if it contravened natural biological processes. 
However, the perspective from which a situation is viewed will determine the 
extent to which it can be defined “natural” or “artificial”. As discussed in Chapter 
3, in the Roman Catholic papal encyclical, Humanae Vitae, the underlying 
assumption seems to be that a marriage consists of a series of apparently 
unconnected sex acts, possibly because of an overly physicalist interpretation 
of natural law. However, O’Donovan claims, rightly, that this assumption 
“falsifies” the true nature of marriage.739 Augustine’s classic work, On the Good 
of Marriage,740 which has contributed considerably to the western church’s 
theology of marriage, places sexual intercourse within the wider context of 
 
739 Oliver O’ Donovan, Begotten or Made? (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), p. 77. 
740 Augustine of Hippo, On the Good of Marriage, 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1309.htm (accessed October 2019). 
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fidelity and natural association (societas) between man and woman and does 
not have a concept of sexual intercourse in marriage as a series of individual 
acts. In the light of Augustine’s approach, a more “natural” understanding of 
marriage is as an ongoing, loving relationship in its entirety, and not merely a 
series of individual sexual acts.  
With reference to the use of contraception, for many years, prior to the 
introduction of teaching on the so-called “rhythm method”, the official position of 
the Roman Catholic church was that, for married couples, abstinence was 
preferable to contracepted sex.741 Yet abstinence in marriage is as “unnatural” 
as the use of contraception and is probably not beneficial for the marriage 
relationship. It is reasonable to see how, in the light of the debate following the 
introduction of the contraceptive pill and the publication of Humanae Vitae, 
Bernard Häring concluded that, as a determinant of morality, biological 
functions could be subordinated to the good of the whole person, on the 
principle of integrity -  and the good of the whole community, on the principle of 
totality.742 On this basis, he argued that the use of the contraceptive pill should 
be acceptable to the Roman Catholic church on the principles of integrity and 
totality, if not on natural law grounds.  
In the medical context, there are complications even in determining which 
biological phenomena are truly natural, at all times and in all circumstances. 
The Roman Catholic church sees the manipulation of fertility as “unnatural” - but 
fertility itself is not a natural state for a woman at all times, and it is perfectly 
natural for a woman not to be fertile at the infertile times of the menstrual cycle, 
or after the menopause.   
The issue of defining what biological attributes and phenomena are “natural” will 
become increasingly problematic with the use of more radical biomedical 
 
741 The Roman Catholic church may have wanted to ensure that its teaching 
remained faithful to Augustine’s binary analysis of “marriage” versus 
“continence” (Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, 8), and were forced to place 
the use of contraception on the side of “continence” due to its implications for 
natural law.  
742 Bernard Häring, “New Dimensions of Responsible Parenthood”, Theological 
Studies, 37 (1976), pp. 120-132. 
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technologies. It will be especially problematic for technologies that are a) more 
invasive (for example, neural threads to enable digital connectivity of the brain), 
b) less tangible (for example, gene therapy) or c) where there is a high degree 
of low-level hybridisation (for example, the use of nanotechnology for surgery 
and cell repair). This is because, with these technologies, it will be hard to 
determine what is natural or unnatural simply by observation, or even by 
physicochemical analysis. 
From an ethical perspective, it will become more necessary than ever to regard 
the nature and biological function of the person as secondary and subordinate 
to the good of the whole person, and the welfare of the community, according to 
the ethical principle of totality. A biomedical technology may change human 
biological function, in relation to previous or “traditional” norms of biological 
function but could be permissible from a Christian perspective if it did not 
undermine the health and wellbeing of the whole person or compromise 
relationships, peace and justice in the community. Thus, for example, a new 
biomedical intervention that enabled human life expectancy to increase to two 
hundred years would have significant societal and cultural impact due to its 
effect on longevity, but if it did not affect the wellbeing of the whole person, or 
create injustices and imbalances in society (or if social policy were able to 
address such injustices and imbalances) it would not be problematic from a 
perspective of Christian ethics.  
As well as the problems of determining what is truly “natural”  in order to inform 
the application of biomedical technologies, there is the question about whether 
the concept of nature can ever be sufficient to deal with human ethical concerns 
from a perspective of Christian theological anthropology, an issue raised by the 
conclusion about natural law drawn by the Anglican Bishops at the 1958 
Lambeth Conference, that because of their self-transcendent nature, humans 
could not be wholly subject to natural law.  
Consequently, to ignore the fact that humans are self-transcendent by applying 
only natural law principles to ethical assessment of biomedical technologies, is 
to ignore a significant aspect of human experience – the way in which human 
beings are above nature and are seeking an understanding of the universe that 
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is beyond their natural selves. It is this capacity that enables a human being to 
perceive a transcendent God. On the contrary, transhumanist biomedical 
technologies enable a person to seek an artificial self-transcendence of their 
own making, rather than one achieved through relationship with the 
transcendent God.743 
A natural law approach to assessing therapies is also problematic when 
considering psychopharmacology and the reductionist biological model of 
depression. The biological model of depression in psychiatry described in the 
previous chapter – the idea that depressive illness is based entirely on organic 
phenomena (an imbalance of neurotransmitters in the brain) – suggests that a 
specific medical condition is rooted in a specific biological state. However, this 
biological state is not typical and is pathological, in that it causes disease and 
disorder. As a disorder, depression would not therefore be regarded as “natural” 
by natural law theorists, even though it might arise from biological processes. 
Biochemical factors are significant in the pathology of depression and, from a 
clinical perspective, cannot be completely discounted. However, both 
psychiatrists - for example, Healy 744 - and theologians - for example, Cole- 
Turner 745- maintain that disease states and therapeutics cannot be reduced 
entirely to biochemical factors.  
Therefore, biological factors - whether they are “natural” or not – cannot fully 
account for the phenomenon of depression, and its treatment. This highlights 
the limitations of natural law as a means of assessing the moral status of 
therapeutic interventions in mental health, such as SSRI antidepressants, and 
suggests that their use may be desirable for the alleviation of human suffering 
and promotion of flourishing, even though natural law moral objections might be 
raised about their use. This is analogous to Bernard Häring’s advocacy of 
contraception on the principle of totality, that the biological functions of the 
 
743 See Deane-Drummond’s critique of immortality as a result of secular 
eschatology (Deane-Drummond, Future Perfect? pp. 168-169)). 
744 Healy, Let Them Eat Prozac, pp. 255-260. 
745 Ronald Cole-Turner, “Towards a Theology for the Age of Biotechnology” in 
Beyond Cloning: Religion and the Remaking of Humanity, edited by Ronald 
Cole-Turner (Harrisburg PA: Trinity Press International, 2001), pp. 143-146.  
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person should be subordinated to the overall wellbeing of the person and the 
good of the whole community. 
An assumption often made with a reductionist approach to human biological 
attributes is that the person’s biological attributes determine their behaviour, 
and this undermines the idea of morality in human behaviour.746 This would 
suggest that a person’s ability to act as a moral agent in a self-determined, fully 
autonomous way is limited by their biological nature. However, I would argue 
that biological attributes simply represent one level at which an individual exists 
as a person in the world (although, as an individual, sentient being, their 
biological attributes will be internally consistent with their psychological 
capacities). Consequently, if autonomy is the ability to act with self-
determination, based on the authentic self – as I have defined it throughout this 
thesis – then the idea that a person’s “authentic self” might be the sum of their 
biological attributes is a secondary and derivative issue in relation to the 
person’s ability to exercise personal autonomy at a behavioural level, based on 
that authentic self.  
Both the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants, the two case studies in 
this thesis, have a range of biological actions which, at one level, exert their 
positive effects on the experience of the user and, at yet another level, exert 
their impact on human society. What has a greater impact on a person’s ability 
to act autonomously – and therefore on their moral agency – than “natural” 
biological attributes, is the influence of external factors that can radically 
undermine self-determination, such as drugs and other psychologically-effective 
biomedical technologies. 
Interestingly, Miravalle appeals to external factors in his argument for a natural 
law approach to the treatment of depression. In terms of Thomist psychology, 
Miravalle argues that the sorrow of depression is a “passion”, which is a 
reaction to an extrinsic evil. He argues that depression is therefore not in itself 
 
746 See Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historic and Contemporary 
Issues (London: SCM, 1998), pp. 80-81. 
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bad, because it is not the extrinsic evil.747 He argues that, in Thomist terms, 
sorrow is meant to elicit an action from the sufferer, and that the “urge to better 
one’s state of affairs ...is the telos of sorrow.”748 He concludes that sorrow 
should be used for good in life, rather than treated with drugs. The implication is 
that the person with depression is somehow responsible for their disease, a 
view that is at odds with contemporary attitudes to mental illness, and indeed to 
other “natural” phenomena - such as homosexual orientation or 
neurodevelopmental variants like autism – for which the individual would not 
necessarily be regarded as morally culpable. For this reason, the natural law-
based approach of Miravalle to the treatment of depression may not be 
appropriate in the context of either clinical therapy or pastoral ministry. 
Apart from the question of personal responsibility, the relationship between 
nature and moral value is complex when considering enhancement, as opposed 
to therapy. McNamee and Edwards state that one argument for use of 
biomedical technologies to enhance the human person to a certain standard is 
that, in a sense, it is fairer than accepting “natural” variations in bodily 
functions.749 However, this is only the case if all human beings are enhanced to 
the same baseline standard, which may not be easy to agree upon, or practical 
to implement. In any case, even if biomedical technology is used to enhance a 
person so that their bodily functions and attributes are “unnatural” by previous 
biological and social standards, this does not necessarily prevent that person 
from acting in a morally virtuous way.750 Conversely, a medical technology 
could be “natural”, in that it is aligned with natural bodily processes, but the 
moral value of its use could still be questionable - either because it is 
instrumentalist – a pragmatic intervention to a specific end, rather than 
 
747 John-Mark Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God: A Catholic Moral 
Perspective on Antidepressants (Chicago: University of Scranton Press, 2010), 
pp. 31-33. 
748 Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God, p. 40. 
749 McNamee and Edwards, “Transhumanism, medical technology and slippery 
slopes”, pp. 513-518. 
750 Ronald Bailey, “For Enhancing People”, in The Transhumanist Reader: 
Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology and 
Philosophy of the Post-Human Future, edited by Max More and Natasha Vita-
More (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), pp. 327-344. 
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something of innate moral value - or because it encourages an arrogant or 
hubristic attitude on the part of the user towards his fellow human beings, or the 
world’s resources. An example of this would be the use of anxiolytic agents as 
“chemical coshes” in agitated care home residents to sedate them for the 
convenience of the staff and the benefit of the service, rather than in the 
resident’s best interest. If biomedical technology were regularly applied to 
human beings in an instrumentalist manner, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 
earlier in this chapter, this would be bad as it would make personal autonomy 
and the exercise of the will routinely dependent on the effects of a biomedical 
technology, which could be deployed in society in an oppressive way. 
Furthermore, as described, a key issue with instrumentalist application of 
biomedical technologies at a personal level is that it short-circuits the process of 
insight, reflection and deliberation that should properly underlie the 
development of moral agency.  
Nevertheless, although human nature cannot be entirely reduced to biological 
factors, it is biologically grounded, as seen in the biological model of 
depression. In his discussion of transhumanism and natural law, Hopkins 
contends that even transhumanists think that human nature is biologically 
grounded, or there would be no “basic” human nature to enhance.751 
Nevertheless, both the therapeutic case studies in this thesis indicate that social 
and cultural factors, not just biological factors, are important when considering 
the benefits of a medical technology for human life and flourishing. The benefits 
of the contraceptive pill on human flourishing are not just related to its biological 
effects on the individual woman’s fertility, but its derivative effects on sexual 
relationships, family life and the role of women in society. The benefits of 
Prozac on human flourishing are not just related to its biological effects on an 
individual’s mood, but its derivative effects on their motivation and relationships.  
Looking at the benefits of these therapies from an ethical perspective, the 
Roman Catholic church and its moralists have argued that with previous 
therapeutic developments - the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants, the 
 
751 Hopkins, “Is enhancement worthy of being a right?”, p. 351. 
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two case studies presented here – the use of these technologies is immoral 
primarily because natural law has been contravened. However, I have 
demonstrated in the case studies that there are other ethical benefits 
associated with the use of these technologies. Use of the contraceptive pill can 
lead to ethical goods such as planned pregnancy, stable family life, improved 
health and welfare, especially for women, and more equitable sexual 
relationships. These benefits have been described at length in the literature 
since the development of the contraceptive pill.752 Similarly, use of SSRI 
antidepressants can lead to ethical goods of the relief of depression, and 
improvement of human function and quality of life – and, significantly, the lifting 
of the socio-economic burden associated with depression. Again, the potential 
benefits of the use of antidepressants have been described extensively in the 
literature.753 I would acknowledge that the ethical benefits in both cases are 
derived either from the anecdotal evidence of historians and commentators – for 
example, Elaine May with the contraceptive pill or Peter Kramer with SSRI 
antidepressants 754 - or from the interpretation of economic studies in the case 
of SSRI antidepressants and their benefits for the poor,755 rather than direct 
observation. Nevertheless, these ethical benefits have indeed been identified 
and discussed in the literature since these medicines were first marketed. Yet 
the Roman Catholic church still prohibits these medical interventions on natural 
law grounds, despite the ethical benefits of both interventions, which have been 
identified during the years since they were first introduced.  
The natural law approach to ethical evaluation used with previous medical 
technologies, as has been the standard treatment by the Roman Catholic 
church, represents only one possible approach for ethical evaluation of 
 
752 For a good summary, see Thatcher, God, Sex and Gender, pp. 211-220.  
753 Aron Halfin, “Depression: The Benefits of Early and Appropriate Treatment”, 
American Journal of Managed Care, 13 (2007), pp. S92-S97. 
754 Elaine Tyler May, America and the Pill: A History of Promise, Peril and 
Liberation (New York: Basic Books, 2010), pp. 50-80; Kramer, Listening to 
Prozac, pp. 1-21. 
755 See especially Julie Donoghue and Harold Pincus, “Reducing the societal 
burden of depression: a review of economic costs, quality of care and effects of 
treatment”, Pharmacoeconomics, 25 (2007), pp. 7-24. 
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biomedical technologies. However, during the years of the therapeutic 
revolution (1950-1990), there have been very few attempts by non-Roman 
Catholic ethicists to formulate an ethic of medical therapeutics that is not based 
on natural law principles, and yet is explicitly Christian in character, as opposed 
to the prevailing secular bioethics. 
There are some notable exceptions. Anglican theologian Oliver O’Donovan 
explored the distinction between person and artifice in the application of 
reproductive technologies, in his 1984 publication, Begotten, Not Made.756 In 
the early 1980s, the Anglican medical ethicist, Gordon Dunstan, made a 
theological case for downgrading the moral status of the early foetus, appealing 
to Aquinas’s view that the foetus was not endowed with a soul until it was fully 
formed.757 Although Dunstan’s work does not relate directly to therapeutics, and 
has since been contested by Jones, on both theological and scientific 
grounds,758 it was nevertheless influential in the deliberations of the Warnock 
Committee in 1984.759 In Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics, Neil Messer, a 
theologian of the United Reformed Church, examines six issues that arise from 
a Christian critique of evolutionary biology, using relevant Christian doctrines, 
such as creation and Christology, to develop the dialogue.760 The overall 
concept that Messer explores is the possibility that human beings can redesign 
themselves with biomedical technology. Arising from this, Messer formulates 
the four diagnostic questions that could be used to assess the acceptability of a 
 
756 O’ Donovan, Begotten or Made? p. 77. 
757 Gordon Dunstan, “The moral status of the human embryo: a tradition 
recalled”, Journal of Medical Ethics, 10 (1984), pp. 38-44. 
758 David Jones, “Dunstan, the Embryo and Christian Tradition,” Journal of 
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759 Mary Warnock (Chair), “Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology”, 1984, 
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760 See Neil Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics: Theological and 
Ethical Reflections on Evolutionary Biology (London: SCM, 2007), pp. 1-6, and 
review by Southgate (Christopher Southgate, “Book Review: Neil Messer, 
Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics: Theological and Ethical Reflections on 
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biotechnological project from a perspective of Christian ethics, and which are 
used as one of the sets of criteria for evaluation of a transhumanist biomedical 
technology in this thesis. 
As discussed in this section, and in Chapters 3 and 4 in relation to the case 
studies, the application of natural law theory in medicine is potentially 
problematic. Furthermore, the case studies demonstrate that, not only have 
cultural factors influenced the development of these therapeutic interventions, 
the effects of these therapies on individual human beings, and collectively on 
human society, have had profound cultural implications. Cultural factors and 
assumptions are therefore closely linked with perceptions of the effects of a 
medical technology on nature and these factors will influence natural law-based 
ethical assessments of biomedical technologies. It may be difficult to remove 
cultural aspects completely from any natural law-based ethical assessment of a 
biomedical technology, but they must at least be accounted for.  
The case studies also demonstrate the importance of personal autonomy in the 
adoption of readily accessible medical technologies. Both the contraceptive pill 
and Prozac have become widely used because individual people have been 
willing to use them to improve their health and quality of life, irrespective of the 
wishes of healthcare practitioners, or the public health priorities of the state. 
When a medical technology is readily accessible and can be used universally, 
personal autonomy becomes a significant factor in whether a technology is 
used in a widespread manner in human society and is able to fully exert its 
effects on that society. In a scientific and healthcare context, considerations 
about the nature of a biomedical technology are of lesser significance. In this 
situation, therefore, whether or not a technology can be used with autonomy 
and the effects of the technology on autonomy have a greater influence on the 
question of whether the technology is ethically good than any arguments 
derived solely from the effects of the technology on human nature.  
There are also concerns with natural law that arise from human embodiment. I 
argued in Chapter 2 that, historically, embodiment has been regarded as a 
significant aspect of human life in Christian doctrine. If human life is – and 
should be - biological, then there is an essential human nature, which is 
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grounded in biological features. There are some things that a human being 
simply cannot be, by virtue of the properties of the material from which he or 
she is made. There are therefore features of humanity that can serve as a 
baseline prior to the application of any biomedical technology. However, it is 
increasingly clear scientifically that this essential human nature may be 
biologically grounded, but it is by no means absolute. There is an extent to 
which the definition of human nature is arbitrary and can be manipulated by 
social and cultural factors. 
Consequently, the influence of society and culture is of increasing significance 
in discussions about standards for enhancement. Therefore, such standards 
should be owned publicly and be part of public discourse, rather than being a 
technical or commercial endeavour. This would be reflected in public policy; 
Wolbring has argued that policy-makers should agree basal levels of human 
function, to develop an equitable framework for the regulation of enhancement 
technologies.761 So, while at present, public health policy decisions are 
concerned with preventive medicine and basic standards of human living, in 
future they might encompass basic standards for human function and 
capacities. This would then inform the activities of the health and care service, 
which are currently often reactive rather than proactive. Such an approach 
would align well with the increased significance that both human rights and 
distributive justice have had in medical ethics in more recent years.762 
Nevertheless, such an approach may be controversial from a Christian 
perspective because it shifts responsibility for the definition of human nature 
from Christian authorities – scripture and tradition – to the secular state, where 
it may well be subject to political manipulation or ideological influences that are 
anti-religious in nature.  
Nature, and what is natural, are therefore relative, not absolute, measures for 
the evaluation of enhancement technologies. As noted above in relation to the 
 
761 Gregor Wolbring, “Nanotechnology and the Transhumanization of Health, 
Medicine, and Rehabilitation”, Controversies in Science and Technology, 3 
(2010), pp. 290-303. 
762 Mark Jackson, The History of Medicine: A Beginner’s Guide (London: 
Oneworld, 2014), p. 171. 
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case studies, cultural factors exercise an influence on how both human nature 
and medical technologies are perceived and will therefore be influential on any 
natural law-based ethical assessment. Furthermore, future radical biomedical 
technologies – if widely distributed - may themselves change attributes that 
were previously regarded as natural. With this relative view of nature, other 
ethical benefits of a biomedical technology, regardless of its status under 
natural law, become more significant. In her critique of transhumanism, As 
stated previously, Celia Deane-Drummond notes that debates about naturalism 
are often counter-productive, and that nature should not be conflated with 
spiritual considerations,763 and Shapiro notes that the question of how natural 
an enhancement is may be a good entry point into the discussion, but it cannot 
constitute the whole discussion.764  
Natural law has had a long and venerable history in Christian moral thinking. It 
appeals primarily to reason, rather than to Christian revelation (or flawed 
interpretation of that revelation), and the universalist claim of natural law, 
regardless of culture and religious tradition, is therefore appealing. It also offers 
universal applicability and works on the basis that every rational human being 
has innate moral capacity (although this equally could be derived from the 
imago Dei). Consequently, natural law, with its reliance on observation and 
reason alone aligns very well with post-Enlightenment rationalism and provides 
a point of contact between modern ethics and an earlier Christian tradition. This 
may account for its persistence in Roman Catholic moral thought into the 20th 
century, and into the era of medical technology challenges on which this thesis 
focuses. Indeed, with its alignment with rationalism and its emphasis on the 
virtuous life of a creature according to its nature, natural law might, at first sight, 
 
763 Celia Deane-Drummond, Theology and Biotechnology: Implications for a 
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764 Michael Shapiro, “Performance Enhancement and Legal Theory” in The 
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seem to be a valuable means of ethical assessment of the benefits of modern 
medical science.  
However, because biomedical technologies are able to change a person’s 
nature, determining a person’s nature, and thus the good moral ends arising 
from that nature, is becoming an increasingly elusive goal, and this is why 
natural law is increasingly problematic for evaluation of biomedical 
technologies. There are two important contributing factors to this, which can be 
seen in the case studies presented in Chapter 3 and 4. First, there is an 
increasing awareness of different cultural factors and assumptions that 
surround and affect the use of medical technology, which detract from an 
understanding of the effects of the medical technology on the nature of the 
person to whom it is applied. Second, there is the dominance of the will in 
modern healthcare, as elsewhere in modern society. Experience with the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants has shown that citizens are willing 
to use medical technologies at their own convenience and for their own benefit 
so, in future, citizens may be willing to apply radical, highly-invasive 
technologies, which have the potential to make profound alternations to their 
nature with relative speed and ease. .  
In addition, natural law has been closely linked with the moral theology of the 
Roman Catholic church, which arguably has been discredited in modern 
society, despite the wisdom of some of its insights, because of the church’s 
intransigent position on contraception.765 Furthermore, the contemporary world 
is postmodern and has a lower view of authority than in previous centuries – 
especially that of the church. The contemporary world is also post-
foundationalist, and the evaluation of human dilemmas is not bound up with 
particular epistemic positions or a priori ideological commitments in the same 
way that it used to be. Consequently, the sole use of a natural law ethical 
approach to new biomedical technologies will not meet the current needs and 
expectations of the world’s citizens. 
 
765 Thatcher, God, Sex and Gender, pp. 211-212. 
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I would contend, therefore, that natural law may provide an initial approach to 
understanding the ethical implications of medical technologies, but it cannot be 
the basis for a full and thoroughgoing ethical evaluation of such technologies – 
either for therapy or for enhancement – in the context of a late modern or post-
modern society. As Shapiro has suggested, a natural law discussion might 
provide an entry point into an ethical analysis. Such a discussion would 
highlight assumptions about nature, identify cultural factors and enable a 
greater understanding of exactly how the technology interacts with the human 
body to exert its effect. But both case studies show that, because of other non-
natural law based ethical factors, a fuller Christian ethical analysis of a 
biomedical technology requires more than just a natural law treatment. 
I therefore contend that ethical evaluation of biomedical technologies should not 
be restricted to a natural law-based approach, such as that which has 
dominated the Roman Catholic responses to both the contraceptive pill and 
SSRI antidepressants in the past. Instead, a range of ethical methodologies 
should be used for a more comprehensive approach to the ethical evaluation of 
new biomedical technologies. Such an approach would need to account for 
ethical issues such as equity of access to, and use of, technologies and a 
consideration of the goods of life that medical technology should support or 
enable.  
A comprehensive approach to therapeutic ethics would be more holistic, and 
therefore more in line with the current holistic approach to healthcare. 
Moreover, a broader approach to the ethics of biomedical therapies would, in 
fact, be consistent with the Roman Catholic ethical principle of integrity, that 
people should act consistently in all areas of human life; and also that of totality, 
that moral decision-making should take into account the flourishing of the whole 
community, not just the individual. This could encompass all kinds of healthcare 
ethical decisions, from those that are essentially clinical or scientific to those 
that are concerned more with culture and social convention. Such a holistic 
approach might be supported by many Christian medical ethicists from 
Protestant traditions, but also by some Roman Catholic medical ethicists. 
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Other ethical approaches which might be used include consequentialist ethics 
or virtue ethics, which examine respectively the consequences of use of the 
technology or the character of the user, rather than just the nature of the 
technology. Modern, secular bioethics has typically tended towards ethical 
decision-making based on consequentialism or situationism,766 with its 
questions of cost utility and cost benefit. However, the consequences of 
implementation of the technology may not all be negative, as these case studies 
of past therapeutic developments demonstrate. 
Nevertheless, the role of human virtue in the ethical assessment of biomedical 
technologies is relatively unexplored. In his classic book After Virtue, Alasdair 
MacIntyre appeals to the renewal of the classic Aristotelian tradition of moral 
virtue in the face of the negative impact of Nietzschean existentialism on 
modern ethics, and the inability of modern ethical theories such as 
consequentialism to address the so-called “existential turn”,767 where the 
incommensurability of the experience of human existence seems to 
overshadow any attempts to make value judgements on human life using 
ethics.  
Virtue has a potential important application in medical ethics – and therefore in 
future biomedical enhancement ethics – because it acts as a counterbalance to 
consequentialism and focuses instead on the qualities and attributes of the 
actors, rather than the materials, the situation and the social context.768 Indeed, 
a virtue ethics approach emphasises the importance of virtue in the good ends 
of human life, as natural law does, but without the problems that arise from the 
use of natural law in the technological world. Indeed, there has been a growing 
interest in the role of virtue in contemporary medical ethics. For example, in his 
advocacy of virtue ethics in modern medicine, Peter Gardner asserts that the 
virtues of the practitioner – and their attention to the human motivations, 
emotional sensitivities and relationships involved in the scenario – are able to 
 
766 Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and David Henry, "Ethics and Evidence-Based 
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767 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981), pp. 256-263. 
768 For discussion and worked example, see Neil Messer, SCM Study Guide: 
Christian Ethics (London: SCM, 2006), pp. 121-140. 
278 
 
provide a fuller ethical analysis of any medical dilemma, and to lead to more 
creative ethical solutions than the usual appeals to either consequentialism or 
principlism (the idea that all scenarios in medicine can be evaluated ethically 
using principles).769 
To conclude this section, I have argued that, despite the long-standing role of 
natural law in Christian ethics, a natural law-based ethical evaluation of medical 
technology is, on its own, deficient for the evaluation of proposed future 
transhumanist biomedical technologies. Natural law has not helped to present a 
full picture of the ethical status of past cases of therapeutics, so is unlikely to be 
fit for purpose when more radical, high-tech medical technologies become 
available in future. A wider ethical framework is needed for the evaluation of 
such technologies and, in answering the proposed research questions, this 
thesis aims to lay down the foundations for such a framework.  
5.3.3. Embodiment 
As discussed in the two case study chapters (Chapters 3 and 4), both the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants exert their positive effects through 
beneficial actions on the human body. Indeed, given the broad survey of the 
therapeutic revolution in Chapter 1, the entire project of pharmacological 
therapeutics to date has been linked with the necessity of human embodiment. 
Consequently, future transhumanist technologies which would negate the 
human body – for example, mind uploading - would not only be problematic in 
respect of Christian beliefs about the significance of the material human body, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, they would also be a significant departure from the 
trajectory of progress in medical science to date. 
The effects of the contraceptive pill have not been regarded in a wholly positive 
light from a perspective of embodiment; for example, Jutte has claimed from a 
feminist perspective that the use of the contraceptive pill has “disembodied” 
women, in that it has denigrated their bodily value by rendering their bodies 
 
769 Peter Gardiner, "A virtue ethics approach to moral dilemmas in medicine", 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 29 (2003), pp. 297-302. 
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solely objects for male sexual desire,770 when, in fact, proper desire should be 
for the whole person, not just their physical body.  
As discussed, both the previous therapies described in the case studies have 
had considerable benefits for humanity, which may be regarded as ethical 
goods of human life. The “un-natural” effect of these therapies on the body – 
that they are synthetic “artificial” substances that interfere with the body’s 
“natural” functions - is a relatively small factor in the overall ethical picture of the 
impact of these therapies, whether positively, in terms of benefits on human life 
and flourishing, or negatively, in terms of possible deficits in terms of equitable 
distribution and coercion in their use. Furthermore, the “un-natural” nature of 
these previous therapies is insignificant indeed, compared to proposed future 
transhumanist technologies which would be radically disembodying, such as 
mind uploading, which would be the ultimate in “unnatural” interventions. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, from a Christian ethical perspective, embodiment is 
an important, and probably necessary, prerequisite for human flourishing, 
because it is the ground for authentic human experience and identity. The more 
marginalised the human body is from human personhood, the less applicable 
the medical ethical principles and methods which have been developed to date 
will be to the evaluation of more radical future biomedical technologies. This is 
because these principles are largely predicated on the biological body as the 
object of therapeutics and medical interventions.  
Apart from potential biomedical technologies which completely disembody the 
human person, such as mind uploading, there are various medical technologies 
that are “in between” full embodiment and complete disembodiment, such as 
cybernetic organs, prostheses, and implanted devices. Such technologies turn a 
fully biological human being into a hybrid or cyborg. Elaine Graham has claimed 
that, in purely technological terms, hybridisation is not a new concept, and that 
humans have always been “mixed up” with their technologies.771 Katherine 
Hayles, in her study of the cyborg discussed in Chapter 2, rejects the idea of the 
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disembodied mind but she highlights the fact that the hybridised person – 
composed of both human tissues and synthetic materials – has important 
ontological implications for what it means to be human.772 These implications, in 
turn, have potential political consequences concerning personal identity and 
status in society. 
This is not an issue with either of the case studies in this thesis, or even with 
some current inert prosthetic organs or other components, because these 
technologies are relatively limited and focused in their effects, but it may 
become an issue in future with the use of more extensive and sophisticated 
cybernetic technologies. This suggests that manipulation of the body is only one 
aspect of the impact of biomedical technological intervention, and that the 
technical ability to manipulate and adapt the human body should not be 
deployed without corresponding evaluation of the ethical impact of such 
manipulation on the individual person and on the society of which the person is 
part. Once again, the role of public policy in the regulation and management of 
technology adoption is highlighted as being important because this accounts for 
the needs of all citizens and the resources available. 
5.3.4. Imago Dei 
Exactly how humans bear the image of God is an important element of a 
Christian understanding of what it means to be human, and for this reason, the 
imago Dei has been explored as the key to human distinctiveness, both in the 
light of modern evolutionary biology,773 and in the light of possible future 
artificial intelligence.774 As introduced in Chapter 2, there has been much 
debate about how the scriptural motif of the imago Dei should be understood, 
and four broad approaches have been proposed – substantive, functional, 
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relational and eschatological.775 These are all interlinked theologically and are 
all important in providing a comprehensive, rounded account of human life in 
theological anthropology. A major criticism of radical transhumanist 
technologies, such as mind-uploading  or genetic enhancement, is that, in terms 
of their assumptions about human life, they reflect a substantive view of the 
imago Dei, because of their emphasis on human attributes and individualism, 
and they downplay functional or relational understandings of human life. 
However, the two therapeutic case studies presented in this thesis - the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants - have ethical implications for 
human life that are consistent with a functional – or vocational – and a relational 
view of human life and vocation. The effects of these two previous medical 
technologies on human life are therefore more consistent with a comprehensive 
understanding the imago Dei as described in the current literature than the likely 
effects on human life of proposed future technologies, which emphasise a 
substantive approach to the imago Dei, at the expense of the other approaches. 
Strikingly, this is despite the wholescale effects on society that have been 
observed since the introduction of these medicines, effects that give them the 
appearance of transhumanist technologies, so often suspect in the view of 
Christian theological ethicists. 
For future biomedical technologies, it will be important to assess their effects on 
human lives – individually and corporately – to ensure they will not undermine 
any aspect of humanity that is important for the imago Dei. Future biomedical 
technologies may certainly enhance human attributes – for example, intellect, 
creativity ability or aesthetic capacity – and thus support a largely substantive 
view of the imago Dei. According to Kramer and advocates of cosmetic 
psychopharmacology, SSRI antidepressant use for personality enhancement 
already enhances some human attributes, such as intelligence and mental 
acuity. Depending on future scientific discoveries, such psychopharmacological 
enhancements might also eventually include more “spiritual” attributes, such as 
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self-transcendence and awareness of God. In either case, in future, people will 
want biomedical technologies as enhancements, precisely for the attributes they 
confer.  
But the question for future biomedical technologies will be whether application 
of the technology will enable a person to conform to other aspects of the imago 
Dei, as the theological literature has understood it to date. First, will the 
biomedical technology affect relationships in human society? Will it affect either 
the extent and quality of interpersonal relationships, the distribution of 
communities or the cohesion of society at a regional, national or international 
level? Some neural and psychological enhancements may have benefits for the 
quality of relationships, but any technology that facilitates extreme individualism 
and inappropriate use of personal autonomy to oppress and exploit other 
people is likely to have a negative effect on relationships. 
Second, will the biomedical technology affect human functioning in the imago 
Dei sense of a human person being able to fulfil the vocation to which God has 
called them in the world? While a functional approach to the imago Dei is about 
human vocation rather than about biological/physical functioning of the human 
body, nevertheless human bodily function in an embodied world is a necessary 
pre-requisite of vocational flourishing, as highlighted in the discussion about 
SSRI antidepressants in Chapter 4. Vocational flourishing may be horizontal or 
vertical in direction – towards the world or towards God. It may be about an 
individual fulfilling their unique purpose in what they do with their time and 
talents to serve the world, or it may be about their worship and prayer and their 
willingness to serve God in the world. In either situation, relationships are also 
involved with vocational function. Many enhancements of biological and mental 
function may assist a person in fulfilling their vocational function, but some 
technologies may enhance some aspects of human (biological) function at the 
expense of others, and these might interfere with a person’s vocational function. 
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Another concern with transhumanism related to the imago Dei is that of idolatry, 
an issue that been discussed by J. Wentzel van Huyssteen.776 The application 
of radical biomedical technology of human devising to a human person 
potentially makes that person and their attributes idols – artefacts that are 
worshipped instead of God. This is essentially the concern expressed by 
O’Donovan, where an enhanced individual becomes an artefact that has been 
engineered, rather than a personal subject. 777  There is therefore a sense in 
which the enhanced person is no longer made in the image of God, but in their 
own image, according their own will; Noreen Herzfeld discusses this concept of 
imago hominis in her work on the implications of computer artificial intelligence 
for the imago Dei.778  
This notion of idolatry can be identified with the application of the two 
therapeutic technologies in the case studies. Because the contraceptive pill 
enables women to have control over their fertility, this in turn allows them to 
control other aspects of their lives – for example, their sexual life, relationships 
or career. These aspects of life may assume increased significance for the 
person and could lead to a situation where the person “worships” their lifestyle, 
as an idol, instead of God. Also, as discussed in Chapter 3, a feminist critique of 
the contraceptive pill is that it contributes to the objectification of women – it can 
make a woman’s body (rather than her whole self) the object of a man’s desire, 
making her an “idol” to him. Similarly, when used for cosmetic 
psychopharmacology, SSRI antidepressants can manipulate and control the 
personality, which may lead to the user becoming preoccupied with their 
personality traits in an inward-looking, individualistic, self-centred way. This 
might detract from an awareness of God and a willingness to serve him in the 
world, in a way that is idolatrous.  
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As discussed in Chapter 2, several theologians - for example, Elaine Graham, 
Celia Deane-Drummond and Peter Manley Scott 779 - take the view that 
creatureliness cannot be separated from technology. Indeed, Graham contends 
that human beings enact the imago Dei when they engage in technological 
innovation, and that human beings have always been hybridised – mixed in – 
with the technologies they use.780 In addition, as we have noted, Hefner 
proposes the notion of the human being as “created co-creator” i.e. that human 
beings have the agency to bring about a good future from their current 
nature.781 The inevitability of the interplay between human life and technology in 
a technological world, as suggested by these theologians, is at odds with the 
idea that biomedical technology is needed to complete a “deficient” imago Dei in 
humanity because of the difficulty of identifying the “deficiency” and the effects 
of technology when the relationship between human life and technology is so 
intricate.  
The key issue here is the status of the unenhanced human being. If all humanity 
undeniably bears the image of God now – however that might be understood – 
then a biomedical technology (past or future) could be understood as a potential 
enhancement of the imago Dei, so that the person more clearly bears the imago 
Dei, rather than a remedy that is needed to complete a deficient imago Dei, or 
to rectify a flawed imago Dei, at the current time. For a person to bear more 
clearly the imago Dei, then substantive, functional and relational aspects of the 
imago Dei will be more clearly identifiable in that person’s life, but there will also 
be an eschatological element – that the person is more directed towards a 
future life that glorifies God. This will be seen in how the technology affects the 
person’s ability to make good ethical decisions about their life, and to use their 
life in the service of God and the world. This move towards a future life that 
 
779 Graham, “In Whose Image?”, pp. 68-69; Celia Deane-Drummond, Theology 
and Biotechnology: Implications for a New Science, (London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1997), p. 93; ; Peter Manley Scott, Anti-Human Theology: Nature, 
Technology and the Post-Natural (London: SCM, 2010), p. 93. 
780 Graham, “In Whose Image?”, pp. 68-69. 
781 Hefner, The Human Factor, p. 27. 
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glorifies God is analogous to the increase in Christlikeness as the believer is 
transformed by the Holy Spirit and filled with the virtuous gifts of the Holy Spirit.  
As pharmacological therapies, the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants 
are technologies that are hybridised with the human body, in that they exert 
their good effects in and through the body. I have argued already that both can 
have a positive effect on the functional (vocational) and relational aspects of 
human life. The case studies indicate that both these technologies have the 
potential to enable their users to make good decisions from a Christian 
perspective. The contraceptive pill has the potential to help couples to exercise 
responsibility concerning family planning, lifestyles and careers, and therefore 
have the potential to strengthen relationships. SSRI antidepressants have the 
potential to give people increased personal confidence and strengthen positive 
personality traits, which have the potential to enhance the person’s interaction 
with the world in a good way. 
Similarly, future enhancements such as laser eye surgery or a cybernetic arm 
may improve function and experience of biological life (although they may be 
associated with other ethical issues) but the important question from a Christian 
perspective will be the extent to which these enhancements support – or 
undermine – an eschatological trajectory, a Godward approach to life; in other 
words the development of the relationship with God and the Christ-like 
character, and the sense in which humans are proceeding to a shared destiny 
provided by God. 
This project evaluates the biomedical technologies – past and future – 
according to Neil Messer’s diagnostic questions of a biotechnology project, one 
of which is: is the project an attempt to be like God, or does it conform to the 
image of God? 782  When future, transhumanist biomedical technologies, such 
as mind-uploading, cybernetics and cryonics, are evaluated against this 
question then, as discussed in Chapter 2, the concerns expressed by 
theologians seem to be warranted. Transhumanist biomedical technologies do 
 
782 Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics, p. 231. 
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indeed seem to be individualistic, concerned only with the attributes of the 
individual person. They do indeed seem to provide an alternative eschatology to 
that of Christian belief, one which is over-realised and does not address human 
moral responsibility and the reality of sin.  
Transhumanist technologies affect human functioning in society, and so it might 
be supposed that this has a bearing on the functional approach to the imago 
Dei. However, the effects of these technologies on human function serve only 
the individual to whom the technology has been applied, with no concept of the 
individual’s vocation as God’s agent in the created world as a whole, which is 
the central component of a functional account of the imago Dei.  
When considering the contraceptive pill, the answer to Messer’s question about 
whether the technology is an attempt to be like God, or whether it conforms to 
the image of God, is rather more nuanced. In the control that it affords the user 
over their menstrual cycle, fertility and family planning, and thereby on their 
marriage, family and working life, the pill does indeed have far-reaching effects, 
and could be used to enable users to manipulate their fertility - and their lifestyle 
- and to be “like God” in terms of the control they exercise over a natural aspect 
of human biological life. This contradicts the notion of divine order in human life, 
which underpins the Roman Catholic Church’s natural law objections to 
hormonal contraception. In this respect, the contraceptive pill resembles a 
proposed future transhumanist technology. However, it should be noted that 
while the pill can interrupt the fertility process, it does not change or abolish the 
process. If the pill is discontinued, then conception and birth still take place in 
the same (natural) way afterwards, despite the use of the pill. On the contrary, 
some of the most radical transhumanist technological interventions – for 
example, mind uploading and cybernetic implants – appear to be, to all intents 
and purposes, irreversible. The effects of transhumanist technologies on human 
life are therefore likely to have more radical implications for the imago Dei in 
humanity than past therapeutic developments.  
As discussed earlier, human life for people enhanced with proposed future 
transhumanist technological developments is individualistic and focused on 
human attributes. It therefore reflects a largely substantive view of the imago 
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Dei, and an alternative, privatised eschatology to that offered by the Christian 
hope. However, while the contraceptive pill does indeed affect certain human 
attributes – namely the ability to become pregnant, and also positive effects on 
human metabolism – its effects have different implications for the way humans 
image God. As argued in Chapter 3, the contraceptive pill has some potentially 
beneficial effects on marriage, family and society, and these social effects of the 
pill are consistent with a relational imago Dei in humanity, where the imago Dei 
is grounded in human relationality, with God and with each other. Furthermore, 
the imago Dei envisaged by the positive effects of the contraceptive pill – most 
notably, greater equality and mutuality in the marriage relationship - counteracts 
previous feminist criticisms that formulation of the imago Dei has, in the past, 
had androcentric tendencies.783 Indeed, the impact of the contraceptive pill on 
human relationships at all levels – in marriage, family and society - downplays 
an imago Dei that is overly focused on human attributes. 
The answer to Messer’s question (being like God or conforming to the image of 
God) is similar for SSRI antidepressants, as for the contraceptive pill - and 
again, is distinct from future transhumanist biomedical technologies. Cosmetic 
psychopharmacology, as envisaged by Peter Kramer and supporters of the 
“Prozac phenomenon”, is where the person has the ability to remould their 
personality and change the kind of person they are at their own instigation, by 
technological means. This would be a more radical means of personality 
change than, for example, counselling or personal development, and would be 
applied with greater control and will power, so could be seen as an attempt to 
be like God. This probably underpins John-Mark Miravalle’s objection to Prozac 
and SSRI antidepressants as a sole therapy for depression on natural law 
grounds.784 However, because the effect of SSRI antidepressants on the human 
being – personality alteration – is more subtle than that of the contraceptive pill 
on fertility, the effects of SSRI antidepressants are harder to identify or control 
 
783 Mary McClintock Fulkerson, “Contesting the Gendered Subject: A Feminist 
Account of the Imago Dei”, in Horizons in Feminist Theology: Identity, Traditions 
and Norms, edited by Rebecca Chopp and Sheila Davaney (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1997), pp. 99-115. 
784 Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God, p. 55. 
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than the pill, and may therefore be more far-reaching than expected. 
Nevertheless, like the contraceptive pill, the use of SSRI antidepressants 
supports human life and flourishing in a way that is consistent with a 
comprehensive understanding of the imago Dei, rather than one which only has 
substantive attributes in view and in which the eschatological dimension has 
been undermined. This is due to the positive effects of SSRI antidepressants on 
human relationships, as described by Kramer,785 and their ability to restore 
biological function in those debilitated with severe depression. These, in turn, 
have positive effects on an individual’s ability to engage with the world, and to 
exercise a vocation of service to God in the world, which would be the 
outworking of a functional approach to the imago Dei.  
There are two caveats here. First, the clinical data concerns restoration of 
biological and mental function in patients with depression but does not extend to 
objective functional improvement in otherwise healthy individuals who might use 
SSRI antidepressants for personality enhancement. Nevertheless, such 
functional improvements can be inferred from Kramer’s clinical vignettes, for 
example the use of SSRI antidepressants giving patients the confidence and 
self-esteem to tackle negativity and problems in their lives, or to make a positive 
contribution in their professional life and communities.786 The positive impact of 
a person’s life and activities on their community and professional contexts links 
clearly with the vocational concept at the heart of the functional approach to the 
imago Dei. Second, improvements in functional ability and relational capacity 
may not necessarily lead to the spiritual response that might be expected in a 
person who reflects different aspects of the imago Dei. A spiritual response 
might be defined in the following terms: as flourishing, generous and realistic 
relationships with oneself and with other human beings, which reflect both a rich 
and vital relationship with God, and a functioning that is concerned with living 
out a divinely given vocation for humanity of service in the world (which the 
interpretation of the functional imago Dei as a “royal representative” would 
 
785 Peter Kramer, Listening to Prozac (New York/London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 2, 
28, 94, 267. 
786 Kramer, Listening to Prozac, pp. 2, 28, 94, 267. 
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entail). Whether or not an individual has true autonomy, they still have 
responsibility for how they live their life in relation to God and to his Kingdom, 
when “enhanced” with an SSRI antidepressant. Nevertheless, improvement in 
functional ability and relational capacity have the potential to support human 
flourishing because they are themselves goods of human wholeness and 
integrity. 
Having considered these four theological domains of autonomy, nature, 
embodiment and the imago Dei in detail, I conclude that these are the four 
areas in which the permissibility and desirability of medical technologies – past 
or future – should be assessed, to understand their impact on the goods of 
human life from a Christian ethical perspective. I have shown that “nature” is 
part of this assessment process, but it is insufficient on its own, most 
significantly because it cannot properly address the claim of transhumanists that 
nature is “unfinished” and therefore needs radical technological intervention, 
and also because it excludes social and cultural issues and benefits with 
technology use. In a technological world, where nature is less significant 
because of its malleability, personal autonomy in decision-making about 
technology assumes a correspondingly greater significance, and good public 
policy is needed to negotiate equity issues with technology use at a societal 
level. Human embodiment is important because the more marginalised the 
human body is from human personhood, the less applicable the medical ethical 
principles and methods which have been developed to date will be to the 
evaluation of more radical biomedical technologies in future. Finally, the imago 
Dei analysis of new biomedical technologies will help with an understanding of 
the eschatological implications of those technologies, which may be significant if 
the technologies are irreversible or highly invasive. This is important given the 
critique that, compared with the Christian destiny envisaged by an 
eschatological approach to the imago Dei, transhumanist biomedical 
developments present an alternative, realised, self-centred eschatology instead.  
Consequently, consideration of all four domains together provide the basis for a 
more detailed and nuanced ethical evaluation of previous medical therapies, 
developed during the “therapeutic revolution” years of the twentieth century, and 
will provide an adequate framework for the medical ethical evaluation of future, 
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transhumanist biomedical enhancements. Such a framework can be used for 
those technologies currently envisaged but not technically feasible - for example 
mind-uploading or cryonics – but it could also be used proactively for those 
technologies which have not yet been thought of.  
5.4. Question 2: To what extent were the past therapeutic developments, in 
their time, transhumanist technologies? 
In Chapter 1, I stated that pharmaceutical medicine in the second half of the 
twentieth century made “stirring advances.”787 However, some of these 
advances were not simply medical advances, which could improve individual 
lives, but were scientific advances that had implications for the whole of society. 
From the time in the early twentieth century when Lorand and the 
organotherapists first perceived the far-reaching biological effects of hormonal 
therapy,788 pharmaceutical medicine has entertained the possibility of radically 
changing the quality, conventions and experience of human life. As noted 
previously, David Healy has remarked on the potential of both the contraceptive 
pill and psychopharmacology to bring about largescale social change; the pill 
changing the sexual order of society, and psychopharmacology changing the 
social order.789 
In Chapter 3, I showed that the developers of the contraceptive pill were 
primarily motivated by the socio-political implications of the use of the pill in 
society, and its potential benefits for social progress. Margaret Sanger 
envisaged the radical social implications of the pill, Katharine McCormick put 
forward the money to fund it, and Gregory Pincus was courageous enough to 
lead the scientific development of the pill in the face of opposition from the 
prevailing academic culture. Indeed, these three factors – vision of a better 
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future, significant financial outlay and willingness to extend the accepted 
boundaries of current practice – are the key elements in the development of 
proposed future transhumanist biomedical technologies.790 I would argue 
therefore that Sanger, McCormick and Pincus saw the potential of the 
contraceptive pill as what might be considered in contemporary terms to be a 
transhumanist technology, and that they therefore planned and funded its 
development in an intentional way.  
By contrast, as I showed in Chapter 4, SSRI antidepressants were the product 
of a much more institutionalised and mature drug development process in the 
1970s and 1980s. Prozac was marketed primarily as a therapeutic advance for 
the treatment of depression and it was only after its launch, perhaps due to 
Lilly’s ingenious and holistic marketing campaign, that Peter Kramer and others 
saw the potential of Prozac and the SSRI antidepressants to transform society 
on a large scale, due to their subtle effects on personality. 
However, are these past therapeutic developments transhumanist in terms of 
the objective criteria defined in Chapter 2 of this thesis? In terms of the general 
criteria for a transhumanist development, they are. Both past therapeutic 
developments are technologies, in the broadest sense – a material means to 
effect a process – and they exert their effects on and through the human body 
to achieve a largely positive effect on human flourishing. This is unsurprising 
given that, as already mentioned, these general criteria are derived from the 
transhumanism literature. Therefore, they reflect the technological and 
ideological breadth of the transhumanist movement, and consequently are very 
general in their nature.  
The ability to apply a biomedical technology to the human body with unbridled 
autonomy is a key tenet of the transhumanist movement, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Consequently, whether a biomedical technology can be applied and 
used autonomously would be a significant factor in the classification of any 
biomedical technology as “transhumanist”. However, I have found that the role 
 
790 See the discussion of the aims and features of transhumanism in More, 
“Philosophy of Transhumanism”, pp. 1-8.  
292 
 
of autonomy in the use and application of biomedical technologies – past and 
future – is rather more ambiguous than transhumanist scholars admit to. In 
Chapter 2, I defined autonomy as self-determination in personal decision-
making, so that the person can act as a moral agent, with minimum interference 
of external factors. I have shown in the previous three chapters that all the 
technologies discussed in this thesis – medical technologies from the past, the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants, and the proposed transhumanist 
technologies of the future – may be applied with autonomy at the outset, but 
that there may be loss of autonomy due to unintended consequences at a later 
stage of their use. These unintended consequences may be due to external 
factors – coercion at an individual level and social pressure and, in the case of 
SSRI antidepressants, possibly the effects of the drugs themselves (the 
dependence and withdrawal effects, or diminished responsibility due to atypical 
reactions). 
Application of the specific theological criteria of Messer and Graham to the case 
studies in Chapters 3 and 4 highlight some of the theological and ethical 
concerns about radical biomedical technologies. Concerning Neil Messer’s 
criteria, the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants have benefits for the 
poor, although the evidence for this is sparse at present for SSRI 
antidepressants, and there may be issues with accessibility to the contraceptive 
pill in some parts of the world. However, comparing the costs of these drugs 
with the likely costs of radical future biomedical technologies at an early stage 
of commercialisation, current drug therapies are more universally available and 
more equitably distributed than some potential future technologies are likely to 
be. Consequently, these two areas of therapeutics are good news for the poor, 
in comparison with some of the proposed future proposed transhumanist 
technologies. 
The contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants both have the potential to 
change human life and flourishing in a way that aligns with a positive and 
comprehensive view of the imago Dei. The effects of SSRI antidepressants are 
not just focused on human attributes but contribute to human flourishing in a 
way that is also consistent with other approaches to the imago Dei. The 
contraceptive pill has the potential to affect society in a way that addresses 
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gender imbalances, and which therefore reflects a less androcentric view of the 
imago Dei. In these respects, these drugs are not like future transhumanist 
technologies. However, these drugs might be said to be like future 
transhumanist technologies in that they can be used to enable the individual or 
practitioner to “be like God” and “play God” in manipulating fertility or personality 
at will. 
Both the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants exert positive effects of 
human flourishing and experience in and through the human body (SSRI 
antidepressants have a positive effect on bodily life as well as mental life). In 
this respect, these drugs are decisively unlike some proposed future 
transhumanist technologies, such as mind uploading and cybernetics, which 
have a negative view of bodily human life, and which deprecate the role of the 
human body in human life and flourishing.  
There is evidence that both drugs have, during their history, been regarded by 
some commentators as triumphs of scientific medicine and panaceas for social 
problems, suggesting an over-confidence in their effectiveness and use in 
human society, which might be seen as technological hubris. In this respect, 
these drugs resemble to some extent more radical future transhumanist 
developments, which are often treated as radical solutions to profound human 
problems.791 
In terms of Elaine Graham’s criteria, both the contraceptive pill and SSRI 
antidepressants have objective benefits for human society corporately, due to 
changed cultural expectations, as well as benefits for the health, wellbeing and 
subjective experience of the individual. In this respect, these drugs are distinct 
from many of the proposed, future transhumanist technologies, which assume 
an individualistic, privatised approach to technology use, rather than one where 
medical technology is deployed according to public policy for the good of 
society.  
In conclusion, both these previous therapies have shown some – but not all - of 
the features of proposed future transhumanist technologies. As pharmaceutical 
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294 
 
medicines, these therapeutic developments work in and through the human 
body to exert a positive effect on human life and experience, and so they work 
on the assumption that the human body is a necessary prerequisite to human 
life and experience, unlike some proposed future technologies such as mind-
uploading and cybernetic hybridisation. 
However, as noted in Chapter 2, transhumanism uses biomedical technology to 
go beyond modernity’s project of transforming the world through culture and 
education. Consequently, as medical technologies available globally, the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants do resemble future transhumanist 
biomedical technologies inasmuch as they have the potential to change society 
primarily by a biomedical means. Medical technologies are often seen as a 
panacea for all sorts of social problems.792 This has been noted with previous 
pharmaceutical technologies in Chapters 3 and 4 and has been raised as a 
potential issue with proposed future transhumanist technologies in Chapter 2. 
The reality, however, is that, while future biomedical technologies may well 
have a widespread impact on human society, and hopefully a positive one, they 
cannot solve all of society’s problems – and the problems they will solve will be 
determined by safeguards around how they are developed, and policies about 
how they will be funded and distributed. 
Many of the transhumanist thinkers, such as Nick Bostrom and Max More, have 
described proposed transhumanist technologies in general terms, and have 
suggested what impact they might have on future human life. However, they 
have not envisaged in any detail how these technologies might be developed 
scientifically and made available to human society. The two case studies here, 
the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants, indicate that the radical 
biotechnologies of the future, with profound effects across the human 
population, will emerge from current medical technology research and probably 
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be enabled by various scientific, organisational, commercial and socio-political 
factors. 
5.5. Question 3: What were the ethical concerns with past therapeutic 
developments? Have these ethical concerns been warranted in the light of 
subsequent experience? 
As described in Chapter 1, large numbers of new medicines were developed 
during the therapeutic revolution years of the twentieth century. Indeed, so 
many were developed that the case studies for this thesis had to be carefully 
chosen as ones which had generated the most theological and ethical 
discussion on their effect on human life. Many medicines developed at that time 
– for example, antibiotics, salbutamol for asthma and cardiovascular medicines, 
such as beta blockers – have had profound effects on medical outcomes, 
human health and wellbeing, and yet Christian ethics has largely been silent 
about their innovation and use. The notable exceptions to this relative lack of 
engagement of Christian ethics with pharmaceutical medicine has been the 
Roman Catholic church’s official opposition to the contraceptive pill on natural 
law grounds, and a similar response by Roman Catholic scholar, John-Mark 
Miravalle, to the “Prozac phenomenon” following the introduction of SSRI 
antidepressants. 
The interesting aspect of this is that, logically, a natural law objection could be 
raised for the use of any non-natural, “artificial” medical intervention of human 
devising, be it a drug or a surgical procedure. However, the Roman Catholic 
Church has only chosen to develop and express this argument against those 
medicines that have significant non-medical and social implications, hence their 
concerns with the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants. Nevertheless, 
despite the robust articulation of the natural law position on contraception by the 
Roman Catholic church in Casti Conubii in 1930 and again in Humanae Vitae in 
1968, the evidence indicates that many Roman Catholic couples are ignoring 
the teaching of their church and using forms of hormonal contraception for 
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purely pragmatic reasons of fertility control and family planning in a developed, 
modern, industrial/post-industrial society.793  
Both the medical technologies described in the case studies of this thesis – the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants – have been controversial in 
western society at, or since, their introduction. The adoption of the contraceptive 
pill took place slowly, due to the relative conservatism of society in America and 
Britain in the early 1960s, compared to the current time. The adoption of Prozac 
and the SSRI antidepressants was more rapid, possibly due to the recognised 
therapeutic need for these drugs in the clinical treatment of depression, as 
alternatives to older agents, and also the more mature stage that both the 
therapeutic revolution and the drug discovery process had reached by the late 
1980s. 
With the introduction of the contraceptive pill in 1960, and its increasing use in 
the United States, opponents claimed that use of the pill would lead to eugenic 
population control, a breakdown of marriage as an institution and as a social 
good, increased sexual activity with multiple partners  and the subversion of 
relationships.794 Similarly, concerns were expressed about SSRI 
antidepressants after their launch – at first, these were medical concerns about 
adverse effects such as alerting reactions, withdrawal effects and suicidal 
ideation, and then subsequently, there were philosophical, social and 
theological concerns about the wider societal implications of SSRI 
“enhancement” following the publication of Peter Kramer’s Listening to Prozac.  
Both the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants had a cultural impact on 
society at, or after, their introduction. The contraceptive pill was associated in 
the popular imagination with the sexual revolution, and SSRI antidepressants 
with the growth of the “better than well” Prozac phenomenon. Yet, for both 
agents, use has become normative and they have been largely assimilated into 
twenty-first century culture. Indeed, neither agent now is dominant in its area of 
pharmacology, in the way it once was. Long-acting contraceptive implants are 
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now an important alternative to oral contraception, and cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT) is an important alternative treatment to SSRI antidepressants in 
many patients with depression. 
Many of the medical and social concerns about both the contraceptive pill and 
SSRI antidepressants have been found to be unwarranted, based on the 
experience of use that has accumulated since their launch. First, by and large, 
the pill has not been used by governments to exert eugenic population control, 
largely because it needs to be taken voluntarily by the user.795 This argument 
has, however, been levelled, and with good reason, at the way injectable forms 
of hormonal contraception – for example, injectable and implantable 
progestogen products – have been distributed in developing countries, and 
within some sections of society in first world countries (for example, women with 
mental disabilities).796 Indeed, it has been suggested that oral contraceptive 
products have, in the past, been distributed in some developing countries in an 
imperialistic and patronising manner by agencies funded by governments of 
affluent western society states, in a manner that could be considered 
coercive.797 Consequently, although the concerns about the use of the 
contraceptive pill for eugenics and population control have not been warranted 
during the history of its use, concerns of this nature should not be ignored with 
future technologies, given the importance of autonomy in the use of biomedical 
technologies, as argued earlier in this chapter. 
Second, contrary to the fears of some commentators who were opposed to the 
contraceptive pill at its launch, marriage remains an important social feature in 
western society, and there is no direct evidence that hormonal contraception 
alone has had an appreciable impact on population trends in marriage. 
Following the introduction of the pill in Britain in 1961, the number of people 
 
795 With the notable exception of the China “one child” policy. This was largely 
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getting married each year in Britain continued to rise until 1970.798 Although 
there was a decline in the number of marriages taking place in Britain between 
1972 and 2009, population research has suggested that this was due to people 
delaying marriage and, while the number of couples cohabiting increased during 
this time, in many cases this was a precursor to marriage.799 Moreover, 
between 2009 and 2012, the number of marriages in Britain actually increased, 
most likely due to factors unrelated to contraception.800 
Third, despite the obvious expectation of an increase in commitment-free sex 
following introduction of the contraceptive pill, there is scant evidence that the 
availability of hormonal contraception alone has led to an increase in sexual 
activity with multiple partners  in society.801 Indeed, in her commentary on the 
history of contraception, Cook argues that sex is legitimised by love, and quotes 
Helen Brook, founder of the Brook Advisory Service, who said that “if you are 
promiscuous, there is a reason for it. Promiscuity is a symptom of something 
else.”802 Furthermore, the social history of contraception in the middle decades 
of the twentieth century indicates that, despite popular perception, there is no 
clear link between the development of the pill and the beginning of the so-called 
sexual revolution, even though the pill has had an impact on popular culture.  
However, as argued in Chapter 3, the ability to control conception and to limit 
family size have the potential to reinforce moral agency and responsibility on 
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the part of would-be parents. Moreover, planned parenthood, the potential 
outcome of effective contraception, is an ethical good, as it has the potential to 
promote marital stability through the health and wellbeing of both partners.803 
Similarly, with the Prozac phenomenon, following the publication of Peter 
Kramer’s Listening to Prozac, detractors envisaged the use of Prozac and other 
SSRI antidepressants for dystopian mind control, in a way which might have far-
reaching implications for both human society and for medical ethics.804 Yet 
these concerns have proved unfounded too. Despite protocol-based use of 
SSRI antidepressants in large populations by US health maintenance 
organisations (HMOs), for reasons of financial cost-effectiveness, there is no 
evidence that there have ever been any organised programmes of social control 
using these drugs. Furthermore, fears concerning the adverse social effects of 
these drugs are not matters of immediate concern for individuals being treated 
with SSRI antidepressants, whose first priority is an effective clinical treatment 
for depressive illness. And, indeed, as argued in Chapter 4, many people 
receive treatment with SSRI antidepressants and enjoy significant benefits of 
that treatment, in terms of alleviation of depression and improved welfare as a 
result.  
With their concerns about the use of both the contraceptive pill and SSRI 
antidepressants, the Roman Catholic church has applied natural law objections 
only to those medical interventions that have a social implication, or where 
conflicts with the church’s doctrine are anticipated. I would argue that the 
Roman Catholic church’s ethical treatment of therapeutics has therefore been 
selective, and that it has not applied the same natural law theory to all 
biomedical developments, as logic would dictate. Yet, in both these therapeutic 
cases where natural law objections have been applied by the church, social 
 
803 Bernard Häring,"New dimensions of responsible parenthood", Theological 
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concerns relating to the therapies have largely not been warranted, but also the 
positive ethical benefits of these therapies have often not been acknowledged.  
As already argued at length, natural law is deficient on its own as a tool for 
ethical evaluation of biomedical technologies. It is not surprising therefore that, 
as discussed in Chapter 1, modern secular bioethics has drawn heavily on 
consequential ethical thought, in dealing with therapy assessment and health 
resource allocation and distribution.805 Yet this approach too is potentially 
problematic from a Christian perspective, due to perceptions of human good, 
difficulties with calculating the quantum of good in different situations and the 
possibility of conflict of consequentialism with Christian duty.806 As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, an approach to biomedical decision-making based on 
virtue – the virtue of the actors (technology users and healthcare practitioners), 
rather than the nature of the technologies or the consequences of their use – 
has considerable potential for future ethical evaluation of biomedical 
technologies because it aligns with the New Testament concept of the fruits of 
the Spirit (Galatians 5).  
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the transhumanist writer Ronald Bailey, has 
argued – reasonably – that the application of biomedical technology does not 
preclude virtue on the part of the human actors in the scenario in question.807 
Similarly, I would argue that the virtues of marital love and commitment are not 
necessarily diminished by the routine use of the contraceptive pill and that use 
of the pill does not have a bearing on the moral quality of a marriage or parental 
relationship. By contrast, the methodology of the Roman Catholic Church’s 
natural law argument against the contraceptive pill, as expressed in Humanae 
Vitae, does seem to devalue the quality of a marriage, as noted by Oliver 
O’Donovan in his criticism of the atomistic approach of the Roman Catholic 
stance on contraception, with its focus on individual sex acts.808 Similarly, the 
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Bioethics, (Chichester: Wiley, 2005), p. 23. 
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807 Bailey, “For Enhancing People”, pp. 331-332.  
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use of SSRI antidepressants per se to alter mood or personality attributes does 
not necessarily preclude virtuous actions on the part of the user. Nevertheless, 
it is possible for both these - and other biomedical technologies - to be 
deployed, applied and used in a non-virtuous way. 
5.6. Question 4: How do issues identified with previous medical technologies 
inform the ethical evaluation of future technologies? 
Kahane and Savulescu are right to make the connection between the use of 
currently available medicines - for example, the SSRI antidepressant, 
citalopram (for enhancement, rather than treatment) - and potentially more 
radical, future transhumanist technologies.809 They make the point that both 
current medicines and future biomedical technologies may be used for human 
enhancement, and they indicate that the ethical issues will be similar in both 
cases. Furthermore, they contend that the subtle enhancements that are 
already available (for example, the use of citalopram to attempt moral 
enhancement) are as significant ethically as more radical enhancements which 
may become available in the future. This is reasonable, as the use of current 
medical technologies provide ethical models for the use of future medical 
technologies, even though their effects might be modest compared with more 
radical future transhumanist enhancement technologies. However, Kahane and 
Savulescu make the incorrect assumption, in my view, that because an ethical 
issue has already been identified and discounted with a current therapy, it is 
therefore of no significance and may be discounted in any future evaluation of 
biomedical technologies. Ethical issues are fundamentally concerned with what 
is a good way of living human life, rather than just the effects of the novel 
application of technology. There is therefore no reason to suppose that the 
same ethical issues will not arise in human society at any point in history, 
irrespective of what technologies are being deployed. Furthermore, possible 
new ethical issues, arising from unintended consequences of new biomedical 
technologies, cannot be discounted. This section will look at how the ethical 
 
809 Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu, “Normal Human Variation: Refocussing 
the Enhancement Debate”, Bioethics, 29 (2015), pp. 133-143. 
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issues from past therapies, described in the case studies in this thesis, might 
influence and inform the ethical evaluation of future biomedical technologies. 
I contend that some of the good ethical ends offered by transhumanist 
technologies – longevity, better biological function and improved quality of life – 
have, at least in part, already been achieved with pharmaceutical medicine, 
during the therapeutic revolution years of the twentieth century. This would 
include, for example, the impact of specific cardiovascular medicines, such as 
beta blockers and ACE inhibitors (see Chapter 1), cancer chemotherapies and 
biological agents for autoimmune disorders. However, many previous 
developments in pharmaceutical medicine during the therapeutic revolution 
years have not directly addressed the enhancement of human capacities. This 
is mainly because they have been developed by the pharmaceutical industry in 
the context of medicine and therapy. Nevertheless, some – for example, the two 
case studies presented in this thesis - have been far-reaching in their influence, 
and have transformed society, as well as individual lives. Perhaps because of 
the contribution of the modern research-based pharmaceutical industry to 
human health and wellbeing, the overall benefits of pharmaceutical medicine 
are rarely questioned in mainstream western society, despite periodic criticism 
of the selective, capital-driven efforts of the industry by members of the medical 
profession and the press.810 
On the contrary, however, in popular culture, future transhumanist technologies 
are frequently regarded with suspicion, and those who advocate them are 
accused of “playing God”. There may be several reasons for this. Firstly, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, proposed future transhumanist technologies are often 
enhancements (to enhance human function, rather than to treat disease) and 
are described as enhancements, rather than therapy. The development and 
introduction of such technologies is therefore not associated with medicine or 
healing, or discussed in the context of healthcare, in the way that medical 
technology has been to date. This is significant because, as discussed in 
 
810 See discussion in Ken Holland, “The Pharmaceutical Industry: the True 
Perspective”, Pharmaceutical Historian, 22 (1992), pp 10-11. 
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Chapter 2, the use of therapy to alleviate suffering has a perceived moral and 
emotional imperative, and there is arguably a duty on the part of the state’s 
healthcare system to provide such therapies. However, the use of 
enhancements in a healthy person are not associated with the same moral 
imperative, or perceived obligation of state provision. Consequently, the use of 
medical technologies for enhancement is not only ethically distinct from their 
use for therapy, but their use “feels” different culturally, and therefore is treated 
differently in popular discourse. 
Secondly, because they are “enhancements”, transhumanist technologies may 
appear to be “unnatural” in the context of current culture and the current 
evolutionary stage of humanity. Given that natural law arguments have been 
prominent in the past in Christian ethical assessments of reproductive 
technologies in general terms, and that the Roman Catholic church’s opposition 
to hormonal contraception in particular is well-known, both within the church 
and beyond it, this has heightened cultural suspicion about radical biomedical 
technologies. However, as previously stated, as the use of radical and invasive 
biomedical technology increases in society, the ethical significance of whether a 
technology is “natural” or not correspondingly diminishes. 
This is particularly relevant in the field of cybernetics. At present, artificial 
prostheses of different types – artificial hip or knee joints, cardiac pacemakers 
or vascular stents – are routinely implanted into the human body, as part of 
various medical treatments, and they present no major ethical concerns for 
users about how “natural” they are. Widespread use of more extensive 
cybernetics – for example, robotic organs or limbs – and indeed the 
development of the cyborg (composite human body and machine) – are 
extensions of these current medical interventions and may well be adopted in a 
gradual manner. When such biomedical technology interventions are more 
commonplace, other ethical issues come to the fore, and whether the 
technology is “natural” becomes of lesser relevance.  
Nevertheless, the importance of social context in medical science should not be 
at the expense of realism in the task and objectives of science. Critical realism 
is an established epistemological point of contact between science and religion 
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in general,811 and the concept of critical realism is important to understand the 
truth claims of science. Critical realism recognises that science is useful 
because it describes a real world, rather than an ideal one (i.e. it is not entirely a 
social or intellectual construct) but that social and cultural factors do have a 
bearing on scientific discoveries, scientific communications and the activities of 
the scientific community.812 I have shown that this is the case for both the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants, by demonstrating how the 
scientific discovery and the cultural reception of these products both arose from 
the historical context of their development. In contrast, as discussed in Chapter 
2, the transhumanist writer, Donna Haraway analyses scientific studies of 
human behaviour and contends that natural science is a purely a social 
construct, with the ideological agenda of imposing the views of a male scientific 
patriarchy onto wider liberal society.813  
However, the fact that pharmacology has had objective and measurable 
benefits to human beings across society in a widespread manner, as shown in 
the two case studies, demonstrates that biomedical science cannot be simply 
dismissed as a social construct, and that this critical realism is important for 
countering any science-religion dualism which might still arise in some parts of 
the Christian world. Just as science is primarily about developing and testing 
theories about the real, natural world, rather than developing and reinforcing a 
social construct, so therapeutics is primarily concerned with the alleviation of 
real disease and humanitarian need and the promotion of genuine human 
wholeness. Science is not a tool for reinforcing certain ideologies in human life, 
such as a liberal modern view of autonomy and human will.  
Scientific reality is more likely to be confounded by social constructionism when 
considering the social impact of technologies than when considering the effects 
 
811 Christopher Southgate, God, Humanity and The Cosmos, 3rd Edition 
(London: T and T Clark, 2011), pp. 15-19; Alister McGrath, The Science of God: 
An Introduction to Scientific Theology (London: T and T Clark, 2004), pp. 139-
153. 
812 McGrath, The Science of God, pp. 139-152. 
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(New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 8. 
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on the individual human person. This is why the evaluation of future 
transhumanist biomedical technologies – both medical and ethical - should be 
evidence-based, according to objective verifiable criteria, using similar 
methodologies to those that pharmacology has developed over the last fifty 
years, during the therapeutic revolution years. 
Thirdly, even the transhumanist technologies that are currently technically 
feasible – such as cryogenic preservation of the body and cybernetic 
enhancements – are still very much in their infancy and at a prototype stage. 
These technologies are therefore expensive, and not in widespread use, as 
they are the preserve of only the wealthiest people in society. For this reason, 
the use of these technologies can be perceived as discriminatory and only of 
benefit to some (wealthy) individuals. However, similar arguments could be 
made for any medical technology at an early stage of its development, 
commercialisation and adoption in western health economies where the 
availability of medical technology is restricted and regulated. New medicines are 
rightly subject to rigorous regulatory controls in developed countries, and all 
new medicines will undergo clinical trials in a limited number of people and be 
subject to scientific – and sometimes media – scrutiny. Some of these issues 
relating to the introduction of a new medical technology are illustrated in the 
development of the contraceptive pill and opposition to its use at the outset, as 
described in Chapter 3.  
Nevertheless, this cultural suspicion means that transhumanist technologies are 
not generally regarded as therapies - agents of healing. Consequently, as part 
of an ethical evaluation of these transhumanist technologies, it may be helpful 
to exercise a countercultural approach and try to think of them as therapies, 
rather than enhancements. As discussed in Chapter 2, the boundary between a 
therapy and an enhancement is indistinct, and similar ethical arguments 
concerning virtue could be applied to enhancements, as well as therapies. I 
have shown that the contraceptive pill is an enhancement in terms of its effects 
on fertility, and largely fits the objective criteria for a transhumanist biomedical 
technology, according to Messer and Graham. Yet, the contraceptive pill may 
also be used therapeutically, as a treatment for menstrual disorders, often at the 
same time as it is being used for its (enhancing) contraceptive properties. SSRI 
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antidepressants were developed as a treatment for clinical depression, but 
subsequently were used by some people as a cosmetic psychopharmacology 
enhancement to make them feel “better than well”.  
Brent Waters has argued that medical care is not simply concerned with 
avoiding (inevitable) mortality, but about exercising human virtues, such as 
compassion and kindness in the relief of human suffering.814 In fact, the same 
arguments could be made of transhumanist enhancements. These, too, should 
be about exercising human virtues in the alleviation of human suffering, rather 
than simply avoiding finitude.  
It is often supposed that immortality is the “final solution” to all the problems of 
human life. However, in Chapter 2, I discussed several issues which might be 
problematic in the event of increased longevity in human society, conferred by 
widespread use of transhumanist technologies – for example, the impact on 
marriage, future working patterns and effects on the economy. These could all 
lead to new hitherto unencountered ethical dilemmas. These would include 
various economic and environmental issues arising from a considerable 
extended human lifespan. Simply overcoming human finitude with 
transhumanist technologies – even if it was possible - would not obviate every 
ethical dilemma that human beings face; rather it would prolong them and 
introduce new issues. Two factors central to the ethical acceptability of new 
transhumanist technologies will be a virtuous motivation on the part of the 
innovators and a willingness of the part of medicine and society to continually 
monitor the societal benefits and risks of the technology for human flourishing 
and wellbeing. A crude Promethean desire for immortality and super-human 
attributes will be no substitute for an ongoing ethical discourse in society about 
the role and desirability of such technologies.  
 
814 Brent Waters, “Saving Us from Ourselves: Christology, Anthropology and the 
Seduction of Posthuman Medicine”, in Future Perfect? God, Medicine and 
Human Identity, edited by Celia Deane-Drummond and Peter Manley Scott 
(London: T and T Clark International, 2006) pp. 194-195.  
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With therapeutic developments to date that have a potential social impact – for 
example, the two case studies presented in this thesis – the Roman Catholic 
church has based its ethical objections on natural law theory. Yet, as I have 
shown, the subsequent experience of the development and use of these 
medicines suggests that various other ethical factors that are not based on 
nature come into play when these medicines are used – for example, the 
benefits of virtuous use of the medicine, and the problems of just distribution of 
the medicine.  
Consequently, as I have argued in this chapter, use of the natural law approach 
alone, or even predominantly, in the assessment of therapeutics is a naïve way 
of assessing therapeutics, and a more varied ethical methodology is needed for 
the assessment of therapeutics now and in the future. Such an approach would 
account for factors such as the motivations of the user, the consequences of 
use of the technology, and the fair use of technology in society, rather than only 
the nature of the technology. This kind of varied ethical approach is urgently 
needed prior to the widespread availability of radical transhumanist 
technologies in the future. Using the theological criteria of Messer and Graham, 
I have shown here that a future ethical assessment of medical technologies 
from a specifically Christian perspective would need to examine the impact of 
the technology on autonomy, embodiment and on the imago Dei, as well as on 
nature.  
Just as natural law alone is an inadequate ethical approach to the evaluation of 
potentially radical transhumanist biomedical technologies, extreme 
conservatism concerning the adoption of biomedical technology (what Carl Elliot 
terms bio-conservatism, or “pharmacological Calvinism” 815) is an inadequate 
cultural response to these technologies. This is for three reasons. First, 
regardless of their enhancement potential, some transhumanist technologies 
also have considerable therapeutic potential for humanity, arguably far greater 
and more widespread potential than therapeutic developments to date. These 
might include, for example, the development of sophisticated cybernetic internal 
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organs for transplant purposes, or the use of nanoparticles in the bloodstream 
to deal with the biochemical effects of blood disorders. 
With all healthcare technologies, from the hygiene provisions of the nineteenth 
century - which might not be considered “medical interventions” by today’s 
standards - to the specific pharmacological developments of the twentieth 
century, the relief of human suffering and improvement of human welfare has 
been a key objective, and a major motivation for research and progress. There 
is no reason why the same cultural approach cannot be adopted with future 
transhumanist technology developments in the twenty-first century. However, 
governments and research agencies would need to be proactive and intentional 
in identifying the policies to enable this. The role of public policy in the equitable 
adoption and distribution of biomedical enhancement technologies has been 
referred to in Chapter 2 and, as discussed earlier in this chapter, public health 
policy could be used to define acceptable minimum levels for human function, 
which enhancement technologies could support. 
Second, because of the goodness of creation as affirmed in Christian theology - 
and the provisional goodness of natural science as a means of exploring 
creation - Christian critics of transhumanism can be reassured that, for all the 
potential benefits of biomedical technologies on human flourishing, the 
eschatology of transhumanism cannot ultimately deal with the problem of sin 
and the real need for human moral responsibility. As argued earlier, the effects 
of transhumanist biomedical technologies on autonomy are debatable, and they 
do not circumvent the ethical issues associated with good human life, which are 
only rendered more complicated by immortality or extreme longevity, due to the 
extended period over which the person – in whatever morphological form – 
must exercise moral agency. While transhumanist enhancements may bring 
benefits in terms of human function and longevity, they cannot be a panacea for 
all human ills, and many of the prevailing moral aspects of human life - for 
example, the development of moral agency, responsibility for sin, living well in 
community and making good moral decisions in the face of new challenges - 
are unlikely to be affected by adoption of more radical biomedical technologies. 
Consequently, I would argue that the fears of strict bio-conservatives are 
unwarranted and should be considered in the context of the hope of the 
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potential benefits of biomedical enhancement technologies on health and 
wellbeing.  
Third, strict bio-conservatism does not do justice to the theological notion of the 
“created co-creator” defined by Philip Hefner, as introduced in Chapter 2 and 
discussed earlier in this chapter. This is the idea that human beings are created 
by God, and yet they also exercise a creative role with him, in science and 
culture.816 As far as the created co-creator role of humanity in the development 
of biomedical technologies is concerned, Hefner’s qualification is important. 
Hefner states that the human destiny embraced must be “wholesome to the 
nature that birthed it.” 817 In other words, the future creation – or re-creation - of 
humanity, by either cultural or scientific means, should be good, in a way that is 
consistent with the original creation. So, while “human nature”, in a strictly 
biological sense, is debatable, this consistency between origin and maturity 
should also be concerned with the virtues that humans have always aspired to, 
which have long been regarded as goods of human society, and which are still 
desirable in a future society where there are transformative medical 
technologies. Such virtues would include compassion and kindness in the 
alleviation of suffering (as envisaged by Waters),818 self-restraint, generosity 
and neighbourly love.  
The cultural implications of Hefner’s theology of co-creation present an ethical 
dimension, and this provides a context for the church to ask important 
questions. For example, how can the fruits of the Spirit (Galatians 5v22-26) in 
human actions and personalities be experienced in a context where humans 
can be radically re-created by biomedical technology? How can wholeness, 
relationality and hope be expressed in a technological context? Strict bio-
conservatism not only shuts out the potential for exploration of the therapeutic 
benefits of transhumanist biomedical technologies, it prevents any discourse on 
the potential benefits of such technologies on human flourishing, from a 
Christian perspective. 
 
816 Hefner, The Human Factor, p. 27. 
817 Hefner, The Human Factor, p. 27. 
818 Waters, “Saving Us from Ourselves”, pp. 194-195. 
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I contend that this space in public discourse for ethical evaluation of biomedical 
technologies is important and is compatible with a Christian view of the world. 
The exact nature of the human being has, in fact, always been open to debate, 
both in theology, with the different approaches to the imago Dei, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, and in science, with the impact of new animal behavioural studies on 
understandings of the distinctiveness of humanity.819 While the popular 
perception is that adoption of transhumanist biomedical technologies will result 
primarily in hitherto unexpected ethical issues, in fact many recognised ethical 
questions in society at present – for example, the issue of how husband and 
wife relate in marriage – will still be present in a technological age, and these 
questions will not necessarily be affected by invasive biomedical technology, as 
argued previously in this chapter. Indeed, this issue has already been 
experienced with the contraceptive pill, as discussed Chapter 3; the effect of the 
pill on conception does not obviate the need for ethical reflection of how a man 
and woman should relate to each other in marriage.  
As mentioned, some critics of potential transhumanist technologies will point to 
the possible unintended consequences of radical biomedical technology. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the history of pharmacology - for example, 
the serendipity of the drug discovery process, and the idiosyncratic nature of the 
adverse events underlying some major drug safety issues (for example, the 
thalidomide disaster) - shows that there have always been unintended 
consequences with medical developments. The possibility of unintended 
consequences has never been an absolute reason not to proceed with a 
biomedical development scientifically, nor should it be an absolute reason not to 
proceed ethically.  
It is these unintended consequences that limit the usefulness of a 
consequentialist ethical approach in medical ethics, as much as natural law 
ethical approaches may be limited in a world where nature is technologically 
malleable. It is understandable that the emphasis of the Hippocratic Oath, 
developed at a time when there was no modern, scientific understanding of 
 
819 Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? pp. 139-143. 
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medicine, was on the actions and motivations of the practitioner, because this 
was the one aspect of medicine that the ancient thinkers could understand, and 
that the practitioner could control. 
The unpredictability of the human biological response applies equally to 
previously developed medicines of the therapeutic revolution era and to 
proposed future transhumanist biomedical technologies. In both cases, although 
the unintended consequences of these biotechnological interventions are 
unavoidable, they call for humility and a respect for the mysteries of the natural 
world, as discussed in relation to Neil Messer’s criterion of attitude to past 
failures in the previous three chapters. This humility and respect should be 
exercised by the healthcare practitioner and, in a world of person-centred care 
and consumerist use of health technologies, ultimately by the person who is 
applying the technology to their own body. 
The mechanisation of medicine with technology, and the evaluative process that 
surrounds it, has rendered the healthcare practitioner a functionary rather than 
a healer, and medicine as a form of engineering rather than an art. I would 
argue then that, while natural law and consequentialist ethical theory are 
inherently limited as ethical tools for the evaluation of biomedical interventions, 
the virtues and motivations of the practitioner should still have a significant role 
in medical ethics and will need to be of greater significance still as more radical 
medical technologies become available.  
As I have shown earlier in this chapter, four specific ethical domains – 
autonomy, nature, embodiment and the imago Dei - provide a framework for a 
fruitful discussion of the ethical issues surrounding two areas of drug 
development from the therapeutic revolution years of the twentieth century, 
namely the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants, the two case studies 
presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. Furthermore, as argued 
earlier in this chapter, both the therapeutic interventions described in these case 
studies had effects on the human body that were radical for their time and had 
far-reaching consequences for society in general, not just for the individual. 
Indeed, both these therapeutic interventions could be considered as 
312 
 
“enhancements” for an otherwise healthy person, rather than just medical 
treatment of an illness or disorder.  
I would therefore recommend that any future transhumanist technologies are 
evaluated according to these four ethical domains. These four areas constitute 
common ground between Christian ethical assessment of past therapies and 
the process of ethical evaluation of future transhumanist technologies. Indeed, a 
proactive approach would be to consider carefully these ethical domains during 
the process of developing and implementing new biomedical technologies 
which might have far-reaching effects on human life, flourishing and experience. 
5.7. Refining the Theological Criteria 
In this final section of the chapter, I explore how the theological ethical criteria of 
Neil Messer and Elaine Graham might be modified in the light of this discussion 
of past therapeutics to give them more diagnostic power when evaluating future 
biomedical technology. These refinements will take into account some of the 
“clinical” aspects of use and evaluation of the technologies, and also the 
principles of integrity and totality – that ethical decisions must be made for the 
benefit of the whole person and indeed the whole community, rather than ruling 
out any ethical benefits, due to the use of a prescriptive ethical methodology for 
assessment of the technology.  
There are various possible refinements to Messer’s four diagnostic questions, 
as far as radical transhumanist biomedical technologies are concerned. 
Whether the transhumanist technology is good news for the poor will depend on 
how scalable the technology is, and therefore how quickly it can be made 
universally available at an affordable cost for as many people as possible. A 
related issue is that there should be no barriers to equitable access to the 
technology in different countries and cultures for any reasons other than cost. A 
further factor concerning whether an enhancement technology is good news for 
the poor is the extent to which governments might subsidise it in the interests of 
equity of access. The question therefore might be rephrased: is the technology 
good news for the poor, the marginalised and for equitable distribution of 
regional, national or international public funding? 
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In terms of the second question about the imago Dei, it is to be hoped that 
applications of future transhumanist technology would enable people to fully 
conform to the image of God, rather than being an attempt to be “like God”. It 
would not be permissible from a Christian perspective for a technology to 
actively enable a person to remodel their body and mind according to their will 
or whim, in their own image (imago hominis). Furthermore, the enhanced 
person should reflect the imago Dei in all its dimensions, as developed in the 
theological literature to date. But the more specific question is: what kind of 
imago Dei does the technology reflect? Is it concerned entirely with human 
attributes – attributes of substance – or does it also reflect and uphold the 
relational element of what it means to be human, and the vocational aspect of 
humanity carrying out God’s purposes in the world? Furthermore, does the 
technology enable the eschatological development of the person, towards a 
destiny of Christlikeness, or does it merely aim to abolish human finitude, with 
no reference to its effects on the person and their spiritual and moral 
development? 
Concerning the third question, about the attitude of the technology towards the 
material world – including the human body – it is vital that the technology is 
characterised by a positive and affirming approach to the material world and to 
the human body for it to be acceptable from a Christian perspective. This 
approach will honour the remarkable significance of somatic life in Christian 
theology and the importance of the resurrection body in the eschatological 
destiny of the believer. Appropriate embodiment will ensure that the 
technologically-transformed human person can continue to participate in the 
sacramental – material – aspects of Christian faith. In addition to ensuring 
appropriate embodiment, the technology should ensure that the identity of the 
transformed human person is preserved, since identity is closely aligned with 
bodily form, both theologically and psychologically. A key question to ask of a 
biomedical technology is not just how will it change a person’s body, but how 
will it change their identity? Furthermore, the right approach to the value of the 
individual body in relation to the material world will, in turn, ensure that the 




Concerning the attitude of the technology to past failures, there is some 
evidence of scientific hubris with both case studies, and indeed with other past 
therapeutic developments, despite the flaws of individual scientists and of the 
pharmaceutical industry as a system. Christians would want the attitude of a 
new technology to be one of humility, and a willingness to learn from past 
failures. As well as the question about the project’s attitude to past failures, an 
additional question that could be asked is: what does humility look like with this 
project and these people in this therapeutic scenario?  
The effect of a biomedical technology on autonomy is a key line of enquiry in 
the ethical evaluation of technology. It is often supposed that transhumanist 
medical technologies enable unbridled autonomy on the part of the user. On the 
contrary, I have shown here that, with past therapeutic technologies, although 
they may be implemented ostensibly with autonomy, that autonomy may be 
eroded by unintended consequences in the light of ongoing experience of the 
technology, or the way the technology is implemented across society. In any 
case, autonomy itself, while genuine in many medical situations, may be an 
ambiguous concept. Concerning the impact of a technology on autonomy 
therefore, rather than wondering what liberties the technology might permit, it 
would be advisable also to consider what aspects of human life it might restrict. 
This will enable ethicists – and indeed all stakeholders – to determine the full 
effects that adoption of a biomedical technology might have in a social context, 
and pre-empt any issues relating to oppression and coercion related to 
universal availability of the technology.  
Finally, although transhumanist technologies are often thought to elevate 
individual subjective experiences, it is worth considering the extent to which 
they objectify the user of the technology – that is to say, treat the user as an 
artefact to be engineered, manipulated, desired or idolised. In general terms, I 
would suggest that the greater the imbalance between the subjective 
experience of the human person using the technology, and the objectification of 
their material body, the less likely the technology is to be acceptable to 
Christian ethicists, in line with Elaine Graham’s reservations about this issue. 
Human subjectivity is important for human dignity, and this principle underpins 
modern clinical trial protocols. Consequently, a biomedical technology that 
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emphasises an individualised, experiential approach to life yet objectifies the 
human body as an artefact to be engineered by the technology undermines that 
dignity. Human distinctiveness is eroded, and the human person is reduced to 
the status of a machine or a laboratory animal.  
The final chapter of this thesis will now draw some outline conclusions from this 
discussion about a possible future ethical approach to transhumanist 
enhancements and present a worked example of a possible future ethical 
approach. It will also discuss the implications of this ethical approach for the 
history of medical ethics, and implications for the church and for society.  
316 
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion – Reimagining Transhumanism 
 
6.1. Review of the Thesis 
This thesis has examined how a Christian ethical evaluation of future 
transhumanist biomedical technologies can be informed by reflection on the 
ethical issues that arose from therapeutic developments that took place during 
the therapeutic revolution years of the twentieth century (1950-1990), and which 
are still in routine use at the current time.  
Specifically, the thesis has set out to answer the following research questions: 
1) What are the various issues of theological ethics presented by 
transhumanist developments? 
2) To what extent were past therapeutic developments transhumanist 
technologies in their time? 
3) What were the ethical concerns with past therapeutic developments? 
Have these ethical concerns been warranted in the light of subsequent 
experience? 
4) How do issues identified with previous therapeutic developments inform 
the evaluation of future biomedical technologies? 
These questions were explored by the comparative evaluation of two cases of 
past therapeutic developments – the contraceptive pill and SSRI 
antidepressants – and of some proposed future transhumanist technologies 
according to three sets of criteria. These comprised a general set of criteria to 
define what might constitute a transhumanist biomedical technology, derived 
from the transhumanist literature, and two sets of specific theological 
considerations for the ethical evaluation of a biomedical technology, derived 
from the work of Neil Messer and Elaine Graham. The purpose of using these 
criteria was to evaluate whether these past therapeutic cases have 
transhumanist features and the ethical implications of the therapeutic cases. 
When applied, these criteria identified four major theological domains that 
constitute ethical issues with both present and future biomedical technologies 
and represent areas of contrast and debate that would enable the evaluation of 
future transhumanist biomedical technologies in the context of medicine to date. 
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These four areas are: a) autonomy, b) nature, c) embodiment and d) the imago 
Dei. These are therefore important areas in the ethical exploration of future 
transhumanist biomedical technologies, in order to determine whether a 
biotechnology is permissible or desirable from a Christian perspective for use in 
human society. Prior to advancing general conclusions, I will now revisit the 
structure and development of this thesis.  
Chapter 1 introduced the background of the project, and described the 
development of modern pharmacology, during the years of the so-called 
“therapeutic revolution”. The chapter discussed the impact of the therapeutic 
revolution on human life and society and described the historical context of the 
ethical questions being discussed, by reviewing the history of medical ethics to 
date. In the latter part of the chapter, the scope, assumptions and limitations of 
the study were described, and the methodology was discussed in detail – 
including why case studies were used, the rationale for the cases chosen, and 
the use and importance of criteria. 
Chapter 2 explored in detail the objectives, history and claims of the 
transhumanist movement. It examined and critiqued the various philosophical 
influences on transhumanism and the approaches taken by different 
protagonists of transhumanism. This enabled a taxonomy of the transhumanist 
movement to be developed, so that its diversity could be understood, and 
common features explored. The chapter described three basic classifications of 
transhumanist scholarship: a) philosophical transhumanism, as exemplified by 
Max More and Nick Bostrom, who see transhumanism as a life philosophy; b) 
technological transhumanism, as exemplified by Ray Kurzweil and Hans 
Moravec, who see transhumanism from the perspective of the effects of 
technology (computing, artificial intelligence or cybernetics) on human life, and 
the benefits that it can bring; and c) ideological transhumanism, as exemplified 
by Katherine Hayles and Donna Haraway, who explore the effects of biomedical 
technology on human society, but in a way that is neutral to technology per se, 
and which primarily sees these technologies as tools for exploring cultural and 
ideological issues, from a feminist perspective. The chapter then described 
briefly the main transhumanist technologies that have been proposed and went 
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on to introduce and define concepts of autonomy, nature, embodiment and the 
imago Dei as key areas of theological and ethical critique of transhumanism. 
The chapter described two sets of criteria – a) general criteria by which a 
biomedical technology might be classified as a transhumanist technology, 
derived from the writings of the transhumanists, and b) specific criteria by which 
Christian ethicists might evaluate a transhumanist technology as permissible or 
desirable. These specific criteria are derived from the work of Neil Messer and 
Elaine Graham. There was then a preliminary discussion about how proposed 
future technologies which could be classified as transhumanist are evaluated 
against the general and specific criteria.  
These two sets of criteria were then used to assess the two case studies of 
previous therapeutic developments which took place during the “therapeutic 
revolution” years (1950-1990) - the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants. 
Chapter 3 presented the first of these two case studies, the development of the 
oral contraceptive pill, which was introduced in 1960. The first section of the 
chapter described the history of the oral contraceptive pill, discussing the events 
that led to its introduction, and the actions of the protagonists involved. The 
second section discussed the effects of the pill on the lives of women and men, 
on marriage, and on society and described the Roman Catholic Church’s 
theological and ethical concerns with the pill following its launch. Finally, the 
contraceptive pill was evaluated against the three sets of criteria for 
transhumanist technologies described in Chapter 2, to determine the extent to 
which, in its time, the pill could have been regarded as a transhumanist 
development, and to evaluate it from the perspective of theological concerns 
about transhumanist technologies. 
Chapter 4 presented the second case study – the development of selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants (for example, Prozac), 
which took place in the late 1980s. As with the previous chapter, the first section 
described the history of SSRI antidepressant development, discussing the 
events that led to their introduction, and the actions of the protagonists involved. 
The second section evaluated the effects of SSRIs on society – their 
therapeutic effect on patients with clinical depression and their use as mood-
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altering drugs in individuals who are not depressed (the so-called “Prozac 
phenomenon”). This section discussed theological and ethical responses to 
SSRIs, looking in particular at the work of Roman Catholic scholar, John-Mark 
Miravalle, which was published in response to the “Prozac phenomenon”; the 
section critiqued in particular the natural law assumptions that Miravalle makes 
in his analysis.820 In the same way as the previous chapter, the third section of 
the chapter assessed SSRI antidepressants against the three sets of criteria for 
transhumanist technologies developed in Chapter 2, to determine the extent to 
which, in their time, they could have been regarded as a transhumanist 
development, and to evaluate them from the perspective of theological 
concerns about transhumanist technologies.  
Chapter 5 reconsidered current transhumanist proposals and technologies, in 
the light of previous experience with chemical therapeutics, as outlined in the 
two case studies presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The chapter began by 
summarising the findings of the case studies according to the criteria and 
determining the issues in theological ethics that arose through the development 
and clinical use of these medicines, which are relevant to a Christian response 
to transhumanist technologies. 
The chapter then answered the research questions of this thesis. In terms of the 
first question, the various issues of theological ethics presented by 
transhumanist technologies, the discussion focused on the four specific 
domains – autonomy, nature/natural law, embodiment and the imago Dei, which 
were introduced and defined in Chapter 2, in the light of the case studies. The 
extent to which the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants were, in their 
time, transhumanist technologies was evaluated, according to the criteria in 
Chapter 2. There was a discussion about whether the ethical concerns 
identified when they were first introduced have proved to be of concern with 
long term experience. The ethical response to future transhumanist biomedical 
 
820 John-Mark Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God: A Catholic Moral 
Perspective on Antidepressants (Chicago: University of Scranton Press, 2010). 
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technologies was then reassessed, in the light of the ethical findings with 
previous medical technologies, and this reassessment was used to further 
refine the proposed criteria for transhumanist technologies. 
As a result of this project, I have shown that four theological domains – 
autonomy, nature, embodiment and the imago Dei - are key points of contact 
between past and present medical interventions and future transhumanist 
biomedical technologies. They are therefore important areas for ethical 
evaluation of proposed radical future technologies. 
The scientific history of the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants, as 
discussed in the case study chapters, suggested that both therapeutic 
developments could be classed as transhumanist technologies, because of 
three observed features:  
a) their attributes as medical technologies, because their pharmacological 
effects are wide-ranging and have profound systemic effects on the 
individual human body; 
b) the total impact they have had on society, rather than just on the health 
and wellbeing of the individuals who take them, and  
c) the understanding of their application to humanity as transformational 
medical technologies in both scholarly and popular discourse. 
 
However, in respect of the objective general and theological criteria specified in 
this thesis, I have argued that the oral contraceptive pill and SSRI 
antidepressants were transhumanist developments in their time according to 
some of the criteria, but less so according to others.  
These two therapeutic developments were transhumanist in that they have had 
transformational effects on individual human flourishing and human society in 
terms of their effects on human relationships, welfare and quality of life. They 
were also transhumanist in the sense that they are a means of manipulating the 
human body with technology, and have been adopted, to some extent, with the 
hubris of technological achievement and human progress. However, these 
therapeutic cases were not transhumanist in the sense that they fell short of the 
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radical nature of some of the proposed future transhumanist technologies, such 
as mind uploading and radical cybernetics, which negate the significance of 
bodily life and which marginalise human bodily experience. On the contrary, 
both these previous therapeutic cases are medicines which work in and through 
the human body and uphold human bodily life in their actions and effects.   
Crucially, these two cases were ambiguous concerning whether they could be 
adopted without compromising individual autonomy. A key tenet of the 
transhumanist movement is that biomedical technology can be applied to the 
human person with the user having complete autonomy to manipulate his/her 
person at will, a tenet that has arisen from the roots of transhumanism in 
secular modernity. However, with both case studies, while the therapeutic 
intervention can be applied with autonomy at the outset, there are potential 
unintended consequences with the use of these agents, as there are with many 
situations in contemporary medicine, and these have the potential to undermine 
the user’s personal autonomy.  
I described the ethical concerns that have arisen with these two therapeutic 
cases, at the time of their introduction and since – which are largely natural law-
based objections from a perspective of Roman Catholic moral theology. I 
argued that, during the time these medicines have been on the market, these 
ethical concerns have largely not been vindicated, but that both medical 
technologies have had positive ethical benefits for human society and 
flourishing and that there has been Christian ethical support for the use of these 
technologies from the principles of integrity and totality - the good of the whole 
person and of human society.  
I went on to argue that, despite its significant role in the history of Christian 
ethics, natural law alone was no longer a sufficient method of ethical evaluation 
of biomedical technologies. This because even current medical interventions, 
such as the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants, can manipulate the 
human body in a way that undermines traditional notions of natural and 
unnatural. Furthermore, because of their more radical nature, future biomedical 




With future biomedical technologies, nature will have less significance as a 
standard for ethical evaluation. In a scientific and healthcare context where 
nature is less absolute and more open to manipulation, the question of whether 
a technology can be used with autonomy, and the effects of the technology on 
autonomy, will have a much greater influence on the ethical implications of the 
technology than any arguments derived solely from the effects of the technology 
on human nature. Furthermore, with increasing use of cybernetic components, 
especially those that are less inert than the prostheses and implants used in 
medicine to date, the concept of embodiment will have increasing significance 
in medical ethics. The more marginalised the human person is from a physical 
body, the less applicable the medical ethical principles and methods which have 
been developed to date will be to the evaluation of more radical future 
biomedical technologies.  
I proposed that, in future, therefore, ethical approaches other than that of 
natural law will need to be actively applied to the assessment of new biomedical 
technologies. These might include consequentialism, which underpins many 
cost and utility ethical arguments in medicine at present, to consider the 
consequences of the new technology, as far as it is possible, and virtue ethics, 
which focus on the personal motivations and qualities of the technology user or 
practitioner.  
I completed Chapter 5 by discussing how Messer and Graham’s theological 
criteria for evaluation of transhumanist biomedical technologies could be 
revised in the light of experience with past cases. The revisions are based on 
examination of these cases according to the four theological domains identified 
earlier in Chapter 5 – namely, autonomy, nature, embodiment and the imago 
Dei. For example, concerning the attitude of the technology towards the human 
body, in future, it will be important to consider the technology’s effect on the 
person’s identity, not just their body. As far as effects on the imago Dei are 
concerned, it will be important to consider exactly what aspects of the imago 
Dei are affected when the technology is applied, and that the eschatological 




As a result of this thesis, I have proposed various possible refinements to 
Messer’s four diagnostic questions, as far as radical transhumanist biomedical 
technologies are concerned. Whether the transhumanist technology is good 
news for the poor will depend on how scalable the technology is and therefore 
how quickly it can be made universally available at an affordable cost for as 
many people as possible. The question therefore might be rephrased: is the 
technology good news for the poor, the marginalised and for public funding? 
In terms of the second question about the imago Dei, it is to be hoped that 
applications of future transhumanist technology would enable people to fully 
conform to the image of God, rather than being an attempt to be “like God”. It 
would not be permissible from a Christian perspective for a technology to 
actively enable a person to remodel their body and mind according to their will 
or whim, in their own image (imago hominis). Furthermore, the enhanced 
person should reflect the imago Dei in all its dimensions, as developed in the 
theological literature to date. So the more specific question is: what kind of 
imago Dei does the technology reflect? Is it concerned entirely with human 
attributes – attributes of substance – or does it also reflect and uphold the 
relational element of what it means to be human, and the vocational aspect of 
humanity carrying out God’s purposes in the world?  
Concerning the third question, about the attitude of the technology towards the 
material world – including the human body – it is vital that the technology is 
characterised by a positive and affirming approach to the material world and to 
the human body, for it to be acceptable from a Christian perspective. This 
approach will honour the remarkable significance of somatic life in Christian 
theology and the importance of the resurrection body in the eschatological 
destiny of the believer. Appropriate embodiment will ensure that the identity of 
the technologically transformed human person is preserved and that the person 
can continue to participate in the sacramental – material – aspects of Christian 
faith. A key question to ask of a biomedical technology is not just how will it 
change a person’s body, but how will it change their identity? Furthermore, the 
right approach to the value of the individual body in relation to the material world 
may, in turn, help to ensure that the corporate body of humanity – human 
society – is able to flourish and is not compromised. 
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Concerning the attitude of the technology to past failures, there is some 
evidence of scientific hubris with both case studies, and indeed with other past 
therapeutic developments, despite the flaws of individual scientists and of the 
pharmaceutical industry as a system. Christians would want the attitude of a 
new technology and its developers to be one of humility, and a willingness to 
learn from past failures. As well as the question about the project’s attitude to 
past failures, an additional question that could be asked is: what does humility 
look like with this project and these people in this therapeutic scenario?  
6.2. General Conclusions 
I now advance the following general conclusions based on the results and 
discussion in this study: 
1) For transhumanists and pharmaceutical scientists alike, a key motivation 
for the development of any medical technology is to alleviate human 
suffering and enhance human flourishing specifically by means of 
material intervention with the human body.821 The two cases of past 
therapeutics in this thesis, which demonstrate some of the characteristics 
of transhumanist developments, show that these two significant 
advances during the therapeutic revolution years of the twentieth century 
(1950-1990) have had demonstrable benefits for human health and 
wellbeing. I would argue, therefore, that if there have been such 
healthcare and wellbeing benefits with pharmaceutical medicine to date, 
then even greater benefits may be possible in future, with more radical, 
invasive, biomedical technologies, such as those proposed by 
transhumanists. This suggests that, while some Christians may be 
suspicious of medical technology, either for cultural or theological 
 
821 In addition, transhumanists are proactive about protecting humanity from 
what they call “existential risk” – that, in future, the existence of humanity could 
be threatened by some unexpected phenomenon, such as a deadly virus or an 
asteroid from space (M.J. McNamee and S.D. Edwards, “Transhumanism, 




reasons, a position of extreme bio-conservatism is probably not tenable 
for Christians, simply because of the humanitarian implications of the 
possible benefits of future biomedical technologies, which would be 
consistent with a Christian understanding of human flourishing. Indeed, 
an argument for strict bio-conservativism on natural law grounds is 
ultimately not consistent with Christian compassion and commitment to 
healing, or the church’s advocacy and practice of healing ministry. 
Moreover, extreme bio-conservatism towards medical technologies on 
the part of Christian theologians or the church would not be credible to 
the scientific community and might inhibit dialogue between science and 
religion on other issues. Furthermore, regardless of Christian apologetics 
to the scientific community, this stance would also be counterproductive 
to the church’s mission in the world in other respects, given the universal 
human appeal of compassion and humanitarianism in many societies. 
2) An ethical issue which may engender caution with the exploration of 
radical - and expensive - transhumanist biomedical technologies is the 
extent to which such radical technologies should be developed in future, 
given the pressing medical needs in some countries of the world yet 
which are unmet by technologies and treatments that are already 
available, but just not accessible in those countries. Should governments 
and big corporations be investing considerable resources in innovative, 
radical biomedical technologies when diseases such as HIV and 
tuberculosis are still endemic in sub-Saharan Africa, due to a lack of 
access to medicines and services? Resources – budget and people – 
are not in unlimited supply – and I would venture that governments 
should address known needs concerning availability of, and equity of 
access to, currently available medical technologies first. Nevertheless, 
governments do need to have systematic and coherent policies on the 
funding of future biomedical technologies, for two good ethical reasons. 
First, such policies will serve to regulate individual and corporate 
innovators in an appropriately permissive way, so that innovation is not 
stifled, and that research and development of biomedical technologies 
can proceed but is directed towards humanitarian ends which support the 
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common good. Second, such policies will manage the technology 
markets to ensure equity of access and that future biomedical 
technologies are indeed “good news for the poor” (according to Messer’s 
diagnostic questions) in that they are accessible and affordable for all 
sections of society. This is central to an ethic of human flourishing within 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition; if shalom is defined, as Cornelius 
Plantinga defines it, as a “universal flourishing, wholeness, and delight—
a rich state of affairs in which natural needs are satisfied and natural gifts 
fruitfully employed all under the arch of God’s love”,822 - then it should 
encompass just and equitable access to medical technologies across the 
whole of human society, as this would support the Kingdom aspiration of 
“good news for the poor”. Some transhumanists – for example, Ray 
Kurzweil and Hans Moravec 823 – are less interested in the socio-cultural 
implications of transhumanism than others, but medicine has always 
been a social and humanitarian venture. It will be important that robust 
public policy on the deployment and use of future radical medical 
technologies accounts for a comprehensive ethical analysis of those 
technologies that is in keeping with the aims and objectives of medicine 
to date.  
3) As illustrated by the scientific history of the development of the 
contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants in Chapters 3 and 4 
respectively, scientific endeavour in pharmacology and drug discovery, 
as in any area of science, is not a purely abstract activity, but always 
takes place in a social and political context. This has been the case in 
the history of drug development to date in general, as shown in Chapter 
1 of this thesis, as well as in the two case studies and, given the 
contingencies of human society, this situation is unlikely to change in 
 
822 See Graham O’Brien and Timothy Harris, “What on Earth Is God Doing? 
Relating Theology and Science through Biblical Theology”, Perspectives on 
Science and Christian Faith, 64 (2012), pp. 147-156. 
823 Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed 
Human Intelligence (New York: Penguin, 1999); Hans Moravec, Mind Children: 




future. I concluded above that extreme bio-conservatism is ultimately 
incompatible with a Christian ethic of healing and medical care. However, 
on the other hand, awareness of the social and political context of 
biomedical research is a powerful corrective to Christians who, perhaps 
because of scientific ignorance, regard science with uncritical awe and 
have unrealistic expectations of the possibilities of science, and who 
therefore may believe that religion cannot in any way influence scientific 
and technological “progress”. The ongoing inability to completely 
eradicate the endemic diseases in Africa is not simply a scientific 
problem, it is also a cultural, financial and political problem. That is 
indicative of why cultural, financial and political factors must be 
accounted for when developing a comprehensive medical ethical 
framework for the transhumanist age. This is important for humanity 
theologically, as well as ethically, in respect of technologies, given Peter 
Manley Scott’s insistence that an understanding of the imago Dei 
abstracted from its social context is inadequate, and that, in a 
technological world, such an understanding of the imago Dei must reflect 
the spatial and temporal setting of material human life.824 Nevertheless, 
the importance of social context in medical science should not be at the 
expense of realism in the task and objectives of science. The realistic 
nature of a scientific advance is possibly easier to overlook when 
considering the social impact of technologies than when considering the 
effects on the individual human person because the social context in 
which the technology is being used will act as a lens through which it is 
interpreted. The potential for social constructs is why evaluations of 
future transhumanist biomedical technologies – both medical and ethical 
- should be evidence-based, according to objective verifiable criteria, 
using similar methodologies to those that pharmacology has developed 
over the last fifty years during the therapeutic revolution years. However, 
there may be a need for greater awareness of implicit biases that have 
 
824 Peter Manley Scott, Anti-Human Theology: Nature, Technology and The 
Post-Natural (London: SCM, 2010), p. 93. 
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occurred in the past (for example, lack of attention to gender differences 
in trial population). Going forward, this evidence-based approach will 
help to ensure that ethical responses to new biomedical technologies 
from the church, or indeed other agencies, are based upon objective 
criteria, and do not reflect either an uncritical acceptance of technology, 
on the one hand, or a knee-jerk rejection of technology, on anti-scientific 
or cultural grounds, on the other. This study has used objective criteria to 
examine, and find points of ethical contact between, past and potential 
future biomedical technologies, in order to derive an evidence-based 
ethical approach to evaluating future biomedical technologies.   
4) A survey of the scientific history and development of the two case studies 
presented in this thesis – the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants 
– together with an evaluation of them according to the three proposed 
sets of criteria, suggests that these therapies were, in many ways, 
transhumanist developments, by the standards of their time, even though 
they were not the radically invasive technologies envisaged in the future 
by transhumanist scholars, such as mind-uploading and cybernetics. The 
case studies show that social and cultural concerns about what were at 
the time new medical technologies – for example, about how society 
would be affected, how relationships would be changed, and how the 
technology might be misused – stimulated significant intellectual 
discourse. Similar cultural and social concerns exist now with proposed 
future radical transhumanist technologies. However, regardless of 
current popular fears and cultural concerns with future transhumanist 
technologies, these technologies may, in due course, yield medical and 
social benefits, in the same way that past therapeutic technologies have. 
I would suggest then that a Christian ethical evaluation of a new 
technology should incorporate lessons learnt from past cases of medical 
technologies where initial fears were not vindicated, as has been done in 
this thesis. Lessons learnt from the past may help to identify and rule out 
any concerns that are largely social and cultural and which are not 
ultimately prohibitive from a Christian perspective.  
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5) As described in Chapter 2, some  scholars, such as Thweatt Bates, 
Campbell and Walker and Garner, have attempted to reconcile 
transhumanism with Christian belief, and with a Christian view of 
humanity, exploring the themes of perfectibility, immortality and Christian 
social concern.825 Helpful as these attempts at dialogue might appear, 
they are superficial, in that they gloss over significant underlying 
differences between Christianity and transhumanist thought, especially 
concerning embodied life, soteriology and eschatology. The objective 
theological criteria used in this thesis help to analyse and identify the 
actual points of divergence between Christian doctrinal principles and the 
claims of transhumanism.  
6) While I have argued here that it is imperative for Christian churches to 
engage with technology, in terms of enquiring about it, understanding 
and evaluating it, churches are under no obligation to advocate the 
implementation of a technology if there are significant ethical concerns, 
either from a perspective of bioethics, social justice or the distinctiveness 
of human life. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the principle that there is no 
stigma in doing nothing is well-established in medical ethics.826 
Notwithstanding point 4) (above), if a medical intervention – whether past 
or future – is perceived to carry significant risks, then it is reasonable - 
and indeed ethically defensible - to employ the axiom “First do no harm” 
and be cautious until the risks of the technology are better understood. In 
the context of Christian ethics, “harm” might consist of something that 
hinders the fulfilment of the Kingdom of God, or which compromises 
loving relationships, not just something that disrupts the functioning of 
the biological body. Public policy on the regulation and deployment of 
 
825 Heidi Campbell and Mark Walker, “Religion and Transhumanism: Introducing 
a Conversation”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, 14 (2005), pp. i – xv; 
Stephen Garner, “Transhumanism and Christian Social Concern”, Journal of 
Evolution and Technology, 14 (2005), pp. 29-43. 
826 Vivian Nutton, “Medicine in the Greek World: 800-50BC”, in The Western 
Medical Tradition 800BC – 1800AD, edited by Lawrence Conrad, Michael Neve, 
Vivian Nutton, Roy Porter and Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), p. 29. 
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such technologies should take all risks into account – including risks to 
the goods of human life, as well as medical and scientific risks, and 
should, where necessary, reflect the important medical ethical principle 
of “first do no harm.” 
7) Christian ethicists and churches need to have a comprehensive Christian 
medical ethic to apply to biomedical interventions as the transhumanist 
era dawns. I argued in Chapter 5 that an approach based largely on 
natural law alone – as has characterised religious responses to previous 
therapies, such as the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants – is 
inadequate. This because radical biomedical technologies render the 
traditional demarcation between natural and unnatural indistinct. 
Furthermore, there are ethical benefits of these therapies that cannot be 
assessed by an appeal to nature alone, for example, positive impacts on 
human function and quality of life, and on wider society. Yet, ironically, 
these are the benefits that John-Mark Miravalle seems to discount as 
positive ethical features in his ethical analysis of SSRI antidepressants, 
because of his insistence on a natural law approach, aligned with the 
stance of the Roman Catholic church regarding the contraceptive pill.827 
A natural law approach to therapeutic ethics only perpetuates the notion 
of a dualism between science and religion, and this is problematic for any 
dialogue between the church and the scientific community. Likewise, a 
consequentialist ethical approach, which has characterised much 
bioethical deliberation in the late modern era, and is the approach used 
by Julian Savulescu in his advocacy of radical biomedical 
technologies,828 is also flawed as a sole means of ethical evaluation of 
therapeutics because it fails to account for unintended consequences of 
medical interventions arising from unexpected biological actions. Such 
 
827 John-Mark Miravalle, The Drug, The Soul and God: A Catholic Moral 
Perspective on Antidepressants (Chicago: University of Scranton Press, 2010) 
pp. 2-3, pp. 50-55. 
828 Julian Savulescu, “The Human Prejudice and the Moral Status of Enhanced 
Beings: What do we owe the gods?”, in Human Enhancement, edited by Julian 




unintended consequences have been noted for both the case studies 
described in this thesis and are commonplace in all therapeutic areas in 
pharmacology. Furthermore, consequentialism does not account for the 
moral agency and motivation of the technology user or practitioner, which 
has traditionally been important in medical ethics. Virtue ethics, which 
consider the motivations of the technology user or practitioner, are 
potentially valuable in modern technological medicine because they help 
to identify the reasons for using new biomedical technology, regardless 
of the nature of the technology. Furthermore, a virtue ethics approach 
has the potential to provide continuity between the future medical ethical 
issues which might be encountered with radical transhumanist 
biomedical technologies, and the ancient Hippocratic medical ethical 
tradition. I conclude that virtue ethics may have an important role in the 
ethical assessment of future medical technologies.  
8) Application of the three sets of objective criteria to the two case studies 
and to some future transhumanist developments has identified four 
ethical domains that are important points of contact between past and 
potential future medical technologies – autonomy, nature, embodiment 
and the imago Dei. Christian ethical evaluation of future medical 
technologies should therefore account for the effects of the technology 
on autonomy, the impact of the technology on the person’s embodied 
state and the assumptions the technology makes about the imago Dei, 
as well as natural law. Although natural law will continue to have some 
value in medical ethics, as a means of framing discussions, it will no 
longer be a sufficient sole means of evaluating future biomedical 
technologies because of their potentially radical and highly invasive 
effects. The other areas mentioned here will have increasing ethical 
significance in future.  
9) I argued earlier that a purely natural law-based ethic for assessment of 
transhumanist biomedical technologies was also inadequate because it 
is individualistic and atomistic and does not account for the social ethical 
aspects of these technologies, such as concerns over the social impact 
of immortality and the equitable distribution of such technologies. I would 
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also argue that advocates of transhumanism are naïve to think that 
biomedical technology is able to solve social and spiritual problems, as 
well as medical ones, and that medical science will somehow bypass 
moral agency and eliminate these social ethical issues in a human 
population going forwards. The reality is that, even if biomedical 
technologies with positive benefits are universally deployed and are 
acceptable ethically in terms of human equity, dignity and community, 
human beings will still need to negotiate the day-to-day ethical dilemmas 
of human life regardless of technology use. 
 
The original contribution to knowledge made by this thesis is that it forges a 
connection between the ethical evaluation of medical interventions to date 
and proposed future transhumanist biomedical technologies, and it locates 
the transhumanism movement within the wider history of medicine. It 
therefore shows that careful analysis of previous medical developments in 
the modern era to date can influence our ethical understanding of potential 
transhumanist proposals. 
By reviewing significant past medical innovations according to objective 
criteria for transhumanist developments and examining theological 
objections to transhumanism, I have developed a methodology for ethical 
analysis that is common to past and future medical developments and could 
be used to assess future radical biomedical technologies from a Christian 
perspective, in a way that is coherent and continuous with medical ethics to 
date. I have shown specifically that four domains of theological evaluation - 
a) autonomy, b) nature, c) embodiment and d) the imago Dei – provide 
points of contact between past and proposed future medical biomedical 
technologies and are important themes for ethical analysis of proposed 
future transhumanist technologies to assess their acceptability from a 
perspective of Christian ethics. 
Future work in this area would involve the application of this “four domains” 
ethical methodology to specific proposed future biomedical technologies. 
This might include current proposed transhumanist developments, such as 
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mind uploading or gene therapy, but also future technologies that have not 
yet been considered. I provide a preliminary worked example of this below. 
6.3. Application of Four Domains Methodology for Ethical Evaluation of 
Biomedical Technology 
As discussed here, some pharmaceutical technologies to date – for 
example, the contraceptive pill and SSRI antidepressants – have had 
significant effects on human society, as well as individual health and 
wellness. In the future, more radical biomedical technologies may be 
introduced that are essentially pharmacological interventions. For example, 
in future, it may be possible to have a “magic implant” fitted which releases a 
combination of metabolically active nanoparticles and gene therapy 
substances (viral victor and nucleotide substances) which would have the 
effect of radically extending the human lifespan to, say, 200 years, improving 
physical functioning during that lifespan and effectively eradicating dementia 
and cognitive decline. Once such an implant has been developed 
commercially, it could be inexpensive enough to distribute to all adults in the 
population, and could be fitted as a simple, minor surgical procedure at a 
local doctor’s surgery or NHS clinic.  
Such an intervention would clearly have enormous health and wellbeing 
benefits for the individual. It would also have a profound impact on society 
and would present the ethical issues related to extended longevity described 
in Chapter 2. These might concern the economic pressures of an enlarged 
population, availability of jobs, attitudes to work, the ability of society to 
change and innovate and increased pressure on marriage as a permanent, 
lifelong relationship, and the development of alternative lifestyles as a result 
of these changes. 
A “magic implant” would indeed have ethical implications for society, to 
which governments, policy makers and corporations would need to respond. 
However, how does this technology look when analysed according to the 
domains of autonomy, nature, embodiment and the imago Dei? In terms of 
autonomy, it is unlikely that such an implant acting at the biochemical level 
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would exert effects on freedom of decision-making, unlike some 
psychoactive drugs. The implant could be fitted at will – but could it be 
removed at will, with no adverse effects other than the loss of its longevity 
benefits, if the user no longer wished to use it? As far as nature is 
concerned, the insertion of such a “magic implant” with radical whole-body 
systemic effects constitutes an intervention that prevents the person fulfilling 
their natural attributes and function, in the same way as hormonal 
contraception does, if viewed from a natural law ethical perspective. 
However, such an intervention appears to be more aligned with the natural 
ends of human bodily life  than, say, mind uploading or radical cybernetic 
remodelling, and there would be significant potential ethical benefits of the 
implant if it were used well by the user, as I have shown is the case with oral 
contraception and use of SSRI antidepressants for neuroenhancement. So 
the “unnatural” nature of the implant does not necessary render the 
intervention unethical from a broad Christian ethical perspective. Then there 
is there is the question of embodiment. While the “magic implant” would be 
an invasive intervention, it would still exert positive effects in and through the 
human body and would enhance bodily life, rather than undermine it, as 
opposed to mind-uploading and radical cybernetic remodelling, which 
negate the body, and marginalise its significance. Indeed, drug-eluting 
stents and implants are already in use primarily to increase life expectancy – 
for example, the use of anticoagulant-eluting stents to improve life 
expectancy in coronary disease or stroke. These are essentially 
enhancements, albeit more minor than the “magic implant” proposed here, in 
terms of quantitative effects on longevity. Consequently, in terms of 
embodiment, such a “magic implant” is, in fact, similar to some of the 
implants used at the current time in terms of ethical status, even if its clinical 
utility is greater.  
What are the implications of such a “magic implant” in terms of the imago 
Dei?  The answer here is more complex. A “magic implant” would offer 
considerably extended longevity, yet with the possibility of eventual death 
and finitude. Such longevity has the potential to transform family and 
societal relationships, in the same way that hormonal contraception has 
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done, and lead to positive opportunities for individuals to do good and 
improve society. This would be positive in terms of a relational approach to 
the imago Dei and would also possibly benefit a functional approach to the 
imago Dei – extended longevity would probably benefit someone’s ability to 
serve God in the world and exercise their God-given vocation. The 
potentially interesting effect of such a technology is on the eschatological 
approach to the imago Dei. The question is whether the technology would 
enable the person to achieve their eventual destiny of Christlikeness and 
being with Christ after life in this world. The longevity provided by the 
technology might indeed help the user to grow towards Christlikeness but, if 
longevity became extended indefinitely, then when would the person 
achieve their eventual destiny of being with Christ beyond this world? The 
problem of delayed or alternative eschatology is a key theological critique of 
transhumanism. 
This would be a particularly significant issue if it were possible, for example, 
to extend life even further by replacing the “magic implant” contents every 
100 years, thus enabling the person to be effectively immortal. This would 
not only render obsolete many aspects of medical care in the face of human 
suffering, it would undermine an individual’s finitude and hinder their ultimate 
fulfilment of a destiny with Christ beyond this world. However, it would be a 
man-made immortality. A situation might arise where there were insufficient 
implant replacements for all citizens, either due to lack of availability or 
funds. How then would it be decided who lives and dies? Of course, similar 
ethical decisions about resource allocation are currently made about 
expensive treatments for rare diseases on a consequentialist basis. 
However, current resource allocation decisions are concerned with providing 
a therapy for a disease, which may only have a marginal impact on a 
person, whereas this future situation is about withholding a life-giving 
enhancement, which is much more problematic.  
If, on the other hand, the “magic implant” gave a single finite increase in 
longevity, then the key question for potential users of a such an implant 
would be: when and how might death come? Of course, some “magic 
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implant” users might be killed in a road traffic accident at the untimely age of 
120. There is then the question of whether there might be any adverse – or 
indeed potentially fatal – unintended consequences of long-term use of the 
implant. Unintended consequences have been a common issue in ethics of 
medical treatment to date, and there is no reason why this might not still be 
the case in future.  
The analysis of the “magic implant” technology according to this autonomy, 
nature, embodiment and imago Dei framework indicates that, while a single-
use medical technology which increases longevity may be culturally alien to 
current society and will introduce some ethical issues, it is not necessarily a 
technology that is unacceptable from a perspective of Christian ethics and a 
Christian view of human life. The key caveat is that the technology does not 
affect human finitude; the problem with medical technologies that confer 
“immortality” is that, firstly, they delay the person’s realisation of their 
ultimate destiny in Christ and secondly, they bring with them the ethical 
problems of an “immortality” that is dependent on human initiative. 
6.4. Concluding Comments: Transhumanism in Historical Perspective   
I began this thesis in Chapter 1 by outlining that medical ethics have 
developed through three phases to date – first the Hippocratic phase, 
characterised by an emphasis on the duties and behaviours of the 
practitioner; then the Renaissance phase, when ethical thinking about 
medicine began to focus on the techniques of medical intervention, and the 
consequences for the patient; and then thirdly, the Late Modern phase, 
which encapsulates modern bioethics, where medical ethics are not just 
concerned with the actions of the practitioner or the consequences of the 
treatment, but also about the equality of healthcare resource distribution and 
the impact of medicine on human rights.  
From this thesis, I conclude that a fourth phase of medical ethics is needed 
to evaluate the future biomedical technology developments proposed by 
transhumanists. This will need to comprise a comprehensive ethical system, 
which will not rely on a single ethical methodology, such as natural law or 
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consequentialism, but will allow a range of forms of ethical analysis. The 
transhumanist philosopher, F.M. Esfandiary claimed that transhumanism 
“deplores standard paradigms”; it is perhaps right then that a form of ethical 
analysis equal to the challenges of radical transhumanist biomedical 
technology should also not be constrained by analysis in any one standard 
ethical paradigm. The analysis of future biomedical technologies described 
here, according to the criteria of Messer and Graham, paying particular 
attention to the domains of autonomy, nature, embodiment and the imago 
Dei, offers a comprehensive approach to ethical evaluation of biomedical 
technologies. It is an approach that is broad enough to evaluate a variety of 
potential future technologies, but incisive enough to identify the significant 
issues and gain a clear understanding of the acceptability of a technology 
from a Christian perspective. 
This comprehensive approach does medical ethics the service of 
reconnecting modern bioethics with both the ancient medical ethical 
tradition, with its emphasis on the virtue of the practitioner, and the history of 
the Christian healing tradition with its emphasis on compassion in medical 
care. This comprehensive ethical understanding of medicine to date, which 
can then be applied to the future transhumanist biomedical technologies of 
tomorrow, would not only be a positive development for current bioethics in 
medical and healthcare practice, it would refocus discourse in this area on 
the broader goods of human life in a postmodern world, and would set the 
scene for a Christian understanding of human life in its current and future 
postmodern technological context. 
As such, it would enable greater dialogue between scientific and theological 
concerns, in respect of future radical biomedical technologies. Furthermore, 
if this ethical framework is used to inform the development and 
implementation of future transhumanist biomedical developments, it would 
enable the development of technologies that would achieve the important 
objective of radical reduction and alleviation of human suffering, while being 
acceptable to Christian ethics and maintaining the defining features and 
dignity of human life, from a Christian perspective. 
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To achieve this would constitute the full flowering of the medical science 
endeavour, which has so far encompassed the so-called “therapeutic 
revolution” - the growth of modern industrial pharmacology since the 
beginning of the twentieth century - and possibly even the development of 
empirical, iatrochemical medicine since the seventeenth century. This ethical 
framework would give Christians and churches the confidence to reject the 
cultural stereotypes of biomedical enhancement, characterised by science 
fiction motifs and “brave new world” ideology, and to embrace those forms of 
biomedical technology which have the potential to alleviate human suffering 
and improve human wellbeing, but which do not undermine the dignity and 
distinctiveness of human life from a Christian perspective. Radical 
biomedical enhancement technologies are neither an absolute evil to be 
rejected at all costs, nor are they a panacea for every medical and social 
disease. The reality is that they are somewhere in between; many 
technologies will have significant benefits to human health and wellbeing, 
but need not fatally compromise the autonomy, the nature, the embodied 
status or the imago Dei of the human being, from a perspective of 
theological ethics. With this kind of ethical approach to the evaluation of 
transhumanist technologies, both the church and society will be truly 
prepared for the enhancement revolution, which will bring more profound 
change to human society and will be more far-reaching than the therapeutic 
revolution. 
In this thesis, I have demonstrated how review of previous therapeutic 
developments can inform an ethical evaluation of proposed future 
transhumanist biomedical technologies. Acceptability of a biomedical 
technology from a perspective of Christian ethics can be established using 
an analysis of the technology according to the domains of autonomy, nature, 
embodiment and the imago Dei. According to this analysis, some proposed 
future transhumanist technologies will be found to be acceptable ethically, 
even if they are unfamiliar culturally. If this is the case, then these 
transhumanist technologies may be as beneficial for the alleviation of human 
suffering as some previous therapeutic technologies from the “therapeutic 
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